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0 SUMMARY 
In  Chapter  II  place  Marqah  within  the  context  of 
Samaritan  history,  and  say  how  this  thesis  has  a  bearing 
on  the  question  of  the  dating  of  Marqah,  whom  I  place 
in  the  4th  century  C.  E.  in  the  period  of  Daba  Rabba. 
I  then  describe  the  Atemar  in  very  general  terms, 
referring  especially  to  the  diversity  of  elements 
which  enter  into  its  construction,  and  to  the  unity  of 
the  work,  which  I  attribute  in  part  to  the 
pervasiveness  of  Marqah's  method  of  Pentateuchal 
warrant.  I  claim  that  the  Memar  contains  an  extensive 
philosophical  system,  though  not  a  system  systematically 
presented,  and  that  Marqah's  philosophical  ideas  are 
to  be  found  in  the  writings  of  other,  Hellenic  and 
Hellenistic  philosophers.  I  propose  to  expound  the 
philosophical  system  of  the  bierrar  and  to  display  the 
coincidence  of  Marqah's  philosophical  ideas  with  those 
of  other  philosophers,  especially  Philo  Judaeus. 
In  Chapter  II  1  examine  Nargahts  cosmological 
argument  for  the  existence  of  God,  and  show  that  both 
i 
has  argument  and  the  details  of  his  exposition  mirror 
the  writings  of  earlier  philosophers.  Specia  attention 
is  paid  to  the  arguments  of  Plato,  Aristotlep  the  Stoics 
and  Philo.  Philo,  in  particular,  "was  shown  to  adopt  a 
position  very  similar  indeed  to  Margah's. ii 
In  Chapter  III  I  take  a  first  step  towards 
identifying'Margah's  account  of  God's  nature,  by 
expounding  his  conception  of  divine  oneness.  Margah 
regards  God  as  one,  both  in  the  sense  that  He  is  unique 
and  in  the  sense  that  He  lacks  internal  plurality.  I 
trace  this  conception  of  divine  oneness  back  throngh 
Philo  to  Aristotle.  Certain  implications  of  divine 
oneness  are  discussed,  namely,  the  spacelessness, 
timelessness  and  incorporeality  of  God,  and  Marqah's 
position  on  these  conceptions  is  shown  to  be  the  same  as 
those  of  earlier  philosophers. 
In  Chapter  IV  I  discuss,  with  special  reference  to 
Philo,  Marqah's  account  of  the  unknowability  of  God. 
His  account  is  based  conceptually  on  his  conception  of 
God's  oneness.  I  show  how  passages  in  which  Marqah 
speaks  of  men  knowing  God  can  be  squared  with  his 
doctrine  of  God's  unknowability;  we  can  know  that  ; God 
is,  but  not  what  He  is.  On  this  matter  Margah's 
position  is  identical  with  Philos. 
In  Chapter  VI  discuss  Marqah's  apparent  inconsistency 
in  holding  both  that  God  is  internally  one  and  that  He 
has  many  attributes,  such  as  justice,  mercy,  knowledge 
and  power.  I  argue  that  all  these  attributes,  which  can 
be  regarded  as  the  powers  of  God,  are  God's  "properties" 
in  the  Aristotelian  logical  sense  of  the  term;  they  are 
not  part  of  God's  essence  but  belong  to  Him  by  virtue 
of  His  essence.  Various  characteristics  of  God's.  powers, 
and  the  question  of  the  knowability  of  those,  powers,  are iii 
discussed.  Philots  writings  are  frequently  referred  to 
since  they  shed  a  great  deal  of  light  on  the  teaching 
of  the  Memar  on  the  divine  powers.  On  this  topic  the 
positions  of  Philo  and  Marqah  are  almost  identical. 
In  Chapter  VI  I  c'iscuss  Marqah's  conception  of  God's 
personhood,  contrasting  his  position  with  Aristotle's 
and  showing  its  similarity  to  Philos.  Margah  speaks 
of  God  as  just,  merciful,  compassionate,  loving  and  so 
one  I  discuss  the  various  ways  in  which  Marqah's  position 
can  be  defended  against  the  charge  of  anthropomorphism, 
and  then  examine:  various  of  the  personal  qualities  Marqah 
attributes  to  God.  Special  attention  is  payed  to  the 
nature  of  divine  knowledge  and  of  the  divine  will.  It  is 
argued  that  Marqah  held  that  divine  knowledge  and  the 
divine  will  are  in  crucial  respects  wholly  unlike  human 
knowledge  and  will. 
Chapter  VII  deals  with  Marqah's  account  of  the  creation 
and  of  the  nature  of  the  created  world.  His  position  is 
contrasted  with  that  of  Hellenic  philosophers  from 
Thales  to  Aristotle,  who  either  ignore  the  possibility 
of  creation  ex  nihilo  (Thales  and  Anaximander)  or  reject 
its  possibility  (Aristotle),  Plato's  Timaeus  doctrine, 
involving  the  idea  of  the  demiurge  employing  a  model  in 
creating,  is  expounded,  and  it  is  suggested  that  Plato 
was  Marqah's  target  when  Marqah  attacks  the  idea  that 
God  used  a  model.  Marqah's  account  of  the  ac?  of 
creation,  seen  as  an  act  of  divine  will,  is  examined. 
His  acceptance  of  miracles  is  discussed,  and 
is 
squared 
with  his  idea  that  the  systematicity  of  the  iorld  testifies iv. 
to  the  oneness  of  God. 
Chapter  VIII  is  on  Margah's  teaching 
as"he  stands  in  relation  to  the  rest  of 
secondlyj'as  he  is  in  himself.  Marqah, 
man  as  the  final  cause  of  the  creation, 
Philo,  sees  man,  by  virtue  of  his  spiri 
on  man,  first  p 
creation,  and 
like  Philo,  sees 
and,  again  like 
tual  qualities, 
as  a  microcosmos.  A  detailed  examination  is  made  of  a 
number  of  Marqah's  psychological  terms,  and  it  is 
argued  that  Margah's  account  of  the  divisions  of  the 
soul  parallels  the  Aristotelian  account  of  practical. 
reason.  Finally,  I  argue  that  Marqah  taught  the 
doctrine  of  human  free  will. 
In  Chapter  IX  I  turn  to  a  consideration  of  man 
regarded  as  an  ethical  animal.  I  argue  that  Marqah's 
ethics  are  universalistic  in  nature,  and  discuss  this 
universalism  in  its  relation  to  Samaritan 
particularism.  Nargah's  conception  of  justice  is 
considered,  and  especially  his  claim  that  the  cognitive 
aspects  of'an  action  have  a  crucial  bearing  on  the 
question  of  its  meritoriousness.  Attention  is  next 
paid  to  Nargah's  account  of  weakness  of  will,  and  the 
consonance  of  that  account  with  Aristotle's  is 
established.  Next,  Margah's  theory  of  the  suffering 
righteous  is  examined;  I  argue  that  he  denies,  that  the 
righteous  do  suffer.  And  I  end  with  a  discus  ion  of 
Marqah's  teaching  on  the  relation  between  the;  motives 
of  fear  and  love.  In  connection  with  this  teaching 
certain  significant  parallels  with  Aristotleiare 
established. V 
In  the  final  chapter  I  present  three  general 
conclusions,  first,  that  underlying  the  Memar  is  a 
system  of  philosophy,  secondly,  that  that  system  is 
Hellenistic,  and  thirdly,  that  the  probability  is  that 
Marqah,  in  writing  the  Nemar,  was  drawing  upon 
philosophical  ideas  that  formed  part  of  the  cultural 
ethos  of  the  Samaritan  community. CONTENTS 
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INTRODUCTION 
Our  subject  is  the  philosophy,  till  now  totally 
neglected,  of 
Marqah's  very 
circles  it  is 
investigation 
purposes  need 
setting. 
the  Samaritan  thinker  Margah.  Since 
name  is  unknown  in  philosophical 
necessary  to  preface  our  philosophical 
with  an  account,  which  for  present 
only  be  brief,  of  Margah's  historical 
Samaritanism  and  Judaism  spring  from  a  common 
matrix  in  the  Israelite  religion.  It  has,  indeed, 
been  held  that  the  Samaritans  are  a  Jewish  sectl. 
But  though  describing  Samaritanism  as  a  separate 
religion  perhaps  overemphasises  its  independence 
from  Judaism,  the  identification  of  Samaritanism  as 
a  sect  of  Judaism  may  be  held  to  overemphasise  its 
2 
dependence  It  is  sufficient  for  us  to  note,  that 
""""o 
1,  M.  Gaster  The  Samaritans  D.  1 
2.  J.  Macdonald  The  Theology  of  the  Samaritans  R.  14 2 
Samaritans  and  Jews  have  shared  origins.  But  at  what 
point  did  the  two  groups  separate?  There  are  two 
conflicting  answers  to  this  question.  One  answer  is 
Samaritan  and  the  other  Judaist, 
According  to  the  Samaritan  account,  as  given  in 
the  second  of  the  seven  Samaritan  Chronicles  to  which 
we  must  turn  for  the  Samaritan  version  of  their 
history,  it  was  Eli  who  caused  the  schism  by 
establishing  at  Shiloh  a  sanctuary  intended  to 
replace  the  sanctuary  on  Mount  Gerizim.  Eli,  whose 
motive,  according  to  Chronicle  II  was  covetousness  of 
the  high  priesthood,  gained  supporters  who  formed 
the  nucleus  of  that  section  of  the  House  of  Israel 
through  which  modern  Judaism  traces  its  descent. 
The  Judaist  version  of  the  origin  of  the  schism  is 
familiar  from  II  Kings  17..  According  to  this  source, 
after  the  Assyrian  attack  on  the  northern  kingdom  of. 
Israel  in  722/1  the  citizens  were  exiled  and  a  new, 
heathen,  population,  from  other  parts  of  the 
Assyrian  empire,  was  brought  in.  The  syncretism  % 
produced  by  the  admixture  of  the  heathen  religions 
with  the  Yahwist  religion  of  the  remaining  citizens 
of  the  northern  kingdom  was,  according  to  the 
Judaist  account,  Samaritanism.  The  Samaritans, 
according  to  this  account,  are  therefore  not  true 
Israelites,  and  their  religion  is,  not  true  Yahwism. 3 
We  need  not  be  detained  here  by  the  question  of 
the  accuracy  of  these  two  accounts 
l.  But  whichever, 
if  either,  is  correct,  by  the  4th  century  BCE  the 
Samaritans  were  a  firmly  established  religious  group, 
N 
distinguished  (a)  by  the  site  of  their  Sanctuary, 
namely,  Mount  Gerizim,  not  Mount  Zion  in  Jerusalem, 
(b)  by  their  priesthood,  for  which  they  claimed  the 
true  Aaronic  mantle  of  succession,  and  (c)  by  their 
Pentateuch,  which  differed  at  numerous  points, 
sometimes  significantly,  often  not,  from  the  Judaist 
Pentateuch  which  subsequently  became  part  of  the 
Masoretic  Bible. 
Evidence  of  the  power  of  the  Samaritans  by  this 
period  is  revealed  by  the  strength  of  their  attempt, 
under  Sanballat,  to  prevent  the  Jews  under  Nehemiah 
rebuilding  the  Jerusalem  Temple.  Their  strength, 
however,  was  insufficient  to  prevent  John  Hyrkanus 
in  the  2nd  century  BCE  destroying  the  Samaritan 
Temple  and  capturing  Shechem,  the  Samaritans'  chief 
town. 
During  the  period  of  Roman  rule  the  Samaritans 
constituted  a  partially  autonomous  group  occupying 
about  one  third  of  Palestine,  in  the  area  between 
Judaea  and  Galilee.  Roman  rule  over  them  was  sometimes 
1.  See  M.  Gaster  The  Samaritans  p,  R.  8ff,  an 
J  "Nacdonald  The  Theolopy  of  the  Samaritans  , pp.  12  ff L. 
benign  and  sometimes  vicious.  But  the  period  was  on 
the  whole  one  of  development  and  consolidation  for 
the  Samaritans.  During  it  the  scene  was  set  for  an 
upsurge,  in  the  4th  century  CE,  of  religious  and 
\ 
literary  activity.  This  upsurge,  which  was 
masterminded  by  the  Samaritan  leader  Baba  Rabba, 
brought  to  the  fore  two  men.  One  was  Amram  Darah, 
whose  work  forms  an  important  part  of  the  Samaritan 
liturgy,  And  the  other  was  Marqah. 
The  chief  ground  for  the  claim  that  Marqah  lived 
in  the  4th  century  is  that  the  Samaritan  Chronicles 
assign  him  to  the  period  of  the  unquestionably 
4th  century  Baba  Rabba.  But  Professor  J.  Macdonald 
has  adduced  a  number  of  further  reasons  for  believing 
Marqah  to  have  lived  approximately  during  this 
period:  "..  The  use  of  Greek  words  (in  his  writings), 
the  Aramaized  Roman  names  of  Marqah's  family 
[Marqah 
=  Marcus,  Nanah  (his  son)  =  Nonus],  the, 
ideological  outlook,  the  midrashic  material,  the 
philosophical  and  scientific  passages,  the  language 
and  style,  and  ..  the  long  textual  tradition.  All 
this  is  in  addition  to  the  unmistakable  fact  that 
Marqah  does  not  betray  any  definite  signs  of  the 
Islamic  influence  so  prominent  in  later  Samaritanism. 
The  Samaritan  chronicles  themselves,  especially  from 
the  11th  century,  place  Marqah  and  Nanah  at 
about 
that 5 
time,  In  addition  there  is  the  fact  that  of  all  the 
hundreds  of  Samaritan  family  names  known  to  us,  only 
Margah,  Nanah  and  Tota  [=  Titus,  by  which  Margah  was 
also  known]  are  Roman"',  I  do  not  wish  here  to 
defend  or  dispute  the  assignment  of  Marqah  to  the 
period  of  Baba  Rabba.  But  since  I  argue  in  this 
thesis  that  Margah  developed  a  philosophical  system 
that  is  unmistakably  Hellenistic,  and  in  particular 
bears  a  striking  resemblance  to  the  Alexandrian 
Hellenism  of  Philo  Judaeus,  who  lived  in  the 
ist  century,  my  findings  have  a  bearing  on  the  question 
of  Marqah's  century.  If  Marqah's  philosophy  is  very 
similar  to  Philo's  there  are  fewer  problems  as  to 
why  this  should  be  so  if  Margah  lived  in  the  same 
period  as  Philo  than  there  would  be  if  he  lived  at  a 
much  later  time.  In  particular,  there  would  be  fewer 
problems  attaching  to  the  chronicles'  claim  that 
Margah  lived  in  Baba  Rabba's  period  than  there  would 
be  to  any  attempt  to  assign  Marqah  to  Islamic  times. 
Marqah  made  two  main  contributions  to  Samaritan 
literature.  One  was  straightforwardly  liturgical. 
A  number  of  his  prayers  and  hymns2  appear  in  the 
Defter  [= 
cicfPFPcY]  q  the  Samaritan  Book  of  Common 
"0""o 
1"  Memar  Margah  vol.  I,  Q.  xx 
2.  A.  Eo  Cowley  The  Samaritan  Liturgy  vol.  Il 
l 
e8p. 
PP.  16-33 6 
Prayer.  The  second  contribution  was  his  Memar 
[.  Teaching],  which  lies  closer  than  any  other  work 
except  the  Pentateuch  to  the  heart  of  Samaritanism. 
The  Nemar  is  written  in  Samaritan  Aramaic,  one  of 
the  two  main  branches  of  Palestinian  Aramaic.  This 
fact  causes  special  problems,  which  will  surface 
frequently  in  the  course  of  this  thesis.  For  Marqah 
was  grappling  with  philosophical  ideas,  in'a 
language  that  lacked  a  well-established  battery  of 
philosophical  jargon  such  as  was  available  to 
contemporary  philosophers  writing  in  Greek.  Perhaps, 
indeed,  the  true  surprise  in  all  this  lies  precisely 
in  the  fact  that  the  affinity  between  Marqah's 
philosophical  ideas  and  those  of  Philo  and  other 
Hellenic  and  Hellenistic  philosophers  is  so 
manifest.  I  will  be  arguing  that  other  Samaritans 
before  Margah  had  trodden  the  path'of  Hellenistic 
philosophy,  in  the  course  of  which  they  had  solved 
some  of  the  linguistic  difficulties  attached  to 
expressing  philosophical  ideas  in  Samaritan  Aramaic. 
The  Memar  is  hard  to  classify  because  of  the 
diversity  of  elements  that  enter  into  its  construction. 
It  is  not  just  a  work  of  religious  devotion,  though 
it  contains  many  prayers  and  hymns;  or  just  biblical 
exegesis,  though  it  contains  extensive  exegetical 
passages  on  the  life  of  Moses;  or  just  theolo 7 
though  it  has  a  good  deal  to  say  about  the  nature  of 
God;  or  just  philosophy,  though  there  is  philosophy 
on  every  page.  The  Memar  is  all  of  these  things. 
Yet  it  manages  not  to  present  the  appearance  of 
disjointness.  Its  unity,  though  not  easy  to  explain, 
is  undeniable.  Two  features,  however,  that  clearly 
have  a  good  deal  to  do  with  the  unity  that  the  work 
as  a  whole  displays  are,  first,  the  manifest  religious 
consciousness  of  its  author,  and,  secondly,  the  part 
played  by  the  Pentateuch.  As  we  shall  see,  even 
when  Marqah  seems  to  stray  far  from  the  Pentateuch 
he  always  brings  us  back  to  that  source  by  finding  in 
it  warrant  for  the  points  he  has  been  making.  The 
presentation  of  Pentateuchal  warrant  for  what  he  has 
to  say  constitutes  the  main  feature  of  Marqah's 
method. 
Although  Margah  achieves  a  unity  in  the  Memar,  the 
unity  is  not  of  such  a  kind  as  to  ensure  that  the 
elements  must  remain  inextricably  interwoven  even 
under  close  analytical  investigation.  For  although 
all  the  elements  sit  easily  together,  certain  of  them 
could  sit  equally  easily  apart.  In  particular  this 
seems  true  of  the  philosophical  element  in  the  Memar. 
And  this  fact  renders  the  topic  of  Marqah's 
philosophy  a  good  deal  more  amenable  to  exposition 
than  it  would  otherwise  have  been. 
0 8 
The  presence  of  a  philosophy.  in  the  Memar  naturally 
prompts  certain  questions.  Was  this  philosophy  worked 
out  by  Margah?  Or  was  it  a  peculiarly  Samaritan 
philosophy,  even  if  Margah  was  not'its  originator 
but  expositor?  Or  was  it  imported  into  Samaritan 
thought  -  and  if  imported,  then  from  where? 
Questions  of  this  sort  are  often  difficult  to  answer, 
and  particularly  so  with  regard  to  cases  like  the 
one  before  us  where  there  is  practically  no 
documentary  evidence  explicitly  stating  sources  of 
ideas.  Nevertheless,  on  the  basis  of  the  clues 
available  to  us  it  is  possible  to  formulate  a  very 
compelling  answer  to  the  problem  of  the  origin  of- 
Margah's  philosophy.  It  iss  of  course,  conceivable 
that  a  fully  fledged  philosophy  sprang  straight  from 
Margah's  mind,  owing  nothing  to  external  influences. 
But  in  the  face  of  certain  important  considerations 
this  hypothesis  can  be  seen  to  be  untenable. 
The  first  consideration  is  the  shortage  of 
examples  of  parallel  occurrences  of  philosophies  of 
the  complexity  and  subtlety  of  Marqah's  emerging  from 
anything  less  than  a  fairly  rich  philosophical 
tradition.  But  more  noteworthy  than  this  is  the 
extent  to  which  Margah's  philosophical  ideas  are  to  be 
found  in  other  writers  of  that  period  and  in  that 
part  of  the  world,  The  coincidence  of  Margah's 
ideas  with  those  of  other  thinkers  is  sufficiently 9 
great  to  warrant  the  belief-that  Marqah  was  not 
unfamiliar  with  a  set  of  ideas  that  were  part  of  the 
common  intellectual  currency  of  the  age.  It  would  not, 
indeed,  be  surprising  if  someone  with  the  intellectual 
liveliness  of  Margah  were  familiar,  even  in  Shechem, 
with  those  ideas.  For  Shechem,  as  a  city  on  the 
main  trading  routes  in  central  Palestine,  was  not  in 
the  least  an  isolated  provincial  village,  and  its 
ready  accessibility  would  permit  the  carriage  there 
of  ideas  as  well  as  material  goods. 
Even  if  the  method  we  employ,  in  establishing  the 
extent  to  which  Marqah's  Memar  is  an  expression  of  a 
cultural  ethos  in  which  he  participated,  is  to  display 
the  degree  to  which  his  ideas  were  also  those  of 
others,  this  would  not  serve  to  diminish  in  any  way 
Margah's  achievement  in  writing  the  Memar,  for  any 
great  work  iss  of  course,  substantially  an  expression 
of  a  cultural  ethos.  Margah's  achievement  lies  not 
so  much  in  the  origination  of  the  elements  out  of 
which  the  work  is  composed  as  in  the  quality  of  his 
synthesis  of  those  Elements.  I  will,  however,  be 
concerned,  not  with  the  overall  synthesis,  but  with 
the  philosophical  elements  that  form  part  of  the 
material  of  that  synthesis. 
This  mode  of  formulation  of  my  aim  gives  rise  to 
the  question  of  whether  the  philosophical  material  of 10 
the  Memar  is  a  synthetic  unity  or  not.  Now,  in  a 
sense  it  would  be  misleading  to  say  that  the 
philosophical  ideas  in  the  Memar  are  synthesised 
there.  For  as  presented  in  the  Nemar  the  philosophy 
is  unsystematic  and  unsustained.  Nevertheless,  I 
wish  to  argue  that  the  fragmentariness  of  the 
presentation  of  the  philosophical  material  serves 
merely  to  conceal  a  wide-ranging  system  of  philosophy. 
As  will  become  evident  from  the  diversity  of  Memar 
passages  I  quote  in  connection  with  any  one 
philosophical  problem,  Marqah  does  not  in  any  one 
place  have  a  full  discussion  of  any  one  philosophical 
problem.  The  only  way  to  deal  with  the  material  was 
to  collect  and  then  assemble  numerous  passages 
scattered  through  the  Memare  Only  after  organising 
the  widely  scattered  material  could  his  philosophy 
become  visible.  Margah  was  not,  after  all,  writing  a 
treatise  on  philosophy.  The  location  of  philosophical 
passages  in  the  Memar  is  determined,  not  in  the  least 
by  the  need  to  present  the  philosophy  in  a  systematic 
fashion,  but,  rather,  by  the  needs  of  the  Pentateuchal 
exegesis  which  substantially  structures  at  least  the 
first  five  of  the  six  books  forming  the  Atemar.  That 
is  to  say,  for  almost  the  entire  course  of  the  Memar 
Marqah  is  engaged  in  interpretation  of  the  Pentateuch. 
Frequently  in  the  course  of  his  interpretations  he 11 
finds  it  necessary  to  make  a  philosophical  point.  The 
order  of  presentation  of  the  philosophy  is  therefore 
determined  by  the  order  of  presentation  of  the 
Pentateuchal  exegesis.  What  I  have,  done  is  detach 
the  philosophy  -  which  proved  surprisingly  detachable  - 
from  the  exegesis,  and  allow  the  detached  fragments 
to  reshuffle  themselves  into  a  philosophically 
ordered  whole.  The  original  location  of  the 
fragments  could  not,  however,  be  ignored  in 
establishing  the  meaning  and  significance  of  the 
philosophical  passages.  Margah  philosophised  as  a 
way  of  illuminating  Biblical  verses.  To  a  certain 
extent  I  have  moved  in  the  opposite  direction,  since 
the  passages  Marqah  was  seeking  to  illuminate  could 
themselves  illuminate  the  exegesis.  Using,  therefore, 
the  clues  readily  available  in  the  text,  I  have 
watched  emerged  from  the  Memar  an  extensive 
philosophical  system.  It  is  to  the  exposition  of  this 
system  that  most  of  this  thesis  will  be  devoted' 
The  account,  given  in  the  previous  paragraph,  of 
the  relation  between  Nargah's  Pentateuchal  exegesis 
and  his  philosophy  could  also  serve  as  an  account  of 
the  relationship  between  the  Biblical  exegesis  and 
the  philosophy  in  the  works  of  Philo  of  Alexandria. 
For  Philo  also  was  primarily  concerned  with  Biblical 
exegesis,  and  wrote  his  philosophy  in  the  course-of 12 
illuminating  the  Biblical  texts.  Thus  for  Philo, 
no  less  than  for  Niargah,  the  order  of  the  philosophical 
exposition  was  dictated  by  exegetical,  not  by 
philosophical,  considerations. 
Marqah  and  Philo  are,  however,  similar  not  only 
with  respect  to  the  extent  to  which  the  order  of 
their  philosophical  exposition  is  determined  by 
Biblical  exegetical  requirements,  but  also,  and 
relatedly,  by  the  extent  to  which  they  regarded 
their  philosophical  doctrines  as  sanctioned  by  the 
Bible.  Neither  Marqah  nor  Philo  could  accept  a 
philosophical  doctrine  which  they  believed  to  be 
inconsistent  with  the  Bible.  What  is  remarkable, 
indeed,  is  the  amount  of  Greek  philosophy  that  iss 
if  Margah  and  Philo  are  right,  consistent  with  or 
even  contained  in  the  Pentateuch.  Some  words  should 
be  said  here  about  how  Philo  could  countenance  this 
measure  of  consonance.  How  Marqah  could  do  so  will 
be  discussed  at  a  later  stage. 
In  a  revealing  passage  Philo  asserts  that:  "It  is 
heaven  which  has  showered  philosophy  upon  us"'.  The 
metaphor  of"showering"  that  Philo  employs  indicates 
. 
by  its  association  with  rain  which  is  freely 
bestowed  on  earth  by  God,  that  philosophy  is  a  gift 
from  God.  But  since  the  Pentateuch  is  also  a  gift 
6"00o 
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from  God,  and  philosophy  deals  with  matter  expounded 
in  the  Pentateuch,  it  is  inevitable  that  philosophy 
should  enable  men  to  learn  by  the  aid  of  their  reason 
something  at  least  of  what  Jews  are  able  to 
discover  by  attending  to  the  contents  of  divine 
revelation.  Since,  in  other  words,  revelation  and 
reason  are  both  God's  gifts  to  men,  there  need  be 
nothing  worthy  of  surprise  in  the  fact  -  as  in  Philo's 
view  it  was  a  fact  -  that  reason  and  revelation  are 
mutually  consistent.  Margahts  position  on  this 
matter  iss  as  I  shall  argue  subsequently,  almost 
identical  to  Philos. 
It  must,  however,  be  admitted  that  Philo  on 
occasion  makes  reference  to  an  alternative,  and  more 
prosaic  (though  not  more  plausible)  explanation  of 
the  mptual  consistency  just  referred  to.  This 
latter  explanation  is  that  the  Greek  philosophers 
were  familiar  with  the  Pentateuch  and  gave  expression 
to`this  familiarity  in  their  writings.  Thus,  for 
example,  there  is  in  Greek  philosophy  a  theory  of 
opposites  according  to  which  everything  has  two  parts 
that  are  equal  and  opposite.  Philo  himself  espoused 
this  theory,  providing  as  his  proof  text  Ex.  xiv  21-2 
where.  it  is  said  that  Moses  divided  the  Red  Sýa  and 
that  the  Israelites  went  into  its  midst.  Having 
claimed  that  the  theory  of  opposites  is  visible,  to 14 
the  discerning  eye,  in  the  Pentateuch,  Philo  then 
states  that'Heracleitus  snatched  the  theory, 
1 
thief-like,  from  Noses 
Margah  may  or  may  not  have  agreed  with  Philo  that 
the  theory  of  opposites  was  snatched  by  Heracleitus 
from  Moses.  But  he  would  have  approved  fully  of 
Philo's  method,  well  exemplified  in  the  above  account, 
of  giving  his  philosophy,  as  a  matter  of  course,  a 
Pentateuchal  underpinning.  The  above  account  of  the 
relation  between  Ex.  xiv  21-2  and  the  theory  of 
opposites  can  also  be  read  as  an  example  of  Philots 
-allegorical  method.  For  Philo  is  presenting  the 
'inner  meaning'  of  the  assertion  that  Moses  divided 
the  Red  Sea  and  the  Israelites  went  into  its  midst. 
The  allegorical  method  of  philosophising,  which 
involves  presenting  philosophy  as  the  inner  meaning 
of  assertions  whose  'outer  meanings'  seem  wholly 
unphilosophical,  was  employed  extensively  by  Marqah,  and 
we  shall  meet  with  numerous  instances  from  the  Memar. 
To  a  considerable  degree  the  use  of  the  allegorical 
method  is  bound  up,  for  both  Philo  and  Marqah,  with 
their  reliance  on  Pentateuchal  warrant,  For  the 
Pentateuch  warrants  a  philosophical  position  to  the 
extent  that  the  position  is  present  explicitly  or 
implicitly  in  the  text.  The  allegorical  method,  in 
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the  hands  of  Philo  and  Margah,  involves  treating 
philosophy  as  if  it  were  present  in  the  Pentateuch 
as  the  hidden  meaning  of  verses,  and  revealing  the 
hidden  meaning. 
It  is  evident  from  this  that,  considered  from 
the  purely  methodological  point  of  view,  there  are 
wide-ranging  similarities  between  Philo  and  Margah. 
But,  as  I  hope  to  show,  the  similarities  are  more 
wide-ranging  still.  For  on  numerous  philosophical 
matters  the.  ideas  of  the  two  thinkers  coincide, 
and  even  their  modes  of  expression  often  bear, 
despite  language  differences,  an  undeniable 
similarity.  It  is  no  part  of  my  aim  here  to  Argue 
that  Marqah  had  read  Philo,  though  the  proposition 
that  he  had  done  would  notl'in  view  of  the 
similarities,  be  bizarre  -  particularly  in  view  of 
the  presence  in  Alexandria  of  a  large  Samaritan 
community,  who  no  doubt  maintained  close  links  with 
Shechem.  It  is  enough  for  my  purposes  if  I  give 
grounds  for  believing  that  the  cultural  ethos  of// 
the  Hellenistic  Jews  of  Alexandria  coincides  apt 
certain  crucial  points  with  the  cultural  ethos  of 
the  Samaritans  of  Shechem. 
The  two  main  parameters  in  this  shared  cultural 
ethos  are  the  Israelite  religion  and  Hellenism. 16 
The  claim  that  riargah  participated  in  such  an  ethos 
will  be  defended  in  the  following  chapters,  in  which 
the  Samaritan  Hellenistic  philosophy  of  the  Memar 
will  be  expounded  in  detail. 17 
CHAPTER  II 
THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD 
Proofs  for  the  existence  of  God  are  to  be  found  in  a 
number  of  philosophers  who  contributed  to  the  cultural  air 
Margah  breathed.  And  as  we  shall  see,  certain  of  their 
arguments  are  to  be  found  in  the  Memar  itself.  The 
arguments  in  question  are  not  beneath  the  surface  of  the 
Memar,  present  so  to  say  by  implication,  and  therefore 
visible  only  to  those  who  are  skilled  at  reading  between 
the  lines.  The  arguments  are  on  the  surface,  easily 
recognisable  for  what  they  are.  As  a  first  step  to 
establishing  the  extent  of  Marqah's  Hellenism  I  shall 
examine  his  arguments  for  the  existence  of  God,  by  setting 
alongside  quotations  from  the  Memar  certain  doctrines  and 
arguments  presented  by  Plato,  Aristotle,  the  Stoics  and 
Philo. 
In  the  Laws 
,X 
886a1  Plato  presents  an  argument 
for  God's  existence,  that  is  based  on  a  consideration 
of  "the  earth  and  the  sun  and  the  stars  and  the 
universe  and  the  fair  order  of  the  seasons  and  the 
division  of  them  into  years  and  months".  According  to 
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Plato's  view  of  the  world  it  is  not  merely  harmonious,  it 
is  the  most  beautiful  artifact  - 
`0  ev 
yäO  Ký  A,  ILc-res 
-rw￿ 
1  /14 
YEro￿o;  w  V-  and  consequently  must  be  understood  to  have 
C7/ 
the  finest  cause  - 
CO 
Jý  ayta'lO5  Tw￿  o  c.  wv  (Tim.  29  C,  D). 
The  language  Plato  employs  in  the  Laws  is  strikingly 
similar  to  that  said  by  Sextus  Empiricus  to  have  been  used 
by  Aristotle.  In  the  De  Philosophia  (1476a5-9)  as  quoted 
py  Sextus  (Adversus  Physicos  122)  Aristotle  claims  that 
ii 
/the  idea  men  entertained  of  God  is  due  to  "celestial 
phenomena,  for  when  they  beheld  the  sun  circling  round  in 
the  daytime,  and  by  night  the  orderly  motions  of  the  other 
stars,  they  supposed  some  god  to  be  the  cause  of  such 
motion  and  orderliness". 
The  design  argument  for  God's  existence  reappears 
shortly  after  among  the  Stoics,  according  to  Cicero's 
evidence  in  the  De  Natura  Deorum.  The  Stoics  were 
evidently  struck,  as  was  Plato,  with  the  beauty  of  nature 
and  spoke  eloquently  of  the  beauty  of  plants  and  trees, 
the  magnificence  of  crags  and  mountains  and  the  magnif- 
icent  canopy  of  the  heavens.  Surely,  they  argued,  only  a 
supremely  rational  being  could  have  been  their  cause. 
But  the  Stoics  used  logically  tougher  arguments  than  this 
to  establish  God's  existence. 
One  argument  attributed  to  the  Stoic  Chrysippus,  and 
showing  again.  the  Greek  tendency  to  peer  into  the  heavens 
for  evidence  of  the  divine,  is  the  following:  "If  there 
be  something  in  the  world  that  man's  mind  and  human 
reason,  strength  and  power  are  incapable  of  producing, 19 
that  which  produces  it  must  necessarily  be  superior  to 
man;  now  the  heavenly  bodies  and  all  those  things  that 
display  a  never-ending  regularity  cannot  be  created  by  man; 
therefore  that  which  creates  them  is  superior  to  man;  yet 
what  better  name  is  there  for  this  than  "god"?  Indeed,  if 
gods  do  not  exist,  what  can  there  be  in  the  universe 
superior  to  man?  For  he  alone  possesses  reason,  which  is 
the  most  excellent  thing  that  can  exist"  (De  Nat.  D.  II 
Ij 
/vii  16). 
'  Likewise  the  Stoic  Cleanthes,  turning  his  eyes  heaven- 
wards  for  evidence  of  God,  speaks  of:  "..  the  uniform 
motion  and  revolution  of  the  heavens,  and  the  varied 
groupings  and  ordered  beauty  of  the  sun,  moon  and  stars, 
the  very  sight  of  which  was  in  itself  enough  to  prove 
that  these  things  are  not  the  mere  effect  of  chance" 
(De  Nat.  D.  II  v  15).  The  reason  why  their  "mere  appear- 
ance"  would  lead  to  the  conclusion  Cleanthes  drew  is  that, 
for  Cleanthes  as  for  other  Stoics,  an  analogy  holds 
between  human  artifacts  and  the  cosmos.  For:  "When  a  man 
goes  into  a  house,  a  wrestling  school  or  a  public 
assembly  and  observes  in  all  that  goes  on  arrangement, 
regularity  and  system,  he  cannot  possibly  suppose  that 
these  things  come  about  without  a  cause",  and  "Far  more 
therefore  with  the  vast  movements  and  phases  of  the 
heavenly  bodies...  is  he  compelled  to  infer  that  these 
mighty  world-motions  are  regulated  by  some  Mind"  (ibid.. 
It  is  of  importance  for  Marqah  studies  to  note  that 
the  Stoics  did  not  consider  only  physical  nature  as  the 20 
basis  of  an,  argument  for  God's  existence,  The  inner 
world  of  the  spirit  was  also  brought  into  service  as  the 
basiijs  for  such  an  argument.  Marqah,  as  we  shall  see,  also 
made  this,  characteristically  Stoic  move.  The  Stoic  Zeno, 
for  example,  constructed  a  number  of  arguments  for  God's 
existence,  based  on  the  fact  of  the  existence  of  besouled 
beings  (men)  in  the  universe.  Thus,  he  argued:  "Nothing 
devoid  of  sensation  can  have  a  part  of  itself  that  is 
sentient;  but  the  world  has  parts  that  are  sentient; 
therefore  the  world  is  not  devoid  of  sensation"  (De  Nat.  D. 
II  viii  22).  Also:  "Nothing  that  is  inanimate  and 
irrational  can  give  birth  to  an  animate  and  rational 
being;  but  the  world  gives  birth  to  animate  and  rational 
beings;  therefore  the  world  is  animate  and  rational"(ibid.  ). 
To  grasp  the  significance  of  these  arguments  it  must  be 
recalled  that  the  Stoics  in  general  thought  of  God  as  the 
soul  of  the  cosmos.  Zeno  himself,  for  example,  is  report- 
ed  as  saying  that  since  God,  as  the  logos  of  the  universe, 
pervades  all  matter,  He  is  present  even  "in  ditches  and 
worms  and  workers  of  infamy"'.  The  various  arguments  of 
Zeno  that  have  just  been  quoted  are  not  indisputably 
valid.  The  point  being  made  however  is  that  Zeno  takes 
the  manifest  presence  of  besouled  beings  in  the  universe 
as  grounds  for  saying  that  God  exists.  Heroin  lies  the 
parallel,  or  rather  identity  with  Marqah. 
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Although  the  Stoics  and  Epicureans  disagreed  on  most 
matters,  they  were  alike  in  holding  that  testimony  to 
divine  existence  is  to  be  found  in  the  contents  of  the 
human  mind,  The  Epicureans  had  a  religion  of  a  sort,  and 
were  theists  of  a  sort,  though  the  nature  of  the  god  or 
gods  to  whose  existence  they  subscribed  is  by  no  means 
clear,  This  religious  aspect  of  the  Epicurean  system  sits 
uneasily  with  other  aspects.  For  Epicurus,  adapting  as 
/hedidq  with  very  little  emendation,  the  atomistic 
' 
doctrine  of  Democritus,  left  himself  with  no  room  to 
introduce  into  his  system  the  idea  of  divine  active  partic- 
ipation  in  the  cosmos.  Yet  he  found  it  necessary  to  admit 
the  existence  of  divine  beings.  His  proof,  as  were  the 
aforementioned  proofs  of  the  Stoics,  is  based  on  a 
consideration  of  the  contents  of  the  human  mind.  Accord- 
ing  to  Epicurus'  mental  philosophy,  any  mental  image  is 
produced  by  atoms  which  emanate  from  objects  and  which 
form  miniature  replicas  of  those  objects.  These  replicas 
enter  the  mind  and  there  cause  the  occurrence  of  a  mental 
image  of  the  object  from  which  the  replicas  emanate. 
Epicurus  accepted  that  men  have  mental  images  of  gods,  and 
consequently  had  to  accept  that  there  are  gods  whose 
miniature  replicas  cause  the  mental  images. 
It  iss  indeed,  part  of  Epicurus'  theory  that  the 
replicas  can  become  intermingled  as  they  travel  from 
object  to  person,  thus  leading  to  a  distortion  in  the 
resultant  mental  image.  Hence  Epicurus  is  willing  to  admit 
that  some  mental  'images,  say  of  a  centaur,  are  derived, i 
not  from  centaurs,  but  from  objects  which  conjointly 
possess  qualities  the  admixture  of  whose  emanating  miniat- 
ure  replicas  gives  rise  to  the  mental  image.  Hence, 
Epicurus  might  have  tried  to  avoid  the  conclusion  that 
gods  exist,  by  arguing  that  the  mental  images  of  gods  are 
distortions  of  external  objects,  just  as  are  the  mental 
images  of  centaurs.  Why  he  did  not  take  this  line,  and 
keep  his  cosmology  god-free,  is  uncertain.  It  has  been 
, 
conjectured 
that  the  clarity  and  persistence  of  the  mental 
/images 
of  gods  ruled  out,  for  Epicurus,  this  possibility 
l. 
But  however  we  resolve  this  difficulty,  the  fact  remains 
that  for  Epicurus,  no  less  than  for  the  Stoics,  sufficient 
testimony  to  divine  existence  is  to  be  found  by  turning, 
not  outwards  to  the  heavens,  but  inwards  to  the  human  soul. 
If,  as  I  hope  to  show,  the  Hellenic  and  Hellenistic 
ideas  just  expounded  are  philosophically  closely  allied 
to  the  Memar,  then  so  also  and  perhaps  to  an  even  greater 
degree  are  the  ideas  of  Philo  of  Alexandria.  One  argument 
Philo  employs  follows  the  pattern  of  several  given  earlier 
(and  of  one  employed  by  Marqah).  We  read:  "..  anyone 
entering  this  world  ...  and  beholding  the  sky  circling 
round  and  embracing  within  it  all  things,  and  planets  and 
fixed  stars  without  any  variation  moving  in  rhythmical 
harmony  and  with  advantage  to  the  whole,  and  earth  with 
"..,  e. 
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the  central  space  assigned  to  it...  will  surely  argue  that 
these  have  not  been  wrought  without  consummate  art,  but 
that  the  Maker  of  this  whole  universe  was  and  is  God. 
Those,  who  thus  base  their  reasoning  on  what  is  before 
their  eyes,  apprehend  God  by  means  of  a  shadow  cast, 
discerning  the  artificer  by  means  of  His  works"1. 
Elsewhere2  Philo  asks  whether  there  is  any  deity,  a 
a  question  which,  he  tells  us,  is  "necessitated  by  those 
who  practice  atheism,  the  worst  form  of  wickedness",  and 
he  answers:  "..  he  who  comes  to  the  truly  Great  City,  this 
world,  and  beholds  hills  and  plains...  the  yearly 
seasons  passing  into  each  other,  and  then  the  sun  and 
moon  ruling  the  day  and  night,  and  the  other  heavenly 
bodies  fixed  or  planetary  and  the  whole  firmament  revolv- 
ing  in  rhythmic  order,  must  he  not  naturally  or  rather 
necessarily  gain  the  conception  of  the  Maker  and  Father 
and  Ruler  also?  For  none  of  the  works  of  human  art  is 
self-made,  and  the  highest  art  and  knowledge  is  shewn  in 
this  universe,  so  that  surely  it  has  been  wrought  by  one 
of  excellent  knowledge  and  absolute  perfection.  In  this 
way  we  have  gained  the  conception  of  the  existence  of  God". 
In  these  two  formulations  of  the  design  argument,  Philo 
relies  on  an  application  to  the  cosmos  of  an  analogy  with 
human  artifacts.  Thus  we  ara  told  that:  "We  see  then  that 
any  piece  of  work  always  involves  the  knowledge  of  a 
"o""" 
1.  Lea.  All.  III  xxxii;  ef.  Praem.  VII  41. 
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workman.  Who  can  look  upon  statues  or  painting  without 
thinking  at  once  of  a  sculptor  or  painter?  Who  can  see 
clothes  or  ships  or  houses  without  getting  the  idea  of  a 
weaver  and  a  shipwright  and  a  housebuilder?  "l.  Likewise, 
who,  on  looking  at  the  orderliness  of  nature,  does  not  at 
once  form  an  idea  of  its  creator? 
Although  Philo  attaches  considerable  importance  to  the 
heavenly  phenomena  so  far  as  they  provide  data  on  which 
a  persuasive 
design  argument  can  be  based,  he  is  neverthe- 
less  anxious  to  make  the  point  that  a  consideration  of  the 
heavenly  bodies  can  be  seriously  misleading.  For  the 
unwise  may  misinterpret  the  evidence  in  such  a  way  as  to 
read  it  as  testimony  to  the  priority  in  the  universe,  not 
of  God,  but  of  the  heavenly  bodies  themselves.  It  is  with 
this  fear  in  mind  that  he  speaks  of  men  who  would  observe 
"the  circuits  of  sun  and  moon,  on  which  depend  summer  and 
winter  and  the  changes  of  spring  and  autumn,  and  would 
suppose  that  the  regular  movements  of  the  heavenly  bodies 
are  the  causes  of  all  things  that  year  by  year  come  forth 
and  are  produced  out  of  the  earth  ... 
[and]  who  owing 
either  to  shameless  audacity  or  to  overwhelming  ignorance 
should  venture  to  ascribe  the  first  place  to  any  created 
thing"  (Onif.  45-6).  Nevertheless,  despite  the  fact  that 
some  men  may  be  misled  by  the  evidence,  it  is  in  no  way 
part  of  Philo's  aim  to  discourage  men  from  considering  the 
heavens..  For  such  a  consideration  leads  to  philosophy, 
..... 
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and  frhilosophy  leads  us  closer  to  God.  Thus  Philo  asserts 
that)  "man's  faculty  of  vision,  led  upwards  by  light, 
discerned  the  nature  of  the  heavenly  bodies  and  their 
harmonious  movement  ... 
[and]  went  on  to  busy  itself  with 
questionings,  asking  What  is  the  essence  of  these  visible 
objects?  Are  they  in  nature  unoriginate?  ... 
It  was  out  of 
investigation  of  these  problems  that  philosophy  grew" 
(Opif.  54). 
-- 
Philo  had  further  arguments  for  God's  existence,  He* 
appears  to  have  held  that  however  strong  may  be  the  argu- 
ment  from  physical  nature,  the  one  taking  as  its  starting 
point  the  existence  of  mind  is  no  less  powerful.  This 
seems  the  most  natural  way  to  understand  the  position 
presented  in  the  following  passage,  which  Philo  puts  into 
the  mouth  of  Abraham:  "How  strange  it  is,  my  friends,  that 
you  have  been  suddenly  lifted  to  such  a  height  above  the 
earth  and  are  floating  there,  and,  leaving  the  lower  air 
beneath  you,  are  treading  the  ether  above,  thinking  to 
master  every  detail  respecting  the  movements  of  the  sun, 
and  of  the  circuits  of  the  moon,  and  of  the  glorious 
rhythmical  dances  of  the  other  constellations...  but 
explore  yourselves  only  and  your  own  nature...  for  by 
observing  the  conditions  prevailing  in  your  own  individual 
household,  the  element  that  is  master  in  it,  and  that  which 
is  in  subjection,  the  living  and  the  lifeless  element,  the 
rational  and  the  irrational,  the  immortal  and  the  mortal, 
the  better  and  the  worse,  you  will  gain  forthwith  a  sure- 
knowledge  of  God  and  of  His  works.  Your  reason  will  show 26 
you  that,  as  there  is  mind  in  you,  so  is  there  in  the 
universe,  and  that  as  your  mind  has  taken  upon  itself 
sovereign  control  of  all  that  is  in  you,.  and  brought  every 
part  into  subjection  to  itself,  so  too  He,  that  is  endued 
with  lordship  over  all,  guides  and  controls  the  universe 
by  the  law  and  right  of  an  absolute  sway"  (Misr.  XXXIII 
184-6). 
The  precise  logical  pattern  of  the  above  argument  is 
not  entirely  clear.  It  is  possible  that  the  argument  is  a 
design  argument,  where  the  designed  artifact  whose  exist- 
ence  is  to  be  explained  as  God's  handiwork  is  the  human 
mind.  This  could  be  thought  to  be  the  import  of  the  claim 
that  if  you  attend,  not  to  physical  nature  but  to  your 
self  "you  will  gain  forthwith  a  sure  knowledge  of  God". 
Such  a  res  creata,  Philo  seems  to  be  saying,  implies  a 
creator  divinus.  Yet  this  interpretation  ignores  the 
explicit  parallel  being  drawn  between  the  human  mind  as 
the  governor  of  the  body  and  God  as  the  governor  of  the 
cosmos.  The  parallel  would  suggest  that  Philo's  argument 
is  a  version  of  the  argument  from  analogy,  in  which  case 
the  argument  must  be  understood  to  be  to  the  effect  that 
it  is  evident  from  features  of  nature  that  something  must 
be  related  to  nature  as  the  human  soul  (or  a  part  of  it) 
is  related  to  the  rest  of  the  human  being.  If  this 
interpretation  is  correct  then  Philo's  argument  is  not 
quite  a  traditional  design  argument,  for  our  soul  is  not 
being  said  to  have  designed  the  non-rational  in  us;  nor  is 
it  being  concluded  that  the  cosmos  bears  marks  ;  of  design. 27 
The  point,  being  made,  rather,  '  is  that  an  insight  into  the 
nature  of  the  human  being  as  containing  a  relationship 
between  governor  and  governed  will  draw  us  to  the  conclus- 
ion  that  the  world  itself  shows  signs  of  being  governed 
(rather  than  designed,  and  hence  a  governor,  namely,  God, 
must  be  posited. 
Thus,  in  the  argument  under  examination,  Philo  employs 
the  concept  of  man  as  a  microcosm.  Elsewhere,  indeed,  Philo 
has  expressed  himself  more  explicitly  on  this  matter.  He 
speaks,  for  example,  of  those  who  "  have  ventured  to 
affirm  that  the  tiny  animal  man  is  equal  to  the  whole 
world,  because  each  consists  of  body  and  reasonable  soul, 
and  thus  they  declare  that  man  is  a  small  world  and 
alternatively  the  world  a  great  man"  (Heres  XXXI  155). 
Philo's  argument  thus  implies  an  injunction  to  investigate 
the  microcosm  (the  human  being)  as  a  means  to  establishing 
the  nature  of  the  macrocosm.  In  that  case  the  entire 
argument  would  seem  to  assume  that  man  is  the  macrocpsm 
writ  small, 
The  problem  of  Philo's  position  on  the  question  of  the 
extent  to  which  the  microcosm  (man)  mirrors  the  macrocosm 
deserves  careful  consideration,  since  it  will  emerge  that 
in  certain  fundamental  respects  Philo's  position  is  a 
good  deal  closer  to  Marqah's  than  it  is  to  the  Stoics'. 
In  particular  it  will  reveal  that  Philo  rejects  the 
standard  Stoic  position  on  the  relation  between  God  and 
the  universe  and  accepts  a  view  on  this  matter  very 
similar  to  one  found  in  the  Memar. 28 
In  dealing  with  this  question  concerning  the  relation 
between  on  the  one  hand  a  man's  soul  and  his  body,  and  on 
the  other  God'and  the  cosmos,  we  must  first  identify 
Philo's  position  regarding  the  relation  between  soul  and 
body  in  man.  In  the  De  Miiratione  Philo  discusses  the 
state  of  philosophic  contemplation.  In  such  a  state,  we 
learn,  the  mind  is  a  'migrant'  from  the  body.  Philo's 
employment  of  this  metaphor  arises  from  the  consideration 
that  if  the  mind  is  to  "arrive  at  a  proper  consideration 
of  the  living  God"  it  must,  in  some  sense  of  the  phrase, 
'leave  behind'  its  normally  attendant  body  and  travel  - 
migrate  -  unaided  by  physical  means,  to  its  goal.  Philo 
appears  to  mean  by  this  that  philosophical  contemplation 
must  be  done,  not  by  a  physical  faculty,  but  by  a  purely 
spiritual  one.  This  seems  the  most  natural  way  to  under- 
stand  the  following  passage:  "For  when  the  mind,  possess- 
ed  by  some  philosophic  principle,  is  drawn  by  it,  it 
follows  this,  and  needs  must  be  oblivious  of  other  things, 
of  all  the  concerns  of  the  cumbersome  body.  And  if  the 
senses  are  a  hindrance  to  the  exact  sight  of  the  spirit- 
ual  object,  those  who  find  happiness  in  beholding  are  at 
pains  to  crush  their  attack;  they  shut  their  eyes,  and 
stop  up  their  ears,  and  check  the  impulses  bred  by  their 
other  senses,  and  deem  it  well  to  spend  their  days  in 
solitude  and  darkness,  that  no  object  of  sense-perception 
may  bedim  the  eye  of  the  soul,  to  which  God  has  given  the 
power  to  see  things  spiritual"  (Misr.  XXXIV  191). 
But  it  might  be  argued  that  this  passage  serves  at  best 29 
to  show  that  the  mind  is  only  relatively  independent  of 
the  body.  For  even  if  it  is  allowed  that  the  objects  of 
the  intellect.  are  not  known  through  the  medium  of  the 
sensory  receptors,  there  remains  the  possibility  that  the 
'mental  receptor'  which  Philo  invokes  to  do  the  job  can 
function  only  in  a  body.  However,  it  will,  for  the 
present,  be  sufficient  to  recognise  that  Philo  argues  at 
length  in  favour  of  the  thesis  that  part  of  the  soul  -  the 
rational  part  -  is  incorruptible  and  therefore  immortal. 
Upon  the  corruption  of  the  body  in  which  the  rational  soul 
is  encased,  the  rational  soul  continues  to  exist  yet  with- 
out  an  attendant  body,  and  hence  must  be  independent  of 
the  body.  But  since  the  rational  soul  is  in  any  case 
incorruptible,  its  existence  could  never  have  been  depend- 
ent  on  the  existence  of  the  body.  Thus  it  follows  that  the 
soul  can,  at  any  stage  in  its  existence,  get  along  without 
the  body.  From  this  position  Philo  believes  himself 
entitled  to  draw  the  anti-Stoic  conclusion  that  God 
cannot  be  embodied  in  the  universe.  His  argument  is  as 
follows  (MiRr.  XXXV):  God  is  greater  than  the  human  mind 
in  that  mants  mind  did  not  create  his  body  but  God  did 
create  nature.  Hence,  if  it  is  a  sign  of  the  perfection 
of  mants  mind  that  it  is  possible  for  it  to  exist 
unembodied,  the  sign  of  God's  greater'  perfection  is  that 
He  is  necessarily,  and  not  merely  possibly,  unembodied. 
In  this  respect  the  human  microcosm  fails  to  mirror  the 
macrocosm. 
But  the  failure  does  not  undermine  the  argument  from 30 
analogy  for  God's  existence,  All  that  the  failure  does  is 
to  make  clear  that  the  God  whose  existence  is  established. 
is  not  the  God  of  the  Stoics.  To  what  degree  it  is  the 
God  of  the  Samaritans  remains  to  be  seen.  For  the 
remainder  of  this  chapter,  however,  I  wish  to  address 
myself  to  the  narrower  question  of  the  extent  to  which 
Marqah's  own  arguments  for  God's  existence  reflect  the 
Hellenic  and  Hellenistic  arguments  so  far  outlined. 
Several  of  the  arguments  expounded  above  fall  within 
the  category  of  design  arguments,  for  they  state  that 
there  are  in  the  world  things  bearing  such  marks  of 
design  as  entitle  us  to  conclude  that  without  the  activity. 
of  a  divine  designer  they  could  not  exist.  Not  one  of  the 
arguments  in  question  is  presented  by  its  author  in  the 
context  of  a  discussion  involving  the  question  of  what 
precisely  is  to  count  as  the  criterion  of  evidence  of 
design,  and  it  has  therefore  not  been  necessary  for  me  to 
raise  that  question  here.  But  certain  of  the  quoted 
authors,  while  not  discussing  the  criterion  of  evidence  of 
design,  at  least  discuss  design  so  far  as  it  is  classifi- 
able  under  different  headings.  The  Stoics  and  Philo 
discuss,  as  we  have  seen,  what  may  be  termed  "inner  design" 
(or  design  in  the  spiritual  world)  and  "outer  design"  (or 
design  in  the  physical  world).  Marqah,  also,  presents 
arguments  for  God's  existence,  and  his  arguments  also  are 
design  arguments,  and  furthermore,  he  deals  with  both 
inner  and  outer  design.  But  not  only  is  Marqah  in  step 
with  the  aforementioned  philosophers  with  respect  to  these 31 
schematic  features  of  his  thought.  As-we  shall  now  see  he 
is  also  in  step  with  respect-to  the  details  with  which  he 
gives  substance  to  his  schema. 
Margah  opens  the  sixth  Book  of  the  Memar  with  a  command 
to  the  reader:  "Magnify  Him  and  praise  His  power  over  the 
manifold  creations",  The  manifold  creations  stand  in  a 
dual  relationship  to  God.  First,  they  are  related  to  God 
as  effect  to  cause.  Secondly,  and  precisely  because  they 
are  effects  of  God,  they  bear  witness  to  God  as  their 
cause.  As  artifacts  the  manifold  creations  bear  the 
impress  of  their  artificer.  And  those  with  appropriate 
insight  can  successfully  scan  the  impress  in  created 
things.  for  clues  to  the  artificer.  More  basic  than  this, 
appropriate  insight  is  necessary  if  the  impress  of  the 
artificer  is  to  be  recognised  for  what  it  is,  namely,  a 
deliberate  impress.  A  person  lacking  the  appropriate 
intellectual  qualities  would  entirely  fail  to  realise  that 
a  given  manufactured  object  is  an  artifact,  and  would 
indtead  take  it  to  be  something  existing  by  chance  or  by 
nature,  but  not  by  design. 
Marqah  held  that  the  world  of  the  senses  bears  marks 
of  design  that  are  so  obviously  marks  of  design  that  the 
physical  world  must  be  an  artifact;  and,  such  a  world,  if 
manufactured,  could  have  been  created  . only  by  God.  Thüs, 
in  Nargah's  view,  physical  nature  enjoys  the  status  of 
God's  witness.  It  provides  us  with  testimony  to  God's 
existence.  Nature  itself  must  be  thought  of  as  a  testa- 
ment,  and  since  it  is  a  testament  to  God,  nature;  is  a  holy 32 
testament. 
Nature's  testimony  must  first  be  identified.  Nargah  is 
explicit  on  this  matter:  "He  created  ten  things  that  bear 
witness  to  His  might,  that  show  Him  to  be  great  and 
mighty:  the  period  of  light  and  the  period  of  darkness  - 
unalterable  witnesses!  And  the  four  seasons  which  He 
ordered  by  His  might,  which  lie  established  as  four  testi- 
monies,  and  thus  come  the  four  elements  which  make  what  is 
created  to  develop.  Observe  these  things  and  realise  that 
they  are  evidences  testifying  of  Him  that  He  is  one  in  His 
essence.  When  He  brought  into  being  light,  it  was  manifest 
to  the  whole  world.  He  ordered  it  in  His  greatness  and 
the  light  of  the  sun  was  produced  from  it,  and  also  that 
of  the  moon  and  all  the  stars.  So  He  willed  a  season  for 
the  light  and  a  season  for  the  darkness,  each  of  these 
according  to  order"'* 
That  this  statement  corresponds  very  closely  indeed  to 
previously  quoted  arguments  is  evident.  As  a  preface  to 
a  detailed  spelling  out 
ing  feature  of  Margah's 
was  for  him  no  accident 
design.  Both  from  the 
of  this  correspondence  the  follow- 
position  must  be  brought 
out: 
it 
that  the  world  bearsmarks  of 
statement  that  God  established  the 
four  seasons  as  four  testimonies  and  also  from  the  general 
tenor  of  the  passage  as  a  whole,  it  is  clear  that  Margäh 
believed  that  God  intended  the  marks  of  design  to  be  seen 
00000 
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to  be  such.  It  would  perhaps  be  straining  the  overt  mean- 
ing  of  the  passage  to  claim  that  it  asserts  the  view  that 
the  world  was  created  with  the  intention  of  securing  the 
didactic  goal  of  teaching  men  of  the  existence  of  God. 
Certainly,  such  a  view  of  the  purpose  of  the  existence  of 
the  universe  would  not  be  un-Samarifan.  For  it  is  found 
in  the  theological  hymns  of  Amram  Darah  who,  with  Marqah, 
was  the  chief  spokesman  of  Samaritan  theology  during  the 
Roman  period.  The  view  is  expressed  in  several  of  Amram's 
hymns  incorporated  in  the  Defter,  the  Samaritan  Book  of 
Common  Prayer.  Thus,  for  example,  he  writes:  "Thou  didst 
make  new  creations  in  time,  to  make  known  that  Thou  art 
pre-existent"'. 
The  various  aspects  of  the  natural  world  that  Marqah 
points  to  as  having  the  didactic  value  just  referred  to 
are  (i)  the  period  of  light  and  the  period  of  darkness, 
(ii)  the  four  seasons,  (iii)  the  four  elements  and  (iv) 
the  light  of  the  sun,  moon  and  stars.  All  these  aspects 
of  nature  are  referred  to  in  the  quotations  of  the  philo- 
sophers  that  were  given  earlier.  As  did  the  earlier 
Hellenic  and  Hellenistic  thinkers,  Marqah  found  testi- 
mony  to  God's  existence  by  turning  his  eyes  heavenwards, 
though  one  significant  difference  is  that  Margah'stresses 
that  testimony  to  God's  existence  resides  in  the  sun, 
moon  and  stars  primarily  so  far  as  they  are  bearers  of 
1.  "The  Theological  Hymns  of  Amram  Darah"  tr.  J.  Macdonald, 
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light,  whereas  the  earlier  philosophers  stressed  the  regul- 
arity  of  the  revolutions  of  the  heavenly  bodies  as  the  bas- 
is  of  their  status  as  witnesses  to  the  existence  of  God. 
Marqah's  preference  for  stressing  the  significance  of  the 
light  of  the  heavenly  bodies,  rather  than  the  regularity 
of  their  movement,  clearly  has  a  Pentateuchal  basis.  The 
first  words  of  God  were:  "Let  there  be  light".  And  Marqah, 
convinced  as  he  was  that  the  creation  bears  witness  to  the 
Creator,  would  naturally  also  be  convinced  that  the  first 
created  thing  in  particular  would  bear  such  witness  - 
hence  the  fact  that  in  listing  the  witnesses  to  God's 
existence  he  begins  by  mentioning  "the  period  of  light". 
And  in  mentioning  the  testimony  of  the  heavenly  bodies  he 
introduces  them  by  reminding  us  that  they  were  made  from 
that  very  primordial  light  with  which  the  process  of 
creation  was  begun. 
.  Nevertheless  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  say  that  the 
factors  of  uniformity  and  regularity  in  the  world  were  not 
thought  by  Marqah  to  have  significance  as  witnesses  to 
divine  existence.  For  in  referring  to  the  season  of 
light  and  the  season  of  darkness  as  God:  s  witnesse 
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Margah  speaks  of  them  as  existing  "according  to  order". 
The  periods  of  light  and  darkness  occur  according  to  the 
divine  arrangement  of  things.  Of  course,  the  only 
possible  arrangement  for  the  appearance  of  light  and 
darkness  is  an  alternation  of  the  two,  for  if  one  period 
of  light  is  followed  without  a  pause  by  another  period  of 
light  there  are  not  in  that  case  two  periods  of  light  but 35 
only  one.  -  Hence  Marqah's  reference  to  the  order  of  the 
two  periods  must  encompass  not  only  the  fact  of  their 
alternation,  but  also  the  length  of  the  two  alternatives. 
In  that  case  the  reference  is  to  the  balance  that  God 
maintains  between  light  and  darkness,  the  fact,  that  is, 
of  their  temporal  equality. 
Margah  further  shows  that  he  regards  the  orderliness  of 
nature  to  be  an  important  witness  to  God's  existence,  by 
his  reference  to  the  ordering  of  the  four  seasons  -a 
reference  that  is  typical,  as  has  been  shown,  of  Hellenic 
and  Hellenistic  thinkers.  Margah  does  indeed  say  at  one 
point  that  the  four  seasons  are  entirely  independent  of 
each  other  [I  131,  II  213],  but,  in  the  first  place,  indep- 
endent  or  not,  Marqah  stresses  the  fact  that  they  make 
their  appearance  according  to  a  regular  sequence,  and,  in 
the  second  place,  he  clearly  holds  that  the  four  seasons 
are  in  fact  a  good  deal  less  independent  of  each  other  than 
he  says  they  are.  For  he  sees  the  four  seasons  as  provid- 
ing  a  kind  of  structure  within  which  it  is  possible  to 
appreciate  the  orderliness  of  the  development  of  nature. 
The  first  season,  we  are  told,  is  like  a  good  mother 
giving  birth  to  children  and  having  compassion  on  them 
because  they  are  weak;  the  second  season  is  like  a  good 
father  bringing  up  his  children  in  well-being;  the  third 
season  is  the  one  in  which  what  happens  in  the  first  two 
is  brought  to  fruition;  while  in  the  fourth  there  occur 
the  developments  that  make  possible-the  processes  of 
birth,  nurture  and  fruition  that  characterise  the  other 36 
three  seasons.  This  way  of  describing  the  four  seasons 
implies  that  they  are  held  together  within  an  organic 
process  of  development  in  which  the  order  of  the  seasons 
must  be  regular,  for  it  is  what  occurs  in  each  season  that 
rgnders  the  next  season  possible.  Nurture  must  be  preced- 
ed  by  birth,  and  fruition  must  be  preceded  by  nurture; 
and  unless  the  ground  is  suitably  prepared  birth  cannot 
take  place.  Thus  Marqah  not  only  insists  on  the  regular 
sequential  nature  of  the  seasonsp  he  also  tells  us  why 
the  sequence  of  seasons  has  the  order  that  it  does  have. 
Not  only  is  there  regularity,  there  is  manifest  reason 
for  the  kind  of  regularity  there  is.  Nature,  as  it 
presents  itself  to  us  in  the  order  of  the  seasons,  bears 
the  stamp  of  rationality.  It  is  easy  to  see  how  a  person 
might  move  from  saying  that  to  saying  that  a  rational 
being  must  have  been  responsible  for  the  order  of  the 
seasons. 
In  the  writings  of  the  Stoics  and  Philo  we  found  the 
view  that  testimony  to  divine  existence  is  available  for 
discovery  no  less  in  evidence  acquired  through  introspect- 
ion  than  in  evidence  acquired  through  sensory  investigat- 
ion.  The  inner  world  as  well  as  the  outer  stands  as  a 
witness  to  the  existence  of  God.  In  several  places  in  the 
Nemar  Marqah  makes  the  same  point.  Thus,  for  example, 
after  referring  to  the  four  seasons  and  describing  the 
relations  between  them  (the  organic  development  of  each 
into  the  next  as  described  above),  he  writes:  "See  the 
order  of  these  four  and  realise  that  you  are  of,  necessity 37 
like  them.  Learn  from'these  and  make  your  mind  to  acquire 
illumination.  Observe  the  four  which  make  the  things  to 
be  created  to  develop,  and  realise  that  in  yourself  there 
are  important  evidences.  When  the  created  thing  is 
perfected  by  the  will  of  its  Creator  out  of  the  four 
elements,  He  brings  them  forth  by  His  power.  He  has 
created  four  divisions  in  you  (too),  so  that  you  may  exist 
and  be  developed  with  power"  [I  131,  II  214].  And  some 
lines  further  on  Marqah  adds:  "What  is  in  the  heavens  is 
in  the  heart,  just  as  what  is  in  the  earth  is  in  the 
imagination.  What  is  in  the  four  quarters  is  in  the  reason, 
just  as  what  is  in  any  place  is  in  every  inner  thought... 
From  His  creations  is  He  known;  from  what  He  has  made  is 
He  comprehended". 
In  both  quotations  the  point  is  being  made  that  the 
outer  world  and  inner  are  in  important  respects 
parallel;  or  even  identical.  The  same  thing  is  in  the 
heavens  and  the  heart,  in  the  four  quarters  and  the 
reason,  in  every  place  and  each  inner  thought.  One 
implication  of  this  view  is  that  if  the  heavens  and  the 
four  quarters  are  witnesses  to  God's  existence  then  so 
also  must  be  the  hear-L.  and  the  reason.  This  is  precisely 
the  move  that  Marqah  makes  in  the  first  of  the  two 
passages  just  quoted.  Parallel  to  the  four  seasons  are 
four  divisions  within  us.  The  four  seasons  are  witnesses 
to  God's  existence.  Hence  it  is  reasonable  to;  suppose 
that  the  four  divisions  within  us  are  likewise  witnesses 
to  God's  existence.  "The"four  divisions  are:  "desire  and 38 
idea  and  conscience  and  reason  hidden  deep  within  you  - 
fl  "r11  *Z`j7  pyl 
`)  "  This  important  state- 
ment  will  be  examined  in  chapter  VIII  on  the  human  soul. 
It  is,  however,.  apposite  at  this  stage  of  our  enquiry  to 
note  the  similarity  of  Marqah's  position  to  the  views  of 
earlier  philosophers.  Marqah  sees  human  reason  as 
providing  testimony  to  God's  existence;  since  man  can  reas- 
on,  he  is  telling  us,  God  must  exist.  This  is  exactly  the 
view  of  the  Stoic  Zeno,  for  Zeno  argued 
(see  Q.;  LO): 
"Nothing  that  is  inanimate  and  irrational  can  give  birth 
to  an  animate  and  rational  being;  but  the  world  gives 
birth  to  animate  and  rational  beings;  therefore  the  world 
is  animate  and  rational".  That  is  to  say,  given  the  Stoic 
position  on  the  relation  between  the  universe  and  God, 
since  rational  beings,  viz.  men,  exist  so  also  must  God. 
Nargah's  use  of  the  term  -.  1:,.  W1'7  thus  links  his  doctrine 
to  that  of  the  Stoics. 
His  use  of  the  term  J'.  J,  Y__  may,  though  perhaps  more 
i 
tentatively,  be  taken  to  link  his  doctrine  to  that  of 
Epicurus.  The  tentativeness  is  due  to  uncertainty  / 
concerning  the  precise  meaning  we  should  give  to  the  term 
"idea"  when  used  as  a*translation  of 
_1'JY  e 
Epicurus 
argued,  as  we  saw,  that  if  we  consider  the  contents  of* 
our  mind,  in  particular  the  ideas  we  have,  we  can  learn 
about  what  exists  outwith  the  mind,  for  the  mind  does  not 
have  the  power  to  generate  entirely  from  its  own  resources 
the  ideas  to  be  found  in  it.  In  general,.  if  we'have  an 39 
idea  of  an  X  thorn  is  an  X  of  which  we  have  an  idea.  And, 
specifically,  Epicurus  regards  our  idea  of  God  as  evidence 
for  the  existence  of  God.  Margah,  wo  now  learn,  regards 
our  11,  as  bearing  testimony  to  God's  existence.  Whothor, 
however#  he  regarded  any  idea  whatsoever  as  bearing  such 
testimony,  or  whether,  as  with  Epicurus,  he  meant 
specifically  that  our  idea  of  God  bears  such  testimony, 
cannot  be  determined  from  the  text. 
Nevertheless,  whatever  may  be  Margah's  precise  point  in 
using  the  term  py,  it  is  certain  that  he  waa,  at  least, 
invoking  1"1y  as  evidence  of  an  inward  nature  for  God's 
existence.  Philo  instructs  us  to  look  inward  in  order  to 
find  testimony  to  Godts  existences  "..  but  explore  your- 
solves  only  and  your  own  naturo...  for  by  observing  the 
conditions  provailing  in  your  own  individual  household... 
you  will  gain  forthwith  a  sure  knowledge  of  God  and  of 
His  works"  (lit 
.  XXXIII).  This,  it  is  now  npparontp  is 
precisely  the  position  that  Ilargnh  himself  adopts. 40 
CHAPTER  III 
THE  ONENESS  OF  GOD 
In  the  preceding  chapter  attention  was  focused  upon 
arguments  for  the  existence  of  God,  and  particularly  upon 
arguments  taking  as  their  starting  point  certain  features 
of  the  cosmos,  In  Book  VI  of  the  Memar  Marqah  affirms: 
"From  His  creations  is  He  known"  [I  132,  II  215].  This 
is  the  guiding  principle  of  his  arguments  for  God's 
existence;  but  the  dictum  was  intended  to  express  the 
doctrine  that  from  God's  creations  He  is  known,  not  only 
to  exist,  but  also  to  have  a  certain  nature.  In  this 
chapter  I  shall  take  a  first  step  towards  identifying 
Marqah's  account  of  the  divine  nature.  His  concept  of 
divine  oneness  will  be  used  as  a  starting  point  for  from 
it  all  Marqah's  leading  positions  regarding  the  nature  of 
God  will  be  seen  to  flow. 
The  concept  of  divine  oneness  has,  of  courser 
scriptural  warrant.  But  it  is  also  to  be  found 
In 
the 
writings  of  Mar4ahts  Hellenic  and  Hellenistic  philosophic- 
al  predecessors.  A  brief  consideration  of  these  earlier 
I 
writings  on  this  topic  will  be 
,  valuable.  both  as  a  means 
of  setting  the  general  cultural  scene  within  which  Margah 41 
played  his  part  and  also  as  a  means  of  illuminating  a 
number  of  important  conceptual  matters  whose  clarification 
will  enable  us  to  see  more  clearly  the  significance  of 
certain  of  Marqah's  teachings  on  Godts  oneness.  The 
philosophers  to  whom  I  shall  turn  are  Aristotle  and  Philo. 
There  is  in  Hellenic  philosophy  a  distinction  between 
two  concepts  of  "one".  The  two  are  marked  linguistically 
by  the  phrases  TO 
v 
and 
_.  _ö 
ocrrAov￿.  The  concepts 
corresponding  to  these  two  phrases  are  present  in 
Aristotle's  works.  In  an  important  passage  in  the 
Physics  227a9ff  Aristotle  discusses  the  concept  of 
"continuity".  A  thing  is  continuous  if  it  has  parts 
whose  contiguous  limits  are  contained  in  each  other;  it 
is  impossible  to  distinguish  between  the  boundary  of  one 
part  and  the  boundary  of  another  because  of  the  union 
they  form.  A  hand  is  in  this  sense  continuous  with  the 
wrist,  for  it  is  not  possible  to  distinguish  between  the 
line  that  marks  the  end  of  the  hand  closest  to  the  arm 
and  the  line  that  marks  the  end  of  the  wrist  at  the  lower 
extremity  of  the  arm.  The  one  line  marks  the  two  / 
boundaries,  which  is  to  say  that  the  two  boundaries  are 
really  one.  Thus  the-hand  and  the  wrist  form  a  contin- 
uous  union.  Nature  is  full  of  examples  of  continuityp" 
where  two  things  are  so  related  as  to  be  continuous  with 
each  other.  This  concept  of  "continuity"  provides  us 
with  the  basis  of  an  account  of  one  kind  of  "oneness". 
For  consider  any  two  things  related'by  continuity  to 
each  other.  "In  whatever  way  that  which  holds  them 42 
together  is  one",  Aristotle  writes,  "so  too  will  the  whole 
be  one,  e.  g.  by  a  rivet  or  glue  or  contact  or  organic 
union".  It  is  clear  from  this  that  Aristotle  is  willing 
to  accept  that  something  can  be  one  even  where,  on 
account  of  its  continuous  quality,  it  is  divisible  into 
a  multiplicity  of  parts.  But  if  it  is  admitted  that  one 
thing  may  contain  a  multiplicity,  then  what  point  is  made 
when  that  thing  is  said  to  be  one?  Aristotle,  operating 
with  the  idea  of  the  natural  number  series,  points  out 
[Physics  207b5ff]  that  the  series  has  at  its  start 
something  indivisible,  namely,  the  number  one,  which  is 
indivisible  in  the  sense  that  there  is  no  natural  number 
less  than  one  by  which  one  can  be  divided.  All  other 
numbers  are  successors  of  one  and  derivitives  of  it.  Thus 
two  is  derived  from  one  by  adding  one  to  one,  and  three 
is  derived  from  one  by  adding  one  to  one,  and  then  adding 
a  further  one  to  that  summation.  Hence,  if  we  are 
thinking  of  one  simply  as  the  base  number  in  the  natural 
number  series,  to  say  that  in  that  sense  something  is 
one,  is  to  deny  that  it  is  two  or  any  higher  natural 
number.  A  complex  object  is  one  in  the  sense  just 
outlined,  and  the  attribution  of  oneness  is  in  no  way 
contradicted  by  the  simultaneous  attribution  of  internal 
multiplicity.  I  shall  term  the  kind  of  oneness,  expounded 
above  "quantitative  oneness". 
There  is  a  second  concept  of  oneness  that  Aristotle 
expounds.  This  second  concept.  is  indeed  implicit  in  the 
above  discussion  of-what  I  have  termed  "quantitative 
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oneness",  and  for  reasons  which  will  quickly  emerge  I  shall 
term  the  second  concept  the  concept  of  "internal  oneness". 
Let  us  consider  again  Aristotle's  idea  that  in  the 
natural  number  series  every  member  of  the  series  is 
related  to  one  by  being  either  identical  with  one  (in 
which  case  it  is  the  first  member  of  the  series)  or  a 
derivitive  of  one  (in  which  case  it  is  expressible  as 
the  sum  of  a  set  of  ones).  In  such  a  conceptual  scheme 
each  natural  number  larger  than  one  can  be  thought  of  as 
complex  since  it  is  expressible  as  the  sum  of  a  series 
of  ones  -  it  is  rendered  complex  by  the  plurality  of 
ones  of  which  it  is  the  sum.  According  to  this  view 
each  natural  number  greater  than  one  must  be  thought  of 
as  a  short-hand  form  of  a  summation  of  ones.  But  the 
number  one  itself  is  not  in  this  sense  complex,  for  it 
is  not  expressible  as  the  sum  of  a  series  of  ones.  One 
itself  is  after  all  that  out  of  which  such  a  series  has 
to  be  constructed.  Or,  put  otherwise,  whereas  any  other 
natural  number  n  is  divisible  by  one  n  times,  and  hence 
1 
consists  of  n  elements,  one  is  itself  divisible  by  no 
natural  number  other  than  itself,  and  consequently 
it 
contains  only  itself  -  it  consists  of  one  one.  Thus 
Aristotle  is  forced  to  the  conclusion  that  the  number  one 
is  indivisible.  Since  in  the  respect  described  it  lacks  l 
parts,  the  number  one  is  simple.  Thus  we  arrive  at  the 
C.  n 
concept  of  one  as  _Q  an,  \ovv.  The  oneness  of  the  number 
00&0* 
1  Phys.  207b5;  Dleta.  1016b18. 
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one  is  what  I  shall  term  "internal  oneness". 
These  two  concepts  of  "one-ness"  are  relevant  to 
Aristotle's  theology,  for  the  Aristotelian  god  is  one, 
both  quantitatively  and  internally.  In  the  Physics  and 
the  MetaphysicsA  Aristotle  develops'the  concept  of  a 
being,  described  by  him  as  divine,  who  is  the  unmoved 
first  mover  of  the  world,  The  Aristotelian  god  is  a 
mover  in  the  way  in  which  an  object  of  desire  moves  the 
desirer,  that  is,  by  drawing  the  desirer  towards  it.  But 
whereas  other  objects  of  desire  need  not  move,  the  unmoved 
first  mover  is  immovable.  It  cannot  be  moved  by  an 
external  agency.  And  it  cannot  move  itself.  Aristotle 
appears  to  hold  that  nothing  moves  itself,  When  apparent 
self-motion  occurs  the  true  situation  is  better  described 
by  saying  either  that  an  unseen,  or  disregarded,  external 
agency  is  causing  motion,  or  that  one  part  of  the  moving 
thing  is  moving  another  part.  Certainly  Aristotle  did 
not  think  that  one  part  of  the  unmoved  first  mover  could 
move  another  part.  For,  first,  all  movement,  according 
to  Aristotle,  involves  an  actualisation  of  what  is  potent. 
ial.  But  Aristotle's  god  is  unmarred  by  any  potentiality; 
it  is  absolutely  actual,  and  hence  cannot  move  in 
any 
of 
its  parts.  Secondly,  it  in,  any  case  lacks  parts  since  it 
is  indivisible,  that  is,  internally  one 
(Phys.  267b25-6). 
Further  characterisations  of  the  Aristotelian  god  are 
deducible  from  the  foregoing.  Since  all  corporeal  things 
are  divisible,  it  follows  that  Aristotle's  god  is 
incorporeal;  and  being  incorporeal  it  is  also  spaceless. 45 
Furthermore,  it  is  the  doctrine  of  the-Physics  221b1  ff 
that  only  what  is  capable  of  motion  is  in  time. 
Aristotle's  god,  being,  as  we  saw,  immovable,  must  also 
r 
be  timeless.  Nothing  that  is  timeless  can  be  subject  to 
change,  since  change  can  occur  only  in  time.  Hence  - 
Aristotle's  god  is  also  immutable.  Aristotle  thus 
develops  the  idea  of  a  god  who  is  quantitatively  and 
internally  one,  and  who  is,  relatedly,  immutable, 
incorporeal,  spaceless  and  timeless. 
This  concept  of  the  deity  is  in  most  respects  very 
similar  to  Margah's,  for  as  we  shall  see  Marqah,  also, 
wishes  to  affirm  that  God  is  both  quantitatively  and 
internally  one,  and  to  deny  that  He  is  mutable,  corporeal, 
spatial  or  temporal.  The  sharp  divergence  of  positions 
occurs  at  the  point  where  the  suitability  of  God  as  a 
subject  of  human  worship  is  in  question,  for  unlike 
Margahts  God,  Aristotle's  is  wholly  unsuitable.  This 
becomes  clear  if  we  consider  the  question  of  what 
Aristotle's  god  does.  Since  he  is  incorporeal  he  cannot 
do  anything  physical.  He  can  engage  only  in  mental  or 
intellectual  activity,  and  furthermore,  only  in  that  kind 
of  intellectual  activ!.  ty  which  does  not  depend  on  matter. 
Since,  according  to  Aristotle,  imagination  depends  upon 
sensation  and  therefore  on  body,  god  cannot  engage  in 
imaginative  activity.  Also  he  cannot  engage  in'  the  kind 
of  thought  that  is  discursive  in  nature,  such  as 
syllogistic  reasoning;  for  discursive  thought  takes  time, 
and  god  is  not  in  time.  Thus  god's  intellectual  activity 46 
must  consist  of  non-discursive,  that  is,  intuitive 
thought.  Now,  it  is  a  central  doctrine  of  Aristotle's 
epistemology  that  the  mind,  in  knowing,  takes  on  the  form 
of  what  it  knows.  The  mind  and  the  object  it  knows  have 
the  same  form.  Hence  if  god  knew  something  marred  by 
potentiality  this  knowledge  would  sully  god's  absolute 
actuality.  Hence  god  can  know  only  what  is  absolutely 
actual.  But  only  god  is  absolutely  actual.  Hence  god 
can  know  only  himself.  Thus  we  arrive  at  the  concept  of 
god  as  self-thinking  thought  (A4eta.  A  9).  Since  we,  and 
the  world  we  inhabit,  are  in  motion  and  hence  in  a  state 
of  potentiality,  and  since  god  cannot  know  what  is  in 
such  a  state,  for  that  knowledge  would  render  him  less 
than  absolutely  actual,  we  and  the  world  cannot  be  known 
by  god.  Whether  or  not  god  can  be  an  object  of  our 
thoughts  we  cannot  be  an  object  of  his.  In  so  far  as 
prayer  is  intended,  minimally.,  as  a  vehicle  by  which  we 
communicate  with  god,  prayer  is  bound  to  fail,  for  god 
cannot  receive  prayers.  He  cannot-receive  a  prayer  unless 
it  becomes  an  object  of  his  thought.  But  the  only 
possible  object  of  his  thought  is  himself.  By  the  same 
token  he  cannot  answer  a  prayer  either.  For  any  answer 
is  a  response,  and  god  can  respond  only  to  himself  -  if 
indeed  it  makes  sense  to  say  he  can  do  even  that.  This 
god  is  clearly  very  different  from  the  God  whom  Margah 
regards  as  a  Being  we  should  approach  in  prayer  in  a  state 
of  utter  humility  and  the  profoundest  reverence. 
What  is  perhaps  most  remarkable  is  that  though  Marqah's 
God  and  Aristotle's  have  so  much  in  common  when  considered 47 
with  respect  to  what  may  be  termed  their  metaphysical 
qualities,  they  should  be  so  different  with  respect  to 
their  religious  qualities.  Indeed,  Aristotle's  god  has 
practically  nothing  to  do  with  the  God  to  whom  the 
religious  consciousness  reaches  out.  He  is  the  god  of 
the  philosopher  rather  than  the  God  of  the  religious  man. 
Marqah's  position,  as  compared  with  Aristotle's,  has  the 
merit  of  approximating  to  a  synthesis  of  the  two 
conceptions  of  the  deity,  since  he  attributes  to  God  many 
of  the  metaphysical  qualities  that  Aristotle  attributes, 
yet  does  so  in  such  a  manner  as  to  give  expression  at  the 
same  time  to  a  deeply  religious  consciousness. 
One  aspect  of  Aristotle's  account  of  god,  that  is  of 
considerable  importance  to  Marqah  studies,  is  the 
otherness  of  the  deity.  We  are  internally  complex,  god  is 
internally  simple;  we  are  many,  god  is  unique;  we  change, 
god  is  immutable;  we  are  corporeal,  god  is  incorporeal; 
we  are  spatial,  god  is  spaceless;  we  are  temporal,  god  is 
timeless,  Given  the  utter  otherness  of  Aristotle's  god, 
there  is  nothing  surprising  in  the  fact  that  this  god  is 
not  the  being  whom  the  religious  man  worships.  Yet 
perhaps  the  most  stri'l:  ing  aspect  of  Margah's  position  is 
his  unshakable  insistence  on  the  absolute-otherness  of 
God.  It  may  seem  that  he  is  being  unreasonable,  in  trying 
to  have  it  both  ways.  He  wishes  to  say  both  that  God  is 
absolutely  other  and  also  that  He  is  accessible  to  man, 
and  it  is  not  clear  that  he  is  entitled  to  saylboth 
things.. 
- 48 
I  wish  to  turn  now  from  a  consideration  of  Aristotle 
to  an  examination  of  Philo's  doctrine  of  the  oneness  of 
God.  Philo  recognised  two  kinds  of  oneness,  namely,  what 
I  have  termed  "quantitative"  and  "internal"  oneness. 
Nevertheless,  despite  the  Aristotelianism  of  the 
doctrine  that  god  is  quantitatively  and  internally  one, 
Philo's  concept  of  the  one  God  is  a  good  deal  more  in 
harmony  with  the  teaching  of  the  Neurar  than  with  the 
Physics.  To  prepare  the  ground  for  showing  the  similarity 
between  Philo  and  Marqah  on  this  matter,  certain  prefatory 
points  must  be  made  regarding  Philo's  position. 
Philo  places  the  greatest  possible  emphasis  on  the 
concept  of  the  oneness  of  God,  Like  Marqah,  he  provides 
two  kinds  of  warrant  for  belief  in  His  oneness,  namely, 
Pentateuchal  and  philosophical.  One  of  the  Pentateuchal 
proof  texts  to  which  he  refers'us  is  the  first  command- 
ment:  "I  am  the  Lord  your  God  who  brought  you  out  of 
Egypt,  out  of  the  land  of  slavery".  Philo  provides  the 
following  commentary:  "Let  us,  then,  engrave  deep  in  our 
i 
hearts  this  as  the  first  and  most  sacred  of  commandments, 
to  acknowledge  and  honour  one  God  Who  is  above  all, 
/and 
let  the  idea  that  gods  are  many  never  even  reach  the  ears 
of  the  man  whose  rule  of  life  is  to  seek  for  truth  in 
purity  and  guilelessness.  Hut...  all  who  give  worship  and 
service  to  sun  and  moon  and  the  whole  heaven  and  universe 
or  their  chief  parts  as  gods  most  undoubtedly  err"1. 
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One  point  that  emerges  from  this  quotation  is  that  Philo 
understands  the  first  commandment  to  be  a  declaration  of 
the  oneness  of  God  in  the  sense  of  oneness  that  we  have 
designated  "quantitative".  This  follows  from  the  fact 
that  Philo  regards  the  commandment  as  in  opposition  to 
polytheism.  A  second  point  that  emerges  is  that  Philo 
regarded  polytheism  as  dangerous  because  it  was  a 
seductive  doctrine.  The  wish  that  the  doctrine  should 
not  be  allowed  "even  to  reach  the  ears  of  the  man  whose 
rule  of  life  is  to  seek  for  truth"  'can  best  be  understood 
as  due  to  a  fear  that  polytheism  is  an  attractive  doctrine 
that  has  the  power  to  tempt  men  from  the  sincere  search 
for  truth.  Philo's  fear  is  the  greater  because  of  his 
accompanying  conviction  that  the  first  commandment, 
extolling  the  oneness  of  God,  is  of  all  commandments  the 
most  sacred.  For  from  this  it  follows  that  a  contrary 
doctrine  is  the  most  profane.  It  is  true  that  in  one 
place1  Philo  refers  to  atheism  as  the  "worst  form  of'wick- 
edness  -  Ii  atKc, 
wý__Tý  ￿ 
;  vý  Eý' 
c'T7￿ 
".  But  there  isi  no 
contradiction  here,  for  it  is  open  to  Philo  to  hol  dthat 
polytheism  and  atheism  are  equally  profane  doctrines. 
Indeed  it  is  open  to  him  to  hold  that  in  the  last 
analysis  polytheism  is  a  variety  of  atheism,  for  a 
believer  in  many  gods  must  deny  the  existence  of  the  one 
true  God.  But  if  a  polytheist  denies  that  God  exists  he 
is  to  that  extent  an  atheist. 
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Philo's  argument  for  the  claim  that  there  is  one  and 
only  one  God  is  based  on  a  consideration  of  a  parallel 
between  the  government  of  the  universe  and  of  cities. 
He  writes:  "..  we  must  first  lay  down  that  no  existing 
thing  is  of  equal  honour  to  God  and  that  there  is  only 
one  sovereign  and  ruler  and  king,  who  alone  may  direct 
and  dispose  of  all  things"  [Conf.  XXXIII  170].  He  then 
quotes  Homer  approvingly: 
"It  is  not  well  that  many  lords  should  rule; 
Be  there  but  one,  one  king"  (I1.  ii  204-5). 
and  comments  on  the  verse  that  it  "could  be  said  with 
more  justice  of  the  world  and  of  God  than  of  cities  and 
men.  For  being  one  it  must  needs  have  one  maker  and  one 
master". 
Philo  also  insists  that  God  is  one,  in  the  sense  that 
He  is  internally  one.  His  proof  text  is:  "It  is  not  good 
that  man  should  be  alone"  (Gene  ii  18).  Philo  argues 
that  the  verse  implies  that  it  is  good  for  God  to 
; 
bei. 
alone.  But  what  does  it  mean  to  say  that  God  is  alone? 
It  means  that:  "God  is  not  a  composite  being,  consisting 
of  many  parts,  nor  is  He  mixed  with  aught  else" 
/ 
i 
[Leg.  All.  II  1  2]. 
It  is  therefore  reasonable  to  hold  that  Philo  held 
that  God  is  one,  in  both  of  the  senses  expounded  by 
Aristotle.  There  are,  however,  further  Aristotelian 
aspects  to  Philo's  theology,  Philo's  God,  like 
Aristotle's,  is  immutable--  "unchangeableness  (:  C-a  TfEj;  cv) 
is  the  property  of  God"  [Leg,  All,  II  ix  333. 51 
Now,  change  can  occur  only  in  time.  But  it  is  a  central 
doctrine  of  Philo's  teaching  that  God  is  not  in  time: 
"For  the  Cause  of  all  is  not  in  the  thick  darkness,  nor 
locally  in  any  place  at  all,  but  high  above  both  place 
and  time"  [Post.  V  14],  Hence  God  cannot  change. 
Philo's  reason  for  denying  that  God  is  temporal  is  as 
follows:  God  created  the  world,  and  time  came  into 
existence  only  because  the  world  did.  But  God  does  not 
depend  upon  the  world  for  His  existefice,  for  otherwise 
the  world  would  be  at  least  coeval  with  God  if  not 
anterior  to  Him.  Hence  God  does  not  depend  upon  time 
for  His  existence  [Immut.  VI].  A  precisely  parallel 
argument  can  easily  be  constructed  to  establish  that  God 
is  also  spaceless.  And  from  this  last  consideration  it 
is  clear  that  Philo  is  committed  to  the  claim  that  God  is 
incorporeal. 
Thus;  Philo's  doctrine  on  the  nature  of  God  involves 
the  claims  that  God  is  unique,  internally  one,  immutable, 
incorporeal,  spaceless  and  timeless.  To  this  extent  the 
otherness  that  we  found  ourselves  committed  to  attributing 
to  Aristotle's  god  seems  no  less  appropriately 
attributable  to  Philo's  God,  and  to  this  extent  Philo's 
position  resembles  the  one  which,  as  we  shall  shortly  see, 
Marqah  later  adopted.  The  chief  point  at  which  Philo 
parts  company  with  Aristotle,  and  stays  in  the  company  of 
Marqah,  is  on  the  question  of  the  attributability  to  God 
of  personhood.  This  point  will  occupy  us  in  Cýapter  VI. 
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despite  his  insistence  on  the  absolute'  oneness  of  God,  on 
His  absolute  uniqueness  and  simplicity  Philo  none  the  less 
finds  himself  able  to  maintain  the  idea  of  God  as  a  being 
who  is  a  suitable  object  of  the  religious,  and  not  merely 
philosophical,  consciousness. 
Turning  now  to  the  4emar  we  shall  see  that  Nargah's 
doctrine  of  the  oneness  of  God  closely  resembles  those  of 
Aristotle  and  Philo.  That  Marqah  propounded  the  doctrine 
of  the  oneness  of  God  is  unquestionable.  Thus,  for 
example,  he  declares:  "Thanks  be  to  the  God  of  gods... 
Lord  of  oneness,  one  (=TI7x  iiJl  l}lT'ri'_  `14)  ..  without 
help,  without  associate,  without  a  second,  without  a 
companion,  without  any  connected  with  Him"  [I  131,  II  213]. 
Though  there  is  ample  Pentateuchal  warrant  for  the  doctrine 
that  God  is  one,  it  is  important  for  an  appreciation  of 
the  rational  content  of  the  Memar  to  recognise  that 
Marqah  does  not  rely  merely  on  Pentateuchal  proof  texts 
to  support  his  position,  for  he  believes  that  his 
position  is  a  reasonable  one.  After  referring  to  ten 
things,  namely,  the  periods  of  light  and  darkness,  the 
four  seasons  and  the  four  elements,  he  states:  "Observe 
these  things  and  realise  that  they  are  evidences 
testifying  of  Him  that  He  is  one  in  His  essence" 
[I  131,  II  213].  In  effect  Marqah  is  here  presenting  a 
design  argument  for  the  oneness  of  God.  Since  nature  is 
replete  with  orderliness  and  uniformity  it  possesses  a 
unitary  quality.  Such  unitariness  could  not  hale  been 
achieved,  Marqah  is  arguing,  if  the  natural  world  had 53 
been  created  by  many  beings.  Margah  is  not  arguing  that 
since  there  is  only  one  world  there  must  have  been  only 
one  creator.  His  point  is  that  the  systematicity  of  the 
world,  in  which  every  element  stands  in  an  orderly 
relation  to  every  other  element,  is  inexplicable  on  the 
assumption  of  a  multiplicity  of  creators. 
In  the  previous  chapter  reference  was  made  to  several 
passages  in  which  Marqah  makes  it  plain  that  he  regarded 
man  as  a  microcosm,  literally,  a  cosmos  in  miniature. 
Thus,  for  example,  he  writes:  "What  is  in  the  heavens  is 
in  the  heart,  just  as  what  is  in  the  earth  is  in  the 
imagination,  What  is  in  the  four  quarters  is  in  the 
reason,  just  as  what  is  in  any  place  is  in  every 
thought"  [I  132,  II  2151.  Hence  it  is  reasonable  to 
deduce  from  the  evidence  of  the  Memar  that  Marqah  would 
willingly  have  subscribed  to  the  doctrine  that  a 
consideration  of  the 
than  a  consideration 
nature,  would  reveal 
It  is  clear  from 
Book  VI  of  the  Memar 
inner  world  of  the  spirit,  no  less 
of  the  outer  world  of  physical 
evidence  of  the  oneness  of  God. 
the  way  Marqah,  at  the  start  of 
describes  God,  namely,  as  "without 
associate,  without  a  second,  without  a  companion,  without 
any  connected  with  Him"9  that  he  held  God  to  be  ones  at 
least  in  the  quantitative  sense  of  the  term.  There  are 
not  two  or  more  Gods,  there  is  only  one.  As  Margah  writes 
at  the  start  of  the  Memar:  "The  Lord  is  God  and  there  is 
none  besides  Him". 
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Marqah  also  subscribed  to  the  doctrine  of  divine  internal 
oneness.  Because  one  of  the  types  of  oneness  ascribed  by 
Marqah  to  God  is  the  internal  variety,  it  is  important  to 
recognise  the  preferability  of  avoiding  the  term  "unity" 
as  a  translation  of  Marqah's  common  term 
Unity  is  the  quality  of  unitedness.  Unitedness  is  a 
relationship  between  a  plurality  of  elements.  That  is  to 
say,  where  there  is  a  unity,  different  things  are  united 
to  each  other.  Whatever  is  internally  one,  however, 
lacks  a  plurality  of  parts.  Since  God  is  said  by  Marqah 
to  be  internally  one,  it  would  be  inaccurate  to  ascribe 
to  Nargah  the  view  that  God  is  a  unity.  Hence,  where 
Marqah  describes  God  as  . 
hiwT'n-1 
,  the  Aramaic  term  is 
better  translated  as"oneness". 
In  discussing  the  qualities  of  God,  in  relation  to 
Aristotelian  and  Philonic  doctrine,  we  showed  both  those 
philosophers  to  be  committed  to  the  view  that  God  is 
internally  one,  spaceless,  timeless,  incorporeal  and 
immutable.  These  qualities  are  not  independent  of  each 
others  for  internal  oneness  is  inconsistent  with 
spatiality,  temporality,  corporeality  and  mutability. 
Any  quantity  of  space  iss  theoretically,  divisible. 
However  small  may  be  an  envisaged  block  of  space,  it  is 
always  possible  to  specify  a  block  that  is  smaller  in 
size.  Because  space  is  thus  indefinitely  divisible  it 
is  possible  to  conceive  any  block  of  space  as  a  unity 
formed  from  smaller  blocks. 
_.  space  has  internal  plurality. 
Therefore,  any  block  of 
Hence,  internal  i 
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implies  spacelessness.  Now,  Marqah.  is  insistent  on  the 
spacelessness  of  God.  Thus  he  writes:  "He  has  no  place 
in  which  He  is  known  and  no  area  in  which  He  is 
recognised;  He  does  not  reside  in  a  place;  He  is  devoid 
of  any  locality"  [I  97,  II  161],  and:  "I.  even  I.  am  He, 
who  is  without  time  or  place"  [I  lll, 
II  187]. 
It  is  evident  from  several  passages  that  Marqah's 
reasons  for  holding  that  God  is  spaceless  is  the  same  as 
the  reason  which,  we  noted  earlier,  Philo  also  gave. 
Immediately  following  the  passage  just  quoted:  "He  is 
devoid  of  any  locality"g  Margah  writes:  "By  His  great 
power  He  created  all  places.  By  this  statement  Moses 
makes  known  that  He  has  no  place  where  He  can  be  sought". 
At  a  later  point  Marqah  adds:  "There  is  no  place  outside 
of  His  control;  all  places  He  made,  fashioned,  perfected, 
set  in  order,  made  ready.  He  supplied  their  needs" 
[I  132,  II  215].  The  argument  that  Marqah  is 
developing  in  these  passages  is  that  since  God  created 
space  He  cannot  Himself  occupy  space.  "He  made, 
fashioned,  perfected"  all  places.  But  he  did  not  make, 
fashion  and  perfect  Himself.  Hence  He  must  be  independ- 
ent  of  space. 
Just  as  spacelessness  is  implied  by  internal  oneness, 
so  also  is  timelessness.  For  any  period  of  time  iss 
theoretically,  divisible.  It  is  therefore  poss  ble  to 
conceive  any  period  of  time  as  a  unity  formed  from 
shorter  periods.  Hence  any  period  of  time  possesses 
internal 
-plurality., 
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timelessness.  When  Marqah  speaks,  as  he  does  repeatedly, 
of  the  eternity  of  God,  when  he  describes  Him  as  the  God 
"who  endures  forever"  [I  5,  II  3],  we  must  understand  him 
to  be  referring  to  Godts  timelessness. 
It  may  be  added  that  precisely  the  same  kind  of 
argument  as  the  one  Margah  employed  in  order  to  establish 
God's  spacelessness  can  also  be  used  to  prove  that  God 
exists  outside  time.  The  argument,  briefly,  is  that  since 
God  created  the  world,  and  in  so  doing  brought  time  into 
existence,  He  cannot  Himself  require  to  exist  in  time  as 
a  condition  of  existing  at  all.  And  since  temporality  is 
inessential  to  God  it  cannot  characterise  Him. 
Acceptance  of  God's  timelessness  carries  with  it, 
logically,  a  commitment  to  the  doctrine  of  divine 
immutability,  for  change  can  occur  only  in  time.  Nargah, 
working  within  the  bounds  of  his  conceptual  system, 
submits  to  the  logic  of.  his  qwn  position  and  accepts  the 
doctrine  of  divine  immutability.  Thus,,  he  writes: 
"Praised  be  the  everlasting  King  who  changes  (177Dý74 
i.  e.  causes  change)  but  is  not  changed"  [I  90,  II'1117]. 
And  similarly,  Marqah  writes  of  God  as  "the  living 
one 
who  does  not  die,  who  abides  unchangingly" 
[i  8,  II  8]. 
Acceptance  of  God's  spacelessness  carries  with  it, 
logically,  a  commitment  to  the  doctrine  of  divine 
incorporeality,  for  bodies  are,  by  definition,  extended 
in  space.  Since,  as  we  saw,  Marqah  subscribes  to  the 
doctrine  that  God  is  not  spatial,  it  need  therefore  come 
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to  the  doctrine  of-divine  incorporeality.  Indeed, 
Marqah's  denial  of  any  similarity  between  God  and 
created  things  permits  the  inference  that  he  was 
committed  to  the  doctrine  of  God's  incorporeality,  for 
ware  God  corporeal  He  would  be  similar  to  his  creations. 
The  far-reaching  epistemological  implications  of 
Marqah's  teaching  on  the  oneness  of  God  will  be 
explored  in  the  next  chapter. 
i 
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CHAPTER  IV 
THE  UNKNOWABILITY  OF  GOD 
For  the  religious  consciousness  Marqah's  position 
on  the  oneness  of  God  may  present  itself  as  an 
incipient  menaces  since  if  Marqah  is  correct  the 
cognitive  gap  between  ourselves  and  God  would  appear 
to  be  so  wide  as  to  render  its  bridgeability  by  our 
finite  minds  an  impossibility.  If  the  gap  is  indeed 
unbridgeable  this  has  very  large  consequences  for  the 
kinds  of  claim  that  we  might  otherwise  consider 
ourselves  entitled  to  make  concerning  Him.  If  we 
whittle  away  steadily  at  the  content  of  our  concept  of 
God,  and  therefore  at  the  kinds  of  things  we  can  claim 
to  know  about  Him,  the  process  may  gather  a  momentum 
that  spends  itself  only  at  the  point  where  there  is 
nothing  left  to  whittle  ate  at  the  point,  that  isp 
where  the  concept  has  lost  its  entire  content.  At  that 
point  what  is  at  stake  is  our  logical  right  to  claim  to 
know  that  God  exists,  for  if  there  is  nothing  we  can 
know  about  God  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  we  can  know 
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Margah  is'led  to  the  brink  of  a  description  of  God  that 
entirely,  lacks  positive  content.  There  is,  he  often 
seems  to  be  saying,  nothing  we  can  know  God  to  be.  But 
if  we  cannot  know  Him  to  be  A,  and  cannot  know  Him  to  be 
B,  and  cannot  know  Him  to  be  anything  else  either,  then 
there  is  nothing  that  we  can  know  Him  to  be.  Thus  a 
resolute  refusal  to  blemish  God's  oneness  by  giving  our 
concept  of  Him  a  positive  content  is  within  logical 
hailing  distance  of  a  thorough-going  agnosticism. 
Furthermore  it  is  a  short  step,  whether  or  not  we  are 
entitled  to  take  its  from  saying  that  there  is  nothing 
we  can  know  God  to  be  to  saying  that  we  can  know  Him  to 
be  nothing,  If  God  is  nothing  He  does  not  exist.  This 
position  is  less  agnostic  than  atheistic.  Yet  it  is 
difficult  to  avoid  the  impression  that  Marqah  is  within 
range  of  it.  Throughout  the  Memar  applications  of  the 
via  negativa  as  a  way  of  talking  about  God  are  present. 
Gods  we  are  told,  is  not  in  space,  He  is  not  in  time',  ' 
He  does  not  have  a  body,  He  does  not  have  parts.  '; 
This 
easy  employment  of  language  carries  with  it  the 
risk 
that  we  might  persuade  ourselves  that  sense  is  being 
talked  when  in  fact  it  is  not.  What  is  at  issue  here  is 
whether,  for  all  its  seeming  fulness,  the  description  of 
God  given  by  Marqah  makes  senses  whether,  that  iss  we 
can  form  a  concept  of  a  being  answering  to  the 
description  given  by  Marqah.  If  we  cannot  then  God  is 
unknowable,  and  if  He  is  unknowable  then  agnosticism  or 
-atheism  rather  than  theism  would-seem  to  be  amore  - 60 
appropriate  response  to  the  facts. 
In  view  of  these  considerations  it  is  surprising  that 
Marqah's  insistence  on  the  cognitive  remoteness  of  God 
is  linked  to  an  exuberant  religiosity.  Marqah  insists, 
first,  that  true  religiosity  must  be  based  on  a 
purified  concept  of  God,  and  then,  in  the  paradoxical 
style  of  the  mystic,  insists  that  recognition  of  God's 
utter  remoteness  provides  the  only  context  within  which 
an  approach  to  God  is  possible.  As  his  account  of  the 
matter  develops  it  emerges  that  the  paradoxical  air  of. 
Margah's  position  is  not  a  mere  decorative  overlay 
conferring  logical  respectability  on  a  position  that 
is  not  so  much  paradoxical  as  self-contradictory.  For, 
using  material  that  at  first  sight  seems  an  unpromising 
basis  for  constructing  a  logically  sound  picture,  Margah 
develops  a  religious  philosophy  surprisingly  free  of 
contradiction. 
Marqah's  doctrines  on  the  cognitive  relationship 
between  God  and  man  can  best  be  appreciated  when 
displayed  within  their  wider  cultural  context,  By  the 
time  Marqah  wrote  the  Memar  there  was  already  a 
substantial  literature  on  the  subject  of  the  knowability 
of  God,  In  particular,  Hellenic  and  Hellenistic 
speculation  presents  the  picture  of  the  gradual 
realisation  of  the  existence  and  seriousness  of  the 
problem.  The  earlier  part  of  this  chapter  will  be 
devoted  to  a  consideration  of  relevant  Hellenic  and 
Hellenistic  metaphysical  speculationss_starting  with  a 61 
brief  account  of  Aristotle's  epistemology  and  its 
applicability  to  the  question  of  whether  the  human  mind 
can  bridge  the  cognitive  gap  between  men'and  God.  This 
is  an  obvious  place  to  begin,  since  Aristotle's  own 
system  set  the  scene  within  which  much  future 
speculation  on  the  knowability  of  God  took  place,  and 
traces  of  Aristotelian  speculation  are  visible  in 
Marqah's  Memar.  Further  light  is  shed  on  the  Memar  by  a 
consideration  of  Philo's  doctrines  concerning  God's 
knowability.  Philo  deals  with  the  topic  more  explicitly 
and  more  fully  than  does  Aristotle,  though  Aristotelian 
thought  is  clearly  not  far  below  the  surface  of  Philo's 
writings  on  the  topic. 
Our  examination  of  Aristotle  and  Philo  will,  it  is 
hoped,  constitute  an  exposition  of  a  conceptual  framework 
that  will  serve  to  clarify  the  Memar's  position  on  divine 
knowability.  Such  light  as  Aristotle  and  Philo  shed  is 
particularly  welcome  in  this  field,  for  considerable 
difficulties  are  encountered  by  those  seeking  to  come  to 
grips  with  Nargah's  position  on  the  matter  under 
consideration. 
Aristotle  does  not  explicitly  raise  and  consider  the 
question  of  whether  or  not  God  is  knowable,  but  his 
theological  position  is  sufficiently  fully  worked  out  for 
us  to  be  able  to  conjecture  with  a  reasonable  degree  of 
assurance  that  had  he  addressed  himself  to  thislmatter  he 
would  have  been  drawn  to  the--position  that  God  s  not 62 
knowable.  As  a  first  step  towards  providing  a 
justification  for  this  conjecture  some  remarks  on 
Aristotle's  theory  of  knowledge  will  be  apposite. 
One  of  the  central  areas  in  epistemology  is  concerned 
with  the  question  of  how  knowledge  is  possible.  It  has 
seemed  to  many  philosophers  that  the'  possibility  of 
knowledge  requires  the  presence  of  an  element  shared  by 
knower  and  known.  Kant,  for  example,  held  that  what  the 
two  have  in  common  is  rationality.  The  knower  has 
rationality  in  that  he  has  a  faculty  of  reason,  and  the 
known  has  rationality  since  the  agent,  using  his  faculty 
of  reason,  has  imposed  a  rational  structure  on  the  object, 
thereby  rendering  it  knowable  to  him. 
Aristotle,  like  Kant,  insists  on  a  close  relation 
between  knower  and  known.  The  Aristotelian  doctrine  is 
that  the  thinking  part  of  the  soul  takes  into  itself  the 
form  of  the  object  of,  thought  and  becomes  identical  with 
it.  The  knower  knows  by  virtue  of  his  mind  assimilating 
itself  to  the  form  of  the  object  known.  Prior  to  knowing 
a  particular  knowable  object  the  mind  is  potentially 
identical  to  the  form  of  that  object.  But  everything  is 
a  possible  object  of  thought1.  Hence  the  mind  is 
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potentially  identical  with  the  form  of  everything,  for 
which  reason  Aristotle  refers  with  approval  to  he 
Platonic  conception  of  the  soul  as  being  the  'p  ace 
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of  forms  -  -rorrov  But  what  is  potentially 
anything  is  actually  nothing,  since  if  an  object  were 
actually  one.  thing  rather  than  another  this  would  prevent 
its  becoming  some  things  though  not  others  -  thus  an 
actual  block  of  wood  is  potentially  a  wooden  statue  but 
not  potentially  a  marble  statue. 
Thus  far  in  the  argument  it  would  seem  reasonable  to 
maintain  that  the  immense  difference  between  God  and  man, 
insisted  on  by  Margah,  is  implied  by  Aristotle  also,  for 
while  in  the  Metaphysics  1071b19  ff  Aristotle  argues  that 
God  is  pure  actuality  and  hence  is  potentially  nothing, 
in  the  De  Anima  III  4  he  argues  that  the  human  mind  is 
potentially  anything. 
It  might  seem  that  Aristotle  has  created  a  difficulty 
for  himself  by  insisting  that  the  part  of  the  soul  that 
thinks  is,  before  it  thinks,  actually  nothing.  For  since 
what  it  thinks  is  actually  something  the  difference  between 
knower  and  known  seems  too  great  to  bridge.  But  this. 
criticism  ignores  the  point  that  though,  prior  to  thought, 
the  mind  is  actually  nothing,  its  nature  is  to  be 
/' 
potentially  anything.  Hence  prior  to  knowing  an-object 
it  is  potentially  identical  to  it.  And  this  relation  of 
potential  identity  is  sufficiently  close  to  be  bridged 
by  knowledge. 
It  is  essential  to  the  Aristotelian  epistemology  that 
it  is  the  form  of  an  object  of  thought  that  is  identical 
1.  De  Anima  429a27 
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to  the  mind  of  the  thinker  while  he  is  actually  thinking 
the  object.  If  the  object  of  thought  is  a  composite  of 
matter  and  form  the  mind  of  the  thinker  does  not  become 
the  composite  object,  for  it  does  not  assimilate  the 
matter  of  the  object.  To  take  Aristotle's  example:  "It 
is  not  the  stone  that  is  present  in  the  soul  but  its 
form"'.  Not  everything,  however,  shares  with  stones  the 
feature  of  hylomorphic  composition.  As  Aristotle  reminds 
us:  "In  certain  cases  the  thing  and  its  form  are 
identical"2.  Since  in  knowing  something  the  mind  becomes 
identical  with  the  form  of  the  thing,  it  follows,  with 
regard  to  those  cases  where  the  object  has  form  but  lacks 
matter,  that  when  the  mind  knows  such  a  purely  formal 
object  it  becomes  identical  with  the  entire  object.  The 
thought  of  the  object  is  identical  with  the  object,  and 
both  are  identical  with  the  mind  of  the  thinker.  Now, 
the  Aristotelian  god  entirely  lacks  matter,  since 
whatever  has  matter  has  potentiality  and  god  lackst 
potentiality.  He  is  pure  actuality.  Consequently  if  he 
is  an  object  of  knowledge  the  knowing  mind  must  become 
identical  with  god.  This  clearly  follows  from  Aristotle's 
identification  of  knowing  with  a  kind  of  being.  There 
would  be  no  question  of  becoming  identical  only  with  the 
form  of  god,  and  remaining  distinct  from  his  matter  since, 
as  has  just  been  stated,  god  lacks  matter. 
1.  De  An.  431b30 
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If  we  accept  this  as  a  fair  statement  of  the  line  of 
thought  Aristotle  would  have  followed  on  the  matter  of 
god's  knowability,  given  his  account  in  the  De  Anima  of. 
the  nature  of  thought  and  his  account.  in  the  Metaphysics 
of  the  nature  of  god,  what  conclusion  can  we  draw 
concerning  the  attitude  Aristotle  would  have  adopted 
towards  the  doctrine  that  men  can  know  god? 
Aristotle  argues  in  several  places  that  we  cannot 
think  without  imagesl.  His  general  doctrine  is  that 
images,  the  product  of  T"VTac- 
., 
are  firmly  grounded 
in  sensation  in  that  they  are  constructions  from  the  data 
of  previous  sensations,  whether  as  waking  imaginings,  or 
as  recollections  or  dreams.  Since  the  Aristotelian  god 
is  not  available  for  sensory  inspection  it  might  seem 
that  an  image  of  god-necessarily  fails  to  correspond  to 
the  facts  about  god,  and  that  therefore  thought  about 
god  is  impossible.  But  this  line  will  not  quite  do  as 
it  stands.  For  Aristotle  holds  that  the  mind  thinks 
forms  in  the  images2.  To  take  a  stock  example,  the 
geometer  thinks  the  form  of  the  circle  in  the  circle  that 
he  has  drawn,  by  a  process  of  extrapolation  or 
abstraction  from  the  material  circle.  The  drawn  circle 
will  to  a  greater  or  lesser  degree  fail  to  correspond  to 
the  form  of  the  circle,  and  these  failings  are  abstracted 
1.  De  An.  427b14  ff,  43lal6,432a7  ff,  De  Mem.  449b31 
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from  the  drawing  before  the  geometer  describes  the 
circle  mathematically.  The  drawing  of  the  circle  is 
perhaps  a  necessary  aid  to  thought,  but  is  not  the 
object  of  thought  as  that  is  described  in  mathematical 
terms  by  the  geometer.  Likewise,  even  if  our  image  of 
god  fails  to  correspond  to  the  facts,  it  might  still 
be  considered  a  necessary  aid  to  thought  about  god,  for 
by  engaging  in  a  gradual  idealisation  of  our  image  of 
god  we  may  secure  an  insight  into  the  form  of  god,  just 
as  the  geometer's  insight  into  the  form  of  a  circle  may 
be  secured  by  way  of  a  gradual  idealisation  of  an 
admittedly  very  inaccurate  picture. 
But  if  we  have  an  insight  into  the  form  of  god  are  we 
not  then  god?  A  major  group  of  commentators, 
particularly  Alexander  and  Zabarella,  have  argued  that 
Aristotle  must,  for  the  sake  of  consistency,  concede  that 
part  of  the  soul  is  to  be  identified  with  god. 
Zabarella's  argument'  is  based  on  Aristotle's  distinction2 
between  passive  and  active  intellect.  Aristotle  writes: 
"since  in  every  class  of  things,  as  in  nature  as  a 
whole,  we  find  two  factors  involved,  (1)  a  matter  which 
is  potentially  all  the  particulars  included  in  the  class, 
(2)  a  cause  which  is  productive  in  the  sense  that  it 
makes  them  all  (the  latter  stands  to  the  former  as  e.  g. 
0.000. 
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an  art  to  its  material),  these  distinct  elements  must 
likewise  be  found  within  the  soul",  The  active  part  of 
the  soul,  the  part  that  makes,  is  described  by  Aristotle 
as  "separable  (--  5  What  "separable"  means  is 
quickly  made  clear,  for  Aristotle  goes  on  to  speak  of 
active  intellect  as  being  "set  free  from  its  conditions" 
and  as  being  "immortal  and  eternal".  It  is  evident  from 
this  that  the  active  intellect  does  not  depend  for  its 
existence  upon  matter.  Essentially  lacking  matter, 
active  intellect  is  pure  form.  But  there  remains  the 
question  "whether  we  have  to  suppose  one  such  substance 
or  more  than  one"2,  Aristotle  is  unsure  how  many  there 
are,  but  makes  it  clear  that  there  are  just  two  kinds, 
one  of  which  is  a  class  whose  sole  member  is  god.  The 
other  is  the  class  of  substances  that  cause  the 
motions  of  the  heavenly  spheres.  There  is  no  indication 
that  the  latter  substances  do  anything  other  than  cause 
those  motions,  and  in  particular  Aristotle  provides  no 
grounds  for  supposing  that  they  do  the  job  assigned  to 
the  active  intellect,  namely,  to  act  upon  the  passive 
intellect  in  such  a  way  as  to  bring  the  latter  from  a 
state  of  potential  knowledge  to  a  state  of  actual 
knowledge.  Consequently,  since  active  intellect!  is 
pure  form  and  the  only  two  kinds  of  pure  form  are  god 
and  the-intelligences  moving  the  heavenly  spher  s,  we 
"oooo 
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are  forced  to  identify  the  active  intellect  with  god. 
Thus  Zabarella. 
Now,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  Aristotle,  at  least 
in  the  De  Anima,  thought  of  the  passive  intellect  and 
l. 
the  active  intellect  as  two  parts  in  the  soul 
Admittedly  the  active  reason  is  "separable"  but  the 
very  fact  of  its  separability  indicates  that  at  some 
stage  it  is  conjoined  with  the  rest  of  the  soul.  This 
is  not  by  itself  reason  for  denying  the  identity  of  the 
active  reason  with  god,  for  the  active  intellect  when 
conjoined  with  the  rest  of  the  soul  could  be  identified 
with  god  in  his  immanent  aspect.  But  it  must  be  borne 
in  mind  that  an  identifying  task  of  the  active 
intellect  is  to  bring  the  passive  intellect  from  a 
state  of  potential  knowledge  to  a  state  of  actual 
knowledge.  A  plausible  explanation  of  how  it  succeeds 
in  performing  this  role  is  that  the  active  intellect 
knows  actually  what  the  passive  intellect  knows 
potentially-and  brings  the  passive  intellect's 
potential  knowledge  to  a  state  of  actuality.  In  so 
doing  it  structures  the  passive  intellect  in  accordance 
with  the  active  knowledge  of  the  active  intellec 
i 
t.  If 
this  account  of  the  activity  of  the  active  intellect 
is.  correct,  it  is  difficult  to  find  a  justifica  ion  for 
Zabarella's  claim  that  the  active  intellect  is-i.  dentical 
to  god,  For  this  account  of  the  active  intellect  is 
-- 
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radically  opposed  to  the  concept  of  god  developed  in 
the  Metaphysics  l074bl5-5a4,  where  it  is  argued  that  god 
is  entirely  absorbed  in  the  activity  of  thinking  about 
himself.  For  this  reason  it  seems  justifiable  to  hold 
that,  despite  certain  similarities  between  the  active 
intellect  and  god,  Aristotle  did  not  take  them  to  be 
identical  to  each  other. 
Aristotle's  doctrines,  therefore,  if  I  am  correct, 
lead  to  the  conclusion  that  men  cannot  know  god.  I  wish 
to  turn  now  to  the  question  of  whether  Philo's  doctrines 
lead  in  the  same  direction.  Philo's  teaching  on  this 
subject  will  be  seen  to  provide  an  important  link 
between  Aristotle  and  Marqah. 
Philo  raises  two  questions:  "One  is  whether  the  Deity 
exists..,  the  other  is  what  the  Deity  is  in  essence 
rwr 
c 
-r'v  o 
io-u 
v  The  first  question  "does  not 
need  much  labour".  Philo  asserts;  and  we  saw  in  Chapter 
Ii  how  he  answered  it.  But  he  pronounces  the  second  to 
be  "not  only  difficult,  but  perhaps  impossible  to 
solve".  It  is,  however,  Philots  more  frequently 
asserted  position  tha-.  the  determination  of  the  essence 
of  God  is  not"perhaps  impossible"  but,  rather, 
"impossible  simnliciter".  For  example,  in  one  place2 
Philo  considers  God's  command:  "See,  see  that  I  am" 
(Deut,  XXXII  39),  and,  concerned  lest  this  verse  be  so 
1.  Spec.  I  VI  32 
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misunderstood  as  to  be  interpreted  as  saying  "See  my 
essence"9  he  points  out  that  God  "does  not  say  'See 
me  (ýSCT& 
C;  ALrz' 
)1 
9  for  it  is  impossible  that  the  God 
who  IS  should  be  perceived  at  all  by  created  beings. 
What  He  says  is  'See  that  I  AM  (pT  c, 
e)'N  Ci 
￿ 
rTap5t￿) 
I.  For  that  is  'Behold  My  subsistence  (St  \ 
7 
it  is  quite  enough  for  a  man's  reasoning  faculty  to 
advance  as  far  as  to  learn  that  the  Cause  of  the 
Universe  is  and  subsists  (E  7't.  TF  kýcL 
C 
rtafAEL  ).  To  be 
anxious  to  continue  his  course  yet  further,  and  enquire 
about  essence  or  quality  in  God,  is  a  folly  fit  for  the 
world's  childhood", 
But  though  Philo  asserts  that  we  cannot  know  God's 
essence,  and  even  that  it  is  "a  vast  boon...  to  see 
precisely  this,  that  He  is  incapable  of  being  seen, 
he  equivocates  on  the  question  of  whether  men  should 
approach  as  closely  as  possible  this  unattainable 
i 
knowledge,  Thus,  when  discussing  the  miracle  of  the' 
burning  bush,  Philo  presents  a  characteristic 
interpretation  of  the  verse  "Come  no  nearer...  the  place 
where  you  are  standing  is  holy  ground"  (Ex.  III  5)ý% 
The  verse,  he  tells  us.,  is  to  be  understood  allegorically 
as  an  injunction  to  the  person  who  "becomes  a  seeker 
regarding  its  [the  universets]  Creator,  asking  of  what 
sort  this  Being  is  who  is  so  difficult  to  see,  so 
o6"0" 
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difficult  to  conjecture"'.  This  interpretation  of  the 
scriptural  verse  just  quoted  certainly  suggests  that  it 
is  Philo's  view  that  knowledge  of  God's  essence  is  not 
merely  unattainable  but  also  is  not  even  a  suitable 
object  of  search. 
But  on  the  other  hand  Philo  states  several  times 
that  though  the  divine  essence  is  not  intelligible  to 
men  we  should  not  on  that  account  be  deterred  from 
approximating  as  nearly  as  possible  to  an  intellectual 
grasp  of  it.  That  at  least  seems  the  most  obvious 
interpretation  of  the  following  passage:  "As  for  the 
divine  essence,  though  in  fact  it  is  hard  to  track  and 
hard  to  apprehend,  it  still  calls  for  all  the  enquiry 
possible.  For  nothing  is  better  than  to  search  for  the 
true  God,  even  if  the  discovery  of  Him  eludes,  human 
capacity,  since  the  very  wish  to  learn,  if  earnestly 
entertained,  produces  untold  joys  and  pleasures" 
2. 
And 
shortly  after  the  passage  just  quoted  he  underlines  the 
point  in  the  clearest  possible  way:  "...  though  the 
clear  vision  of  God  as  He  really  is  is  denied  us,  we 
ought  not  to  relinquish  the  quest.  For  the  very  seeking, 
even  without  finding,  is  felicity  in  itself"3. 
It  is  not  certain  which  way  of  reconciling  these  two 
opposed  viewpoints  would  be  truest  to  the  spirit  of 
00""9 
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Philo's  philosophy,  or  whether  indeed  we  are  not  simply 
faced  with  the  product  of  an  irreconcilable  conflict 
in  Philo's  mind.  One  solution,  which  has  the  merit  of 
harmonising  with  the  tenor  of  much  of  Philo's  writings 
on  the  topic  is  the  following:  the  search  for  insight 
into  the  essence  of  God  is  not  in  itself  to  be  praised 
or  condemned.  What  makes  the  difference  between  a 
commendable  and  a  condemnable  search  is  the  spirit  in 
which  the  search  is  undertaken.  The  search  for  God's 
essence  can  be  carried  out  in  a  spirit  of  arrogance  or 
of  reverential  humility.  An  arrogant  search  is  made 
when  the  seeker  believes  that  his  mind  is  sufficiently 
great  to  encompass  the  nature  of  the  Creator.  When 
Philo  opposes  the  search  for  an  understanding  of  God's 
nature  he  can  be  understood  as  condemning  any  search 
carried  out  in  the  haughty  belief  that  the  goal  is 
attainable.  Such  a  belief  Philo  would  regard  as 
irreverent  -  if  not  indeed  blasphemous. 
That  same  search  carried  out  in  a  spirit  of 
reverential  humility  dictated  by  the  seeker's  recognition 
of  the  inability  of  his  created  mind  to  gain  insight 
into  the  nature  of  the  Creator,  though  his  mind  can  at 
least  move  in  that  direction,  is  not  opposed  by  Philo. 
Certainly  Philo  accepts  the  idea  that  one  can  to  some 
small  extent  diminish  the  cognitive  gap  between  God  and 
man.  It  is  in  this  way  that  Philo  seeks  to  interpret 
Ex.  XXXIII  18  ff  where,  in  reply  toMoses'  "ShIw  me 
Thy  Glory".  God  asserts  "You  shall  see  My  back  but  My 73 
face  shall  not  be  seen"'.  In  seeing  God's  back  Moses 
approaches  as  closely  as  possible  to  a  view  of  God's 
face,  and  is  closer  to  such  a  view  than  he  would  be 
were  he  unable  to  see  even  His  back. 
But  why  should  God  s  face  not  be  visible  to  man? 
The  answer  can  best  be  given  by  reference  to  the 
Platonic  tradition  of  thought  and  expression  within 
which  Philo  was  working.  In  the  Allegory  of  the  Cave, 
in  the  Republic  ßk.  VII9  the  sun  is  described  by  Plato 
as  rendering  visible,  by  its  illuminative  power,  all 
things  in  the  perceptual  world.  What  is  potentially 
visible  to  the  eye  is  rendered  actually  visible  by  the 
presence  of  the  light  from  the  sun.  Likewise,  the  Form 
of  the  Good,  the  parallel  in  the  intellectual  world  to 
the  sun  in  the  physical  world,  can  be  understood  as 
having  the  function  of  shedding  on  intellectual  objects 
a  light  that  enables  the  mind  to  grasp  what  would 
otherwise  be  hidden  from  it.  In  his  discussion  of  the 
educational  development  of  those  groomed  for 
guardianship  in  the  ideal  state,  Plato  makes  it  clear 
that  by  the  end  of  their  training  they  would  be 
competent  to  do  the  intellectual  equivalent  of  looking 
directly  at  the  sun  without  their  eyesight  being 
.- 
destroyed  in  the  process.  The  guardians  are  able, 
that  is  to  say,  to  contemplate  the  Form  of  the  Good 
without  damaging  themselves. 
1.  See  e.  g.  Mut.  1579 74  11. 
Philo  regards  God  as  performing  a  similar  function 
to  Plato's  Form  of  the  Good,  at  least  to  the  extent 
that  God  also  can  be  regarded  as  a  counterpart  in  the 
intellectual  world  to  the  sun  in  the  physical  world. 
But  Philo  holds  that  the  intellectual  equivalent  of 
gazing  at  the  sun  is  impossible.  Thus  in  one  place  he 
writes:  "..  the  man  that  wishes  to  set  his  gaze  upon 
the  Supreme  Essence,  before  he  sees  Him  will  be  blinded 
by  the  rays  that  beam  forth  all  around  Him"'.  Thus 
we  are,  according  to  Philo,  unable  to  know  God's 
essence  because  even  when  the  human  mind's  potential 
is  fully  realised  God's  actuality  contains  more  than 
the  human  mind  can  cope  with,  just  as  the  human  eye  is 
unable  to  cope  with  the  brightness  of  the  sun  even 
though  the  eye's  potential  for  sight  is  actualised 
only  when  light  is  present.  Philo  indeed  wishes  to 
take  a  large  step  beyond  this  position,  for  he  holds 
that  it  is  not  only  the  human  mind  that  is  limited  in 
the  manner  just  described.  In  one  place  Philo  puts  into 
God's  mouth  the  words:  "..  the  apprehension  of  Me  is 
something  more  than  human  nature,  yea  even  the  whole 
heaven  and  universe  will  be  able  to  contain"2.  What 
this  passage  suggests  is  that  only  God  can  apprehend 
God,  and  hence  that  any  man  who  comprehends  Godi  must 
be  God.  And  Philo,  not  wishing  to  embrace  the  octrine 
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that  a  man  can  become  God,  is  thus  compelled  to  reject 
the  idea  that  God  is  comprehensible  by  man. 
If,  however,  Philo  bases  his  argument  for  the 
unknowability  of  God  solely  upon  an  alleged,  but 
undefended  parallel  between  God  and  the  sun  his 
position  would  not  be  firmly  established.  It  is, 
therefore,  important  to  note  that  there  is  available 
to  Philo  further  proof  of  the  unknowability  of  God. 
This  further  proof  is  based  on  arguments,  considered  in 
the  previous  chapter,  on  the  oneness  of  God.  As  we  saw 
there,  Philo  makes  it  clear  that  in  his  view  one  of  the 
ways  in  which  God  is  one  is  that  He  is  internally  ones 
that  iss  simple.  A  philosophical  consequence  of  this 
is  that  God  must  lack  attributes,  and  indeed  it  was 
observed  how  Philo  took  this  path  and  denied  that  God 
was  spatial  or  temporal  or,  consequently,  corporeal. 
But  if  nothing  is  attributable  to  God  He  must  lack  all 
qualities.  By  affirming  any  attribute  of  God  we 
implicitly  deny  His  simplicity;  for  we  imply  that;  He  is 
a  substance  with  attributes,  and  in  that  case  imply  His 
complexity.  Now,  the  essence  of  a  thing  is  that's,  t  of 
its  attributes  which  secure  for  it  membership  of  its 
species.  Hence,  whatever  lacks  attributes  has  no 
essence*  But  whatever  lacks  complexity  lacks  attributes. 
Hence,  God,  lacking  complexity,  has  no  essence.  Little 
wonder  that  He  is  unknowable.  Thus  all  that  we  can 
truly  say  of  God  is  that  He  exists..  If  we  insist, 
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could  say  of  God  is  that  His  essence  is  His  existence, 
for  He  has  nothing  else  that  we  can  affirm  of  Him.  Yet 
it  is  not  true  to  say  that  He  has  even  existence.  Rather 
it  must  be  said  that  He  is  existence.  This  is  the  line 
taken  by  medieval  philosophers  in  asserting  that  God's 
esse  and  essentia  are  identical.  But  this  is  to  strain 
the  meaning  of  essentia.  In  this  special  case  it  is  no 
longer  an  attribute,  because  normally  a  thing  is  said  to 
have  essentia  whereas  in  this  case  God  is  said  to  be 
His  essentia. 
Philo  seems  reluctant  to  be  drawn  into  saying  that 
God's  existence  is  His  essence,  but  his  position  is 
certainly  close  to  it,  if  indeed  it  does  not  amount  to 
that.  In  that  case,  is  Philo  not  open  to  the  criticism 
of  inconsistency?  For  on  the  one  hand  he  holds  that  we 
cannot  know  God's  essence,  and  on  the  other  hand  he 
seems  to  hold  that  in  knowing  that  God  exists  we  do, 
after  all,  know  His  essence,  The  textual  evidence, 
however,  suggests  that  Philo  would  not  yield  to  critical 
pressure  from  that  direction.  For,  as  we  observed,  what 
Philo  says  is  that  we  can  come  to  know,  not  God's 
existence,  but  rather  the  fact  that  He  exists.  This  is 
a  very  different  matter,  since  to  know  that  God  exists 
is  not  the  same  thing  as  to  have  a  direct  insight  into 
the  nature-of  God's  existence,  nor  does  it  imply  such 
an  insight  or  even  the  possibility  of  it.  The  insight 
may  be  unavailable  to  us  even  though  the  fact  itself  is 
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It  may  be  argued  against  P.  hilo  that  if  we  are 
unaquainted  with  God's  existence  we.  cannot  know  that 
God  existso  Surely,  it  might  be  said,  we  have  to 
encounter  God  in  order  to  understand  the  statement  that 
God  exists,  It  is  of  little  value  to  encounter  other 
existent  things  and,  having  understood  what  it  means  to 
say  that  they  exist  (whatever  that  does  mean),  then 
affirm  that  in  the  same  sense  of  "exist"  God  exists. 
For  God's  existence  is  not  the  existence  of  other 
things. 
This  argument  is  not  necessarily  opposed  to  the 
tenor  of  Philo's  position.  The  words  Philo  uses  are 
words  in  human  language  and  apply  very  well  to  human 
matters.  But  it  need  come  as  no  surprise  that  our 
language  reveals  its  limitations  when  made  to  serve  as 
an  instrument  for  discussing  the  divine.  Even  to 
ascribe  existence  to  God  may  involve  us  in  ai 
metaphorical  or  analogical  mode  of  expression. 
Nevertheless,  though  severe  strain  is  placed  upon 
human  language  when  it  is  employed  to  speak  about  God, 
it  does  not  follow  that  language  is  a  wholly 
worthless  instrument  for  communication  in  this  field. 
For  there  would  remain  point  to  saying  that  God  exists; 
in  some  sense  of  the  term  "exists".  For,  as  Philo 
insists,  the  whole  cosmos  bears  witness  to  the  existence 
of  a  Maker.  The  precise  manner  of  His  existence  may  be 
impossible  to  fathom,  and  therefore  impossible  intellig- 
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of  view,  this  much  at  least  must  be  said  out  of 
deference  to  the  quality  of  the  available  testimony: 
however  inadequate  may  be  the  human  claim  that  God  existsp 
the  claim  that  He  does  not  would  be  a  good  deal  more 
inadequate  still  -  for  it  would  be  entirely  false. 
A  further  point  deserves  stress  here.  Philo  has  a 
good  deal  of  sympathy  for  the  via  negativa.  A 
thorough-going  application  of  that  via  leads  to  the 
doctrine  that  God  does  not,  in  the  literal  sense  of  the 
term,  exist.  This  implication  of  the  via  negativ 
naturally  prompts  the  question  as  to  whether  God  can, 
so  to  says  survive  its  persistent  application.  Why 
does  it  not  lead  directly  to  atheism,  or  at  least 
agnosticism?  A  possible  answer  is  that  its  very 
application  presupposes  God's  existence.  For  we  must 
suppose,  minimally,  that  God  exists  if  we  are  to  be 
able  to  see  ourselves  as  entitled  to  deny  anything  of 
Him.  We  must  believe  that  God  exists  if  we  are  to 
believe  that  He  is  not  X'  whatever  X  may  be. 
Maintaining  firm  hold  of  the  foregoing  discussion  on 
Aristotle  and  Philo  on  the  unknowability  of  God,  I  wish 
to  turn  now  to  an  examination  of  Margah's  contribution  to 
the  topic.  We  have  already  observed  in  this  chapter 
that  the  Aristotelian  epistemology,  as  expounded  in 
the  De  Anima,  leads  to  the  doctrine  that  man  could 
not  know  god  without  becoming  him,  and  that  therefore  if 
it 
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we  assume  that  man  cannot  be  god  we  are  forced  to  the- 
conclusion  that  god  is  unknowable  by  men.  And  we  have 
also  observed  how  Philo,  relying  both  on  the  concept  of 
the  oneness  of  God  and  on  the  idea  of  an  analogy  between 
God  and  the  sun,  is  likewise  drawn  to  the  conclusion 
that  God  is  not  a  possible  object  of  human  cognition. 
Granted  what  we  have  already  tried  to  establish 
concerning  the  extent  to  which  Marqah's  general  and 
detailed  positions  on  the  proofs  of  God1s  existence  and 
on  the  nature  of  God's  oneness  are  in  harmony  with, 
indeed,  at  one  with,  earlier  Hellenic  and  Hellenistic 
positions  on  these  matters,  it  would  come  as  no 
surprise  to  discover  that  Marqah  is  willing  to  sanction 
the  doctrine  that  God  is  unknowable.  And  as  we  shall 
see,  numerous  passages  in  both  the  Memar  and  Marqah's 
Defter  hymns  do  suggest  that  Marqah  not  only  accepted 
the  doctrine  but  even  regarded  it  as'having  especial 
importance  -  as  indeed  it  would  be  bound  to  have  were 
it  true.  The  best  way  to  provide  a  setting  for  an 
analysis  of  Marqah's  views  on  God's  unknowability  is  to 
let  Margah  speak  for  himself.  This  will  not  provide  us 
with  all  the  hard  data  we  shall  need,  since  reference 
will  have  to  be  made  to  the  Hellenistic  cultural,  ethos 
of  which  Marqah  was  in  part  an  expression.  Reference 
to  the  cultural  ethos  will  clarify  Margah's  vie  s 
because  it  will  make  explicit  a  good  deal  that  Marqah 
took  for  granted  and  felt  no  need  to  formulate. 
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Margah  writes  persistently  of  the  invisibility  of 
God.  Thus,  for  example,  in  the  second  of  his  set  of 
twelve  hymns  in  the  Defter  he,  writes:  "Thou  seest 
everything  but  nothing  seest  Thee"  [v.  ii],  and  adds: 
"Thou  art  close  to  those  who  worship  Thee,  but 
invisible  to  them"  [x.  19].  In  the  third  hymn  he 
writes:  "Everything  trembles  at  Thee  -  of  whom  no 
appearance  is  seen"  [y.  ii],  and  in  similar  vein  in  the 
tenth  hymn  Marqah  affirms:  "He  sees  both  unseen  and 
seen,  yet  He  is  unseen,  for  He  is  unseeable  against 
the  divine  darkness"  [v.  16]0  This  same  doctrine  and 
mode  of  expression  are  also  present  in  the  Memar.  On 
the  first  page  of  that  work  we  are  told  of  God:  "He  is 
unseen  (`M)j7,  %  Xý7)".  And  somewhat  later  Marqah  adds: 
"He...  is  concealed  from  all.  He  is  never  observed" 
[I  89  II  9]0 
Now,  the  mode  of  expression  employed  by  Marqah  couldp 
if  considered  out  of  context,  give  the  impression  that 
what  he  is  concerned  to  affirm  is  that  God  is  invisible 
to  the  human  eye.  Certainly  there  is  every  reason  to 
suppose  that  Marqah  believed  God  to  be  invisible  to  the 
eye.  But  in  the  above  quotations  Marqah  is  making 
reference  to  a  second  kind  of  invisibility,  namely, 
invisibility  to  the  eye  of  the  soul.  Our  language  is 
studded  with  modes  of  expression  embodying  the  idea  that 
knowledge  or  understanding  is  a  kind  of  sight  what  is 
suggestively  denoted  in  English  by-the  term  "il-sight". 
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an  idea.  A  good  judgment  is  spoken  of  as  a  "sound 
observation"  ora  "shrewd  perception"p  or  as  "shedding 
light"  or  as  "illuminating".  This  dual  function  of 
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perception  terms  is  characteristic  not  only  of  English 
but  also  of  Aramaic.  For  example,  when  Marqah  refers  to 
Aaron  and  Moses  as  two  great  lights  who  will 
illumine  (11`1'JA  )  the  House  of  Israel  [I  10,  II  12]9 
he  must  be  understood  to  be  making  reference  to  a 
spiritual  or  intellectual  light  that  they,  prophet  and 
priest,  shed.  This  idea  of  things  being  made  visible 
to  the  spirit  or  intellect  is  even  more  clearly  present 
when  Marqah  speaks  of  God  as  "the  Illuminator  who  fills 
the  wise  with  the  spirit  of  wisdom,  so  that  they  are 
like  lamps  shining  in  the  world  and  dispelling  the 
dark"  [I  143,  II  236].  It  is  therefore  not  unreasonable 
to  hold  that  when  Marqah  speaks  of  God  as  unseen  it  is 
at  least  possible  that  the  point  he  is  concerned  to  make 
is  that  God  is  not  an  object  of  spiritual  or  intellectual 
cognition. 
Reinforcement  for  this  possibility  is  provided  by  a 
number  of  passages  in  the  Memar  where  Marqah  gives 
expression  to  the  doctrine  that  God  is  unknowable  by  the 
human  mind  and  not  merely  unknowable  by  means  of  the 
human  eye.  For  example,  Marqah  declaims  the 
rhetorical  question:  "Who  knows  how  He  is,  or 
understands  what  He  ist  or  knows  where  He  is  or  can 
reach  Him"  [I  106,  II  176].  The  same  rhetoric  l  vein 
asserts  itself  later  in  the  Memar  when  Marqah  "  7sks: 82 
"Who  can  estimate  what  He  is  or  know  how  He  is" 
[I  132,  II  215].  And,  to  take'one  further  example  of 
Margali's  expression  of  God's  unknowability,  he  writes: 
"Who  can  praise  Him  according  to  what  He  is  or  know 
what  He  is"  [I  90,  II  146]. 
One  possible  theological  position  is  that  God  cannot 
be  praised  according  to  His  essence,  because  human 
language  is  not  equipped  to  have  such  an  exalted 
function.  But  although  Aiargah  makes  it  clear  in  the 
sentence  just  quoted  that  he  holds  that  God  cannot  be 
praised  for  what  He  is,  he  does  not  base  his  position 
simply  on  the  inadequacy  of  human  language  for  the  task. 
For  he  straightaway  cites  as  his  reason  the  fact  that  man 
cannot  know  what  God  is.  Thus,  rather  than  impute  to 
Marqah  the  view  that  man's  praise  of  God  is  limited  by 
the  inadequacy  of  human  language,  it  would  accord  more 
with  text  to  ascribe  to  him  the  view  that  the  inadequacy 
of  human  language  as  a  vehicle  for  praising  God  is  due 
to  obstacles  in  the  way  of  human  knowledge  of  Him. 
Ultimately,  therefore,  it  is  the  cognitive  obstacles 
that  set  the  limit  on  mants  praise  of  God. 
If  Margahts  affirm2pions  quoted  above,  and 
numerous  others  in  the  same  vein,  were  all  that  he  had 
to  say  about  the  knowability  of  God,  there  would  be  no 
obstacle  to  attributing  to  him  the  view,  frequently 
affirmed  by  Philo,  and  readily  extrapolated  from 
Aristotle,  that  men  cannot  know  God.  However,  the 
overall  picture  exhibits  complications  that  prI  ent -,  -I  f 
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immediate  acceptance  of  the  account  just  proposed.  The 
complications  arise  from  the  fact  that  Marqah  often 
speaks  as  though  knowledge  of  God  is  available  to  us. 
In  view  of  the  doctrines  so  far  attributed  to  Marqah 
these  further  statements  by  Marqah  call  for 
investigation. 
Margah  writes:  "Israel  are  magnified  through 
knowledge  of  their  Lord  (;  "0:  17  ;  ýj  trail)"  [I  97,  II  160]  , 
and  adds  shortly  after,  as  if  to  stress  the 
availability  of  God  as  an  object  of  human  knowledge: 
"Wherever  He  is  sought  He  is  to  be  found"  [I  97,  II  161]. 
In  the  sixth  Book  of  the  Memar  Marqah  writes:  "Perfect 
state  of  knowledge  (,  U)1yT  J114'>117  )  means  knowing  ('T" 
that  the  Lord  is  God  and  that  there  is  none  besides 
Him"  [I  141,  II  213]. 
Of  course,  this  last  statement  is  not  decisive  in 
showing  that  Marqah  held  that  God  is  knowable  by  men, 
for  it  does  not  answer  the  crucial  question  of  whether 
perfect  knowledge,  as  defined  by  Marqah,  is  humanly 
attainable.  Nevertheless  the  answer  to  that  question 
does  seem  to  be  provided  when  we  are  told:  "He  has 
given  us  His  scripture,  and  honoured  us  with  knowledge 
of  Him...  how  could  we  let  ourselves  be  removed  from 
such  knowledge,  when  the  great  prophet  Moses  is  our 
teacher"  [I  136,  II  223].  This  last  quotation  suggests 
not  merely  that  knowledge  of  God  is-available  to  usl 
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but  that  we  actually  possess  it,  for  God  has  already  " 
"honoured  us  with  knowledge  of  Him".  And  if  weI  cease 84 
to  possess  that  knowledge,  or  do  not  reach  it,  we  are 
responsible  for  that,  since  we  have  "let  ourselves  be 
removed  from  it", 
From  the  evidence  thus  far  cited  it  might  be  thought 
that  Marqah's  teachings  on  the  knowability  of  God  can 
fairly  be  dismissed  as  contradictory.  But  I  would  like 
to  argue  that  the  apparent  contradictoriness  is  a 
surface  phenomenon  that  does  not  characterise  the 
conceptual  picture  that  Nargah  is  presenting.  He  can, 
with  some  justice,  be  accused  of  adopting  modes  of 
expression  that  are  liable  to  mislead.  But  even  such 
criticism  must  be  offered  with  a  very  light  touch,  for 
it  is  difficult  to  judge  whether  the  modes  of  expression 
that  can  be  misleading  to  us  would  have  misled  to  the 
same  extent  or  in  the  same  way  those  of  Marqah's 
contemporaries  for  whom  the  Memar  was  composed. 
A  strong  case  can  be  presented  for  the  claim  that 
Marqah  is  employing 
observed  in  Philo's 
God's  existence  and 
when  Diargah  affirms 
the  possibility  in 
the  distinction,  which  we  have  already 
writings,  between  knowledge  of 
knowledge  of  God's  essence.  And 
the  possibility  of  knowledge,;  of'God, 
question  is  of  knowledge  that  God 
exists.  When,  on  the  other  hand,  he  denies  the 
possibility  of  knowledge  of  God,  the  possibility  in 
question  is  of  knowledge  of  God's  essence. 
The  case  for  this  interpretation  of  Marqah  is  based 
on  a  consideration  of  certain  crucial  passages  and  also 
on  a  consideration  of  the  general  tenor  of  the  Memar  as 
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a  whole  -  particularly  so  far  as  that  tenor  concerns  the 
pervasive  concept  of  the  utter  otherness  of  God. 
It  will  be  recalled  that  Margah  is  insistent  that 
knowledge  that  God  exists  is  possible,  and  indeed  that 
testimony  to  His  existence  is  available  to  anyone  who 
turns  a  discriminating  eye  upon  nature,  or  even  turns 
a  thoughtful  eye  upon  his  own  soul.  For  our  present 
purposes  the  question  of  the  validity  of  the 
cosmological  argument  (whether  in  its  application  to 
the  macrocosm  of  nature  or  to  the  microcosm  of  man)  is 
irrelevant.  The  important  consideration  is  that  Marqah 
held  that  it  established  the  existence  of  God.  As  he 
succinctly  puts  it:  "From  His  creations  is  He  known" 
[I  132,  II  215],  And  the  answer  to  the  question:  From 
His  creations  what  is  He  known  to  be?  is  simply  that 
from  them  He  is  known  to  exist.  In  the  light  of  this 
point,  Marqah's  statement  about  God:  "Wherever  He  is 
sought  He  is  to  be  found"  [I  97,  II  161],  is  readily 
interpretable  as  stating  that  testimony  to  God's 
existence  is  presented  throughout  the  created  world. 
God  is  in  His  creations  so  far  as  they  are  expressions 
of  Him.  But  from  them  we  learn  not  of  His  essence  but 
of  His  existence.  He  reveals  Himself  only  as  He  leaves 
His  mark  on  created  things.  He  does  not  reveal  Himself 
as  He  is  in  Himself.  Hence  Margah  is  able,  without 
contradiction,  to  assert  that:  "He  reveals  Himself  in 
majesty,  but  is  concealed  from  all.  He  is  nev 
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revealed,  though  His  majesty,  perhaps  as  it  expresses 
itself  in  the  majesty  of  the  heavens,  reveals  the 
existence  of  God  to  us. 
Margah  does  not  indeed  hold  that  God  reveals  Himself 
only  through  physical  nature  or  through  men's  souls. 
He  writes,  in  a  significant  passage:  "I  revealed  myself 
to  former  good  men  through  an  angel,  not  by  revelation 
of  my  own  mighty  self.  Behold  I  reveal  myself  to  you 
and  make  my  voice  to  be  heard  by  you"  [I  21,  II  32]. 
In  this  case  again  it  is  made  clear  that  Godts  existence 
is  revealed.  There  is  nothing  in  the  text  that  implies 
that  God's  essence  is  revealed.  What  is'revealed  is 
God  so  far  as  He  receives  expression  in  the  world  of  an 
angel  of  God. 
A  similar  point  can  be  made  concerning  the  previously 
quoted  statement  that  God  "has  given  us  His  scripture, 
and  honoured  us  with  knowledge  of  Him"  [I  136,  II  223. 
W 
This  knowledge  must  at  least  be  knowledge  of  God1s 
existence,  But  the  text  does  not  permit  us  to  go 
further  and  attribute  to  Marqah  the  view  that  God's 
essence  is  made  known  to  us, 
It  must  be  acknowledged  that  the  few  quotations  just 
referred  to  are  not  so  expressed  as  to  rule  out  the 
possibility  that  Marqah  might,  not  without  inconsistency, 
have  been  subscribing  to  the  doctrine  that  man  can  know 
God's  essence.  The  reason  why  I  wish  to  ascribe  to  Marqah 
the  view  that  we  cannot  know  God's  essence  is  tlat  in  a 
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made  he  does  assert  that  view.  But  since  he  asserts  it 
the  question  arises  as  to  whether  he  asserts  it 
consistently  or  whether  he  also  denies  it.  I  have 
argued  that  he  does  on  occasion  appear  also  to  deny  it. 
Ttiat  being  the  case  it  must  be  asked  whether  those 
passages  in  which  he  seems  to  deny  it  can,  without 
forcing  their  meaning,  be  so  interpreted  that  they  do 
not  clash  with  the  view  I  have  attributed  to  Margah. 
What  I  have  argued  is  that  by  making  an  elementary 
distinction,  namely,  between  the  essence  and  the 
existence  of  God,  such  an  interpretation  of  the 
troublesome  passages  can,  not  merely  be  found,  but 
be  seen  to  be  readily  to  hand. 
Against  this  way  of  approaching  the  subject  it 
could  be  argued  that  I  am  at  too  great  pains  to  defend 
Marqah  from  the  charge  of  self-contradiction  on  a 
central  issue.  It  is  certainly  true  that  anyone 
anxious  to  find  Nargah  guilty  of  contradiction  can, 
without  great  effort,  do  so.  But  what  I  have  shown 
i 
so  far  is  that  there  is  a  way  to  resolve  the  apparent 
contradictions  concerning  his  teachings  on.  the  ii 
knowability  of  God;  and  hence  the  way  is  open  to 
anyone  who  is  anxious  to  find  Marqah  free  of 
contradiction  to  absolve  him  of  the  charge.  However, 
the  case  in  favour  of  the  interpretation  of  Margah 
that  I  have  been  presenting  can  be  strengthened  with 
the  aid  of  certain  points  that  are  worthy  of  emphasis. 88 
The  first  is  that  the  distinction  I  have  been 
employing  in  showing  how  Margah's  apparent  contradictions 
can  be  neutralised  might  well  have  been  familiar  to 
Nargah.  It  would  certainly  be  familiar  to  those 
conversant  with  Jewish  Hellenistic  philosophy.  As  we 
saw  earlier  in  the  chapter,  it  was  a  distinction  to 
which  Philo  paid  a  good  deal  of  attention  -  as  when  he 
writes:  `...  it  is  quite  enough  for  a  man's  reasoning 
faculty  to  advance  as  far  as  to  learn  that  the  Cause 
of  the  Universe  is  and  subsists.  To  be  anxious  to 
continue  his  course  yet  further,  and  enquire  about 
essence  or  quality  in  God,  is  a  folly  fit  for  the 
world's  childhood"'*  Bearing  in  mind  what  we  have 
already  observed  concerning  the  very  close  similarity 
between,  and  often  the  identity  of,  Marqah's 
religious  philosophy  and  the  Alexandrian  Hellenistic 
philosophy  of  Philo,  it  is  not  unreasonable  to  suppose 
that  the  distinction  between  divine  essence  and  divine 
existence  that  was  crucial  to  Philots  writings  was  a 
distinction  familiar  to  Marqah,  The  distinction  in/' 
question  might  well  have  been  an  element  in  the 
cultural,  common  currency  of-the  Hellenised  Levant  in 
the  early  centuries  of  the  Common  Era. 
A  second  reason  for  wishing  to  subscribe  to  the  view 
that  Marqah  was  not  guilty  of  contradiction  in  his 
00000. 
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teachings  on  the  knowability  of  God  is  that  on 
occasion  he  places  the  two  apparently  mutually 
contradictory  views  in  such  close  proximity  that  he 
could  not  have  failed  to  observe  the  contradiction  if 
in  fact  there  were  one  to  observe.  This  suggests  that 
though  he  was  conscious  of  the  paradoxical  nature  of 
his  teachings  he  did  not  consider  them  contradictory. 
For  example,  one  quotation  already  referred  to  in  this 
chapter  reveals  Margah  consciously  displaying  the 
paradoxical  nature  of  his  doctrine.  Thus,  when  he 
writes:  "He  reveals  Himself  in  majesty,  but  is 
concealed  from  all.  He  is  never  observed"  [I  8,  II  9], 
the  carefully  exhibited  paradoxical  air  of  the  statement 
leaves  us  in  no  doubt  that  Margah  intended  to  convey 
the  doctrine  that  God  is  in  one  sense  or  respect 
revealed,  and  in  another  not. 
A  third  reason  for  holding  that  Marqah  taught  that 
God's  existence  is  knowable  but  His  essence  is  not  is 
that  such  a  teaching  accords  fully  with  the  general 
tenor  of  the  Memar.  Regarding  the  conceptual  content 
of  the  Tierrar  twin  pillars  can  be  seen  to  be  responsible 
for  the  cohesiveness  of  the  fabric  as  a  whole.  These 
twin  pillars  are,  first,  the  idea  that  the  cosmos, 
in  toto  as  well  as  in  its  separate  parts,  bears  witness 
to  a  divine  Creator,  and  secondly,  and  relatedly,  the 
idea  that  God  is,  above  all,  one.  The  first  idea  leads 
to  the  conclusion  that  we  can  know  of  God  at  least  that 
he  exists.  The  second,  as  we  saw  earlier,  lea  s  to  the 9o 
n 
doctrine  that  we  cannot  know  of  God  what  He  is,  Not 
even  the  cosmos,  considered  as  a  witness  to  God, 
considered,  that  iss  in  a  real  sense,  as  a  holy 
testament,  can  yield  up  even  the  smallest  clue  to  the 
divine  essence.  On  this  crucial  matter  Margah  is  in 
full  agreement  with  Philo. 
It  is  important  at  this  point  to  be  clear  about 
what  has  been  established  and  what  has  not.  So  far  the 
argument  has  drawn  us  to  the  conclusion  that  for  Margah 
God's  essence  is  not  knowable.  But  although  Marqah 
persistently  refers  to  a  certain  rI  of  God  which  is 
not  within  man's  cognitive  grasp,  one  fact  that  cannot 
be  ignored  is  that  Marqah  is  very  informative  about 
what  God  is.  He  tells  us  repeatedly  that  God  is  good, 
just  and  merciful,  that  He  is  wise,  that  He  is 
powerful.  And  furthermore,  the  Memar,  contains  proofs 
of  such  attributions.  First,  there  are  numerous 
scriptural  proof  texts,  and,  secondly,  there  is 
rational  argument.  In  particular,  Nargah  frequently 
asserts,  both  in  the  Memar  and  also  in  his  theological 
.., 
hymns  in  the  Defter,  that  the  cosmos  bears  witness  to 
the  oneness  and  the  goodness  of  God,  This  point  will 
be  pursued  more  fully  in  subsequent  chapters.  For  the 
present  the  fact  that  such  descriptive  terms  are  used 
of  God  i.  s  being  mentioned  to  clear  up  a  possible  source 
of  confusion.  Since  Marqah  repeatedly  refers  to  a 
certain  ilA  that  cannot  be  known,  and  since  he  a'so 
says  that  wo  can  know  God's  goodness  and  oneness  and 91 
power,  the  natural  conclusion  to  draw  is  that  these 
qualities  are  not  part  of  the  1)  of  God.  We  can  know 
His  goodness  and  power  but  lack  the  spiritual  vision 
to  see  behind  these  qualities  and  observe  the  God  whose 
goodness  and  power  they  are.  The  power,  goodness, 
justice  and  wisdom  of  God,  as  well  as  other  qualities 
Marqah  mentions  in  connection  with  God,  are  in  some 
sense  expressions  of  God,  but  are  neither  all  nor  even 
part  of  His  essence.  If  indeed  Marqah  had  considered 
them  part  of  the  divine  essence  he  could  not 
consistently  have  insisted  on  God's  oneness.  The 
correct  way  to  characterise  their  relationship  with  God 
is  a  problem  which  will  be  investigated  in  the  next 
chapter. 
I 
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CHAPTER  V 
THE  POWERS  OF  GOD 
In  this  chapter  I  wish  to  discuss  a  problem  arising 
out  of  Marqah's  teaching  on  the  oneness  of  God.  The 
problem  can  be  simply  stated.  According  to  Marqah's 
teaching  God  is  one  both  in  the  sense  that  He  is 
unique,  and  in  the  sense  that  Ile  is  simple,  that  iss 
free  from  internal  complexity.,  This  teaching,  as  we 
saw,  did  not  separate  Marqah  from  the  mainstream  of 
Hellenic  and  Hellenistic  philosophy.  The  pedigree  of 
the  doctrine  is  traceable  back  at  least  as  far  asp 
Aristotle.  But  it  must  be  remembered  that  Aristole's 
philosophy  enjoyed  the  benefit,  if  it  be  a  benefity/ 
of  not  being  at  all,  or  at  least  to  any  significant 
extent,  guided  or  structured  by  the  Greek  religion.  If 
his  philosophy  clashed  at  any  point  with  the  state 
religion  he  was  free  to  reject  the  religious  claims 
and  accept  in  their  stead  his  own  philosophically 
established  doctrine.  Marqah,  on  the  other  hand,  was 93 
quite  otherwise  placed  in  relation  to  the  Samaritan 
religion.  Margahts  philosophising  was  guided  and 
structured  at  every  move  by  the  Pentateuch,  for  his 
entire  life  was  imbued  and  permeated  with  a  profound 
love  for  and  acceptance  of  the  teaching  of  Moses.  He 
regarded  himself  as  not  merely  lucky,  but  privileged 
to  be  a  Samaritan,  and  willingly  lived  a  Samaritan  life 
and  thought  Samaritan  thoughts.  But  to  a 
philosophical  thinker  immersed  in  the  Samaritan 
cosmology  there  is  a  dichotomy  that  must  be  taken  note 
of.  For  the  Pentateuch,  as  well  as  insisting  on  the 
oneness  of  God,  also  tells  us  about  many  apparent 
attributes  of  God.  We  are  told,  for  example,  that  He 
is  powerful,  just,  merciful  and  knowing.  But,  it  may 
be  asked,  how  can  God,  who  lacks  internal  complexity, 
also  be  so  many  things?  If  He  is  powerful  and  just 
and  merciful,  surely  He  cannot  correctly  be  described 
as  internally  simple.  I  wish  now  to  present  what  I 
believe  to  be  the  solution  to  the  problem  I  have  thus 
placed  at  Marqah's  door. 
It  must  be  stated  at  the  start,  as  a  caveat,  that 
though  the  problem  can  be  stated  in  the  stark  and 
simple  way  in  which  I  have  just  presented  its  and 
though  when  it  is  so  stated  it  appears  to  be  a 
difficult  problem  to  cope  with,  Marqah  himself 
'seems 
totally  unaware  of  any  difficulty.  The  confidence 
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troublesome  dichotomy  of  the  simplicity  of  God  and 
a  plurality  of  divine  attributes  suggests  that  he  was 
operating  with  a  cosmological  doctrine  that  permitted 
an  easy  accomodation  of  those  elements  that  to  us 
seem  opposed.  We  shall  therefore  have  to  establish 
the  identity  of  that  cosmological  doctrine  within 
which  the  harmony  of  those  elements  could  be  so 
felicitously  maintained. 
The  Pentateuch  is  replete  with  references  to  God's 
power;  lie  has  the  power  to  create  the  world  and  to 
sustain  it,  the  power  to  exert  a  providential 
influence  on  the  course  of  history,  the  power  to  rule 
with  justice  and  to  temper  his  justice  with  mercy.  ' 
Pentateuchal  warrant  for  believing  in  God's  power  is 
clearly  present  in  abundance,  and  it  is  therefore 
wholly  to  be  expected  that  Marqah  should  insist  on  the 
fact  of  the  power  of  God.  And  the  Memar  and  Marqah's 
Defter  hymns  contain  numerous  reference  to  the  power  of 
God. 
Thus,  for  example,  we  are  told:  "Thy  powers 
(  7,1iK  ti  1  :  1;  1  )  are  the  fruit  of  Thy  mind"'*  "He  sustains 
all  things  by  His  mighty  power 
CI  132,  II  214]q 
and,  in  similar  vein,  "Thy  great  power  (A"S"R) 
sustains  all  things  without  being  near  to  them"2. 
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We  are  also  told:  "power  (r71r7L7>>)  is  His,  might  is 
His"  [I  90,  II  146],  and,  finally,  Marqah  declaims: 
"0  power  (-[y--n)  above  all  powers  -  and  all  powers 
derive  from  Thine"'. 
These  various  statements  about  God's  power  and 
powers,  as  well  as  numerous  other  statements  by  Marqah 
in  the  Memar  and  the  Defter  on  the  same  subject,  are  not 
readily  understandable.  What  exactly  is  a  power  of 
God?  Is  there  one  power,  as  is  sometimes  suggested 
by  Margah,  or  several,  as  is  also  suggested  by  him?  If 
both  modes  of  expression  -  "power"  and  "powers"  -  are 
justifiable  then  how  is  the  relationship  between  the 
two  to  be  understood?  If  it  is  correct  to  speak  of 
the  powers  of  God  what  consequences  does  this  have  for 
our  interpretation  of  the  Memar's  doctrine  that  God  is 
one?  Is  Marqah  inconsistent  in  holding  both  that  God 
has  powers  and  that  He  is  one?  And  finally,  and 
arising  out  of  the  previous  question,  how  should  we 
conceive  the  relationship  between  God  and  His  power 
or  powers?  ýl. 
In  tackling  these  various  questions  a  consideration 
I 
of  Alexandrian  Hellenistic  teachings  will  prove  an 
invaluable  adjunct  to  the  internal  evidence  of  Nargah's 
own  writings.  There  is  indeed  good  reason  to  suppose 
that  many  of  the  gaps  in  Margah's  exposition  of  his 
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doctrines  of  divine  power  derive  from  the  fact  that 
those  gaps  would  not  present  themselves  as  gaps  to 
those  to  whom  Margah  addressed  his  writings.  For  the 
cultural  background  of  his  addressees  would  furnish 
them  with  the  material  that  would  enable  them  to  see 
Marqah's  doctrine  as  forming  a  continuous  whole  -a 
unity,  The  disconnectedness,  for  us,  of  Margah's 
doctrines  on  God's  power  is  due  to  our  inability  to 
read  into  those  doctrines  what  Marqah  himself  read  into 
them,  and  what  those  for  whom  the  Memar  and  the  Hymns 
were  written  could  reasonably  be  expected  to  read  into 
them. 
I  hope  to  make  out  a  case  here  for  the  claim  that 
Alexandrian  Hellenistic  thought,  and  particularly  the 
works  of'Philo,  provide  us  so  completely  with  a 
system  within  which  Margah's  writings  on  divine  power 
can  be  harmonised  and  understood  that  the  weight  of 
evidence  can  be  seen  to  be  in  favour  of  the  claim  that 
Philo's  system,  or  an  Alexandrian  Hellenistic  system 
of  the  Philonic  variety,  constituted  a  significant/ 
element  in  the  cultural  ethos  of  which  Margah  himself 
was  an  expression.  The  strength  of  this  claim,  though 
great  when  based  on  a  consideration  of  the  relation 
between  the  teachings  of  Philo  and  Marqah  on  the 
power.  of  God,  must  be  judged  to  be  greater  when.  we  also 
bear  in  mind  the  relation,  already  displayed,  between 
Philo  and  Marqah  on  the  subjects  of  God's  existence, 
oneness  and  unknowability. 
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Philo  wrote  a  great  deal  on  the  subject  of  the 
power  of  God,  and  not  all  that  he  had  to  say  is  free 
from  obscurity.  Nor  are  all  his  pronouncements,  at 
least  on  the  surface,  entirely  free  from  contradiction. 
Thus,  for  example,  a$  is  clear  from  Wolfson's  complex 
and  subtle  discussion  on  this  matter 
l, 
considerable 
dexterity  and  also  a  willingness  to  employ  many 
assumptions  that  must  remain  conjectural  are  needed  if 
Philo's  teaching  on  the  knowability  of  the  divine 
powers  in  their  essence  are  to  be  harmonised  with  each 
other.  Fortunately  it  is  not  necessary  here  to  attempt 
a  detailed  exegesis  of  Philo's  position  on  the  divine 
powers.  An  exposition  of  less  substantial  proportions 
will  suffice  to  indicate  the  philosophical  background 
to  Margah's  teaching  on  this  subject. 
In  an  earlier  chapter  we  noted  Philo's  close 
interest  in  the  unitariness  of  the  world  as  mirroring, 
though  imperfectly,  the  oneness  of  its  Creator.  In 
Philo's  view  this  mirroring  relationship  is  not  merely 
fortuitous  but  is  on  the  contrary  a  natural  outcome  of 
the  relationship  in  which  the  world  stands  to  God.  It 
is  the  created  in  relation  to  the  Creator.  Precisely 
for  this  reason  Philo  felt  entitled  to  present  a 
cosmological  argument  for  the  existence  of  the  divine 
oneness.  The  quality  of  oneness  is  a  divine  quality, 
0  000" 
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for  God  is  one.  Therefore  where  there  is  one  there  is 
God.  Where  there  is  an  imperfect  oneness  there  we 
find  an  expression,  though  an  imperfect  expression,  of 
Godts  oneness.  The  universe  itself  is  one  and  hence 
the  universe  is  divine.  But  the  universe  is  a  many  in 
one.  Its  oneness  is  not  perfect.  '  Something  not  divine 
interferes  with  the  perfection  of  its  oneness.  Hence  } 
it  must  be  possible  to  distinguish  between  that  aspect 
of  the  universe  which  is  expressive  divinity  and  that 
aspect  which  is  not.  Now,  what  holds  the  universe 
together  as  a  unity,  and  therefore  secures  its  identity 
as  a  single  universe,  is  a  power,  ors  perhaps  better, 
powers.  Thus  Philo  writes:  "...  the  complex  whole 
around  us  is  held  together  by  invisible  powers  (G(op/'"e( 
which  the  Creator  has  made  to  reach  from 
the  ends  of  the  earth  to  heaven's  furthest  bounds, 
taking  forethought  that  what  was  well  bound  should  not 
c 
be  loosened:  for  the  powers  of  the  universe  (aL  VV  76L5 
Tail  rrocVros)  are  chains  that  cannot  be  broken"  . 
And 
speaking  of  the  sense  in  which  God  may  be  said  to  be 
everywhere,  he  affirms:  "He  has  made  His  powers  extend 
through  earth  and  water,  air  and  heaven,  and  left  no 
part  of  the  universe  without  His  presence,  and  uniting 
i 
all  with  all  has  bound  them  fast  with  invisible  bonds, 
that  they  should  never  be  loosed" 
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The  powers  extending  through  the  universe  are,  then, 
powers  of  God.  But  to  assert  that  God  has  powers  is  to 
predicate  something  of  Him.  This  point  gives  rise  to 
the  question:  What  kind  of  predicate  is  'power'  when 
this  is  predicated  of  God?  Wolfson1  suggests  the 
following  answer:  Philo  relied  heavily  upon  the 
Aristotelian  account  of  the  kinds  of  relation  that  cari' 
obtain  between  subject  and  predicate  in  a  logical 
proposition.  These  relations  are  four  in  number. 
The  predicate  can  be  a  property.,  a  definition,  a  genus  or 
an  accident  of  the  subject2.  Philo  unquestionably 
considers  that,  of  these  four,  three  are  not  possible 
relations  in  which  anything  can  stand  to  God.  The 
three  are  definition,  genus  and  accident.  Only  property 
remains.  And  consequently  the  powers  of  God  must  be 
classified  as  His  properties. 
It  is  necessary  however  to  consider  this  in  greater 
detail,  for  the  issue  is  crucial.  The  underlying  issue, 
as  we  shall  see,  is  the  tenability  of  the  claim  that 
God  has  powers,  when  that  claim--is  maintained  in 
conjunction  with  an  insistence  upon  the  oneness  of  God. 
As  a  first  step  we  must  see  what  Aristotle  himself  said 
about  the  meanings  of  the  terms  that  he  employs  in 
referring  to  the  four  predicables. 
41  .0.000 
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for  his  discussion  is  the  Topics,  particularly  Book  I. 
"A  definition"  he  tells  us  "is  a  phrase  indicating 
the  essence.  of  something"  [101b39  f].  It  tells  us 
what  it  is  for  a  thing  of  a  certain  kind  to  be  of  that 
kind.  Thus  we  give  a  definition  of  "man"  when  we  say 
that  man  is  a  pedestrian  biped  animal 
[l0lb30  ff]. 
A  property  is  "something  which  does  not  show  the 
essence  of  a  thing  but  belongs  to  it  alone  and  is 
predicated  convertibly  of  it.  For  example,  it  is  a 
property  of  man  to  be  capable  of  learning  grammar; 
for  if  a  certain  being  is  a  man,  he  is  capable  of 
learning  grammar,  and  if  he  is  capable  of  learning 
grammar,  he  is  a  man"  [102a18  ff]. 
Thirdly,  "a  Fenus  is  that  which  is  predicated  in  the 
,  category  of  essence  of  several  things  which  differ  in 
kind.  Predicates  in  the  category  of  essence  may  be 
described  as  such  things  as  are  fittingly  contained 
in  the  reply  of  one  who  has  asked  'What  is  the  object. 
before  you?  "".  Thus,  for  example,  faced  with  a  man, 
and  asked  what  it  is  that  the  confronted  object  is,  the 
answer  giving  the  genus  would  be,  "an  animal".  The  same 
answer  would  have  been  in  order  had  the  question  been 
asked  with  reference  to  an  ox.  For  men  and  oxen  are 
generically  the  same,  though  specifically  different. 
Finally,  "an  accident  is  that  which  is  none  of  these 
things  -  neither  definition  nor  property  nor  genus  -  but 
rs 
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still  belongs  to  the  thing".  What  distinguishes  the 101 
accident  is  that  it  can  belong  to  a  particular  thing, 
but  also  need  not  do  so  [102b4  ff]. 
Aristotlels  list  of  predicables  is  not  random,  and 
indeed  one  aspect  of  its  value,  in  Aristotle's  eyes, 
lies  precisely  in  this  fact.  The  list  is  demonstrably 
complete.  The  demonstration  is  as  follows:  any  predicate 
is  either  convertible  with  its  subject  or  it  is  notl, 
Likewise,  the  predicate  is  a  term  given  in  the 
definition  or  it  is  not.  A  convertible  definitional 
term  gives  the  essence  and  hence  the  definition;  a 
convertible  non-definitional  term  gives  a  Property;  a 
non-convertible  definitional  term  gives  the  genus  and 
a  non-definitional  non-convertible  term  gives  an 
accident. 
Aristotle's  proof,  as  presented  in  the  Topics,  is 
indeed  not  entirely  plain  sailing,  since  he  says  there 
that  where  a  predicate  term  enters  into  the  definition 
of  the  subject  term,  but  is  not  convertible  with  its 
then  the  term  refers  to  the  genus  or  differentia,  and 
this  seems  to  demand  a  broadening  of  Aristotle's  list 
to  five.  Since,  for  Aristotle,  definition  is  composed 
of  genus  plus  differentiae  [103b15],  differentia  should 
be  added  to  the  initial  list  of  predicables.  But  this 
problem  in  Aristotelian  hermeneutic  need  not  detain  us 
1.  A  predicate  P  is  convertible  with  a  subject,  S  if  the 
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at  this  stage.  The  important  point  to  be  borne  in 
mind  here  is  that  in  Aristotle's-view,  and,  according 
to  Wolfson,  in  Philo's  view  also,  the  list  of  four 
predicables  is  complete.  It  follows  that  if  anything 
san  be  predicated  of  God  and  yet  cannot  be  predicated 
under  three  of  Aristotle's  four  headings,  then  it  must 
be  predicated  under  the  fourth.  Hence,  we  are  faced 
with  the  question  of  which  predicable,  if  any,  is 
applicable  to  God. 
Since  a  definition  refers  to  genus  and  differentiae 
of  the  definiendum,  and  since  whatever  has  genus  and 
differentiae  is  complex,  God  is  indefinable.  To  put  the 
point  otherwise:  a  definition  gives  the  essence  of  a 
thing.  But  God  lacks  an  essence,  and  hence  cannot  be 
defined.  We  noticed  in  the  preceding  chapter  that  there 
is  in  fact.  a  problem  concerning  whether  Philo  did  reject 
the  view  that  God  has  an  essence,  or  whether  he  held 
that  God  did  have  an  essence,  namely,  His  existence. 
But  this  problem  was,  as  we  saw,  caused  in  part  by  the 
fact  that  the  term"essence"  can  be  employed  in 
non-standard  ways.  If,  however,  the  term  is  understood 
as  referring  to  genus  plus  differentiae  then  God 
certainly  lacks  essence  and  hence  lacks  definability. 
With  regard  to  the  second  of  the  predicables,  namely, 
genus,  the  question  of  whether  it  has  application  to 
God  does  not  admit  of  a  simple  answer  when  considered 
within  the  context  of  Philo's  teachings,  since  Philo's 
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pronouncements  on  this  matter  are  prima  facie 
contradictory,  He  says  both  that  the  predicable  "genus" 
has  application  to  God  and  that  it  does  not.  Thus,  he 
describes  God  as  Tö  vEVLK 
rOTO 
￿ 
19 
that  iss  the  highest 
genus,  or  the  supremely  generic,  though  he  also  wishes. 
, 
to  affirm  that  God  lacks  essence  and  hence  lacks  genus. 
Wolfson  has  argued  that  Philo's  reference  to  God  as 
ýEv(.  )c4ýfvc'rov  was  made  in  order  to  indicate  that 
God  lacks  the  tnormal'  kind  of  genus,  namely,  the  kind 
that  allows  for  differentiation  according  to  specific 
differences 
2.  God,  though  a  genus  of  sorts,  is  not  the 
kind  of  genus  that  admits  of  specific  differentiation. 
Now,  Aristotle  makes  it  clear  in  the  Topics  that  the 
predicable  he  refers  to  as  "genus"  is  precisely  the 
sort  that  does  allow  for  such  differentiation.  Hence, 
despite  Philo's  use  of  the  term  -r'0  y611jkwr"o<-roV  to 
refer  to  God,  the  Aristotelian  predicable  genus  does 
not  apply  to  Him. 
The  predicable  "accident"  is  simpler  to  deal  with. 
God,  as  we  have  seen,  cannot  have  accidents,  since  the 
possession  of  accidents  is  possible  only  for  a  complex 
being.  Hence,  at  least  three  of  the  four  kinds  of 
predicable  listed  by  Aristotle  would  have  to  be 
rejected  by  Philo  as  inapplicable  to  God. 
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This  line  of  reasoning  draws  us  to  the  conclusion 
that  if  any  kind  of  predicable  is  applicable  to  God 
that  predicable  must  be  o  Lo￿  -  property.  Wolfson 
indeed  unhesitatingly  draws  the  conclusion  that  the 
predicable  property-is  applicable  to  God.  But  the 
issue  is  rendered  more  complicated*by  the  fact  that  a 
further  possibility  has  to  be  considered,  namely,  that 
the  theory  of  predicables  as  a  whole  has  no  application 
to  God.  It  may,  after  all,  not. 
Now,  one  reason  for  holding  that  in  Philo's  view 
the  list  of  predicables  is  applicable  to  God  is  simply 
that  Philo  does  speak  of  things  as  being  the  ; 
dLCV 
of 
God.  But  this  fact  alone  leaves  entirely  open  the 
question  of  whether  Philo's  use  of  the  term 
ýsýo 
accords  with  the  description  of  the  concept  of  'property'. 
as  that  is  presented  by  Aristotle.  The  chief  reason 
for  doubting  that  such  accord  exists  centres  on 
Aristotle's  account  of  the  relation  between  the 
essence  of  a  thing  and  its  properties.  In  a 
significant  passage  in  Book  V  of  the  Topics  Aristotle 
a 
writes:...  in  properties,  as  in  definitions,  the  first 
term  to  be  assigned  ought  to  be  the  genus,  and  then, 
and  not  till  then,  the  other  terms  should  be  added 
and  should  distinguish  the  subject..  *  you  must 
Isee 
if 
he  [the 
assigner  of  the  property]  has  placed  the 
subject,  whose  property  he  is  assigning,  in  itI 
essence  and  then  adds  the  other  terms;  for  then  the 105 
property  t,  rill  have  been  correctly  assigned  in  this 
respect"  [132a10  ff].  The  question  naturally 
prompted  by  this  account  is  whether  it  is  possible  to 
attribute  properties,  understood  as,  limited  in  the  way 
just  described,  to  God.  Philo  holds  that  God's 
essence  is  not  a  possible  object  of  human  knowledge, 
and  that  cognitively  we  approach  most  closely  a 
knowledge  of  God  in  knowing  that  He  exists.  If  we 
take  the  line,  suggested  earlier,  that  for  Philo  God's 
essence  is  to  exist,  and  that  even  if  we  lack  direct 
insight  into  the  nature  of  His  existence  we  know  at 
least  of  the  fact  of  His  existence,  then  we  may 
conclude  that  we  can"place  God  in  His  essence"  for  we 
can  ascribe  existence  to  Him.  In  that  case  to  ascribe 
properties  to  God  is  to  ascribe  to  Him  certain 
attributes  which  He  possesses  by  virtue  of  His 
existence,  and  which  are  of  such  a  nature  that  only  a 
divine  Existent  could  possess  them. 
It  seems  reasonable  therefore  to  conclude  that' 
Philo's  system  does  not  generate  logical  pressures 
sufficiently  strong  to  ensure  that  he  cannot 
consistently  ascribe  to  God  an 
LJtpVq 
as  that  term  is 
understood  by  Aristotle  in  the  Topics.  Philots 
logical  entitlement  to  ascribe  properties  to  God  brings 
immediate  advantages,  for  it  enables  Philo  to  say  many 
things  about  God  without  implicitly  denying  His 
simplicity.  Since  properties  do  not  form  part  of  the 
essence  of  a  subject,  the  ascription  of  a  multiplicity 106 
of  properties  does  not  imply  the  internal  plurality  of 
the  essence  of  the  subject. 
Granted  that  Philo  did  hold  that  God  has  properties, 
it  is  necessary  to  establish  what  these  properties  are. 
One  divine  property  is  To 
TrOL2  vý  "action"  or  "activity". 
It  must  be  borne  in  mind  here  that  Philo  is  not  simply 
taking  over  the  Aristotelian  terminology  with  its 
Aristotelian  interpretation.  For  Aristotle  draws  a 
distinction  between  T;  oe  D-LS  (making)  and  t'i'Caý,  Ls 
(doing),  the  crucial  point  for  him  being  that  trot  9-L5 
has  an  end  other  than  itself  whereas  action  cannot  have2 
Philo's  -t'a  r-cc. 
E(, 
V  is  clearly  intended  to  cover  the 
n 
Aristotelian  rrpa5L 
JC. 
But  if  ro  IToc  C  LL￿  is  understood 
as  an 
Lý'Lo 
￿  o/f  God,  then  since  a  property  is  (by 
definition)  predicated  convertibly  of  its  subject,  it 
follows  that  only  God  can  act.  In  particular,  it 
follows  that  Philo  must  deny  that  human  beings  are 
capable  of  actingo  And  indeed,  in  accordance  with 
expectation,  we  find  Philo  arguing  that  corresponding 
1 
to  TO  Ttpc, 
EL%/ 
'  considered  as  the  property  of  the 
Creator,  is  To  TT 
v 
»L%-  ,  considered  as  the  property 
of  creatures3. 
The  power  of  God  is  a  power  to  act,  the  power  of 
-ro  rr  vL  etV.  But  TO  rro  ..  EL  V  is  a  property  of  God. 
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The  power  of  God,  therefore,  is  a  divine  property.  If,  now, 
we  seek  insight  into  the  property  of  God  by  establishing 
the  precise  nature  of  God's  power  to  act  we  will  not 
find  Philo  entirely  helpful.  It  is  not  indeed  clear 
that  Philo  considered  the  power  of  God,  any  more  than 
he  considered  the  nature  of  God,  to  be  comprehensible. 
It  is  as  though  the  relationship  of  ownership  in  which 
God  stands  to  His  power  secures  the  participation  of 
His  power  in  His  own  incomprehensibility.  The  divine 
power  is,  so  to  say,  too  close  to  God  to  escape  beyond 
the  periphery  of  the  halo  of  incomprehensibility  that 
surrounds  Him.  Thus,  if  we  are  to  have  knowledge  of 
that  power,  we  can  come  to  it  through  a  consideration 
of  its  effects  rather  than  by  an  unmediated  insight 
into  the  power  itself.  Thus  a  cosmological  argument 
for  the  existence  of  divine  power  can  be  constructed 
that  is  closely  parallel  to  the  cosmological  argument 
for  the  existence  of  God.  Indeed  a  case  can  be  argued 
for  the  claim  that  Philo's  cosmological  argument  for 
the  existence  of  God  is  really  an  argument  for  the 
existence  of  divine  power.  The  point  of  this  is  that 
the  divine  power  whose  existence  is  established  by  the 
argument  makes  immediate  reference  to  God  to  wh 
i 
om  the 
power  belongs.  Hence  the  divine  power  can  be  regarded 
as  a  mediator  between  God  and  the  world  we  kno  . 
The  role  of  divine  power  as  a  mediator  has  been 
pointed  out  frequently  by  Philo's  commentators'.  But 108 
the  account  of  mediation  that  I  have  just  given 
stresses  the  logical  aspect  of  that  mediation  rather 
than  the  ontological  aspect  that  has  largely  held  the 
attention  of  the  commentators. 
In  support  of  this  logical  interpretation,  which 
supplements  the  ontological  interpretation,  and  is  not 
intended  as  a  replacement  for  or  a  criticism  of  its  two 
points  may  be  mentioned.  The  first  is  that  Philo 
explicitly  embraces  the  doctrine  that  the  essence  of 
the  divine  power  is  incomprehensible  to  us  and  that  wo 
know  it  only  through  knowing  the  effects  of  its 
activity 
l.  And  hence  the  divine  power  is  seen  as  the 
middle  term  linking  God  with  the  visible  effects  of 
God  that  enable  us  to  argue  that  He  exists.  That  iss 
the  visible  effects  indicate  the  existence  of  an 
invisible  power,  and  the  invisible  power  indicates  the 
existence  of  a  God  whose  property  that  power  is. 
Secondly,  Philo  considers  the  divine  power, 
00040 
1.  Spec.  1  6,  It  is  in  the  light  of  this  consideration 
that  Philo  offers  an  allegorical  interpretation  of  the 
account  of  Jacob  wrestling  with  the  angel.  The 
refusal  of  the  angel  to  give  his  name  to  Jacob 
[Gen.  XXXII  29]  is  interpreted  by  Philo  as  referring 
to  the  impossibility  of  naming  the  divine  power  -a 
naming  whose  impossibility  derives  from  the 
unknowability  of  the  power  [riot.  II  14]. log 
incomprehensible  in  its  essence,  to  have  many  aspects, 
each.  of  these  aspects  being  itself  a  power.  It  is  of 
little  importance  whether  we  attribute  to  Philo  the 
view  that  there  is  only  one  power  that  has  many  aspects, 
or  the  view  that  there  are  many  powers.  Philo's  mode 
of  expression  permits  both  interpretations.  Thus, 
\  /1 
when  he  speaks  of  -ro  Tro(,  ELV  as  the  property  of  God 
the  implication  is  that  God  possesses  onepower.  Yet 
at  the  same  time  he  speaks  of  several  powers  of  God. 
Any  dispute  about  how  many  powers  there  are,  whether 
one  or,  many,  is  on  a  terminological  matter  of  little 
conceptual  importance.  The  important  point  is  that 
Philo  does  insist  on  the  existence  of  many  divine 
powers  or,  as  he  would  be  equally  happy  to  express  it, 
on  the  existence  of  many  aspects  of  one  divine  power. 
Thus  in  a  central  passage  he  writes:  "...  while  God  is 
indeed  one,  His  highest  and  chiefest  powers  are  two, 
even  goodness  and  sovereignty.  Through  His  goodness 
He  begat  all  that  iss  through  His  sovereignty  He  rules 
what  He  has  begotten.  And  in  the  midst  between  the 
two  there  is  a  third  which  unites  them,  Reason  (.  \oyv), 
for  it  is  through  reason  that  God  is  both  ruler  and 
good";  Now,  we  observed  in  Chapter  II  how  Philo 
argued  to  the  existence  of  God  from  a  consideration  of 
a  parallel  with  situations  close  to  home,  situations 
such  as  the  evidence  of  a  human  hand  in  the  order  and 
1.  Cher.  IX  27-8 
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construction  of  buildings  and  cities.  Just  as  the 
existence  of  cities  points  to  the  existence  of  a 
human  authority,  a  human  ruler,  so  the  world,  considered 
as  a  kosmopolis,  points  to  the  existence  of  a  divine 
authority,  Thus  the  cosmological  argument  of  Philo  is 
in  reality  in  two  stages.  First,  evidence  is  adduced 
for  the  claim  that  the  cosmos  bears  marks  of  being 
ruled.  And'secondly,  this  testimony  is  offered  as 
evidence  for  the  existence  of  a  cosmic  sovereign  -  who 
could  of  course  be  no  other  than  God.  The  middle 
term  in  this  argument  is  that  power  of  God  which  Philo 
terms  His  "authority"  or  "sovereignty". 
In  the  passage  just  quoted  from  the  De  Cherubim 
Philo  makes  reference  to  goodness 
('AlmOk,  5)  and 
authority 
('Eýovc, 
-Zfcc)  as  God's  "highest  and  chiefest 
powers",  and  thereby  shows  that  he  subscribes  to  the 
doctrine  that  God  has,  in  some  sense  of  the  phrase,,  a 
plurality  of  powers.  But  how  many? 
Philo  does  not  give  a  uniform  answer  to  this 
question.  One  reason  is  that  in  certain  cases  one/ý 
r 
power  can  be  considered  to  be  several  by  virtue  of  its 
possession  of  several-  aspects,  each  of  which  can 
itself  be  classified  as  a  power.  However,  in  one  placel 
Philo  asserts  that  there  are  six  divine  powers.  The 
first  of  these,  the  Tr(E  o"vroc  -r  7,  states  Philo, 
00000 
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clearly  bearing  in  mind  the  term's  logical  rather  than 
temporal  connotations,  is  the  divine  logos,  which  Philo 
here  compares  with  a  metropolis  with  the  five 
remaining  powers  possessing  merely  "colonial"  status. 
This  terminology  makes  it  clear  that  Philo  did  not 
consider  the  six  powers  to  be  on  a  par.  Of  the  five 
colonies  the  first  is  the  creative  power  (￿  yi  '.  5 
TTo(ý  YY  LY- 
y)  by  which  God  made  the  world  with  a  word 
/ 
( 
i\oyw).  Second  is  the  cývv«ti  pKan,  i\LI.  y 
/ 
God's 
royal  power,  by  which  He  rules  over  His  creation. 
Third  is  the  JVVC(; 
41 
CLAG-1.5 
,  the  propitious  or  merciful 
power,  by  which  God  shows  pity  and  mercy  to  His 
creatures.  Next  is  the  J'6  , 
tj  voI,  t»o 
6  DiI  Ole 
9  the 
legislative  power,  which  divides,  Philo  tells  usl,  into 
two  powers,  namely,  fourth  "the  power  of  enjoining  what 
is  right",  and  fifth,  "the  power  of  prohibiting  what  is 
not  right". 
These  six  powers  are  not  mutually  independent.  Two 
relations  in  particular  must  be  mentioned.  First,  the 
legislative  power  must  be  subsumed  under  the  royal 
power,  since  legislative  activity  is  one  form  of 
expression  of  royal  power.  And  secondly,  the  merciful 
0000" 
1.  The  lacuna  in  the  text  immediately  following 
"fourth"  can  readily  be  reconstructed,  at  least 
with  regard  to  its  conceptual  content,  by  reference 
to  the  following  pages  of  text. 112 
power  must  be  subsumed  under  the  creative  power.  The 
reason  for  this  latter  subsumption  is  based  on  the  close 
link,  upon  which  Philo  insists,  between  the  goodness 
of  God  and  the  creation  of  the  world.  For  example, 
Philo  describes  the  power  by  which  the  universe  was 
made  as  "one  that  has  as  its  source  nothing  less  than 
true  goodness  (-rö  trPöS  uAit'c.  acv 
äyoe  v  )"l.  Hence, 
subsequent  to  exercise  of  creative  power  we  must 
expect  to  find  evidence  of  the  exercise  of  the 
propitious  or  merciful  power  of  God. 
According  to  the  account  just  outlined  the  basic 
powers  of  God  are  His  creative  and  His  royal  powers, 
with  the  logos  supreme  above  them.  A  unity  of  the 
powers  is  assured,  since  the  logos  stands  to  the  other 
powers  in  the  same  relation  in  which  a  metropolis 
stands  to  its  colonies.  Elsewhere,  however,  we 
referred  to  a  slightly  different  account  of  the  powers, 
that  is  nonetheless  sanctioned  by  Philo.  In  the 
De  Cherubim,  as  we  observed,  the  chief  powers  were  said 
to  be  the  goodness  and  the  authority  of  God,  with  the 
logos  "uniting  them"  and  thereby  performing  a 
unifying  function  in.  the  Philonic  cosmology. 
It  is  clear  from  this  that  Philo  was  concerned  to 
lay  stress  on  the  systematic  relatedness  of  th  powers 
of  Godg.  so  much  so  that  no  severe  distortion  o  his 
system  would  be  committed  if  it  were  claimed  that  God's 
....  C 
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powers  were  really  one  power  -  one  power  with,  perhaps, 
several  aspects,  or  with,  perhaps,  several  kinds  of 
manife.  ttation.  Nevertheless,  the  crucial  point  for 
our  present  purpose  is  that  the  unitariness  of  the 
divine  power  is  not  logically  required  as  a  corollary 
to  the  claim  that  God  is  one,  The  reason  for  this  is 
that,  as  was  argued  earlier,  a  power  of  God  is  an 
Though  it  belongs  to  God  by  virtue  of  His  essence  it  is 
not  itself  a  part  of  His  essence.  Hence,  the 
existence  of  a  plurality  of  divine  powers,  or  even  the 
existence  of  a  single  divine  power  complex  in  itself, 
does  not  prove  that  God  is  essentially  complex. 
In  the  course  of  his  important  chapter  on  Tho 
Unknowability  of  God1  Wolfson  claims,  on  the  contrary, 
that  "the  essence  of  God  is  one  and  simple  and 
consequently,  whatever  belongs  to  it  as  a  property  must 
be  one  and  simple".  His  argument  for  this  claim  is 
unconvincing:  "If  you  assume  that  He  has  many 
properties,  then  you  will  have  to  say  either  that  His 
essence  is  not  one  or  simple  or  that  some  of  these/ 
properties  do  not  belong  to  Him  in  virtue  of  His 
essence;  in  the  latter  case  they  would  not  be 
properties  but  accidents".  This  is  less  an  argument 
for  his  claim  than  an  alternative  way  of  making  the 
same  point.  It  is  not  clear  from  Wolfson's  statement 
00"00 
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why  he  wishes  to  maintain  that  God's  power  is  one  and 
simple,  for  he  is  insistent  on  the  basic  point  that 
Godts  power  is  not  all,  or  part,  of  the  essence  of  God. 
Furthermore,  his  claim  that  it  was  in  order  to  avoid 
the  implication  that  God  is  internally  complex  that 
Philo  reduces  the  list  of  God's  properties  to  one  is 
open  to  criticism.  For  even  though  Philo  does  insist 
on  the  hierarchic  nature  of  the  divine  powers,  on  their 
systematic  interrelatedness,  he  seems  not  to  have 
attributed  to  divine  power  the  oneness  and  simplicity 
that  he  affirms  of  God.  Yet  if  Wolfson  were  correct 
in  his  interpretation  of  Philo1s  doctrine  of  divine 
power  we  should  have  expected  Philo  to  have  made  an 
attempt  to  prove  that  the  divine  powers  do  indeed  have 
the  oneness  and  simplicity  of  God.  -Yet,  on  the  contrary, 
Philo  does  the  precise  opposite.  His  list  of  divine 
powers  is  long,  and  even  when  he  presents  shorter 
lists,  which  he  does  on  occasions  and  introduces  a 
unifying  principle,  say  the  logos,  into  them,  the 
list  can  at  best  be  said  to  have  unity,  but  not  in 
the  least  to  have  oneness  in  the  sense  in  which  God  in 
His  divine  simplicity  has  oneness. 
Nevertheless,  though  the  power  of  God  does  not 
share  with  God  His  absolute  simplicity,  the  various 
powers  are  characterised,  according  to  Philo,  'n  ways 
that  also  characterise  God.  As  is  to  be  expected, 
therefore,  Philo's  descriptions  of  the  divine' 
I 
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In  discussing  the  verse:  "He  met  him  in  the  place" 
(Gen.  XXVIII  11),  Philo  allegorises  on  the  term  "place". 
He  speaks  of  it  as  "..  the  Divine  Word,  which  God 
Himself  has  completely  filled  throughout  with 
incorporeal  potencies 
ývVa, 
0Eo"(.  v)" 
1. 
First,  then,  the  powers  are 
c 
V-  x-('oL  as,  indeed,  is 
God  Himself,  and  the.  presence  of  the  powers  in 
corpora,  imposing  form  and  unity  on  the  corpora,  does 
not  imply  that  the  unifying  powers  themselves  are 
corporeal.  Secondly,  and  relatedly,  Philo  draws  an 
explicit  parallel  between  God,  who  is  a  CEP  ýP,  xcpos 
and  His  powers,  which  are 
ärr 
/'L  p  ocfol_  -  uncircumscribed, 
and  being  boundless  must  therefore  in  some  respect  be 
infinite  2. 
In  the  context  of  the  passage  under 
discussion  Philo  is  primarily,  concerned  with  the  two 
divine  powers  of  goodness  and  authority,  and  it  may  be 
that  in  this  context  it  is  specifically  those  two 
powers  that  are  being  said  to  be  c'r  jr6f  y19,,  k)PoL.  Hut' 
there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  having  described 
those  two  powers  in  that  way  Philo  would  wish  to 
withhold  that  description  from  the  other  divine/  / 
powers.  Thirdly,  the  powers  are  povoc3.  In  the 
De  Sacrificiis  XX  73  Philo  states:  "Those  things  whici 
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are  first  in  consideration  and  in  power  (J'v 
v 
ycL) 
are 
good  actions,  the  virtues,  and  conduct  in  accordance 
with  virtue".  He  is  here  classifying  virtue  as  a 
power  of  God,  and  is  perhaps  identifying  virtue  with 
the  divine  power  of  goodness.  Thus,  when,  immediately' 
before  this1,  he  criticises  Pharaoh  for  being  unable, 
in  his  impiety,  to  receive  the  conception  of  virtue 
unconnected  with  time  äX 
pov  o$  )  for  "the  eyes  of  the  ( 
soul,  whereby  alone  incorporeal  natures  are  apprehended, 
are  blinded  in  him",  it  is  clear  that  Philo  wishes  to 
describe  the  relevant  divine  power  as  ct(poVOS  .  And  as 
it  is  evidently  by  virtue  of  being  an  incorporeal 
nature  that  this  ascription  can  correctly  be  made,  it 
follows  that  the  divine  powers  are,  like  God,  7/  OVOL  .  / 
A  further  characterisation  of  the  divine  powers 
provides  us  with  evidence  of  the  origin  of  the  Philonic' 
divine  powers.  In  an  allegorical  interpretation  of  the 
account  of  the  divided  portions  (Gen.  YV)  Philo 
describes:  "the  auVI,  4CL5  as  they  pass  through  the 
midst  of  material  and  immaterial  things.  They  destroy 
nothing  -  for  the  half-pieces  remain  unharmed  -  but 
divide  and  distinguish  the  nature  of  each"2.  Philo  is 
here  ascribing  to  the  divine  powers  the  function  of 
"dividing  and  distinguishing  the  natures"  of  things, 
that  is  to  say,  fixing  each  thing  in  its  species, 
oo"o" 
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making  it  the  kind  of  thing  it  is.  This  is  a  function 
0  of  the  Platonic  Forms.  The  similarity  between  the 
Philonic  divine  powers  and  the  Platonic  Forms  is  in 
fact  closer  still,  since  the  Forms  also  are 
'q. 
a-c, 
ý 
1-0L 
7/ 
and  acypoVOC. 
FurVthermorep  Philo's  insistence-on  the  unitariness 
of  the  system  of  divine  powers,  with  their  hierarchic 
organisation  subsumed  under  a  single  principle,  closely 
resembles  Plato's  conception  of  the  unitariness  of  the 
Forms,  with  the  Form  of  the  God  in  the  position  of  the 
supreme  member  of  the  World  of  Forms,  and  thus  playing, 
-in  certain  respects,  a  similar  role  in  the  World  of 
Forms  to  the  role  played  by  the  logos  in  the  system 
of  divine  powers. 
These  similarities  between  the  Platonic  Forms  and 
the  Philonic  divine  powers  suggest  an  important 
question  in  the  field  of  epistemology  whose  answer 
will  illuminate  certain  passages  in  Marqah's 
writings  which  we  shall  shortly  be  considering.  The 
question  concerns  the  knowability  of  the  divine 
powers. 
It  is  clear,  particularly  from  the  Republic,  what 
Plato's  position  was  on  the  matter  of  the  knowability 
of  the  Forms.  He  thought  that  knowledge  of  the  Forms 
was  difficult,  indeed  impossible  for  most,  and  that 
only  a  few,  and  even  in  their  case  after  a  special 
education,  would  be  able  to  know  the  Forms.  1;  hud  Plato 118 
did  not  deny  that  men  could  know  the  Forms,  and  in 
fact  his  political  theory  assumes  that  there  will  be 
men  who  would  be  able  to  secure  insight  into  the  Forms 
of  Goodness  and  Justice  and  who  would  be  able  to  rule 
a  State  according  to  the  principles  gained  from  that 
insight. 
Earlier  in  this  chapter  reference  was  made  to  the 
fact  that  in  Philo's  view  the  divine  powers  were 
incomprehensible,  a  view  which  does,  of  course,  indicate 
a  lack  of  similarity  between  the  Forms  and  the  divine 
powers.  Dut  the  Philonic  position  on  this  matter  is 
not  a  simple  one.  Something  must  now  be  said  to  give 
some  indication  of  the  points  at  which  it  is  complex. 
In  an  important  passage  Philo  portrays  Moses  as 
beseeching  God  to  show  him  the  glory  that  is  around 
God.  The  answer  which  Philo  represents  God  as  giving  is 
as  follows:  "The  powers  which  thou  seekest  to  know 
are  discerned  not  by  sight  but  by  mind  even  as  I, 
Whose  they  are,  am  discerned  by  mind  and  not  by  sight, 
and  when  I  say  'they  are  discerned  by  mind'  I  speak  not 
of  those  which  are  now  actually  apprehended  by  mind 
but  mean  that  if  these  other  powers  could  be 
apprehended  it  would  not  be  by  sense  but  by  mind  at  its 
purest.  But  while  in  their  essence  they  are  beyond  your 
apprehension,  they  nevertheless  present  to  yo 
Ir 
sight  a 
sort  of  impress  and  copy  of  their  active  working.... 
Do  not,  then,  hope  to  be  ever  able  to  apprehend  Me 
.ý1 
f 
.J ll9 
or  any  of  My  powers  in  Our  essence"'*  Philo  is 
asserting  that  whether  or  not  the  divine  powers  are 
comprehensible-at  all,  with  respect  to  them  the 
outer  senses  are  not  a  veridical  source  of  knowledge. 
Yet  it  would  seem  that  Philo  does  not  entirely  rule 
out  the  knowability  of  the  powers  since  he  allows,  or 
appears  to  allow,  that  they  can  be  attained  by,  and 
only  by,  "mind  at  its  purest".  Nevertheless,  though 
the  purest  mind  is  able  to  attain  to  a  knowledge  of 
the  divine  powers  that  knowledge  is  not  of  their 
essence,  for  that  is  no  more  available  than  is  the 
essence  of  God.  But  if  we  cannot  know  them  in  their 
essence,  then  under  what  description  can  we  know  them? 
Philots  reference  to  "a  sort  of  impress  and  copy 
of  their  active  working"  provides  a  clue  to  the  answer. 
For  this  mode  of  expression  suggests  that  he  is  making 
use  of  a  model  similar  to  the  model  of  the  relationship 
between  Platonic  Forms  and  the  things  informed.  The 
implination  is  that  the  power  can  be  known  in  so  far 
as  it  impresses  itself  in  matter.  We  know  it  in  its 
effects,  just  as  we  can  come  to  know  God  by  a 
consideration  of  nature.  We  cannot  know  God  as  He  is 
in  Himself,  that  is,  as  He  is  is  in  His  essence,  but 
only  as  He  is  in  the  world.  And  likewise  we  know  His 
powers  only  as  they  have  an  effect  in  the  world. 
Hence  we  can  know  them  only  in  a  sullied,  andlnever  in 
a  pure,  state. 
Confirmation  that  Philo  had  Plato's  theory  of  Forms 
in  mind  is  ready  to  hand.  In  the  same  chapte  of  the t"(" 
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De  Lerribus  Snecialibus  with  which  we  have  been  concerned 
Philo  puts  the  following  words  into  God's  mouth:  "You 
men  have  for  your  use  seals  which  when  brought  into 
contact  with  wax  or  similar  material  stamp  on  them 
any  number  of  impressions  while  they  themselves  are 
not  docked  jn  any  part  thereby  but  remain  as  they  were, 
Such  you  must  conceive  My  powers  'to  bei  supplying 
quality  and  shape  to  things  which  lack  either  and  yet 
changing  or  lessening  nothing  of  their  eternal  nature, 
Some  among  you  call  them  not  inaptly  "forms"  or 
"ideas".  since  they  bring  form  into  everything  that  is"l 
Philo,  it  can  be  seen  from  the  last  sentence,  is 
hesitant.  He  tells  us  that  some  "not  inaptly(OL'  crt  o 
o'KOCTO  v)"  call  the  powers  Forms.  Speculation  on  the 
purpose  of  this  phrase  is  bound  to  be  conjectural.  But 
it  is  possible  that  the  reason  he  employs  the  phrase 
"not  inaptly"  rather  than,  say,  "entirely  correctly"  is 
precisely  that  Plato  believed  that  men,  even  though 
only  men  of  the  purest  mind,  can  know  the  Forms, 
/ 
whereas  according  to  Philols  view  of  the  matter  the 
divine  powers  are  not  thus  knowable. 
However,  though  the  divine  powers  are  considered  by 
Philo  to  be  unknowable  in  their  essence,  he  nevertheless 
also  considers  himself  entitled  to  say  a  good  deal 
about  them,  since  he  regards  himself  as  able  to  read 
about  them  in  the  world  as  a  man  can  read  about  ideas 
"o""o 
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in  a  book.  In  particular  Philo  is  especially 
informative  on  the  subject  of  the  logos,  which  we 
noticed  earlier  as  standing  in  a  pre-eminent  position 
among  the  powers.  This  is  not  the  place  for  a 
detailed  and  sustained  examination  of  this  large  and 
controversial  topic.  Instead  I  shall  restrict  myself 
to  a  few  points  about  the  logos  which  will,  it  is  to 
be  hoped,  provide  a  sufficient  basis  for  the 
exposition  of  certain  particularly  close  conceptual 
links  between  Philo  and  Marqah. 
The  term  'logos'  is  used  by  Philo  to  cover  a  range 
of  things  created  and  uncreated.  It  is  used,  as  we  saw, 
to  refer  to  the  chief  power  or  Form,  its  role  being  at 
least  partly  that  of  a  unifier,  that  of  a  principle  of 
unity,  in  the  world  of  powers  or  Forms.  For  this 
reason  Philo  identifies  logos  with  the  world  of  Forms.  ,  X, 
Now,  logos,  as  so  understood,  has  two  aspects  that  may 
without  serious  distortion  be  termed  the  transcendent 
and  the  immanent  aspects.  As  transcendent,  logos  must 
first  and  foremost  be  seen  in  its  relation  to  God. 
Logos  is  a  Kö  dos  voryi-  ,  an  intelligible  world 
l,  Philo 
tells  use  and  as  such  can  be  an  object  only  of  the 
intellect,  not  of  the  senses.  But  in  relation  to  whose 
intellect  or  mind  does  the  world  exist?  Philo  s 
answer  is  that  the  mind  that  knows  the  intelli  ible 
world  is  God's.  But  it  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  God, 
Does* 
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so  to  say,  found  the  Forms  or  powers  that  form  the 
intelligible  world.  The  De  Onificio  Mundil  suggests 
that  the  Forms  were  created  by  God,  He  as  it  were 
thought  them  into  existence,  as  a  preparatory  stage  to 
the  creation  of  the  perceptual  world.  Thus  Philo"is 
able  to  write  of  the  logos:  "...  it  alone  preceded  and 
outran  all.  things,  conceived  before  them  all,  manifest 
above  them  all.  In  this  mode  of  existence  the  logos  "2 
is  transcendent. 
The  logos,  as  conceived  by  Philo,  is  however  dynamic. 
The  Philonic  God  has  a  superabundance  of  being,  which, 
being  superabundant,  spills  from  Him  and  pours  down, 
The  outpouring  cannot,  of  course,  in  any  way  diminish 
God,  since  a  God  that  could  be  diminished  is  not  a  God 
that  is  absolutely  one,  In  this  respect,  to  stress  a 
point  that  Goodenough,  both  in  By  Light,  Light  and  in 
An  Introduction  to  Philo  Judaeus,  saw  as  central  to 
Philo's  teaching,  God  can  be  compared  to  the  sun  which, 
though  sending  forth  a  stream  of  life-creating  and 
life-supporting  light,  remains  as  complete  and  self- 
sufficient  as  if  it  passed  on  noneof  itself,  The 
Philonic  logos,  then,  is  like  the  sun,  -and  as  the 
rays  of  the  sun  have  an  effect  on  the  world  so  also, 
though  in  a  more  profound  way,  does  the  logos.  In  its 
.  .... 
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influential  role  in  the  perceptual  world  the  logos 
manifests  its  immanent  aspect.  Two  related  features 
of  the  immanent  aspect  of  the  logos  must  be  mentioned 
here. 
First,  it  makes  things  in  the  world  the  kinds  of 
things  they  are.  It  moulds  or  shapes  matter,  or 
patterns  it.  The  pure  patterns  themselves  are,  of 
course,  the  Forms  or  divine  powers  that  comprise  the 
logos.  These  are,  as  we  have  seen,  unknowable  in 
themselves  though  not  in  their  effects,  the  effects 
being  things  in  the  world  in  so  far  as  they  embody 
the  divine  powers.  With  this  aspect  of  the  logos  in 
mind  Philo  speaks  of  it  as  clothed  in  the  world,  as  the 
soul  is  clothed  in  the  body.  With  regard  to  this 
l 
stage  of  Philo's  system,  the  Christian  concept  of  the 
word  of  God  made  incarnate  is.  close  to  hand  -  though 
what  Philo's  response  would  have  been  to  the  Christian 
version  of  the  doctrine  that  he  espoused  is  not 
ä 
question  that  need  be  tackled  here.  It  is  sufficient 
for  our  present  purpose  to  note  that  Philo  conceived 
the  logos  as  made  incarnate,  and  that  he  conceived  it 
as  being,  in  that  incarnate  state,  knowable. 
Secondly,  the  logos  is  immanent  as  the  laws  of 
nature.  Wolfson  discusses  at  length  three  of  these, 
namely,  (a)  the  law  of  opposites,  (b)  the  law  of  the 
*0000 
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harmony  of  opposites,  and  (c)  the  law  of  the 
perpetuity  of  the  species 
l.  Very  briefly  stated,  the 
law  of  opposites  affirms  that  all  things  are  in  two 
parts  which  are  equal  and  opposite.,  Thus  God  created 
two  equal  light  elements  (air  and  fire),  two  equal 
heavy  elements  (earth  and  water),  and  the  light 
elements  are  conjointly  equal  to  the  heavy.  Similarly, 
light  and  darkness  occur  in  equal  proportions,  as  do 
the  opposing  seasons  (summer  and  winter,  and  spring 
and  autumn). 
The  law  of  the  harmony  of  opposites  states  that 
opposite  things  are  equal.  Philo  formulates  the  law 
as  follows:  "The  Divine  Word  stations  Himself  to  keep 
these  elements  apart...  that  the  universe  may  send  forth 
a  harmony  like  that-of  a  masterpiece  of  literature. 
He  mediates  between  the  opponents  amid  their 
threatenings,  and  reconciles  them  by  winning  ways  to 
peace  and  concord"z 
Finally,  Philols  law  of  the  perpetuity  of  the 
species  states:  ,  For  God  willed  that  Nature  should  run 
a  course  that  brings  it  back  to  its  starting-point, 
endowing  the  species.  with  immortality,  and  making  them 
sharers  of  eternal  existence"3.  ýr 
....  . 
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It  can  be  seen  from  this  brief  exposition  of  the 
Philonic  teaching  on  the  incarnate  logos  that  with 
respect  to  its  presence  in  the  world  the  logos  is  all- 
permeating,  determining,  as  it  does,.  both  the  nature  of 
each  thing  and  also  the  particular  way  in  which  each 
thing  occupies  a  position  in  space  and  time,  in  the 
harmoniously  arranged  cosmos. 
It  is  with  regard  to  this  account  of  Philo's 
teaching  on  the  divine  powers,  sketchy  though  my 
exposition  has  been,  that  I  wish  now  to  consider  the 
extent  to  which  Marqah's  teaching  on  the  divine  power 
bears  a  resemblance  to  Philo's  doctrine.  As  we  shall 
shortly  see,  the  resemblance  between  the  teachings  of 
Philo  and  Marqah  on  the  subject  of  the  divine  power  is 
very  close  indeed,  'so  much  so  that  a  strong  case  can  be 
made  out  in  favour  of  the  claim  that  Marqah's 
philosophy  of  divine  power  is  almost  identical  to 
Philo  s. 
A  striking  feature  that  must  not  be  passed  over  in 
silence  is  the  centrality  of  the  idea  of  divine  power, 
both  for  Philo  and  for  Marqah.  It  is  no  accident  that 
the  opening  sentence  in  the  Memar  is:  "Great  is  the 
mighty  power  i'1  L!  '  j)  who  endures  forever".  The 
prominence  thereby  given  by  Marqah  to  the  ideal  of  the 
divine  power  was  clearly  intentional,  for  the 
conception  of  the  divine  power  can  be  seen  to  be,  at 
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Margah's  teachings. 
Not  only  in  the  Memar  itself,  but  also  in  his  chain 
of  hymns  in  the  Defter,  Marqah  gives  a  prominent 
position  to  the  conception  of  the  divine  powers.  In 
Hymn  I  v.  3  he  declares:  "Thy  powers  are  the  fruit  of 
Thy  mind".  This  statement  warrant*  close  scrutiny, 
since  its  affinities  with  Philonic  thought  are 
startling.  As  a  first  step  towards  understanding  this 
verse  it  is  necessary  to  bear  in  mind  the  conception, 
outlined  above,  of  the  transcendent  logos.  According 
to  this  conception  the  logos  can  be  regarded  as 
identical  with  the  mind  of  God.  But  we  cannot  suppose 
the  divine  mind  to  be  devoid  of  content.  It  must,  of 
course,  contain  ideas.  Indeed,  the  Aristotelian 
position  on  this  matter  would  be  that  a  mind  without 
ideas  is  necessarily  deficient,  for  mind  has  a 
potential  for  ideas-and  is  thus  fully  real  only  when  it 
is  engaged  in  thought.  Hence  if  we  are  not  to  be  able 
correctly  to  attribute  unreality  to  the  mind  of  God  we 
must  suppose  that  He  has  ideas.  But,  as  we  have 
observed,  the  content  of  God's  mind  consists  of; 
(Platonic)  Forms  or,.  as  Philo  also  terms  them,  divine 
powers.  Hence,  the  divine  powers  are  produced;  byg  or 
are  the  fruit  of,  the  divine  mind. 
Of  course,  neither  for  Philo  nor  for  Margahlwould  it 
be  correct  to  employ  the  model  of  a  plant-bearing  fruit 
or  of  a  seed  coming  to  fruition,  as  understood  in  an 
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entirely  literal  way.  For  the  literal  model  is  a 
temporal  model.  Temporally,  that  is  to  say,  the  plant 
must  precede'its  fruit,  or  the  seed  its  fruition.  But 
since  both  Philo  and  Nargah  are  insistent  on  the 
timelessness  of  God,  the  model  of  seed  and  fruit,  or 
plant  and  fruit,  must  be  regarded  by  them,  whether 
correctly  of  not,  as  invoking  a  logical  or  an 
ontological  priority  rather  than  a  temporal 
precedence. 
This  parallel  between  Philo  and  Margah  may, 
however,  seem  merely  fortuitous.  Though  Philo  would 
unquestionably  have  accepted  that  "Thy  powers  are  the 
fruit  of  Thy  mind",  it  may  be  that  it  is  only  the 
verbal  formula  itself  rather  than  its  conceptual 
content  as  that  is  understood  by  Margah  that  Philo 
subscribes  to.  But  it  is  in  fact  the  conceptual  content 
on  which  the  two  thinkers  are  agreed. 
Indication  of  this  agreement  is  to  be  found  in  the 
fact  that  Samaritan  thought  has  a  logos  doctrine  and 
that  Moses,  'playing  a  role  for  the  Samaritans  that 
resembles  in  certain  respects  the  role  that  Chri.  s 
plays  in  Christianity,  is  regarded  by  the  Samaritans 
as  a  kind  of  incarnate  logos,  and,  prior  to  his  birthx 
an  unincarnate  logos.  Philo,  also,  as  is  well  known, 
spoke  of  Moses  as  "logos".  But  the  issue  presently 
before  us,  namely,  Margah's  understanding  of  the  idea 
of  the  divine  power,  and  its  relationship  with,  Philo's 128 
teaching  on  the  same  matter,  will  shed  much  light  on 
this  further  similarity  between  the  two  men. 
A  consideration  of  the  great  stress  laid  by  Philo 
upon  the  unknowability  of  God's  powers  in  their  essence 
naturally  gives  rise  to  the  question  of  whether  Margah's 
teachings  include  a  comparable  doctrine.  The  weight  of 
evidence  supports  the  claim  that  Marqah  did  subscribe 
to  that  doctrine.  The  evidence  is-to  be  found  in  both 
the  Neorar  and  the  Defter  hymns.  Thus  in  the  second 
hymn  1.3  Marqah  writes:  "Who  can  discover  or 
understand  Thy  great  might 
(  "J'-"'I  P"I  X11'a)" 
.  And  in 
a  similar  vein  in  hymn  IX  v.  3  he  affirms:  "Thy  might 
is  hidden  (i  1'  b  T_n  `71ýa  )" 
.  That  this  doctrine  is 
maintained  in  the  Memar  also  is  easily  demonstrated. 
Early  in  Book  VI  he  writes:  "It  is  not  possible  even 
for  a  knowledgeable  man  to  know  the  might  of  his 
Creator"  [I  132,  II  215].  Elsewhere  Marqah  asserts: 
"Here  is  power  that  is  not  comprehensible,  here  is 
might  unceasing"  [I  90t  II  146].  And  writing  of  God's 
power  as  it  manifested  itself  at  the  Red  Sea,  Marqah 
affirms:  "The  mightyWise  One  has  said  that  it  is  not  in 
man's  power  to  comprehend  it"  [I  41,  II  651. 
Nevertheless,  Marqah  does  not  maintain  that  there  is 
nothing  that  we  can  know,  however  inadequately, 
concerning  the  divine  power  -  any  more  than  Philo,  before 
him,  had  maintained  this,  One  point  that  mustinot  be 
lost  sight  of  is  that  we  do,  in  Marqah's  view 
of 
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matter,  know  at  least  that  God's  power  exists.  The 
evidence  Marqah  adduces  in  support  of  this  position 
allows  him.  to  construct  a  variety  of  cosmological 
argument.  for  the  existence  of  the  divine  power.  For, 
with  reference  to  day  and  night,  to  the  four  seasons 
and  the  four  elements,  he  writes:  "'Ile  created  ten 
things  that  bear  witness  to  His  might"  [I  131,  II  213]. 
More  generally,  he  asserts:  "From  Thy  works  we  know 
what  Thy  power  is"  [Hymn  X  v.  13].  As  with  so  much 
else  relating  to  God,  we  can,  we  are  told  now,  read 
the  fact  of  His  power  in  the  pages  of  nature.  His 
power  over  His  creations  leaves  its  indelible  mark 
on  the  res  creatae  themselves;  and  in  fact  Marqah 
affirms  not  merely  that  the  four  seasons  are 
testimonies  to  God's  power  but  even  that  they  were 
"established  as  four  testimonies"  [I  131,  II  213].  It 
is  therefore  not  surprising  to  find  that  immediately 
before  the  statement  just  quoted,  Marqah  offers  a 
short  prayer:  "Magnify  Him  and  praise  His  power  over 
the  manifold  creations". 
It  is  of  especial  interest  to  any  study  of  the 
relationship  between-Philo  and  Marqah  on  the  topic  of 
the  divine  powers,  that  having  asserted  that  the  "ten 
things"  (sc,  day,  night,  the  four  seasons  and  the  four 
elements)  bear  witness  to  the  might  of  God,  Margah 
immediately  asserts:  "Observe  these  things  and  realise 
that  they  are  evidences  testifying  of  Him  that  He  is  one 130 
in  His  essence"  [I  131,  II  213].  Marqah  is  here 
claiming  that  a  collection  of  ten  things  is  testimony 
both  to  the  power  of  God  and  to  His  oneness.  Despite 
the  disparateness  of  the  ten  things  they  are 
witnesses  to  something  essentially  one.  But  the 
implication  of  the  contiguity  of  the  ideas  thus  expressed 
in  the  Memar  is  that  the  powers  of  God  also  have  an 
essential  oneness,  as  does  God  Himself.  And  this,  as 
we  saw,  is  precisely  the  doctrine  that  Philo  himself 
taught.  For  he  held  that  the  logos,  considered  in  one 
of  its  aspects,  is  not  merely  a  power  of  God,  but  is  also 
a  unifying  principle  binding  together  the  other  powers, 
and  is  thus  responsible  for  their  unitariness.  Indeed, 
Wolfson,  as  we  noted,  wished  to  take  a  further  step  and 
argue  that  the  powers  of  God  have  the  same  degree  or 
kind  of  oneness  that  God  Himself  has.  Margah's  text 
does  not  demand  this  interpretation.  But  even  if  we 
reject  Wolfson's  thesis,  it  nevertheless  seems 
reasonable  to  maintain  that  Marqah  held  that  the 
divine  powers  are  sufficiently  close  to  God  to  be  able 
to  bask  in  the  reflection  of  His  oneness.  And  though 
perhaps  not  one  in  the  sense  in  which  God  is  one,  they 
do  form  a  particularly  close  unity  that  owes  its 
existence  to  a  special  relation  with  God.  If,  as  we 
suggested  in  the  previous  chapter,  Margah  held  that 
God's  oneness  renders  God  incomprehensible  to  mane  it 
would  not  be  surprising  if  the  divine  power,  jprecisely 131 
because  it  is  divine,  also  has  a  oneness  that  renders 
the  power  incomprehensible.  It  must  be  admitted  that 
Margah  does  not  in  fact  explicitly  attribute  the 
incomprehensibility  of  the  divine  power  to  its  oneness. 
But  it  is  not  wholly  5.  mplausible  to  offer  such  an 
interpretation  of  the  Memar  as  a  fair  extrapolation 
from  the  text. 
Marqah's  acceptance  of  the  doctrine  of  the 
incomprehensibility  of  the  divine  power  appears 
indisputable.  Not  only  specific  statements  that  he 
makes  on  this  topic  but  also  a  consideration  of  the 
general  tenor  of  his  teaching  as  a  whole,  in  which  the 
otherness  of  the  divine  is  strongly  stressed,  point  in 
the  direction  of  Marqah's  acceptance  of  that  doctrine. 
Nevertheless,  the  position  is  not  entirely  free  from 
complication,  In  the  previous  chapter  it  was  shown 
that  Marqah  held  both  that  God  is  incomprehensible  and 
also  that  we  can  know  God,  The  problem,  of  course,  was 
how,  if  at  all,  these  seemingly  mutually  inconsistent 
positions  could  be  reconciled.  Precisely  this  type  of 
difficulty,  firmly  placed  in  the  field  of 
epistemology  and  arising  in  connection  with  divinity, 
occurs  with  respect  to  God's  powers.  For  despite 
Marqah's  persistent  denials  of  the  knowability  by  man 
of  the.  divine  powers,  he  also  presents  what  iss  at  least 
on  the  surface,  a  position  logically  opposed  to  the  one 
I  have  attributed  to  him.  Thus  he  writes:  "The 132 
beginning  of  knowledge  is  when  man  knows  the  might  of 
his  Creator  and  trembles  at  His  greatness  and  is  in 
dread  of  His  power"  [I  14+1,  II  2311.  What  I  wish  to 
argue  now  is  that  by  making  certain.  distinctions  that 
are  familiar  to  us,  and  that  were,  more  importantly, 
demonstrably  familiar  to  Marqah,  the  seeming 
contradiction  in  his  epistemological  doctrine  can  be 
resolved. 
The  crucial  distinction  is  that  between'  transcendence 
and  immanence,  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  Hargah  held 
that  the  divine  power  exists  in  both  these  modes.  He 
invokes  them  when  he  affirms  that:  "Thy  divine  power 
is  all-permeating,  on  high  and  below"  [Hymn  I  v.  8],  or, 
slightly  altering  the  imagery:  "On  high  and  down 
below  Thy  power  is  great  and  sovereign" 
[Hymn  II  v.  2]. 
Likewise,  Marqah  declaims:  "His  power  is  in  the 
heavens  above  and  in-the  earth  beneath.  There  is  no 
place  outside  of  His  control"  [I  132,  II  215]. 
Granted  that  Margah  does  distinguish  between  the 
transcendent  and  the  immanent  power  of  God,  one  move 
that  is  available  to  us  as  a  way  of  resolving  the 
difficulty  we  are  facing  is  to  say  that  God's  power  is 
unknowable  in  its  transcendent  aspect  but  knowable  so 
far  as  it  is  immanent.  In  this  connection,  Margah's 
statement,  quoted  earlier,  "From  Thy  works  we 
inow 
what 
Thy  power  is",  as  well  as  his  other  declarations  about 
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have  a  particular  significance.  Marqah's  doctrine,  which 
is  the  same  as  Philo's  at  this  point,  is  that  the  divine 
powers  are  not  comprehensible  in  themselves,  that  is,  in 
their  essence,  but  are  comprehensible  to  man  only  so  far 
as  they  are  immanent  in  the  world.  We  know  them  by 
their  effects.  But  know  them  to  be  what? 
Various  statements  by  Margah  allow  us  to 
reconstruct  his  position  on  this  matter,  and  also 
enable  us  to  relate  his  account  to  Philos.  In  an 
important  passage  in  the  Memar  we  are  told:  "His  power  is 
in  the  heavens  above  and  in  the  earth  beneath  ...  all  places 
He  made,  fashioned,  perfected,  set  in  order,  made 
ready"  [I  132,  II  215].  More  remarkably  still,  Marqah 
asserts:  "For  our  Lord  in  His  great  power  made 
everything  a  form,  then  created  and  fashioned  and  made 
creatures  exceedingly  grand"  [I  88,  II  142].  There  is 
an  unmistakable  similarity  between  this  picture  and 
Philo's  doctrine  of  the  divine  powers  considered  as 
Platonic  Forms  which,  acting  as  causes,  form,  or 
rather  inform,  things,  thereby  giving  them  their 
specific  nature,  making  them,  that  is,  the  kinds  of 
things  they  are. 
Since  everything  has  a  Form,  God's  power  must 
permeate  the  world.  This  aspect  of  divine  power  is 
invoked  by  Marqah  when  he  affirms:  "The  divine  power 
is  all-permeating"  [Hymn  I  v.  8].  In  so  writing  he 
points  directly  to  the  fact  that  everything 
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universe,  being  structured  or  shaped,  or  bearing  a  form, 
possesses  the  marks  of  divine  power,  But  though  divine 
power  does  permeate  the  world,  it  does  not  do  so  in  a 
manner  that  enables  the  power  to  be,  known  in  itself  or 
in  its  essence.  One  reason  for  this  is  that  though  the 
divine  power  is  in  a  sense  in  what  it  empowers,  the 
relation  of  "in-ness"  is  not  a  spatial  relationship. 
Marqah  warns  us  against  a  materialist  interpretation  of 
the  relationship  when  he  writes:  "Thy  great  power 
sustains  all  things  without  being  near  them"  [Hymn  I  v.  5]. 
Thus,  in  looking  at  an  empowered  res  creata  we  cannot 
be  looking  at  the  power  itself  for  it  is  not  a 
corporeal  entity  visible  to  the  eye.  We  can  look  only 
at  what  is  merely  an  effect  of  the  divine  power.  It  is 
possible  that  Marqah's  rejection  of  the  materialist 
conception  we  are  here  discussing  is  also  what  underlies 
his  phrase:  "Helper,  Uplifter,  Sustainer,  who  does  use 
no  physical  force"  [Hymn  I  v.  15].  Thus  the  evidence* 
suggests  that  Philo's  description  of  the  divine  powers 
as 
äo" 
ýa-r- 
oL  was  acceptable  to  Marqah. 
Likewise,  Philo's  descriptioft  of  the  divine  posers, 
mentioned  earlier,  as 
ä 
R6r  (-ýPa  pL  was  also  acceptable 
to  Marqah.  Thus,  'Margahls  description  of  the  powers  as 
"incalculable"  [I  69,  II  110],  and  his  assertion:  "There 
is  no  end  to  Thy  power"  [I  10,  II  11]  both  accord  with 
Philo's  «nEPt, 
ypo(roL. 
Furthermore/, 
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assertion  that  the  divine  powers  are  c  fOvoc.  accorded 
with  Margahts  position  on  this  matter.  It  is  possible  to 
adduce  two  kinds  of  justification  for  this  claim.  First, 
there  are  the  ipsissima  verba  of  Marqah.  He  writes,  in 
the  first  sentence  of  the  Nemar:  "Great  is  the  mighty 
Power  who  endures  forever  (ý/yýJ)"",  And  later  he 
repeats  the  doctrine:  "Nothing  exists  forever  (p9Y') 
but  His  power"  [I  709  II  112].  If  we  understand  P  %y 
to  refer  to  a  timeless  eternity  then  certainly  we  are 
forced  to  the  conclusion  that  the  divine  powers  are, 
in  Margah's  view,  aAeoVot_. 
Secondly,  a  philosophical  justification  can  be 
adduced  to  support  the  claim  that  Marqah's  conception  of 
a  divine  power  is  of  an  aX(OVO5  . 
The  argument  is  that 
God  did  not  create  His  power  at  the  time  that  He 
created  the  world.  Hence  the  divine  power  does  not 
rely  for  its  existence  on  the  existence  of  the  world. 
But,  as  we  saw  in  an  earlier  chapter,  Marqah  held  that 
time  came  into  existence  with  the  creation  of  the 
world.  Thus  divine  power  does  not  need  time  in  order 
to  exist.  Hence  it  must  itself  be  timeless. 
This  large  measures  of  agreement  between  Philo  and 
Marqah  on  the  nature  of  the  divine  power,  naturally 
invites  the  question  of  whether  their  doctrines  of  divine 
power  do  differ  at  any  point.  Much  the  most  obvious 
point  at  which  to  look  for  divergence  of  doctrine  is 
the  doctrine  of  emanation,  That  Philo  subscribed  to 136 
such  a  doctrine  is  not  for  the  moment  in  dispute.  The 
question  at  issue  is  whether  Marqah  did.  I  would  like 
to  argue  that  the  evidence  indicates  that  he  did  not. 
The  reason  for  supposing  that  he  could  not  have  done 
relates  to  his  insistence  on  the  otherness  of  God. 
The  point  about  God's  otherness  is  that  it  is  due  to 
an  infinite  and  unbridgeable  gap  between  Himself  and 
the  created  world.  The  gap,  though  infinite,  must 
not  be  thought  to  separate  God  from  the  world  by  an 
infinite  distance  in  space  or  an  infinite  period  in 
time.  For  even  an  infinite  spatial  or  temporal  gap 
would  ensure  a  spatial  or  temporal  relationship  between 
God  and  the  world.  Yet  an  aspect  of  God's  otherness 
is  that  His  existence  is  neither  spatial  nor  temporal. 
I  argued  in  an  earlier  chapter  that  the  fundamental 
concept  underlying  the  utter  otherness  of  God  is,  for 
Margah,  Godts  absolute  oneness.  Since  God's  oneness 
cannot  alter,  and  since  the  essential  multiplicity  of 
the  world,  however  unitary  it  is  in  its  multipliccity, 
cannot  alter  either,  God  cannot  over  get  closer  to  us 
or  we  to  God. 
But  the  emanationist  doctrine  presents  a 
significantly  different  story  on  the  relationship 
between  God  and  the  world.  That  doctrine  relies  on 
the  concept  of  a  series  of  intermediaries  bridging  the 
gap  between  God  and  mundane  perceptual  objects.  The 
bridging  is  achieved  by  a  process  of  germinatibn  in 137 
which  each  thing  produces  from  itself  something  of  an 
adjacent  but  lesser  nature.  This  doctrine  has 
implications  for  the  theory  of  the  otherness  of  God. 
For  even  though  God,  according  to  this  theory,  remains 
other,  the  conclusion  would  have  to  be  drawn  that  His 
otherness  is  greater  in  relation  to  some  things  than  to 
others.  And  it  is  not  unreasonable  to  suppose  that 
Marqah  would  hesitate  over  the  acceptance  of  such  a 
doctrine. 
In  considering  the  question  of  whether  Nargah  is  an 
emanationist  a  further  approach  would  be  to  consider 
the  kind  of  metaphor  he  employs  in  connection  with  his 
description  of  creation.  In  particular,  it  would  be 
important  to  take  account  of  the  way  he  speaks  about  the 
divine  powers,  for  above  all  else  in  his  writings  these 
seem  much  the  likeliest  candidates  for  the  role  of 
intermediaries  between  God  and  the  world. 
Now,  two.  standard  neoplatonic  metaphors  used  in 
connection  with  the  process  of  emanation  are,  first, 
the  metaphor  of  God  as  the  sun  whose  emanating  rays  are 
the  intermediaries  between  Him  and  the  perceptual  worlds 
and  secondly,  the  metaphor  of  germination.  -Neither  of 
these  metaphors  is  absent  from  Marqah's  writings,  any 
more  than  from  Philos.  In  the  Memar  Marqah  writes: 
"Praise  be  to  the  Illuminator  who  fills  the  wise  with 
the  spirit  of  wisdom,  so  that  they  are  like  lamps 
shining  in  the  world  and  dispelling  the  dark" 138 
[I  143,  II  236].  Elsewhere  he  writes:  "In  the 
Primordial  Silence  Thou  didst  germinate  (11y)ß  )  words 
which  generated  creations,  Thy  powers  are  the  fruit 
of  Thy  mind"  [Hymn  I  vv.  2.3].  The  first  of  these  two 
quotations.  constitutes  slender  evidence  upon  which  to 
base  an  imputation  to  Margah  of  an  emanationist  theory. 
But  the  second  provides  much  more  substantial  support 
for  such  an  imputation. 
By  itself  it  is  not,  of  course,  conclusive.  It(is 
a  crucial  methodological  principle  that  a  distinction 
has  to  be  drawn  between  similarity  of  imagery  or  of 
modes  of  expression,  and  similarity  of  the  conceptual 
content  of  that  imagery  or  those  expressions.  It 
remains  to  be  considered,  therefore,  whether  DSargahts 
employment  of  the  germination  metaphor  is  indicative 
of  an  acceptance  of  neoplatonic  emanationism. 
Philöis  reference  to  the  logos  as  the  "first  born 
son  of  God  (n-(w  ro 
/ovov 
V 
ov)"1, 
as  being  "second  to 
God"2,  as  the  "eldest  of  created  things"3,  as  well  as 
to'the  special  place  that  he  assigns  to  the  logos, 
/at 
the  head  of  the  chain  of  divine  powers,  is  strongly 
suggestive  of  the  idea  that  in  so  far  as  there  is  a 
theory  of  emanation  in  Philo's  teachings,  it  is,  the 
logos  that  has  the  role  of  first  emanation.  The  logos 
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was  described  by  Philo,  as  we  saw,  as  being  in  one  of 
its  aspects  the  mind  of  God.  These  facts  point  to  an 
unexpected  parallel,  that  is  at  least  a  verbal  parallel, 
0-0  with  Margah.  For  in  the  Nemar,  where  a  mysterious 
dialogue  between  Mind  and  Heart  is  presented,  Heart 
asserts:  "0  Mind...  you  are  the  first  of  created  things. 
Who  can  compare  with  you? 
"[I  68,  II  109].  To  what 
extent  Philo  and  Margah  are  in  conceptual,  as  well  as 
verbal,  agreement  is-not  easy  to  judge,  since,  though 
Philo's  position  is  reasonably  clear,  Marqah's  is  not. 
In  particular,  it  is  not  entirely  clear  whose  mind 
Marqah  is  invoking.  It  may  be  God's  mind,  But  it  may 
instead  be  man's.  And  it  may  indeed  be  Mind  as  such, 
that  iss  nobody's  mind,  but  rather,  mind  simn].  iciter. 
A  further  similarity  that  may  be  verbal  only,  but 
may  also  be  conceptual,  concerns  the  second  and  third 
(or  perhaps  the  'joint  second')  elements  in  the  chain 
of  divine  powers.  We  have  observed  that  Philo 
assigned  an  exalted  position  to  goodness  and 
sovereignty  -  "Through  His  goodness  He  begat  all  that 
iss  through  His  sovereignty  He  rules  what  He  has 
begotten"'.  But  although  Philo  regards  those  powers 
as  a  duality,  he  nevertheless  saw  them  as  possessing  a 
unitariness,  with  logos,  the  first  power,  being  the 
unifying  principle.  Now,  it  is  worthy  of  note  that 
..... 
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`  Margah,  'who  can  be  seen  from  the  Memar  to  have 
attached  especial  significance  to  the  story  of  the 
rod  of  Moses,  asserts  that:  "A  rod  out  of  the  fire 
has  been  given  to  me  [Moses]  by  Thy 
_goodness. 
with 
great  sovereignty"  [I  99  II  10  my  italics].  We  know 
that  Margah  took  the  rod  to  have  a  mystical  reality, 
for  he  portrays  God  as  saying  to  Noses:  "You  will  see 
it  [the  rod]  with  your  eyes,  but  its  inner 
significance  must  be  within  your  heart"  [I  79  11  7]. 
The  nature  of  its  "inner  significance"  is  indicated 
within  two  lines,  namely:  "in  it  is  great  and 
powerful  rulership".  Bearing  in  mind  that  Margah  holds 
that  the  rod  was  given  by  God's  "goodness  with  great 
sovereignty",  a  natural  interpretation  of  the  text  is 
that  the  rod  is  in  some  special  sense  a  representative 
of  God.  Thus  the  rod,  playing  a  similar  role  in 
Marqah's  teaching  to  th; 
Philols,  can  be  seen  as 
together  the  two  divine 
sovereignty. 
But  here,  again,  the 
it  played  by  the  logos  in 
the  unifying  principle  holding 
powers  of  goodness  and 
l 
verbal  similarity  between/Margah's 
text  and  Philo's  is  not  conclusive  proof  of  a  deeper 
relationship  between  them.  For  example,  with  regard 
to  the  statement  concerning  the  rod:  "in  it  is  great 
and  powerful  rulership",  although  the  text  suggests  that 
the  rulership  referred  to  is  divine,  it  is  not  impossible 
that  it  is  the  rulership  Moses  will'  enjoy  as  a  result  of 141 
his  use  of  the  rod. 
Likewise,  with  regard  to  the  statement:  "A  rod  out  of 
the  fire  has  been  given  to  me  by  Thy  goodness  with 
great  sovereignty"  - 
L  11  »t  &v.  2  Tom'  i'  -r3  i 
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the  Aramaic  phrase  permits  us  to  interpret  the 
statement  as  affirming  that  both  the  rod  and  great 
sovereignty  were  given  to  Moses  by  God's  goodness. 
This  interpretation  is  admittedly  less  natural  than 
the  one  I  suggested  earlier,  but  it  cannot  be  ruled  out. 
If  it  is  the  correct  interpretation  then  the  verbal 
parallel  with  Philo's  assertions  that  I  have  been 
pointing  to  can  be  seen  to  have  no  deeper 
significance.  It  may  be  argued,  indeed,  that  the  less 
natural  interpretation  must  be  wrong,  since  Margah  does 
say:  "There  is  no  origin  to  His  power,  no  offshoot  of 
His  sovereignty"  [I  8,11  9].  But  it  is  probable  that 
Marqah  is  here  simply  making  the  point  that  God  has  not 
created  another  divine  being  with  sovereign  powers. 
Marqah  nowhere  seeks  to  deny  that  God  could  confer/ 
kingship  on  Moses.  I 
However,  immediately  following  his  affirmation  that 
there  is  no  offshoot  of  God's  sovereignty,  Marqah  adds: 
"He  Himself  is  the  origin  of  the  world  and  the  offshoot 
of  His  creation  (i  l  l"i'`11  /  ''T71)  ""o  Since  it  is 
possible  to  regard  this  assertion  as  sanctioning  an 
emanationist  interpretation  of  Margah's  teaching,  it  is 12 
important  not  to  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  it 
accords  well  with  a  non-emanationist  interpretation, 
In  describing  God  as  the  offshoot  of  His  creation, 
Marqah  may  simply  be  stating  his  frequently  repeated 
position  that  God  left  evidence  of  Himself  in  His 
creation,  evidence  of  such  a  sort  that  it  entitles  us 
to  say  that  God  exists  immanently  in  His  creation, 
though  also  transcending  it.  Thus  the  passage  at 
issue  does  not  demand  an  emanationist  interpretation. 
Hence,  if  such  an  interpretation  is  to  be  given,  the 
move  could  be  justified  only  by  showing  that  that 
interpretation  accords  with  the  tenor  of  Marqah's 
philosophy  as  a  whole.  But  so  far  no  substantial 
evidence  that  it  does  has  come  to  light. 
If,  as  appears  to  be  the  case,  there  is  no 
emanationist  doctrine  in  Marqah's  teaching  it  is 
worth  paying  attention  to  the  question  of  why  this 
should  be  so.  I  suggested  earlier  that  Marqah's 
doctrine  of  the  utter  otherness  of  God  was  at  least  a 
contributary  factor  in  this  situation.  But  there  are 
other  aspects  that  are  no  less  important,  and  that  are 
logically  related  in  subtle  ways  to  the  aspect  just 
referred  to.  Two  positions  in  particular  that  I 
would  like  to  defend  in  connection  with  this  matter  are, 
first,  that  Marqah  did  not  need  an  emanationist  theory 
to  bridge  any  lacuna  in  his  cosmological  doctrine,  and 
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emanationist  doctrine  in  his  writings  would  contradict 
one  of  his  most  deeply  held,  and  frequently  mentioned, 
religious  beliefs. 
The  purpose  of  the  doctrine  of  emanation,  certainly  as 
this  is  presented  passim  in  the  Enneads  of  Plotinus, 
is  to  explain  how  from  a  god  who  is  absolutely  one  a 
world  of  multiplicity  could  be  brought  into  existence. 
It  was  Plotinus'  view  that  whatever  has  perfection  is 
necessarily  creative,  and  also  that  any  creator  is 
necessarily  more  perfect  than  its  res  creata.  Thus  he 
developed  the  doctrine  of  a  series  of  emanations 
processing  from  the  One,  each  emanation  less  perfect 
than  its  immediate  source  and  each  a  necessary  step  in 
the  chain  of  Being  whose  point  of  origin  is  God  and 
whose  most  familiar  stage  (fainiliarp  that  iss  to  us) 
is  the  perceptual  world. 
The  reason  why  Marqah  did  not  need  to  introduce  this 
emanationist  doctrine  into  his  cosmology  is  that  he  was 
in  any  case  well-armed  with  a  doctrine  which  could  also 
r 
explain  how  the  perceptual  world  came  into  being.  % 
Furthermore,  Marqah's  own  position  had  the  benefit  of 
unequivocal  support  by  numerous  proof  texts  providing 
the  clearest  possible  Pentateuchal  warrant.  Margah's" 
doctrine  was  that  God  is  an  a  pens;  He  creates  things  by 
an  act'of  will.  Things  come  into  existence  at  His 
command.  For  this  reason  he  speaks  of  God  as 
"Orderer  of  all  by  His  command  (i  i>1'y  t77,  ß  7  7j' 144 
[I  131,  II  213].  Similarly,  he  writes:  "He  produced 
them  [the  two  tablets]  by  His  power  from  the  will  of 
His  mind"  [I  L6p  II  7L]ß  "Everything  was  drawn  into 
being  by  His  command  'come"'  [I  88,  II  142],  "He  it  was 
who  created  when  He  willed  and  intended"  [I  91,  II  149]v 
and  "At  Thy  summons  come  created  things,  at  Thy 
proclamation  Worlds"  [Hymn  I  v.  71.  In  a  significant 
phrase  Marqah  writes:  "When  He  wills  He  does  it 
-ray'  'Jý.  -i-r)"  [I  145,  II  239],  and,  in  similar 
vein:  "Praise  be  to  Him  who  says  and  does  all  He  wills" 
[I  719  II  113].  In  taking  that  line  Marqah  is  going 
further  than  merely  ascribing  a  will  to  God.  For  he  is 
also  conveying  the  idea  that  God's  will  has  the 
non-human  quality  of  being  unable  to  fail.  A  human 
being  may  will  to  perform  a  given  action  yet  not 
succeed  in  performing  it,  For  with  human  beings  an  act 
of  will  is  not  by  itself  sufficient.  Various  contingent 
factors  may  arise  that  interfere  with  the  performance 
of  the  envisaged  action.  The  agent  may  find  himself 
with  an  insurmountable  obstacle,  or  with  an  obstacle 
that  is  surmountable  but  only  at  a  price  he  is  unwilling 
to  pay,  or  he  may  change  his  mind  on  a  whim  about 
performing  the  action,  or  he  may  simply  forget  to  do  itl. 
With  respect  to  the  efficacy  of  His  will,  God  is 
quite  otherwise  placed.  There  iss  so  to  say,  no  gap 
1.  For  a  full  discussion  of  this  aspect  of  human  action 
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between  His  act  of  will  and.  the  performance  of  the 
willed  action.  This  is  an  important  aspect  of  Marqah's 
doctrine  of  the  power  of  God.  In  the  light  of  this 
consideration  it  is  easy  to  see  why  Marqah  considered 
himself  entitled  to  exclaim:  "Helper,  Uplifter, 
Sustainer,  who  does  use  no  physical  force"  [Hymn  I  v.  15]. 
God  does  not  need  to  use  physical  force,  since  he  can 
secure  the  result  that  He  wants  by  a  mere  act  of  will. 
It  is  precisely  proof  of  man's  lack  of  power  that  he  does 
need  to  employ  physical  force. 
These  considerations  suggest  a  deeper  point  that 
Margah  is  perhaps  making  when,  having  entreated  us  to 
"praise  God  over  the  manifold  creations"q  he  asserts 
that:  "God  created  ten  things  that  bear  witness  to  His 
might"  [I  131  , 
II  213],  For.  what  Margah  may  be 
directing  our  attention  to  is  the  fact  that  the  ten 
things  (day  and  night,  the  four  seasons  and  four 
elements)  not  merely  testify  to  the  great  power  of  the 
Being  who  created  them,  but  furthermore  testify  jn 
their  own  way  to  the  manner  of  their  creation,  namely, 
by  an  act  of  pure  will  -  "God  said  'Let  there  be  light'. 
And  there  was  light";  Now,  Margah's  talk  about  the 
powers  of  God  certainly  suggest  that-he  allowed  for  the 
existence  of  intermediaries  between  God  and  the 
perceptual  world,  Marqah's  divine  powers  are 
intermediaries  in  the  sense  that  they  are  properties  of 
God  and  hence  have  a  specially  exalted  status,  lyet  are 146 
also  superior  to  the  perceptual  world.  They  are 
poised  between  God  and  man.  But  what  I  am  unable  to 
find  justification  for,  in  Margah's  teachings,  is  the 
view  that  the  powers  of  God  play  the  same  role  as  that 
played  by  the  intermediaries  in  Plotinusi  system. 
Furthermore,  granted  Margah's  unequivocal  insistence 
on  the  existence  and  power  of  God's  will,  for  Marqah  to 
have  added  that  the  powers  of  God  emanate  from  Him 
like  Plotinean  intermediaries  would  have  been  to 
introduce  a  contradictory  element  into  his  system.  I 
conclude  from  this  that  although  much  of  what  Marqah 
has  to  say  about  the  powers  of  God  is  strongly 
suggestive  of  neoplatonic  ideas,  Marqah's  position  with 
regard  to  the  divine  powers  is  in  radical  opposition  to 
Plotinean  neoplatonism. 
This  line  of  argument  was  introduced  in  order  to 
establish  whether  there  are  any  sharp  divisions  between 
Philo's  theory  of  divine  powers  and  Margah's.  As  a 
first  step  in  this  direction  I  have  argued  that  Marqah 
does  not  have  a  Plotinean  type  of  emanationist  doctrine. 
If  it  is  correct  to  attribute  such  a  doctrine  to  Philo 
then  there  is  a  sharp  and  profound  disagreement  between 
Philo  and  Margah  on  the  subject  of  the  divine  powers, 
despite  certain  superficial,  particularly  verbäl, 
similarities.  It  is  therefore  necessary  for  e  to 
comment  on  the  relationship  between  Philo  andiPlotinus 
with  respect  to  the  doctrine  of  intermediaries. 147 
The  advantage  of  approaching  Philois  doctrines  on 
divine  power  by  way  of  a  comparative  study  of  Philo 
and  Marqah  is  that  the  two  thinkers  have  so  much  in 
common  that  a  clear  recognition  of  a  particular  element 
in  Margah's  teaching  may,  perhaps  unexpextedly,  prompt 
a  search  for,  and  a  discovery  of  the  same  element  in. 
Philo's.  However  much  Marqah  employs  Hellenistic 
philosophical  ideas  these  are  all,  so  to  say,  passed 
through  a  Biblical  sieve  before  being  accepted.  It  is 
impossible  to  study  many  lines  of  the  Nemar  without 
observing  that  Marqah's  teaching  is  permeated  with 
Pentateuchal  ideas.  Philo,  of  course,  most  of  whose 
writings  are  biblical  commentaries,  was  similarly 
imbued  with  Biblical  ideas  (though  Margah's  Bible, 
unlike.  Philo's,  was  only  the  Pentateuch).  Philo  used 
Biblical  proof  texts  no  less  profusely  than  did  Margah 
in  justification  of  his  philosophical  positions.  This 
point  prompts  the  consideration  that  if  Marqah,  relying 
heavily  upon  Pentateuchal  warrant,  laid  stress  on  the 
idea  of  the  will  of  God,  and  hence  did  not  need,  nor 
could  consistently  employ,  the  idea  of  Plotinean 
emanation,  then  perhaps  Philo,  no  less  alive  than 
Marqah  to  the  importance  of  Pentateuchal  warrant,  was 
similarly  placed  in  relation  to  Plotinus. 
In  this  connection,  the  first  question  that  has  to 
be  asked  is  whether  Philo  accepts.  the  idea  that  God 
has  a  will.  The  brief  answer  is  that  he  does)  Will, 148 
for  Philö,  is  to  be  accounted  a  property  of  God,  one 
of  His  powers,  There  are  several  passages  in  which  he 
expresses  himself  clearly  on  this  matter.  Thus,  for 
example,  in  the  course  of-discussing  the  superiority  of 
man  above  the  rest  of  the  animal  creation,  Philo  writes: 
"...  it  is  reasonably  held  that  the  mind  alone  in  all  that 
makes  us  what  we  are  is  indestructible.  For  it  is  mind  :  '" 
alone  which'the  Father  who  begat  it  judged  worthy  of 
freedom,  and  loosening  the  fetters  of  necessity, 
suffered  it  to  range  as  it  listed,  and  of  that  free-will 
which  is  His  most  peculiar  possession  and  most  worthy 
of  His  majesty  gave  it  such  portion  as  it  was  capable  of 
receiving"1.  Some  lines  later,  Philo  asserts  that  the 
soul  of  man  "alone  has  received  from  God  the  faculty  of 
voluntary  movement,  and  in  this  way  especially  is  made 
like  to  Iiim".  There  is  thus  good  reason  to  believe 
that  Philo  did  accept  the  doctrine  that  God  possesses  a 
will.  But  granted  that  this  doctrine  is  an  alternative 
to,  and  is  inconsistent  with,  the  Plotinean  doct 
1 
rine  of 
emanating  intermediaries,  are  we  entitled  to  interpret 
Philo's  teaching  in  such  a  way  as  to  ascribe  to,  "hLm 
the  doctrine  that  the  divine  powers  play  a  different 
kind  of  role  in  the  world  from  the  role  assigned  to 
them  by  Plotinus? 
Critical  opinion  has  been  divided  on  this  matter. 
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Thus,  for  example,  Drummond1  held  that  Philo  presented 
an  emanationist  doctrine  according  to  which  the  creation 
of  the  perceptual  world  was  due  to  the  creative 
activity  of  intermediaries.  He  was  particularly 
impressed  by  Philo's  description  of  man  as  an 
n 
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,a  divine  fragment,  which  is  a 
phrase  suggestive  of  the  emanationist  doctrine.  In 
connection  with  this  phrase  Drummond  refers  us  to  a 
passage  in  which  Philo  says  of  the  human  soul  that  it 
is  "an  inseparable  portion  of  that  divine  and  blessed 
soul.  For  no  part  of  that  which  is  divine  cuts  itself 
off  and  becomes  separate,  but  does  but  extend  itself, 
The  mind,  then,  having  obtained  a  share  of  the 
perfection  which  is  in  the  whole,  when  it  conceives  of 
the  universe,  reaches  out  as  widely  as  the  bounds  of  the 
whole,  and  undergoes  no  severance;  for  its  force  is 
expansive  12.  Now,  whether  or  not  this  passage 
presents  a  doctrine  of  emanation,  with  the  power;  ofý 
God  cast  in  the  role  of  intermediary,  there  is  nothing 
I 
in  it  to  indicate  a  Plotinean  view  of  the  relation/  between 
God  and  the  perceptual  world.  In  particular,  the/idea 
of  the  "extension"  of  God,  and  the  "expansiveness"  of 
God's  power,  can,  without  distortion  or  force,  be 
taken  to  be  a  reference  to  the  immanence  of  God's  power 
0*0 
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in  the  world.  And  this  latter  doctrine  is  no  less 
consistent  with  the  "divine  will"  theory  of  creation  than 
with  the  Plotinean  theory.  Furthermore,  and  here  I 
briefly  anticipate  a  point  discussed  in-the  Chapter 
on  Creation,  Philo  affirms  that  the  part  played  by  the 
divine  powers  in  the  creation  of  the  perceptual  world 
is  that  of  TrtgC  r&-L  yºa-ro(  The  world  is  modelled  on 
the  powers,  or  on  certain  of  them,  but  it  is  not  said 
to  issue  from  them  by  a  process  of  metaphysically 
1 
necessary  emanationl. 
Thus  with  respect  to  their  relationship  to  the 
Plotinean  theory  of  emanating  intermediaries,  Philo 
and  Marqah  are  in  substantial  agreement.  With  respect 
also  to  numerous  other  aspects  of  their  doctrines  of 
divine  power  Philo  and  Marqah  are,  I  have  attempted  to 
establish,  in  agreement.  So  close  is  this  measure  of 
agreement  that  it  is  tempting  to  suggest,  at  least  as  a 
working  hypothesis,  that  on  those  aspects  where  Marqah 
is  silent  and  Philo  is  not,  Philo's  position  should  be 
used  as  a  tentative  guideline  to  what  Marqah  would  have 
said  had  he  broken  his  silence.  This  procedure  could  be 
employed,  of  course,  only  where  the  general  tenor  of 
Marqah's  position  accords  with  Philo's  doctrine  on  the 
matter  at  issue.  Bearing  this  rider  in  mind,  and  not. 
losing  sight  of  the  tentativeness  of  my  conclusion,  I 
1.  For  a  defence.  of  this  interpretation  of  Philo's 
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would  like  to  suggest  that  in  Philo's  teachings  lies 
the  clue  to  the  precise  relation  envisaged  by  Nargah 
between  God  and  His  powers.  In  particular  I  wish  to 
offer  as  a  hypothesis,  necessarily  provisional  in 
character,  the  suggestion  that  in  Marqah's  view  the 
relationship  between  God  and  His  powers  is  one  of 
ownership  where  the  powers  are  to  be  understood  as 
properties  of  God  in  the  Aristotelian  sense  of 
"properties". 
This  interpretation  of  Margahts  position  has  several 
points  in  its  favour  that  entitle  it  at  least  to  a 
sympathetic  hearing.  Perhaps  the  most  crucial  is  that 
it  enables  us  to  make  sense  of  Margah's  insistence  upon 
both  the  oneness  of  God  and  the  powers  of  God.  The 
major  difficulty  that  we  faced  in  tackling  the  problem 
of  Margahts  reference  to  divine  powers  was  precisely 
that  the  divine  powers  seemed  to  ensure  complexity  in 
a  God  who  is,  above  all,  one.  And  not  only  if  there 
were  many  divine  powers,  but  even  if  there  were  only 
one,  the  problem  would  exist.  The  doctrine  that  God's 
powers  are  His  (Aristotelian)  properties  resolves  this 
difficulty,  by  implying  that  the  divine  powers  are  not 
part  of  the  divine  essence,  even  though  they  belong 
uniquely  to  God  by  virtue  of  His  essence. 
As  to  whether  God  has  one  power  or  many,  the  line 
most  in  harmony  with  the  overall  position  I  have  been 
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"powers"  of  God,  are  both  in  order.  Reference  to  the 
"power"  of  God  can  be  understood  as  indicating  the  fact 
of  His  agency  -  in  other  words,  the  fact  of  His  power 
to  act.  And  reference  to  His  "powers"  can  be 
understood  as  indicating  the  multiplicity  of  the  modes 
of  expression  of  His  agency. 
While  I  think  that  these  ideas  are  present  at  least 
implicitly  in  the  Memar  and  the  Defter  hymns,  I  do  not 
want  to  say  categorically  that  they  are  not  there 
explicitly  also.  It  may  be  that  those  better  attuned 
to  Margah's  way  of  expressing  himself  can  detect  in  its 
explicit  form  what  I  feel  is  present  in  the  conceptual 
background  that  Marqah  takes  for  granted  as  being 
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CHAPTER  VI 
THE'PERSONHOOD  OF  GOD 
My  primary  concern  in  the  last  chapter  was  with  the 
question  of  the  nature  of  the  relation  that  Marqah 
believed  to  exist  between  God  and  His  powers.  The 
answer,  which  I  hesitantly  advanced,  was  that  His 
powers  are  His  "properties"  in  the  Aristotelian  sense 
of  the  term.  That  is  to  say,  His  powers,  though  not 
part  of  His  essence,  belong  to  Him  by  virtue  of  His 
essence.  In  the  course  of  justifying  this  answer 
reference  was  made  to  specific  powers  attributed  to 
God  by  Marqah,  though  very  little  was  said  about  the 
specific  powers  beyond  the.  point  that  they  could  all  be 
regarded  as  modes  of  expression  of  divine  agency. 
Since  God's  power  to  act  expresses  itself  in  many 
ways,  that  iss  in  many  kinds  of  action,  it  is 
possible  to  present  many  characterisations  of  God, 
each  characterisation  being  based  upon  a  particular 
mode  of  action  in  which  God  expresses  Himself.  The 
question  to  which  I  wish  to  address  myself  in  his 
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God  so  far  as  that  emerges  when  we  attend  to  the 
nature  of  His  powers. 
Chapter  III  was  devoted  to  a  consideration  of  a 
particularly  important  characterisation  of  God, 
namely,  His  oneness,  perhaps  the  divine 
characterisation  most  frequently  referred  to  by  Margah 
in  his  Nemar.  By  attending  to  the  logical  features 
of  Margah's  conception  of  divine  oneness,  we  were  able 
to  draw  a  number  of  conclusions  concerning  what  can  be 
said  about  God.  Thus,  for  example,  we  deduced  that 
God,  if  truly  one,  must  be  incorporeal,  outside  space 
and  outside  time.  Margah  himself,  as  we  saw,  does 
say,  not  only  that  God  is  one,  but  also  that  Ho  is 
incorporeal,  spaceless  and  timeless;  and  he  even 
provides  Pentateuchal  warrant  for  these  further  claims. 
The  point  I  wish  to  stress  here  is  that  even  had  he 
not  made  these  further  claims  and  even  had  they  not 
been  so  readily  derivable  from  Pentateuchal  verses,  we 
could  still  have  asserted  that  Marqah  was  implicitly 
committed  to  these  claims  by  virtue  of  his  initiäl 
commitment  to  the  doctrine  of  the  absolute  oneness  of 
God,  For  these  further  claims  are  logically  deducible 
from  the  fact  that  God's  oneness  is  absolute, 
But  there  are  other  claims  that  Marqah  makes 
concerning  God,  and  these  "other"  claims  are  not 
related  in  the  same  evident,  logical  way  to  the 
concept  of  "oneness".  To  take  a  conspicuous  example, 
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though  it  is  clear  why  the  fact  of  God's  oneness 
entails  His  incorporeality,  it  is  by  no  means  clear 
why,  or  even  whether,  it  entails  His  mercifulness. 
Nevertheless,  Marqah  is  no  less  insistent  that  God  is 
merciful  than  that  He  is  one.  With  respect  to  the- 
apparent  logical  gap  between  divine  oneness  and 
divine  mercifulness,  numerous  other  qualities  that 
Marqah  ascribes  to  God  are  to  be  placed  in  the  same 
class  as  His  mercifulness.  For  they  also  do  not  seem 
deducible  from  the  fact  that  God  is  one.  The  kinds 
of  ascription  I  have  in  mind  are  expressed  by  Marqah  in 
the  following  ways:  "He  knows  what  has  been,  what  is 
now,  änd  what  is  yet  to  be"  [I  5,  II  3]v  "He  does  what 
He  wills"  [I  5,  II  3]9  "I  [God]  will  fight  for  them 
there  with  great  mercy"  [I  26,  II  41],  "It  is  a 
special  thing  that  we  receive  blessings  from  our  Lord, 
who  is  merciful  and  pitiful,  doing  good  to  thosewho 
love  Him"  [I  4+7,  II  751,  "God  forgives  and  pardons 
you  when  you  turn  back  to  Him"  [I  56,  II  89],  "..  ýas 
the  Great  One  promises  so  He  does,  for  it  is  His  wont 
to  bring  about  what  He  has  promised"  [I  64,  II  1011, 
"He  does  not  accept  guilty  men  till  they  repent" 
[I  67,  II  107],  "His  Lord  is  angry  with  him  and  will 
never  pardon  him"  [I  76,  II  122],  "He  loves  you" 
[I  78,  'II  127],  and  lastly  "Our  Lord  has  chosen  us" 
[I  95,  '11  156].  - 
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also  from  the  Defter  hymns,  could  be  added  to  this 
list.  What  the  list  reveals  is  an  account  of  God  that 
is  far  richer  than  the  one  that  has  so  far  been 
allowed  to  emerge.  Marqah,  it  is  now  clear,  believed 
in  a  God  who  has  great,  perhaps  limitless,  knowledge, 
who  is  concerned  to  act  justly,  who  is  merciful  and 
full  of  pity,  and  who  is  compassionate,  who  can  be 
angry  but  also  loving,  who  can  forgive  and  pardon,  but 
who  can  also  withhold  forgiveness  if  He  desires,  and 
who  can  make  choices.  Perhaps  the  most  important 
point  that  emerges  from  Margah's  expressions  which  we 
have  just  been  considering,  and  which  would  not  have 
emerged  had  we  concentrated  entirely  on  Marqah's 
insistent  references  to  the  oneness  of  God,  is  that  in 
Margah's  view  God  is  a  person. 
Now,  though  Marqah  conceived  of  God  in  these  terms, 
it  is  not  necessary  to  do  so.  It  is  possible  to  make 
a  distinction,  which  can  be  maintained  at  a  crude  level, 
between  the  god  of  metaphysics  and  the  God  of  religion. 
For  the  belief  that  God  exists  can  be  reached  not  only 
by  the  acceptance  of  the  validity  of  a  divine 
revelation,  but  also  by  a  rational  consideration  of 
what  must  be  posited  if  reality  is  to  be  explained. 
Thus  Aristotle,  faced  with  the  puzzling  phenomenon  of 
movement  in  the  world,  drew  the  conclusion  that 
movement  could  be  explained  ultimately  only  b3 
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first  mover  he  called  "god".  Likewise,  by  a  process 
of  metaphysical  speculation  he  reached  the  conclusion 
that  a  being  which  is  self-thinking  thought 
necessarily  exists,  and  this  being  he  called  "god". 
Such  conceptions  of  god  can  be  supported  by 
philosophical  reasoning.  But  whether  the  conceptions 
thus  supported  are  of  the  biblical  God,  the  God  of 
Abraham,  Isaac  and  Jacob,  is  another  matter,  One 
place  at  which  a  wedge  can  be  inserted  between  the  god 
of  Aristotle  and  the  biblical  God  is  at  the  point  where 
the  personhood  of  God  is  at  issue.  For  it  can  be 
argued  that  the  biblical  God  and  therefore  the  God  of 
Marqah  is  a  person,  whereas  the  mod  of  Aristotelian 
metaphysics  is  not, 
Of  course,  how  such  an  issue  is  resolved  will 
depend  partly  on  what  is  accepted  for  the  purpose  of 
argument  as  the  proper  definition  of  "person".  Thus, 
it  is  open  to  an  Aristotelian  to  say  that  a  necessary 
and  sufficient  condition  for  personhood  is  the  ability 
to  think;  and  since  the  god  of  Aristotle  is  nothing  if 
not  a  thinker,  that  god  is  indeed  an  person.  But/whether 
an  Aristotelian  is  allowed  to  make  this  move  depends 
on  whether  his  account  of  personhood,  is  accepted, 
When  the  matter  is  put  in  these  terms,  the  argument 
over  whether  God  is  a  person  seems  to  be  nothing  more 
than  an  idle  terminological  dispute  in  which  nothing 
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however,  which  will  make  the  dispute  a  very  serious 
one  indeed  for  the  religious  consciousness.  For  the 
issue  can  be  presented  in  such  a  way  as  to  have 
immediate  and  profound  practical  implications.  The 
way  to  change  the  issue  from  one  of  terminology  to  one 
of  substance  is  to  relate  the  idea*of  "person"  to  that 
of  "worship"  by  postulating  that  only  a  person  can  be 
a  proper  object  of  worship.  If  we  make  this  move  then 
one  way  to  tackle  the  question  of  whether  the  god  of 
Aristotle  is  a  person,  and  therefore  is  truly  a  God, 
is  to  ask  whether  he  can  be  worshipped.  If  it  is 
answered  that  he  cannot,  it  must  be  concluded  that, 
even  though  he  perhaps  has  the  other  qualities  we 
would  attribute  to  God,  he  is  not  the  personal  God  of 
the  Bible. 
No  distortion  of  the  concept  of  "worship"  seems  to 
be  involved  if  it  is-held  that  worship  is  essentially 
a  form  of  communication  by  which  man  establishes  a 
relationship  with  the  divine.  And  this  communication 
would  not  be  undertaken  but  for  the  fact  that  it  is 
believed  that  what  is,  so  to  say,  transmitted,  is  also 
received.  Whatever  God  does  in  response  to  the  message, 
He  does  at  least,  if  nothing  else,  get  it.  But,  as  we 
have  already  had  occasion  to  note  in  this  work'  the  god 
of  Aristotelian  metaphysics  would  be  incapable  of 
receiving  our  prayers.  For  he  is,  essentially, 
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only  of  the  most  perfect  activity,  which  is  the 
activity  of  thought.  And  being  perfect  in  his  thinking, 
he  can  think  only  of  a  perfect  object,  for  anything 
less  would  diminish  him  in  value.  Hence,  his  only 
possible  object  of  thought  is  himself.  It  is  difficult 
to  see  how  such  a  being  can  be  conceived  of  as  able  to 
receive  the  prayers  of  men.  Men,  recognising  his 
unreachability,  may  consider  the  Aristotelian  god  to  be 
a  metaphysical  necessity.  But  if  the  relationship 
suggested  above,  between  personhood  and  worship,  is 
accepted,  he  cannot  be  considered  a  personal  God. 
This  is  not,  of  course,  to  suggest  that  an 
Aristotelian  would  object  on  that  account  to  the 
rejection  of  the  idea  of  Aristotle's  god  as  a  proper 
object  of  worship.  An  Aristotelian  may  indeed  say 
that  the  conception  of  God  as  a  person  is  radically 
incoherent,  and  that  if  our  idea  of  God  were  thought 
through  with  sufficient  clarity  we  would  see  that  God  is 
an  utterly  inappropriate  object  of  worship.  Whether, 
in  the  face  of  this  line  of  argument,  we  say  Iso  much 
the  better!,  or  'so  much  the  worse  for  the 
Aristotelian  conception  of  god',  will  depend  in  part 
on  the  fundamental  matter  of  the  relative  weight  we 
attach  to  reason  and  to  revelation  as  veridical 
sources  of  knowledge  about  the  divine.  Marqah,  as  I 
hope  has  become  plain,  was  no  despiser  of  reaIon,  and 
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investigation  of  nature.  For  example,  while 
discussing  the  origin  of  the  mass  of  the  sun  he  says 
that  it  derives  from  the  "greater  light  and  the  fire 
from  it";  and  then  adds:  "Tell  them  ['some 
men']  that 
and  make  investigation  along  with  them"  [I  132,  II,  214-5]. 
But  though  Marqah  did  attach  high  value  to  rational 
enquiry,  he  attached  no  less  value  to  the  discovery 
of  truth  from  the  Pentateuch.  And  from  that  source 
he  learnt  that  God  was  a  person.  And  from  it  he  also 
learnt  that  God  was  accessible.  For  this  reason  we 
find  Marqah  persistently  doing  something  wholly 
un-Aristotelian  -  he  addresses  God  as  "Thou".  When 
he  says:  "Thou  art  our  God"  [Hymn  II  v.  l]  he  thereby 
makes  it  clear  that  he  is  engaged  in  a  personal 
encounter  with  God. 
But  the  possibility  of  such  an  encounter  raises 
important  questions,  that  should  be  considered 
separately  despite  their  close  relationship.  The 
first  question  concerns  the  fact  that  personhood  is 
attributed  to  God  by  Margah  by  virtue  of  several 
qualities  that  God  is  taken  to  display.  And  this 
multiplicity  of  qualities  implies  a  complexity  in  God, 
which  apparently  clashes  with  Marqah's  doctrine  of 
divine  oneness.  The  answer  to  this  criticism  is  now 
readily  to  hand.  \  Since  those  qualities  of  God,  such 
as  His  love,  justice,  compassion  and  so  on,  one 
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can  be  regarded  as  His  powers,  it  follows  that  they 
are  His  property  and  therefore,  though  possessed  by 
Him  by  virtue  of  His  essence,  are  not  part  of  His 
essence  and  hence  do  not  imply  that  He  has.  a 
complex  essence.  Thus  the  doctrine  of  the 
essential  oneness  of  God  is  not  set  at  risk  by 
evidence  for  the  claim  that  He  is  a  person; 
The  second  question  takes  us  deeper  into  Margah's 
philosophy  of  religion,  Those  properties  of  God  by 
virtue  of  which  He  is  regarded  as  a  person  are  also, 
at  least  in  name,  qualities  that  we  attribute  to  men. 
Such  attributions  are  a  risky  matter  for  those  who 
accept  the  kind  of  position  presented  in  the  Memar, 
since  they  inevitably  provoke  the  criticism  that 
Marqah  is  courting  a  variety  of  anthropomorphism. 
Bearing  in  mind  that  the  morphai  that  set  Marqah's 
position  at  risk  include  those  of  love,  compassion, 
even  anger,  the  anthropomorphism  in  question  can 
fairly  be  classified  as  an  anthropopathismv  That  is, 
the  similarity  between  God  and  man  is  being  thought  of 
as  due  to  a  likeness  of  their  spiritual,  rather  than 
physical  form.  It  is  clear  that  anthropopathism  is  a 
serious  pitfall  for  Marqah,  since  that  doctrine  is,  at 
least  prima  facie,  logically  inconsistent  with' 
Marqah's  doctrine  of  divine  otherness.  In  particular, 
Marqah  cannot  hold  both  that  God  is  utterly  other  than 
His  creatures  and  also  that  He  is  in  certain 
respects 
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like  men. 
The  ground  has,  I  hope,  been  adequately  prepared 
for  showing  how  the  edge  of  this  line  of  attack  can 
be  blunted.  As  a  first  step  in  this  direction  I 
would  like  to  look  at  the  problem,  as  far  as  is  `possible, 
through  the  eyes  of  Philo.  For  the 
difficulties  I  have  been  expounding  apply  in  exactly 
the  same  way  to  Philo  as  they  do  to  Margah,  and 
though  Margah  has  an  answer  to  those  difficulties  his 
answer  lies  further  below  the  surface  of  his  work  than 
does  Philo's  answer  to  the  identical  charge. 
Philo's  problems  in  this  field  have  two  distinct 
causes,  one  being  philosophical,  the  other 
Pentateuchal.  The  philosophical  cause  lies  in  the 
nature  of  one  of  Philo's  arguments  for  the  existence 
of  God.  We  have  studied  in  Chapter  II  Philo's 
argument  in  which  he  reasons  that  something  must  stand 
in  a  similar  relation  to  the  cosmos  as  man's  mind 
stands  to  human  artifacts.  And  likewise,  he  suggests 
that  something  must  relate  to  the  cosmos  as  man's 
mind  does  to  manes  body.  In  both  cases  the  "something" 
in  question  is  said  to  be  God  -  the  mind  of  the 
universe.  Of  course,  as  was  pointed  out  in  Chapter  II, 
the  similarity  breaks  down  at  important  places.  For 
example,  God  is  the  creator  of  the  cosmos  but  man  is 
not  the  creator  of  his  body,  and  neither  is  man's 
mind  by  itself  the  creator  of  artifacts  for  m 
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their  limbs  in  order  to  make.  things.  God  needed 
nothing  corporeal  in  order  to  create  the  cosmos,  and 
indeed  priorýto  the  creation  of  the  cosmos  there  existed 
in  any  case  nothing  corporeal.  However,  despite  the  fact 
that  the  relation  between  the  human  mind  and  the 
human  body  is  not  exactly  like  the  relation  between 
God  and  the  cosmos,  Philo  clearly  thought  them  at 
least  similar.  This  is  important  because  it  implies 
a  similarity  between  God  and  men.  In  particular,  a 
similarity  is  implied,  as  is  suggested  by  the  verbal 
similarity,  between  the  mind  of  the  world  and  the  mind 
of  man.  Both  God  and  men  have  minds  and  however 
different  they  are  in  certain  respects,  God  and  men 
have  enough  in  common  to  justify  the  attribution  of 
mind  to  both.  But  since  mind-has  a  human  form, 
attribution  of  mind  to  God  seems  an  anthropomorphic 
attribution. 
The  second  reason  why  Philo  has  a  problem  about 
anthropomorphism  is  easily  stated.  The  Bible,  it 
countless  places,  attributes  to  God  qualities  that 
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attribute  also  to  men.  These  qualities  include! 
physical  forms  (as  when  reference  is  made  to  the  hand 
of  God),  emotional  forms  (as  when  He,  is  said  to  be 
angry,  and  behavioural  forms  (as  when  He  is  said  to 
swear).  As  we  would  expect,  Philo  does  not  accept 
these  modes  of  expression,  at  least  so  far  as  they  are 
understood  as  making  claims  to  stating  the  literal 
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truth.  Philo's  response  to  the  biblical  assertion 
that  God  swore  is  well  worth  considering  here  as 
constituting  a  particularly  interesting  example  of 
Philo's  method  of  dealing  with  anthropomorphic 
expressions  in  the  Bible.  He  argues1  that  men  to 
whose  word  little  credence  would  be  given  have 
recourse  to  an  oath,  that  iss  say  what  they  have  to 
in  God's  name,  in  order  to  secure  for  their  words  a 
credence  that  would  otherwise  be  lacking.  But  what 
God  says  is  to  be  believed  precisely  because  it  is 
God  who  says  it.  To  add  an  oath  would  not  increase  the 
credibility  of  His  words.  But  furthermore,  an  oath 
itself  renders  a  statement  credible  because  by  its 
invocation  of  God's  name,  God  is  used,  so  to  say,  to 
underwrite  the  validity  of  the  statement.  But  God 
cannot  underwrite  His  own  statements  by  an  oath, 
because  He  is  in  any.  case  guaranteeing  His  statements 
merely  by  uttering  them.  There  is  therefore  no 
conceptual  room  for  God  to  swear  to  anything, 
Consequently,  Philo  finds  himself  drawn  to  the 
conclusion  that  the  anthropomorphic  attribution  to 
God  of  the  act  of  swearing  is,  when  literally 
understood,  logically  incoherent.  ' 
Philo  is  no  less  insistent  on  the  unsatisfactoriness 
of  the  attribution  to  God  of  any  human  passions  or 
the  actions  based  on  them,  when  those  attributions 
are  understood  literally.  In  Gen.  VI  7  God  aýserts 
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that  He  will  destroy  man  from  off  the  face  of  the 
earth,  and  will  also  destroy  all  other  animals 
"because  I  have  considered  and  repent  that  I  have  made 
them".  This  passage  attracts  Philots  attention, 
because  according  to  a  literal  understanding  of  the 
text  God  is  giving  way  to  anger  and  passion.  Philo's 
immediate  comment  on  this  literalist  interpretation 
is:  "He  is  not  susceptible  to  any  passion  at  all. 
For  disquiet  is  peculiar  to  human  weakness,  but 
neither  the  unreasoning  passions  of  the  soul,  nor  the 
parts  and  members  of  the  body  in  general,  have  any 
relation  to  God"'.  But  if  the  attribution  to  God  of 
human  form  (whether  physical,  spiritual  or 
behavioural)  is  not  to  be  understood  literally,  then 
how  is  it  to  be  undorstood? 
Philo's  answer  is  based  on  a  consideration  of  two 
Pentateuchal  proof  texts.  The  first  is  that  God  is 
not  as  man  (Num.  XXIII  19)9  and  the  second  that  God  is 
as  man  (Deut.  131).  These  seem  mutually  inconsistent, 
but  Philo  holds  that  according  to  their  correct 
interpretation  they  are  not.  The  firs 
statements  is,  in  Phi.  lo's  view,  true, 
the  other  hand,  is  not  literally  true, 
understood  in  relation  to  its  purpose, 
introduced  "for  the  instruction  of  the 
t  of  these 
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such  by  nature". 
That  God  is  not  as  man  is  a  truth  recognised  by  those 
men,  "the  comrades  of  the  soul",  who  see  that  God  is 
not  comparable  with  the  species  of  any  created  thing. 
Such  men  understand  that:  "He  is  not  apprehensible 
even  by  the  mind,  save  in  the  fact  that  He  is.  For 
it  is  His  existence  which  we  apprehend,  and  of  what 
lies  outside  that  existence  nothing"2.  But  other  men 
with  a  less  insightful  intellect  must  be  taught 
something  different,  since  they  require  legislators  as 
physicians  "who  will  devise  the  treatment  proper  to 
their  present  condition.  Thus  ill-disciplined  and 
foolish  slaves  receive  profit  from  a  master  who 
frightens  them,  for  they  fear  his  threats  and 
menaces  and  thus  involuntarily  are  schooled  by  fear"3. 
Philo's  point  is  that  it  does  not  matter  whether  the, 
master  is  in  fact  a  hard  or  cruel  man.  His  I' 
effectiveness  at  securing  obedience  is  determined  by 
the  construction  put  upon  his  character  traits  by.  his 
servants.  The  master  who  hides  his  loving  nature 
behind  a  ferocious  appearance  may  be  a  more  effective 
master  than  one  whose  loving  nature  prevents  him 
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exerting  discipline.  The  effective  master,  Philo 
tells  us,  is  also  like  a  physician  who,  from  a  desire 
to  see  his  patient  recover,  refrains  from  telling  him 
a  truth  that  will  so  upset  the  patient  as  to  interfere 
with  his  recovery.  So  also,  God  does  not  tell  all 
the  truth.  To  secure  obedience  from  those  who  would 
not  otherwise  live  according  to  the  law,  God  presents 
Himself  as  capable  of  indignation  and  anger,  and, 
generally,  as  threatening  the  well-being  of  those 
who  would  happily  not  be  His  subjects.  Such  men  are 
persuaded  to  obey  God  by  their  fear  of  Him,  just  as 
"the  comrades  of  the  soul",  knowing  the  truth,  will 
obey  God  from  love.  Thus  there  is  a  close  relation 
between  "God  is  as  man"  and  the  motive  of  fear,  and 
between  "God  is  not  as  man"  and  the  motive  of  love. 
And  just  as  "God  is  not  as  man"  is  the  truer  statement, 
so  also  is  love  the  finer  motive. 
It  may  seem  from  this  that  Philo  wishes  to 
maintain  that  at  least  with  regard  to  men  with  more 
sluggish  intellects,  they  dare  not  be  taught  the 
truth  because  disco'rery  of  the  truth  would  have 
disastrous  consequences  for  their  modes  of' 
behaviour.  But  I  think  that  this  would  be  a 
misleading  way  to  state  Philo's  position.  In  the 
first  place,  he  thinks  that  those  who  do  need  to  be 
given  the  motive  of  fear  need  this  because  tIey  are 
incapable  of  grasping  the  truth.  It  appears  that 168 
Philo  believed  those  who  do  have  an  insight  into  the 
truth  to  be  incapable  of  withholding  love  of  God.  In 
that  case,  it  would  be  unnecessary  to  give  them  a 
motive  of  fear;  and  more  than  unnecessary,  there 
would  not  in  fact  bo  room  for  fear.  A  soul  suffused 
with  love  of  God  cannot  also  act  out  of  fear  induced 
by  threats  of  divine  retribution. 
Besides  this  consideration,  however,  it  must  be 
mentioned  that  it  appears  to  have  been  Philo's  view 
that  obedience  of  divine  law  brings  one  closer  to  the 
truth,  even  when  the  motive  for  obedience  is  fear. 
In  that  case  Philo  is  not  saying  that  God  withholds 
the  truth  from  those  with  weaker  intellects.  He  is 
saying  that  since  certain  men  have  weaker  intellects 
God  has  to  employ  a  different  method  than  He  would 
otherwise  use  in  order  to  bring  them  as  close  to  the 
truth  as  they  can  come.  It  is  not  that  some  things 
are  too  important  to  be  allowed  to  be  interfered  with 
by  the  truth,  but  on  the  contrary,  that  the  truth  is 
so  important  that  even  fear  can  justifiably  be 
instilled  into  men's  souls  as  a  means  of  drawing  them 
closer  to  the  truth. 
The  reason  for  supposing  that  Philo  held  that 
obedience  of  the  law,  by  whatever  motive  that 
obedience  may  be  prompted,  brings  men  closer  to  the 
truth,  is  briefly  as  follows:  Philo  held  that  men 
can  be  placed  in  one  or  other  of  three  clasesl, 169 
namely,  (i)  those  who  accept  only  the  literal 
interpretation  of  the  lawl,  (ii)  those  who  accept 
both  the  literal  and  allegorical  interpretations2, 
and  (iii)  those  who  reject  the  literal  interpretation 
and  accept  only  the  allegorical3.  Philo  opposed  the 
third  group  partly  because  of  his  conviction  that 
those  who  do  not  live  according  to  the  law,  as  it  is 
literally  understood,  necessarily  fail  to  give  a 
satisfactory  allegorical  interpretation  of  it4.  There 
are  certain  insights  into  the  truth  represented  by  the 
law  that  can  be  secured  only  by  those  who  do  accept 
it  in  its  literal  form.  Now,  in  presenting  this 
position  Philo  makes  no  allusion  to  the  preferability 
of  one  motive,  rather  than  another,  for  obedience.  The 
implication  of  this  is  that  he  saw  obedience  itself 
as  a  first  step  on  the  road  to  truth.  Certainly  Philo 
held  that  by  allegorical  interpretation  one  can  gol 
further  down  that  road  than  can  the  straightforward 
literalists.  But  nevertheless  the  latter  are  aI  ll  the 
same  touched,  however  lightly,  by  truth  on  account 
of  their  acceptance  of  the  law  as  literally  /I 
understood,  So  God-does  not  withhold  the  truth  from 
those  who  obey  Him  from  fear.  On  the  contrary,  He 
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makes  available  to  them  as  much  truth  as  they  can 
cope  with. 
It  is  clearly  Philo's  view  that  those  motivated  by 
fear  have,  in  some  respect,  less  insight  into  the 
nature  of  the  truth  than  do  the  comrades  of  the  soul. 
As  was  indicated  above,  the  important  respect  in  which 
the  two  groups  differ  is  that  the  comrades  of  the  soul 
are  not  misled  by  the  anthropomorphic  expressions  in 
the  Bible,  and  the  comrades  of  the  body  are.  But  how 
great  is  the  difference  between  the  two  groups?  Though 
the  comrades  of  the  soul  recognise  that  God  is  not  as' 
man,  do  they  take  the  extreme  line  that  God  is  not  as 
man  in  any  respect  whatever? 
I  would  suggest  as  a  tentative  first  step  in 
answering  this  question  that  they  do  not  take  quite  - 
this  line.  In  a  key  passage  Philo  speaks  of  the  human 
mind  as  apparently  the  one  indestructible  element  in 
us,  The  reason  he  offers  is  that  the  mind  is  the  one 
thing  in  us  that  God  thought  worthy  of  freedom.  And 
therefore  He  bestowed  upon  it  "that  freewill  which 
is  His  most  peculiar  possession  and  most  worthy  of 
His  majesty"'.  This  way  of  putting  the  point  prompts 
the  question  of  what  Philo  means  by  "His  most 
eculiar  ossession 
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'  later  he  says  that  the  soul  of  man,  by  receiving  the 
power  of  voluntary  motion,  "in  this  way  specially  has 
been  made  like  to  Him".  Thus  Philo  is  evidently 
committed  to  the  doctrine  that  God  resembles  man  in 
one  respect  at  least,  namely,  in  respect  of  His 
freedom.  In  that  case  does  Philo  not  thereby 
embrace  an  anthropomorphic  doctrine,  despite  his-- 
apparent  rejection  of  anthropomorphism  as  untrue?  But 
this  would  not  be  a  fair  inference,  for  several 
reasons. 
The  most  evident,  perhaps,  is  that  Philo's  doctrine 
is  in  a  sense  the  precise  opposite  of  anthropomorphism. 
It  might  better  be  described  as  "theomorphism",  since 
Philo  is  saying  not  that  God  has  a  human  form,  but 
rather,  man  has,  in  one  respect  at  least,  a  divine 
form.  In  this  connection  it.  is  noteworthy  that  Philo 
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speaks  of  the  soul  of  man  as  an  WToDv  rTaoc  o￿l. 
The  human  soul  is  really  a  fragment,  of  the  diving  soul 
in  the  human  body.  Hence,  by  claiming  a  resemblance 
between  God  and  man  by  virtue  of  a  certain  quality 
of  the  human  soul,  Philo  is  not  drawing  God  down/to 
the  human  level,  lie  is,  on  the  contrary,  elevating 
man  to-an  exalted  position  in  the  universe,  a  position 
to  which  man  is  entitled  by  his  participation,  in 
divinity.  The  affirmation  that  "God  is  not  as  man"  is 
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true  despite  the  resemblance  of  wills  between  God  and 
man,  because  with  respect  to  the  power  of  volition, 
"Man  is  as  God"  -  though  it  is  not  true  in  the  least 
that  "God  is  as  man". 
But  to  try  to  de  end  Philo's  apparent  lapse  into 
anthropomorphism  by  claiming  that  his  position  is 
what  I  have  termed  "theomorphism",  may  seem  a  verbal 
sleight  of  hand,  that  has  altered  the  terminology 
without  really  clearing  Philo  of  the  accusation.  I 
think  that  the  move  I  have  here  suggested  is  not  a 
mere  sleight  of  hand  and  that  it  does  substantially 
blunt  the  accusation.  Nevertheless,  the  accusation 
can  be  blunted  more  drastically  by  moving  deeper  into 
Philonic  metaphysics. 
A  consideration  of  the  metaphysical  situation 
reveals  two  lines  of  argument  that  are  open  to  Philo, 
both  being  familiar  to  us  from  discussions  in  earlier 
chapters.  First,  we  have  already  argued  that  for 
Philo  the  power  of  God,  though  possessed  by  Him-by 
virtue  of  His  essence,  is  not  part  of  God's  essence.  It 
follows  from  this  that  even  if  a  given  divine  power, 
say  the  power  of  volition,  and  a  given  human  power 
resemble  each  other  in  some  respect,  it  is  not 
possible  to  draw  the  conclusion  either  that  God's 
essence  is  in  any  respect  like  man's  (which  would  be 
anthropomorphism)  or  that  man's  essence  is  in  any 
respect  like  God's  (which  would  be  theomorphlsm). 173 
Thus  our  earlier  classification  of  the  divine  powers 
as  Aristotelian  properties  of  God  can  be  seen  as  an 
important  element  in  the  defence  of  Philo  against  the 
charge  of  anthropomorphism. 
But  it  is  possibin  to  go  further  than  this  in 
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defence  of  Philo.  For  according  to  Philo  not  only  is 
God's  essence  unknowable  by  men,  so  also  is  the 
essence  of  the  power  of  God.  We  know  of  the  existence 
of  God's  power,  but  though  we  have  an  insight  into  the 
effects  of  His  power  -  that  is,  we  recognise  them  as 
effects  of  His  power  -  we  do  not  have  any  insight 
into  the  power  itself.  Thus  we  are  not  any  better 
placed,  according  to  Philo,  to  claim  a  resemblance 
between  God's  power  and  manes,  than  to  claim  a 
resemblance  between  God  and  man.  All  we  are 
entitled  to  claim  is  that  there  is  a  resemblance 
between  the  effects  of  God's  power  and  the  effects  of 
ours,  And  this  position  is  clearly  far  too  weak  to 
count  as  a  variety  of  apthropomorphism. 
I  have  now  stated  my  reasons  for  holding  that 
Philo,  despite  his  commitment  to  the  Bible,  and 
therefore  to  numerous  statements  about  God  that  imply 
His  personhood,  is  not  thereby  committed  to  an 
anthropomorphic  doctrine,  and  indeed  is  able  , 
effectively  to  rebut  the  charge  of  anthropomorphism. 
I  would  like  now  to  conclude  these  remarks  about 
Philo's  doctrine  of  God's  personhood  by'saying 174 
something  about  the  specific  qualities  that  Philo 
attributes  to  God  and  that  allow  us  to  describe  the 
Philonic  God  as  a  person. 
Perhaps  the  most  conspicuous  aspect  of  God  as  a 
person  is  His  mind.  To  say  that  He  has  a  mind  is, 
possibly  less  accurate  than  to  say  that  He  is  mind, 
and  not  merely  one  mind  among  others  in  the 
universe  but  rather  the  supreme  mind.  Indeed,  if  we 
take  seriously  the  idea  of  the  human  mind  as  a 
divine  fragment,  then  it  may  be  necessary  to  say 
that  God1s  mind  is  the  only  mind  in  the  universe, 
other  individual  minds  really  being  parts  of  it. 
This  view  is  strengthened  by  the  consideration  that 
Philo  persistently  refers  to  God  by  using  such 
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God,  being  a  mind,  is  thereby  a  thinker.  Since  God 
cannot  be  supposed  to  err,  His  thinking  must  give  Him 
knowledge.  His  knowledge  iss  however,  unlike  human 
knowledge.  Two  points  of  difference  are,  first,  its 
necessity.  and,  secondly,  its  scope.  Though  men  can 
believe  false  statements  God  cannot.  The  reason  for 
this  is  closely  tied  in  with  the  reason  for  the  fact 
that  the  scope  of  God's  knowledge  is  unlike  the  scope 
of  men's.  In  discussing  the  oneness  of  God,  in 
Chapter  III,  we  saw  that  the  concept  of  oneness  with 
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which  Philo  was  concerned  forced  him  to  the 
conclusion  that  God  is  both  spaceless  and  timeless. 
Consequently  he  has  to  say  that  kinds  of  distance 
between  subject  and  object,  which  restrict  human 
knowledge,  are  not  similarly  effective  in  restricting 
divine  knowledge.  Nothing  can  be  concealed  from  God 
by  being  spatially  too  distant  from  Him  for  Him  to 
be  able  to  secure  a  cognitive  grasp  of  it. 
Similarly  nothing  can  be  concealed  from  Him  by  being 
at  a  different  time  from  Him,  for  nothing  is  either 
past  or  future  in  relation  to  God.  A  further 
distinction  between  divine  and  human  knowledge  is  that 
whereas  men  engage  in  discursive  thought  God  does  not. 
It  follows  that  discursive  thought  is  a  possible 
source  of  error  for  men  but  not  for  God.  The  point 
here  is  that  men,  engaging  in  a  process  of  reasoning, 
can  go  wrong  in  the  temporal  process  of  moving  from 
one  step  to  another;  but  God's  very  timelessness 
prevents  Him  being  subject  to  error  from  this  source. 
His  thought  is  intuitive  rather  than  discursive. 
That  is  to  say,  His  knowledge  is  unmediated  by 
logical  processes.  - 
What  the  foregoing  suggests  is  that  the  truth  of 
what  God  knows  cannot  be  jeopardised  by  the  kinds  of 
things  that  place  at  risk  the  validity  of  human  claims 
to  knowledge.  By  the  same  token,  the  scope  of  divine 
knowledge  must  be  different  from  the  scope  of;  human 176 
knowledge.  This  is  the  second  point  of  difference 
between  divine  and  human  knowledge.  Since  there  is 
no  possible  obstacle  to  divine  knowledge  there  can-be 
nothing  knowable  that  God  does  not  know  -  "For  He  with 
an  eye  that  never  sleeps  beholds  all  things"l.  - 
Another,  related  approach  to  God's  omniscience  is 
by  way  of  a  consideration  of  Godls'immanence,  No  part 
of  the  universe  excludes  God,  for'His  powers  are  the 
forces  that  structure  the  cosmos,  that  hold  it  together 
in  a  state  of  unitariness.  Philo  comes  very  close  to 
saying  that  God's  knowledge  of  the  universe  is 
knowledge  of  Himself,  since  He  cannot  know  anything  in 
the  cosmos  without  knowing  His  own  power  in  the  object 
of  knowledge. 
Philo's  concern  with  the  extent  of  God's  knowledge 
is  not  unconnected  with  practical,  almost  pastoral, 
considerations,  for  it  relates  to  the  Biblical  idea 
of  God  as  able  to  see  into  the  depths  of  the  human  soul 
and  therefore  able  to  see  good  and  evil  thoughts. 
There  is  in  the  Bible  an  incipient  doctrine  of 
divine  omniscience  (whether  or  not  the  doctrine  also 
appears  in  a  fully  fledged  form)  t  for  if  we  'suppose  the 
private  thoughts  of  the  individual  to  be  the  best 
concealed,  least  accessible  things  in  the  world,  then 
it  is.  tempting  to  argue  that  if  God  has  access-to  them 
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He  must  have  access  to  all  other  possible-objects  of 
knowledge  as  well.  Philo,  who  sets  no  limits  on 
divine  knowledge,  lays  stress  on  the  divine  knowledge 
of  the  inner  lives  of  men,  as  when  he  speaks  of:  "God, 
who  surveys  the  invisible  soul  and  to  whom  alone  it  is 
given  to  discern  the  secrets  of  the  mind"'. 
The  practical  implications  of  this  aspect  of  God 
are  clear..  The  rewards  and  punishments,  bestowed  or 
inflicted  by  God,  which  contribute  to  the  maintenance 
of  a  cosmic  system  of  justice,  can  be  based  only  upon 
knowledge.  If  God  is  to  punish  men  justly,  or  to 
reward  men  justly,  they  must  of  course  be  worthy  of 
punishment  or  reward.  But  furthermore,  if  men  know 
that  God  can  see  into  the  innermost  depths  of  their 
souls  and  will  punish  transgression  they  are  thereby 
provided  with  a  motive  for  obeying  divine  law. 
This  point  leads.  to  a  further  aspect  of  the, 
Philonic  personal  God.  He  is  good,  and  being  good 
acts  justly.  His  justice  is  not,  however,  untempered 
by  mercy.  In  one  passage2  Philo  speaks  of  God's 
mercy  as  older  than  justicel  By  this  he  appears  to 
mean  that  judgment  is  passed  by  God,  the  Judge,  on  man 
in  the  light  of  the  requirements  of  mercy.  The  picture 
Philo  presents  here  is  of  a  God  who  sees  what  justice 
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demands,  then  sees  how  the  demands  of  justice  can  be 
tempered  by  mercy,  and  only  then  and  on  the  basis  of  the 
consideration  of  mercy  passes  judgment.  Philo's  God 
was  not,  at  least  to  Philo,  a  fearful  and  terrifying 
Being.  Philo  does  indeed  speak  of  God's  kindness,  and 
love  for  mankind'. 
The  terms  "justice"  and  "mercy"  have  to  be  handled 
carefully  in  this  context,  Philo  clearly  thought  that 
God's  perfection  is  expressed  in  part  in  His  perfect 
justice.  Now,  there  is  a  sense  in  which  an  act  of 
mercy,  in  so  far  as  it  contradicts  a  just  judgment,  is 
itself  unjust.  If  justice  demands  that  a  man  be 
punished,  and  mercy  demands  that  the  man  remain 
unpunished,  the  decision  not  to  punish,  being  the 
opposite  of  what  is  required  by  justice,  is  itself 
unjust.  It  might  be  said  in  answer  to  this  that  mercy 
was  dictated  by  a  "higher"  justice,  that  if  the 
positive  law  of  the  land  were  the  sole  factor 
determining  the  judge's  decision,  the  decision  would  be 
too  harsh  in  relation  to  what  is  demanded  by  natural 
justice.  Consequently,  it  may  be  said,  what  we  call 
mercy  is  what  would  be  positive  justice  if  positive 
justice  were  brought  into  line  with  natural  justice. 
But  God's  mercy  cannot  be  inconsistent  with  divine 
justice  by  virtue  of  being  dictated  by  a  "higher" 
1. 
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justice,  for  there  can  be  no  higher  justice  than 
God's.  It  seems  necessary  to  conclude  from  this  that, 
though.  Philo  does  talk  about  the  justice  and  the 
mercy  of  God,  His  mercy  must  be  understood  to  be 
mercy  only  in  relation  to  human  positive  justice  and 
not  in  relation  to  divine  justice. 
One  more  aspect  of  divine  personhood  requires 
mention  here,  namely,  God's  free  wi]1.  As  we  have 
already  had  occasion  to  mention,  unlike  dead  matter 
which  lacks  potential  for  agency  since  it  is 
necessitated,  God  acts  voluntarily.  Thus  Philo 
writes:  "God  is  a  being  of  free  will;  the  world  of 
things  is  Fatality  öcv  y'iK 
)"l*  Philo  takes 
seriously  the  concept  of  vine  free  will,  so  much  so 
that  he  even  insists  that  when  God  acts  well  He  does 
so  freely.  For  in  Philo1s  view  it  is  in  God's  power 
to  do  good  and-to  do  evil  rA>  to  vc  -roe,  Ka  I  Eu 
2 
<at-  -  ºca  KS  and  the  fact  that  He  always 
does  good  is  due  to  an  act  of  choice3. 
This  is  not  the  place  to  discuss  in  detail  the/ 
I 
question  of  the  extent  to  which  Philo's  attribution 
of  choice  (rcrDa  e 
.vL.  $)  to  God  is  warranted  only  by 
his-interpretation  of  the  verse  "God.  is  as  man" 
....  . 
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discussed  earlier.  But  it  is  worth  mentioning  at  this 
point  that  if,  as  seems  the  case,  Philo  is  taking 
over  the  Aristotelian  conception  of  npoälpto'LS  as 
developed  in  the  Nicomachean  Ethics,  it  is  not 
certain  that  Philo  avoids  a  variety  of  anthropomorphism. 
Two  points  are  especially  relevant  to  this  issue.  The 
first  is  that  Aristotle  undoubtedly  considered  choice 
an  integral  aspect  of  the  activity  of  practical 
reason,  which  he  considered  part  of  the  essence  of 
man.  Therefore  if  'choice  has  the  same  relation  to 
God  that  it  has  to  man,  we  would  have  to  conclude 
that  practical  wisdom  is  part  of  God's  essence.  And 
this  is  not  a  conclusion  that  Philo  would  wish  to 
draw  -  bearing  in  mind  his  teaching  on  the 
unknowability  of  God's  essence. 
Secondly,  Aristotle  presents  choice  as  playing  a 
certain  role  in  practical  deliberation,  reasoning 
about  what.  we  are  to  do.  This  reasoning  is 
portrayed  as  though  it.  is  discursivel.  Now,  if  choice 
is  necessarily  imbedded  in  practical  reasoning,  and 
such  reasoning  is  discursive,  then  our  earlier 
objection  to  the  idea  of  God  engaging  in  discursive 
reasoning  can  be  applied  here  to  show  that  HeI  'cannot, 
in  the  full  Aristotelian  sense  of  the  term  "choice", 
00000  i 
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make  choices.  Elsewhere1  I  have  argued  that  one  way 
to  understand  Aristotle's  account  of  practical 
reasoning  is  to  see  it,  not  as  a  genetic  or 
historical  account  of  the  process  by  which  an  action 
came  to  be  performed,  but  rather  as  an  analytic 
account  of  the  elements  that  go  to  make  up  an  action. 
If  this  interpretation  is  correct  then  it  seems 
possible,  at  least  at  first  sight,  to  give  an 
account  of  Aristotelian  practical  reasoning  without 
introducing  the  concept  of  discursive  thought.  But 
this  position  is  not  entirely  secure,  for  in  Book  VII 
of  the  Nicomachean  Ethics,  where  Aristotle  discusses 
the  practical  reasoning  of  the  incontinent  man,  he 
appears  to  view  practical  reasoning  as  a  process  in 
which  the  agent  sets  out  the  premisses  but  fails  to 
act  on  them.  If  the  Book  VII  account  is  taken  as 
representing  the  true  Aristotelian  position,  it  will 
have  to  be  concluded  that  practical  reasoning  is 
discursive  and  that  therefore  it  is  impossible  for  God 
to  engage  in  it.  And  since  choice  is  essentially 
imbedded  in  practical  reasoning  He  cannot  in  the  full 
Aristotelian  sense  make  choices.  It  does  indeed  seem 
arguable  that  the  text  of  Aristotle  can,  without 
contradiction,  support  both  the  genetic  and  the 
analytic  interpretations  of  practical  reasoning, 
1"  "Aristotle  on  Rational  Action"  Phronesis  XIX  19711, 
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because  these  two  interpretations  make  reference  to 
different  aspects  of  the  one  phenomenon.  If  that  is 
the  case  then,  in  so  far  as  practical  reasoning  can 
correctly  be  seen  as,  among  other  things,  a 
discursive  process,  our  argument  that  God  cannot  make 
choices  can  be  maintained,  despite  the  validity  of  the 
analytic  interpretation  of.  the  same  phenomenon. 
These  points  complete  the  account  I  wish  to  give  of 
Philo's  conception  of  the  personal  God.  Clearly  the 
topic  of  the  Philonic  personal  God  is  very  large  indeed, 
but  I  hope  that  what  I  have  said  about  the  topic 
provides  an  adequate  conceptual  preparation  for  what 
we  meet  with  in  Margah's  Memar.  Indeed,  to  a  large 
extent  what  we  meet  with  in  the  Memar  in  connection 
with  Marqah's  teaching  on  the  personhood  of  God 
coincides  with  Philo's  teaching  on  that  subject.  In 
particular,  Margah's  difficulties  in  relation  to 
anthropomorphism  are  the  same  as  Philo's,  arising  as 
they  do  from  the  same  source;  and,  as  I  shall  argue, 
in  so  far  as  Philo  can  resolve  those  difficulties  so 
also  can  Margah  -  and  in  the  same  way. 
Marqah,  like  Philo,  based  his  belief  in  the 
personhood  of  God  on  two  distinct  kinds  of  ev  dence. 
The  first  is  Pentateuchal  and  the  second  phil  sophical. 
The  precise  nature  of  the  first  should  be  evildent  from 
what  was  said  on  the  same  subject  in  respectIof  Philo's 183 
position.  The  second  requires  closer  attention.  With 
regard  to  the  cosmological  argument  for  God's 
personhood,  we  have  already  discussed,  in  Chapter  III 
Nargah's  concept  of  God  as  an  artificer  of  the 
universe  as  man  is  an  artificer  of  human  artifacts. 
One  of  the  points  that  Marqah  has  in  mind  is  that  just 
as  a  human  artifact  bears  witness  to  the  nature  of  the 
artificer,  because  the  artificer  puts  something  of 
himself  into  what  he  makes  -  his  artifacts  are  an 
expression  of  himself  -  so  also  the  world  bears 
witness,  no  less  than  do  human  artifacts,  to  an 
artificer.  The  cosmos,  however,  bears  witness  to  a 
cosmic  artificer  and  such  a  being  can  only  be  God. 
Nature  bears  witness  not  only  to  His  existence  - 
though  it  does  at  least  do  that  -  but  also,  and  more 
specifically,  to  His  power;  Marqah  writes:  "He 
created  ten  things  that  bear  witness  to  His  might"f 
[I  131,  II  213].  It  also  bears  witness  to  His 
oneness  -  "Observe  these_things  and  realise  that  they 
are  evidences  testifying  of  Him  that 
n 
essence  [ibid.  ].  Elsewhere,  Marqah 
that  the  cosmos  bears  witness  to  the 
This  at  least  seems  to  be  what  Margäl 
He  is  one  ;  in 
/His 
1/ 
appears  to  affirm 
value  of  Godo 
h  has  in  mind  when 
he  asserts:  "Time  and  season  are  not  silent  over  Thy 
goodness"  [Hymn  II  9],  Thus  God  is  one,  powerful  and 
good.  And  it  is  by  a  consideration  of  nature,  that  we 
can  come  to  learn  this. 184 
By  a  consideration  of  nature  we  can  also  come  to 
learn  something  further  about  God,  in  Marqah's  view, 
that  establishes  Him  as  a  person.  Nature  reveals  that 
He  is  loving.  Marqah  writes:  "Everything  bears  witness 
to  Thee  that  Thy  love  is  without  end" 
[Hymn  III  ll]. 
And  as  though  anxious  not  to  be  misunderstood  on  this 
crucial  matter,  Marqah  says  it  again  in  the  same  hymn: 
"Thy  name  is  'Loving  One'.  Everything  bears  witness 
that  Thou  art  so"  [v.  21].  Thus  Marqah,  no  less  than 
Philo,  considers  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  turn  to 
Scripture  for  evidence  of  the  personhood  of  God,  even 
if  a  more  detailed  picture  is  to  be  gleaned  from 
Scripture  than  from  nature. 
A  further  important  parallel  between  Philo  and 
Marqah  concerns  the  Philonic  conception  of  God  as  the 
mind  of  the  universe.  I  discussed  earlier  the 
Philonic  doctrine  that  as  the  human  body  has  a  human 
mind  so  the  cosmos  has  a  divine  mind,  and  went  so  far 
as  to  suggest  as  a  possibility,  on  the  basis  of  Philots 
reference  to  the  human  mind  as  äroa--rrao-at  ©Ec. 
o￿ý  that 
God1s  mind  is  the  only  mind  in  the  universe.  Both 
these  ideas  appear  in  slightly  altered  form  in 
Margahts  writings.  For  what.  Philo  says  about 
mind, 
Marqah  says  about  life.  In  the  Memar  Marqah  affirms 
that:  '"Life  is  'borrowed'  from  Him  for  a  seas)  on,  and 
He  is  the  owner  of  all  the  seasons"  [I  132,1I  214]. 
And  in  a  similar  vein  he  puts  into  God's  moutlh  the 185 
words:  "I,  even  I,  am  He,  to  whom  the  life  of  the 
world  belongs"  [I  111,  II  187].  This  latter-statement 
could  mean  no  more  than  that  God  is  the  sole  owner  of 
living  beings  in  the  world.  But  it  could  also  mean 
that  the  life  of  the  world  is  God's  life.  This  last 
doctrine  is,  in  its  verbal  form,.  very  similar  to  the 
Stoic  doctrine,  to  a  version  of  which  Philo  would  have 
subscribed,  that  God-is  the  life  of  the  world.  This 
Stoic-sounding  element  in  Margah's  position  is  more 
evident  still  in  his  assertion:  "The  world  has  no  life 
to  it  but  He"  [I  112,  II  188].  It  is  clear  from  this 
that  Marqah  does  indeed  subscribe  to  the  doctrine  that 
God  is  the  life  of  the  world,  and  that  in  so  far  as 
it  is  correct  to  ascribe  life  to  anything  other  than 
God,  the  life  thus  ascribed  is  on  loan  fron  God.  The 
life  remains  God's  though  someone  else  is  being 
permitted  by  Him  to.  use  it. 
It  is  tempting  to  conclude  from  this  that  Margah 
is  on  the  brink  of  the  doctrine  that  the  life  of  man 
is  an  ä7o%n,  %C;  AI  & 
0Qov.  For  evidently  if  Margah 
ascribes  life  to  men,  and  also  says  that  the  only 
life  in  the  universe  is  God1s,  he  would  seem  to  be 
committed  to  the  view  that  the  lives  of  men  arge 
fragments  of  the  divine  life.  If  this  suggested 
interpretation  of  Margah's  account  of  the  rel  tion 
between  human  life  and  the  life  of  God  is  acceptedq 
Margah  would  seem  to  have  laid  himself  open  tlo  the 186 
accusation  of  anthropomorphism.  The  reason  for  making 
this  move  is  that  Marqah  is  saying  that  in  one  respect 
at  least,  and  that  respect  is  a  basic  one,  God  has  a 
quality  that  men  have,  namely,  life.  And  in  implying 
that  God  resembles  man  in  respect  of  being  alive,  is 
Margah  not  ascribing  to  God  a  form  that  he  ascribes  to 
men,  and  is  he  not  thereby  subscribing,  to  an 
anthropomorphic  doctrine? 
If  he  is  then  he  has  failed  to  maintain  with 
consistency  his  doctrine  of  Godts  utter  otherness, 
since  with  respect  to  life  God  would  clearly  not  be 
other  than  man.  There  are  several  possible  lines  that 
can  be  taken  in  response  to  this  criticism, 
The  first  is  suggested  by  a  move  I  made  earlier  in 
defence  of  Philo  when  considering  an  argument  designed. 
to  prove  that  Philo's  teaching  has  anthropomorphic 
-  implications.  In  defence  of  Marqah  it  may  be  said  that 
his  doctrine  is  not  anthropomorphic,  but,  rather, 
theomorphic,  since  he  is  not  saying  that  God  has  a 
human  quality;  on  the  contrary,  he  is  saying  that  man 
has  a  divine  quality.  If  Marqah  were  saying  this  he 
would  not  be  drawing  God  down  to  man1s  level;  he  would 
Ir  1  be  raising  man  to  a  supernal  position  in  the  rrld. 
The  position  would-indeed  be  exalted,  for  man  would 
be  seen  as  participating  in  divinity.  That  's  to  say, 
man  would  not  be  merely  in  the  image  of  God;  he 
would,  on  the  contrary,  be  in  one  respect  Go  Himself. 
" 
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Now,  whether  or  not  the  ascription  of  theomorphism 
to  Philo  is  justified,  the  implications  of  such  an 
ascription  to  Marqah  can  be  seen  to  be  contrary  to 
the  tenor  of  the  Memar  as  a  whole.  Against  the 
backcloth  of  deep  humility-in  the  presence  of  the'-. 
divine,  which  permeates  the  Memar,  the  doctrine  that 
man  shares  in  divinity,  and  is  in  one  respect  identical 
with  God,  is  stridently  incongruous.  In  particular, 
it  clashes  sharply  with  Marqah's  doctrine  of  divine 
otherness. 
Nevertheless,,  we  are  faced  with  the  fact  that 
Marqah,  who  nowhere  suggests  that  men  are  not  alive, 
does  say  that  the'life  of  the  world  belongs  to  God, 
and  that  "The  world  has  no  life  to  it  but  He".  And 
it  is  not  easy  to  ignore  the  implication  that  if  man 
has  life  then  his  life  is  really  God's,  and  that 
therefore  man,  so  far  as  he  is  alive,  is  to  that 
extent  divine.  Since  the  claim  that  Nargah's 
position  is  theororphic  rather  than  anthropomorphic 
can  be  seen  not  to  resolve  the  difficulty  of 
reconciling  the  doctrine  of  God's  otherness  with  the 
doctrine  of  God  as  the  life  of  the  world,  an 
alternative  line  of  defence  must  be  sought,  In  fact 
there  is  a  line  more  effective  than  the  one  just 
pursued. 
It  concerns  the  difference  between  the  life  of  God 
and  the  life  of  man.  These  are  so  different)  in 
I 
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Margah's  view,  that  it  would  make  sense,  within 
Margah's  system,  to  speak  of  a  total  transformation 
of  Godts  life  when  it  is  "loaned"  to  man.  The 
difference  is  sufficiently  great  to  warrant  the  claim 
that  if  true  life  is  God's. 
-. 
then  human  life  is  life 
only  in  a  weakened  sense  of  the  term.  What  then  are 
the  differences? 
Margah  describes  God  as:  "the  living  one  who  does 
not  die,  who  abides  unchangingly" 
[I  8t  II  8].  For 
Marqah,  of  course,  God,  who  is  alive,  can  never  cease 
to  be  alive,  since  He  is  unchangeable.  Now,  God's 
immortality  cannot  be  conceived  in  temporal  terms, 
since  God  is  timeless.  Hence  His  life  is  not 
everlasting  through  time.  But  we  are  in  that  case 
faced  with  having  to  say  that  God  lives  though  His 
life,  everlasting  though  it  may  be,  does  not  last 
through  even  one  moment  of  time.  Whatever  the  nature 
of  such  a  life  may  be,  and  it  is  possible  that  the 
conception  of  such  a  life  cannot  be  grasped  by  man, 
it  is  certainly  radically  different  from  human  life. 
And  it  is  human  life,  essentially  structured  by  time, 
that  provides  us  with  our  model  or  exemplar  of  life. 
God's  life,.  wholly  unaffected  by  one  of  the 
characteristic  structuring  principles  of  human  life, 
"  is  not  life  at  all  in  the  human  sense  of  the  term. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  we  say  that  Godts  life  truly 
is  life  then  it  follows  that  man's  life  is  1'Ife  only 189 
in  a  weakened  sense  of  the.  term. 
Perhaps  nothing  brings  out  more  the'ambiguity  of 
the  term  "living"  when  predicated  of  men  and  of  God 
than  does  the  fact  of  man's  mortality.  When  Marqah 
describes  God  as"the  living  one  who  does  not  die"  he 
thereby  makes  oblique  reference  to  men  -  who  do  die. 
Man's  life  is  regarded.  by  Marqah  assubject  to  the 
divine  will,  but  God's  life  is  not.  God,  cannot  will 
His  own  death,  but  He  can  will  the  death  of  man. 
Thus,  in  a  powerful  passage  Marqah  proclaims:.  "No 
deceiver  in  the  world  has  any  future.  A  corrupter  of 
men  is  a  corrupter  of  the  Lord,  for  he  has  denied 
Him.  Because  of  the  magnitude  of  what  he  says,  he 
has  no  future  before  me.  I  will  erase  his  memory 
from  under  heaven,  because  he  disobeyed  my  command; 
I  will  destroy  his  life"  [I  729  II  115].  If 
finitude  is  an  essential  feature  of  human  life,  and 
t 
Godts  life  is  infinite,  we  must  draw  the  conclusion 
that  God1s  life  and  mans  are  essentially  different.. 
On  the  evidence  I  have  presented  it  seems  that/ 
Margah  would  argue  that  to  insist  on  a  similaritý 
between  God  and  mane  on  the  grounds  that  God  has 
life  and  men  have  life,  would  be  to,  succumb  to  the 
misleading  impression  given  by  the  employment  of  the 
single  term  "life",  in  reference  to  God  and  to  men. 
The  philosophical  question,  of  which-Margah  was 
evidently  not  unconscious,  was  whether  the  verbal 
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similarity  is  justified  by  a  conceptual  similarity,  or 
whether  the  verbal  similarity  masks  an  equivocation 
in  the  term  "life"  when  applied  first  to  God  and  then 
to  men.  Marqah  is  committed  to  the  second  of  these 
alternatives. 
In  discussing  Marqah's  conception  of  God  as  a 
person,  attention  has  so  far  been  directed  to  the 
fact  that  Marqah  conceived  of  God  as  alive.  But 
Marqah  says  numerous  other  things  about  God  that 
enable  us  to  build  up  a  picture  of  Marqah's  living 
God  as  being  unquestionably  a  personal  God.  One 
striking  feature  of  Margah's  God  is  that  He  knows 
things.  The  Nemar  and  the  Defter  hymns  are  replete 
with  references  to  God  as  knower,  This  consideration 
raises  an  immediate  question  concerning 
antkiropomorphism  in  Margah's  teaching.  For  though 
Marqah's  doctrine  on  the  life  of  God  does  not  lead  to 
anthropomorphism,  it  is  possible  that  his  doctrine  on 
God  as  a  knower  does.  However,  reason  for  supposing 
that  anthropomorphism  does  not  lurk  beneath  the 
surfa'e  of  Margah's'teaching  on  God  as  a  knower  is 
provided  early  in  the  Memar.  For  on  the  very 
first 
page  Marqah  presents  the  following  doctrine  a  out  God: 
He  knows  all  secrets  without  having  recourse  to 
knowledge".  It  is  not  certain  what  DMargah  means  by 
this  statement,  but  of  the  two  interpretations  between 191 
which  one  has,  I  think,  to  choose,  neither  accords 
with  a  doctrine  of  anthropomorphism,. 
First,  Marqah  may  be  making  use  of  the  via 
nerativae  Perhaps,  that  is,  he  is  basing  his 
position  on  the  doctrine  that  affirmative  attributes 
should  not  be  ascribed  to  God  since  otherwise  a 
distinction  could  be  made  in  God  between  God,  the 
possessor  of  the  attributes,  and  the  attributes 
possessed  by  God.  Thus  it  may  be  in  order  to  avoid 
implying  plurality  within  God  that  Margah'is 
denying  that  God  has  knowledge.  Consequently,  if  we 
are  to  attribute  knowledge  to  God  what  is  thereby 
attributed  cannot  be  part  of  God's  essence,  for  this 
would  be  to  imply  plurality  in  God.  But  if  divine 
knowledge  is  not  to  be  conceived  of  as  part  of  the 
divine  essence,  it  must  instead  be  a  power  of  God. 
Since  the  powers  of  God  are  His  properties  it  follows 
that  divine  knowledge  is  a  divine  property  and  therefore 
cannot  be  possessed  also  by  men.  Hence,  though'God 
has  knowledge  and  men  have  knowledge,  human 
knowledge  cannot  be  knowledge  in  the  sense  of  the 
term  "knowledge"  according  to  which  we  speak  of 
divine  knowledge.  It  follows  from  this  that  talk 
about  God  knowing  things  does  not,  within  Nargah's 
system,  imply  an  anthropomorphic  doctrine.  This 
conclusion  iss  of  course,  reached  on  the  basis  of  a 
possible,  though  not  certain,  interpretation  of  the 192 
statement  about  God:  "He  knows  all  secrets  without 
recourse  to  knowledge".  There  iss  however,  a 
second  possible  interpretation  that  also  has  to  be 
considered. 
Immediately  preceding  the  statement  just  quoted,  . 
Marqah  asserts:  "Self-subsisting  is  He,  who  has  no 
need  of  anything".  Marqah's  two  statements  are 
closely  related  in  that  they  have  the  same  logical 
structure.  We  are  told,  first,  that  God  does  not 
depend  for  His  existence  on  the  existence  of 
anything  outside  Himself.  It  is  not  surprising  that 
Marqah  does  regard  God  as  self-subsistent,  for  he 
regards  God  as  the  Creator  of  the  world,  and 
therefore  as  in  some  sense  prior,  though  not 
temporally  prior,  to  it.  Prior  to  the  existence  of 
the  world  God  got  along  without  the  world.  And  since 
God  is  unchanging,  it  follows  that  God  can  get  along 
without  it.  But  there  is  nothing  outside  the  world 
but  God,  for  the  world  is  the  mundus  creatus  and  the 
only  thing  outside  it  is  the  creator  Himself.  Hence 
Godts  existence  depends  only  upon  Himself.  Thit/is 
to  say,  He  is  self-subsistent. 
The  statement  that  God  knows  all  things  without 
having  recourse  to  knowledge  can  be  understood  in  a 
similar  manner.  We  can,  that  iss  understand  it  as 
making  the  point  that  Godts  knowledge  also  is 
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what  is  true,  where  the  knowledge  is  conceived  of  as 
dependent  on  the  existence  of  the  truth.  The  fact 
that  a  given  proposition  is  true  constitutes  one  of 
the  conditions  that  have  to  be  satisfied  if  the 
proposition  is  to  be  an  object  of  human  knowledge. 
In  this  respect  human  knowledge  has  dependent  being, 
since  it  depends  on  the  prior  truth  of  its  object. 
I  think  that  Margah  is  claiming,  in  the  passage 
under  discussion,  that  God's  knowledge  is,  with 
respect  to  its  relation  to  the  truth,  the  precise 
opposite  of  human  knowledge.  For  in  saying  that  God 
does  not  need  to  have  recourse  to  knowledge  in  order 
to  know,  he  is  saying  that  unlike  human  knowledge 
which  is  created  partly  by  the  truth  of  the  object  of 
knowledge,  God's  knowing  something  creates  the  truth 
of  what  He  knows.  God  does  not  have  recourse  to 
possible  objects  of  knowledge  in  order  to  know,  simply 
because  those  possible  objects  of  knowledge  do  not 
exist  until  God  brings  them  about  by  knowing  them. 
It  is  worth  noting,  as  a  historical  footnote,  that 
if  this  is  the  doctrine  that  Marqah  is  putting 
forward  he  would  not  be  the  only  philosopher  to  have 
presented  it.  Perhaps  its  greatest  exponent  is 
St.  Thomas  Aquinas,  who  argues  in  the  Summa  Theoloviae 
la,  1Zt,  8  that:  "Scientia  Dei  est  causa  rorum.  Sic  enim 
scientia  Dei  se  habet  ad  omnes  res  creatas, 
sicut 
scientia-artificis  se  habet  ad  artificiata.  JScientia 194 
autem  artificis  est  causa  artificiatorum,  eo  quod 
artifex  operatur  per  suum  intellectum".  But  while 
I  think  that  "Scientia  Dei  est  causa  rerum"  is  the 
correct  interpretation  of  Margah's  position,  I  am  not 
certain  whether  Marqah  would  have  accepted  all  of 
Aquinas'  doctrine  in  this  field.  For  on  examination 
Aquinas  turns  out  to  be  saying  not  simply  that  divine 
knowledge  is  the  cause  of  the  object  of  its 
knowledge,  but  that  divine  knowledge  is  such  a  cause 
when  combined  with  an  act  of  will  -  "secundum  quod 
habet  voluntatem  conjunctam"1.  It  is  because  the 
divine  knowledge  is  combined  with  an  act  of  will 
(thus  constituting  "scientia  approbationis",  to  use 
the  technical  term)  that  Aquinas  compares  the  divine 
knowledge  with  the  knowledge  that  an  artificer  has  of 
his  artifact.  But  on  the  basis  of  what  we  have 
-"  already  learned  about  Margah's  views  on  the-divine 
will,  it  seems  safe  to  conclude  that  he  would  reject 
this  proposed  parallel.  For  the  artificer's  knowledge 
is  Only  of  the  final  cause  of  his  artifact.  And  even 
s  when  he  has  willed  to  make  it,  his  knowledge  mü 
/ 
remain  of  an  ideal  until  by  an  act  of  will,  and  with 
the  aid  of  other  contingent  factors,  he  has  made  what 
he  had  originally  thought  of.  His  initial  knowledge 
is  not  therefore  of  an  objective  relatity.  For  the 
artifact  is  not  yet  made.  And.  his  knowledge  conjoined 
with  his  will  is  not  of  an  objective  reality  either, 
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since  the  human  will  can  fail  the  agent.  Marqah, 
however,  would  wish  to  hold  that  on  the  contrary 
divine  knowledge,  when  conjoined  with  an  act  of  will, 
cannot  fail  to  be  of  an  objective  reality.  In  this 
case  the  divine  mind  does  not.  need  to  look  beyond 
itself  in  order  to  see  whether  the  object  of  knowledge 
already  exists.  For  God  knows  that  if  Ile  wills  an 
object's  existence  that  object  must  exist.  So  God 
needs  to  look  no  further  than  His  own  will.  The 
"  artificer,  on  the  other  hand,  must  look  at  the  world, 
since  his  will  is  not  infinite.  Therefore,  even  if 
Marqah  would  accept  the  dictum:  "Scientia  Dei  est  causa 
rerum",  he  could  not  consistently  accept  Aquinas' 
claim  that  the  relation  between  an  artificer  and  his 
artifact  is  like  that  between  God  and  his  creatures. 
Now,  in  so  far  as  Aquinas  does  take  seriously  his 
reference  to  the  human  artificer  and  his  artifacts,  as 
shedding  light  on  the  relation  between  God  and  His' 
creations,  there  is  at  least  a  hint  of  l 
I 
anthropomorphism  in  Aquinas'  position.  But  Margah,  by 
insisting  as  he  does  on  the  power  of  the  divine  will, 
is  able  to  maintain.  that  "Scientia  Dei  est  causa 
rerum"  while  rejecting  as  irrelevant  Aquinas'  model 
of  the  human  artificer. 
I  have  argued,  so  far,  that  Alargah's  account  of 
divine  knowledge  is  free  from  anthropomorphic 
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divine  and  human  knowledge  With.  respect  to  their 
nature,  it  would  not  be  unexpected  if  they  also 
differed  in  scope.  On  examination,  Marqah  can  indeed 
be  seen  to  hold  that  God's  knowledge,  unlike  man1s,  is 
illimitable. 
In  the  opening  paeon  of  praise  in  the  Memar  Marqah 
asserts:  "No  secret  is  hidden  from  Him,  for  everything 
is  under  His  dominion".  Since  God  has  dominion,  and 
hence  power,  over  the  entire  cosmos,  Marqah  is 
affirming,  everything  is  available  to  Him  as  an 
object  of  knowledge.  This  position  is  repeated  later 
in  the  Memar:  "He  knows  the  secrets  of  every  heart  and 
what  is  hidden  in  it;  nothing  is  beyond  His  power" 
[I  76,  II  1231.  The  metaphysical  basis  of  Margah's 
teaching  on  the  scope  of  divine  knowledge  has  already 
been  discussed  in  connection  with  Philo,  who,  under 
the  same  kind  of  metaphysical  pressure  as  Marqah,  i 
presents  the  same  conclusions.  Marqah,  like  Philo, 
faced  with  the  fact  of  the  absolute  oneness  of  God, 
held  that  God  is  outside  time  and  space.  Nowlla 
/ 
being  for  whom  there  is  ,a  past  and  a  future  isless 
perfect  in  his  knowledge  than  is  a  being  for  whom  all 
of  time  is  spread  out  as  present.  The  reason  for  this 
is  that  those  in  relation  to  whom  there  is  a  future 
either  do  not  no  know  what  will  happen  (in  which  case 
their  knowledge  is  imperfect)  or  do  know  what  will 
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of  extrapolation.  Where  something  is  known  by 
extrapolation  it  is,  of  course,  known  mediately,  not 
immediately.  And  since  unmediated  knowledge  is  more 
certain  than  mediated  it  is  more  perfect.  Therefore, 
since  God's  knowledge  is  timeless  and  hence  cannot  be 
past  or  future  in  relation  to  the  object  of  His 
knowledge,  His  knowledge  has  the  possibility  of  a 
degree  of  perfection  not  available  to  human  knowledge. 
In  the  light  of  this  consideration  it  comes  as  no 
n 
surprise  to-find  Margah  saying  of  God:  He  knows  what 
has  been,  what  is  now,  and  what  is  yet  to  be" 
[I  5,  II  3],  But  what  has  to  be  borne  in  mind  here  is 
that  Marqah  is  not  saying  that  in  the  past  God  knew 
what  was  happening,  now  He  knows  what  is  happening, 
and  in  the  future  Ile  will  know  what  will  then  be 
happening.  He  is,  on  the  contrary,  taking  the  much  more 
rw 
stringent  view  that  God  knows  as  present  to  Him  what,  is 
past,  present  and  future  to  us, 
Thus  the  condition  of  temporality,  which  sets  a 
limit  on  human  knowledge,  does  not  set  a  limition" 
divine  knowledge.  Similarly,  the  condition  of 
spatiality  does  not  limit  God's  knowledge  though  it 
does  limit  man's.  God,  we  are  told:  *"does  not  reside 
in  a  place;  He  is  devoid  of  any  locality"  [I  97,  II  161]. 
Man,  necessarily  restricted  in  locality,  can  of 
course  see  the  world  only  from  his  particular  point 
of  view.  What  he  sees  is  the  world  as  it  looks  from  a 
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specific  position.  This  is  part  of  the  condition  of 
finitude  under  which  man  lives.  For  by  looking  at 
the  world  from  one  position  man  is  thereby  excluding 
himself  from  the  possibility  of  looking  at  the  world 
at  that  moment  from  any  other  position,  just  as  by--- 
seeing  the  world  at  one  moment  intime  he  thereby 
expresses  his  finitude  because  he  is  unable  also  to  be 
seeing  the  world  at  a  different  moment.  Margah's 
view  is  that  God,  lacking  the  limitations  of  spatial 
existence,  has  the  potential  for  a  degree  of  cognitive 
scope  from  which  men,  and  indeed  all  creatures  living 
under  the  conditions  of  space  and  time,  are  in  the 
nature  of  the  case  barred. 
This  interpretation  of  Marqah,  as  involving  the  idea 
that  God  can  know  everything  at  all  times  because  He 
is  not  Himself  in  time,  is  open  to  a  line  of  criticism 
that  can  be  undercut  though  it  should  at  least  be 
noted.  Since  God  does  not  exist  at  one  time  rather 
than  another,  the  availability  to  Him  of  knowledge  of 
what  in  relation  to  us  has  occurred  in  the  past  cannot 
depend,  as  it  must  with  us,  on  the  exercise  of  memory. 
God  does  not  have  a.  memory  because  He  is  timeless. 
But  He  is  not  limited  in  what  He  can  know,  by!  an 
absehce  of  memory,  precisely  because,  unlike 
those 
living  under  the  conditions  of  time,  He  does 
Inot 
need 
a  memory.  In  the  face  of  this  consideration  it  is 
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entitled  to  speak  of  God,  as  he  does  on  numerous 
occasions,  as  having  a  memory.  For  example,  he 
frequently  implores  God  to  remember  good  men  of  past 
generations,  as  when  he  declaims:  "0  Merciful  One, 
remember  our  fathers"  [I  94P,  11  1531* 
In  dealing  with  this  difficulty  I  want  to  take  as  a 
basis  that  must  remain  intact  the  fact  that  in  Marqah's 
view  God  is  timeless.  The  entire  weight  of  Margah's 
metaphysical  position  in  the  Memar  underpins  the 
doctrine  of  God's  timelessness.  What  requires  to  be 
effected  is  an  interpretation  of  the  claim  that  God 
has  a  memory,  that  can  be  accommodated  to  the  doctrine 
that  God  is  timeless.  And  there  is  such  an 
interpretation.  In  saying  that  God  has  a  memory  what 
Marqah  can  be  taken  to  mean  is  that  God  has  knowledge 
of  what  is  past  in  relation  to  us.  In  asking  God  to 
remember  our  fathers,  we  would  not  be  asking  Him  to 
bring  to  mind  something  that  lies  in  the  past  in 
relation  to  Him  -  such  a  cognitive  act  would  be/ 
metaphysically  impossible  for  God,  We  would,  on  the 
contrary,  be  asking  Him  to  bring  to  mind  what  li?  s  in 
our  past,  God,  it  is  to  understood,  sees  our  past  as 
His  present. 
Precisely  the  same  kind  of  explanation  can  be  given 
concerning  a  passage  in  which  Tlargah  represents  God  as 
speaking  to  Moses  about  the  world's  righteous  in  the 
following  terms:  "ßy  my  goodness  I  established  a 200 
covenant  with  their  fathers,  which  I  shall  not  forget 
as  long  as  the  world  exists"  [I  6,  II  5].  -Here  also  it 
is  the  human  standpoint  that  dictates  the  mode  of 
expression.  The  idea  that  God  will  bear  something  in 
mind  for  a  period  of  time  is  incoherent  when  considered 
from  God's  point  of  view.  This  is  not  to  say  that  we 
can  understand  God's  point  of  view.  It  is  merely  to  say 
that  whatever  that  viewpoint  is  like,  it  cannot 
correctly  be  described  in  temporal  terms.  What  Nargah 
means  is  that  from  the  human  standpoint  God's  knowledge 
must  be  understood  as  lasting  through  time,  indeed,  as 
lasting  throughout  time.  All  times  are,  or  rather,  all 
time  iss  simultaneously  present  to  God. 
Such  modes  of  expression  as  we  have  just  been 
considering  are  found  not  only  in  the  Memar  but  also 
in  Nargah's  Defter  hymns,  as  when  he  declaims: 
"Remember  those  of  the  past,  and  forget  not  those  who 
are  yet  to  come"  [I  v.  16].  It  seems  reasonable  to  give 
the  same  interpretation  to  the  Defter  passage  as  has 
seemed  fitting  in  the  case  of  the  Memar  statements. 
As  did  Philo  before  him,  Marqah  lays  great 
emphasis  on  the  practical  implications  for  men  of  the 
fact  that  God's  knowledge  is  unlimited.  When  Margah 
says  of  God:  "No  secret  is  hidden  from  Him"  [S  5,  II  3] 
he  is  referring,  among  other  things,  to  the  secrets  of 
men.  In  one  passage  in  the  Meniar  Marqah  attributes  to 
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[sc.  in  punishment],  I  will  exact  vengeance  on  him!  If 
he  thought  he  could  deal  in  secret,  none  of  his  deeds  is 
concealed  from  me,  for  to  me  the  concealed  is  just  as 
the  revealed.  No  deed  done  is  concealed  from  me" 
[I  71,  II  113].  That  God  has  the  ability  to  know,  even 
those  secrets  that  men  can  successfully  keep  hidden 
from  other  men  is,  of  course,  a  crucial  premiss  for 
Nargah,  if  he  is  to  be  able  to  sustain  his  references 
to  God  as  a  just  God.  For  the  ability  to  deal  justly 
with  people  is,  as  was  pointed  out  earlier  in 
connection  with  Philo,  based  in  part  on  the  ability  to 
know  the  relevant  facts.  The  'relevant  facts'  include 
mental  occurrences  and  activities  as  well  as  overt 
physical  actions.  Even'the  mental  aspects  of  action 
are  present  to  the  divine  gaze.  Such  aspects,  no  less 
than  the  physical,  are  said  by  Margah  to  be  the 
material  on  whose  basis  God  judges  men.  This  is  the 
implication  of  Marqah's  attribution  to  God  of  the  words: 
"If  a  man  utters  a  corrupt  statement,  knowing  what  he 
does,  I  will  judge  him.  You  need  not  reprove  him 
among  men,  for  I  will  reprove  him  with  many 
calamities.  If  he  did  not  realise  what  he  was  saying 
and  if  he  learns  from  you,  happy  are  you  and  he  alike" 
(I  729  II  115].  In  a  similar  vein  Marqah  puts  into, 
God's  mouth  the  words:  "A  man  who  hastens  to  do  evil, 
if  he  was  in  his  right  mind  (i'  '  fl  T)  1A 
1 II.  \'7T1 
will  receive  the  curse" 
[I  729  II  116],  and:  j"Woe  to 202 
the  man  who...  commits  adultery  in  his  mind" 
[I  75,  II  122].  Thus  Margah  considers  that  if  God  is 
-to  be  a  just  God  he  must  have  insight  into  the  inner 
life  of  man,  as  well  as  the  outer.  And  he  does 
consider  God  to  be  jüsto  This  is  the  clear  message  'of 
the  affirmation:  "Who  is  like,  Thee.  majestic  in 
holiness?  (Ex. 
xv  11)  who  dealest  with  just,  holy  and 
pure  judgment,  contrary  to  all  that  the  unbelievers 
say"  [I  449  II  70].  The  polemical  note  struck  here 
by  Margah,  and  in  particular  the  question  of  whether 
Marqah  had  a  specific  group  of  unbelievers  in  mind, 
need  not  concern  us  here.  What  is  of  concern  is  the 
question  of  what  Nargah  saw  as  the  basis  of  God's 
justice.  It  is  not  enough  to  be  told  merely  that: 
"There  is  no  iniquity  in  Him"  [I  90,  II  146].  What 
is  required  is  an  account  of  what  it  is  about  God 
that  justifies  the  denial  of  iniquity  in  Him. 
Fortunately  Margah  has  a  great  deal  to  say  on  this 
subject,  and  I  would  like  at  this  stage  to  devote  some 
space  to  what  he  has  to  say  on  the  matter.  There  are 
two  important  respects  in  which  Marqah  studies  will 
benefit  from  a  close  scrutiny  of  the  area  at  issue. 
ý--:  First,  it  will  inevitably  shed  light  on  the  question 
of  what  kind  of  person  Margah  takes  God  to  be.  It  is 
because  it  will  shed  light  in  this  area  that  I  shall  be 
discussing  the  question  in  this  chapter. 
Secondly,  it  will  also  shed  light  on  what  Marqah  has 203 
to  say  about  the  moral'  behaviour  of  men.  For,  as  we 
shall  see  in  Chapter  IX  on  Marqah's  moral  philosophy, 
Margah  considered  God  as  providing  in  Himself  a  kind  of 
ethical  model  for  human  beings  to  imitate  as  closely 
as  possible.  Of  course,  certain  aspects  of  divine 
action  are  wholly  beyond  the  range  of  even  poor-..  - 
imitation,  and  perhaps  whenever  we  do  seek  to  imitate 
God  our  actions  necessarily  fall  short  of  the  model 
by  a  greater  or  lesser  margin.  Nevertheless,  divine 
justice  and  even  divine  compassion  can  be  seen  as 
ideals  towards  which  we  should  direct  our  lives.  And 
though  we  do  not  fully  embody  those  ideals  in  our 
action,  to  the  extent  that  we  do  secure  an  even 
partial  embodiment  of  them  in  our  behaviour  we  will 
have  vested  our  lives  with  a  special  value.  From  this 
account  of  the  way  Marqah  places  divine  justice  in  the 
scheme  of  things,  it  follows  that  for  Marqah  the 
question  of  what  divine  justice  is  has  immediate  and 
profound  practical  implications.  For  on  learning  what 
the  principles  are  on  the  basis  of  which  God  acts 
justly,  we  thereby  learn  what  the  principles  of  justice 
I  I/  are  that  we  ought  to  seek  to  embody  in  our  actions. 
Thus  the  account,  which  now  follows,  of  divine  justice, 
is  no  less  a  preface  to  the  subsequent  chapter  on 
Marqah's  moral  philosophy  than  it  is  a  continuation  of 
the  present  chapter  on  God  as  a  person. 
Perhaps  the  most  conspicuous  aspect  of  God  as  a 
judge  is  His  impartialityo  Persistent  references  to 
this  feature  of  God's  justice  are  made  in  the;  Mema'r 204 
and  Nargah's  Defter  hymns.  '  God.  is  a  "Righteous  Judge 
who  is  impartial"  [Hymn  VI  v.  4].  And  Moses  is 
portrayed  as  saying:  "Greatness  to  Thy  power,  0  my 
Lord,  0  Judge,  0  True  One,  Thou  dost  not  show 
partiality,  not  to  prophet  nor  to  righteous  man" 
[I  117,  II  193].  Ifs  as  seems  likely  from  the  context, 
in  which  Moses  is  making  preparations  for  his  own 
death,  Moses  was  referring  to  himself  in  speaking  of 
the  prophet  and  righteous  man,  this  serves  to  highlight 
the  degree  to  which  God  is  seen  as  not  susceptible  to 
the  vice  of  nepotism. 
That  Godts  impartiality  is  seen  as  a  virtue  is 
quickly  made  evident  to  us.  For  having  repeated: 
"Thou  dost  not  shun  judgment.  Thou  dost  not  show 
partiality,  not  to  prophet  or  to  righteous  one", 
Marqah  immediately  adds:  "Righteousness  is  Thine,  0 
True  One!  Righteousness  is  Thine,  0  Judge"  j 
[I  118,  II  195].  Thus  Margah'"regards  God's 
impartiality  in  'as  an  as  ect  or  ex  ression  judgment  PsPs 
of  God's  righteousness.  I/ 
Marqah's  association  of  God's  impartiality  with  His 
righteousness  also  occurs  elsewhere  in  the  Memar,  as 
when  Marqah  tells  us:  "Reuben  seeks-to  utter  his  shame 
(Gen.  xlix  4)  in  his  mouth,  thereby  giving  warning 
lest  it  should  happen  again,  and  so  that  you  may  know 
that  our  Lord  is  righteous;  He  is-not  a  favourer  of 
persons,  whether  great  or  small" 
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does  not  wish  to  rule  out  the  possibility  of  God 
having  favourites  as  such.  A  persistent  special 
concern  for,  or  a  special  regard  for  some  people  may 
be  justified.  What  is,  in  Nargahts  view;  objectionable 
is  the  singling  out  for  special  concern  of  those  who 
do  not  have  some  quality  by  virtue  of  which  they  merit 
being  singled  out  as  worthy  of  special  concern.  To 
reward  someone  unworthy  of  the  reward,  or  to  punish 
someone  who  does  not  merit  the  punishment  is  not 
merely  irrational  but  also  iniquitous,  and  God  is 
neither  irrational  nor  iniquitous.  If  we  have  done 
evil,  therefore,  repentance  is  necessary  if  we  are  to 
find  favour  in  God's  eyes:  "God  forgives  and  pardons 
you  when  you  turn  back  to  Him"  [I  56,  II  89];  "Know 
that  He  is  merciful  and  pitiful.  He  does  not  accept 
guilty  men  till  they  repent" 
[I  67,11-107],  Unless  we 
repent,  God  cannot  favour  us.  He  would  otherwise  show 
Himself  tobe  a"favourer  of  persons"  in  the  pejorative 
sense  of  the  phrase.  Marqah  makes  this  point  with  the 
greatest  possible  clarity  when  he  writes:  "If  the 
prophet  Moses  were  to  pray  for  us  when  we  were  in  evil, 
his  prayer  would  not  be  accepted,  for  tht  prayer  of  the 
righteous  on  behalf  of  the  sinner  while  he  is/yet  in 
his  sin  is  not  efficacious.  When  Abraham  prated  on 
behalf  of  Abimelech  -  and  he  was  righteous  - 
this 
prayer  was  accepted.  When  Moses  prayed  on  behalf  of 
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accepted" 
[I  77,  II  125].  Margah's  point  is  evidently 
that  if  not  even  Moses'  intercession  on  behalf  of  the 
unrepentant  is  effective,  then  it  would  certainly  be 
impossible  for  the  intercession  of  any  other  person  to 
be  effective.  - 
Moses  does  indeed  play  a  crucial  role  in  Margah's 
teaching  on  repentance.  For  within  the  scheme  of 
things,  as  presented  by  Marqah,  repentance  expresses 
itself  in  the  penitent  drawing  close  to  the  teaching 
of  Moses.  Thus,  even  though  Mosesl  personal 
intercession  on  behalf  of  an  impenitent  is 
inefficacious,  it  is  the  existence  of  the  law  of  Moses 
that  provides  the  backcloth  against  which  acts  of 
repentance  and  contrition  must  occur.  It  is  in  the 
light  of  this  consideration  that  we  can  best  understand 
Margah's  call:  "0  men,  learn  from  him  [Moses]  and  walk 
after  him,  and  hold  fast  to  his  command  and  do  not 
forget  his  statutes.  Woe  to  those  who  lack  it  and 
turn  from  its  light!  His  teaching  is  then  forgotten 
and  they  have  withdrawn  from  it.  They  do  not  draw 
near  to  it:  they  destroy  themselves  and  God  is  too 
righteous  for  them.  They  call  Him  but  He  does  not 
answer"  [i  97,  II  l40]. 
There  are  several  points  arising  from  the  passage 
just  quoted  of  immediate  relevance  to  the  present 
chapter,  One  point  concerns  the  sentence:  "Tý  ey  call 
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surprising  position  to  find  Margah  adopting.  For 
surely,  it  may  be  said,  if  a  person  does  call  on  God 
this  can  only  be  because  he  is  close  to  the  Law;  and  if 
he  is  in  fact  close  then  it  would  be  unjust  of  God 
not  to  answer.  But  Märgah  could  defend  his  assertion, 
by  making  a  distinction  between  different  ways  of 
calling  to  God,  or  perhaps  between  different  states  of 
mind  or  spirit  that  a  man  may  have  when  calling  to 
God.  For  a  man  can  call  to  God,  in  the  sense  of 
pronouncing  the  appropriate  religious  formulae,  even 
though  he  does  not  tsay  them  in  his  heart  $.  And  he  can, 
alternatively,  pronounce  them  with  devotion.  In  the 
former  case,  the  person's  call  to  God  is  not  merely 
insincere,  it  is  blasphemous.  It  would  entirely 
accord  with  Margah's  view  that  such  a  call,  made  to 
God,  should  remain  unanswered. 
It  is  easy  to  fit  into  this  context  Marqah's 
statement:  "God  is  too  righteous  for  them",,  Marqah's 
view  is,  as  we  have  seen,  that  God's  righteousness 
expresses  itself  in  His  impartiality.  There  is 
nothing  arbitrary  or  capricious  about  Him.  Now,  Ho 
would  indeed  be  acting  capriciously  if  He  acceded.  to 
a  call  from  a  person  who,  though  impenitent,  went 
through  the  motions  of  prayer  by  uttering,  but 
without  sincerity,  the  appropriate  religious  formulae. 
It  is  almost  as  if  the  impenitent.  is,  by  praying, 
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arbitrary  or  capricious  judgment  from  Him.  That  is  to 
say,  the  impenitent  man  at  prayer  can  be  seen  almost  as 
inviting  God  to  become  precisely  what  in  His  dealings 
with  man  He  is  not,  namely,  a  favourer  of  persons. 
In  the  light  of  this  interpretation  of  what  the 
impenitent  man  at  prayer  is  seeking  to  dog  it  is  not 
difficult  to  understand  Margah's  evident  revulsion  at 
such  a  manes  behaviour.  What  should  be  borne  in  mind 
here  is  that  such  behaviour  is  not  merely  morally  and 
religiously  offensive.  It  is  also  based  on  a 
philosophically  unsound  conception  of  God.  For  the 
view  that  God  could  be  tempted  into  capriciousness  is 
crudely  anthropomorphic. 
A  second  point  arising  from  the  passage  at  issue  is 
crucial  for  a  proper  understanding  of  Tlargah's 
theodicy.  The  particular  sentence  in  question  is: 
"They  destroy  themselves".  The  idea  that  those  who 
do  wrong  are,  as  it  were,  their  own  executioners 
occurs  frequently  in  the  Memar.  For  example,  in  a 
typical  piece  of  rhetoric  Margah  declaims:  "God  is 
more  righteous  than  you  in  what  He  does  to  you.  You 
slay  yourself  -  you  are  your  own  enemy.  Your  own 
words  have  become  your  destroyer,  Your  own  deeds 
punish  you.  You  yourself  have  amassed  evil  deeds. 
Receive  recompense  for  them  all.  In  truth  from  the 
sowing  of  evil  comes  a  harvest  of  thorns" 
[I  34-5,  II  52].  Such  modes  of  expression  as  these 
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can  be  taken  to  make  the  point  that  human  agents,  by 
freely  electing  to  do  wrong,  are  responsible  for  the 
recompense  they  duly  receive.  But  Marqah's  stress  on 
the  inevitability  of  the  recompense  suggests  a 
particular  theory  of  divine  judgment  underlying  the 
rhetoric.  The  theory  is  that  just  as  God  setab_ 
initio  a  set  of  immutable  laws  of  nature,  so  also  He 
set  up  ab  initio  a  set  of  immutable  laws  of  justice. 
And  just  as  from  a  given  natural  event  a  given  effect 
follows  inevitably  in  accordance  with  the  immutable 
laws  of  nature,  so  also  from  a  given  deed  a  given 
recompense  follows  inevitably  in  accordance  with  the 
immutable  laws  of  justice.  As  Professor  J.  Macdonald 
has  put  the  point,  in  language  recalling  Marqah's 
statement  "In  truth  from  the.  sowing  of  evil  comes  a 
harvest  of  thorns"  quoted  above;  "Just  as  the  hand 
that  seizes  the  thorn  will  be  hurt,  so  the  mind  that 
contravenes  the  laws  of  purity  will  become  defiled, 
and  the  light  within  the  mind  will  be  dimmed  anL 
something  of  that  which  makes  the  light  more  radiant 
will  be  lost"'. 
I 
If  this  way  of  looking  at  the  matter  is  correct  it 
follows  that  God  does  not  need  to  make  a  judgment 
about  appropriate  recompense  each  time  a  deed  is  done. 
Divine  justice  receives  expression  as  a  result  of  each 
deed  being  done,  because  appropriate  recompense  is 
ab  initio  arranged  for  in  the  cosmic  scheme  of  things. 
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God  no  more  needs  to  decide  how  to  recompense  each  deed 
once  it  is  performed  than  Ile  needs  to  "decide  after  the 
occurrence  of  each  natural  event  what  its  successor 
should  be.  A  decision  about  the  successor  in  nature 
is  unnecessary  because  things  in  nature  fall  into 
place  in  accordance  with  the  arrangement  of  the 
sequence  of  things,  and  likewise  the  recompense  for 
actions  falls  into  place  in  accordance  with  the 
arrangement  of  the  moral  sequence.  Consequently, 
just  as  a  natural  event  can  be  seen  as  being 
responsible  for  its  successor  since,  given  the 
immutable  laws  of  nature,  a  given  natural  event  is 
bound  to  cause  the  succeeding  event  that  it  does  cause, 
so  likewise  a  human  deed  can  be  seen  as  responsible 
for  its  recompense,  since,  given  the  immutable  laws  of 
justice,  a  given  deed  is  bound  to  cause  its 
recompense.  With  regard  to  unjust  agents,  therefore, 
it  makes  as  good  sense  to  speak  of  them,  as  Nargah 
does,  as  destroying  themselves,  as  to  speak  of  God 
destroying  them. 
If  the  exercise  of  divine  justice  is  understood  in 
the  way  I  have  been.  describing  its  we  have,  a 
ready-made  account  of  how  anthropomorphism  injthe 
field  of  divine  justice  is  to  be  avoided.  The 
anthropomorphic  account  would  portray  God  as  a  kind 
of  judge,  before  whom  agents  and  their  actions  pass 
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the  judge  a  new  act  of  judgment.  According  to  Margah's 
account  of  the  matter,  as  I  have  interpreted  its  a 
unique  act  of  judgment  was  carried  out  at  the  start 
in  arranging  the  system  of  cosmic  justice;  and 
thereafter  recompenso.  is  awarded  automatically  or 
mechanically. 
Now,  if  God  is  seen  as  setting  up  immutable  laws 
of  justice  corresponding  to  the  immutable  laws  of 
nature,  it  is  reasonable  to  see  the  cosmic  order  of 
justice  as  an  expression  of  Godts  own  immutability. 
If  God  is  changeless  then  surely  the  laws  of  divine 
justice  will  be  changeless  also.  But  the 
changelessness  of  God  has,  as  was  shown  earlier,  a 
basis  in  the  oneness  of  God.  Hence,  Marqah's 
theodicy  can  be  regarded  as  taking  the  form  it  does 
partly  because  Marqah  consistently  draws  out  the 
implications  of  his  doctrine  that  God  is  one. 
Let  us  accept  for  the  time  being  the  metaphysical 
doctrine  that  a  God  who  is  absolutely  one  must  have 
set  up  a  system  of  cosmic  justice  that  is  immutable. 
Now,  if  God  passes  an  arbitrary  or  capricious 
judgment,  by,  for  example,  forgiving  the  unrepentant, 
it  follows  either  that  God  is,  in  so  doing,  acting 
contrary  to  the  laws  of  justice,  in  which  case  He  is 
! 
acting  unjustly,  or  that  He  has  changed  the  laws  of 
justice  to  suit  the  needs  of  the  immediate  situation. 
But  we  must  wholly  disallow  that  God  can  be  ilnjust. 212 
Hence,  we  would  be  forced  to  accept  that  God  can 
change  his  laws  of  justice.  But  we  can  now  see  that 
if  the  aforementioned  metaphysical  doctrine  linking 
divine  oneness  and  immutable  justice  is  correct  then 
the  idea  that  God  can  forgive  the  unrepentant  sinner 
must  strike  at  the  heart  of  the  doctrine  of  divine 
oneness. 
Though  the  position  I  have  been  developing  on  the 
nature  of  divine  judgment  appears  to  me  to  accord  well 
with  the  general  metaphysical  position  underlying,  and 
also  expressly  stated  in,  the  Memar,  particularly 
with  regard  to  the  teaching  on  the  oneness  and  the 
immutability  of  God,  it  must  be  recognised  that  if 
we  attend  to  the  specific  modes  of  expression 
employed  by  Marqah  in  talking  about  God  qua  judge  of 
meng  a  different  picture  emerges,  For  Marqah  does 
speak  as  though  God  is  to  be  pictured  as  passing 
successive  judgments  on  successive  acts.  For  example, 
Aiargah  describes  in  the  following  way  God1s  dealings 
with  four  kinds  of  evil-doer:  "As  for  those  who  made 
my  statutes  into  nothing,  I  will  make  remembrance  of 
them  to  cease.  As  for  those  to  whom  I  imparted  my 
knowledge  and  they  did  not  want  to  learn,  I  shall 
appear  in  my  judgment  and  make  remembrance  of  them  to 
cease,  As  for  those  unto  whom  I  called  and  they  did 
not  hearken  to  my  summons,  I  shall  appear  in 
judgment.  and  make  remembrance  of  them  to  cea  e.  As 213 
for  those  who  rebelled  against  the  True  One  and 
brought  falsehood,  I  shall  appear  in  my  judgment  and 
make  remembrance  of  them  to  cease" 
[I  101,  II  167-8]. 
Nevertheless,  despite  the  successive  references  to  God 
"appearing  in  His  judgment",  it  is  open  to  us  to` 
interpret  Nargah  as  saying,  not  that  God  passes  a 
series  of  individual  judgments  on  those  who  do  not 
listen  to  His  summons,  those  who  rebel  against  Him, 
and  so  on,  but  rather  that  God's  system  of  divine 
justice,  which  was  established  in  the  world  at  the 
creation,  receives  expression  in  the  way  recompense  is 
inevitably  undergone  in  accordance  with  immutable  laws 
that  apply  unexceptionably  to  all  deeds.  That  is  to 
say,  according  to  Marqah's  theodicy  as  expounded  in  the 
Memar,  it  is  as  if  God  sits  in  judgment  and  passes 
sentence  on  each  act.  From  the  point  of  view  of 
recompense  bestowed  there  is  no  difference,  for  if 
God  were  sitting  in  judgment  on  each  deed  the  result 
would  be  exactly  the  same  as  if  an  immutable  law  swung 
automatically  into  action  -  the  same  recompense  would 
--.  be  bestowed.  But  from  the  metaphysical  point  of  view 
the  situation  is  entirely  different,  for  if  God  were 
sitting  in  judgment  on  each  deed  He  would  not  be  the 
eternal  immutable  One  the  conception  of  whom 
permeates  Marqah's  view  of  the  world. 
One  further  line  of  criticism  concerning  my  account 
"  of  Marqah's  theodicy  should  be  considered  hee.  It 214 
concerns  Godts  lack  of  arbitrariness.  Marqah  writes: 
"Not  all  peoples  will  be  questioned  about  a  deed,  for 
they  have  not  been  called  holy  people,  nor  firstborn, 
nor  priests,  nor  holy,  nor  specially  select,  nor  have 
they  heard  the  voice  of  the-living  God.  Woe  to  the 
sinner  who  has  done  evil  with  all  his  might" 
[I  108,  II  180].  The  implication  of  this  statement  is 
that  a  standard  of  justice  different  from  that 
applied  to  the  other  peoples  is  applied  by  God  to  the 
Samaritans.  And  this  may  seem  evidence  for,  or  rather 
a  symptom  of,  the  capriciousness  of  God. 
Yet  Marqah  has  adequately  protected  himself  against 
such  an  interpretation  of  his  position,  For  after 
saying  that  the  Samaritans  will  have  to.  answer  for 
deeds  which  if  performed  by  others  would  not  call 
forth  divine  questions,  Marqah  is  then  careful  to  state 
precisely  why  this  should  be  so.  The  Samaritans  are, 
after  all,  a  holy  nation,  priests  who  have  heard  the 
voice  of  the  living  God,  and  therefore  their  actions 
merit  an  unusual  degree  of  scrutiny  from  the  divine 
Judge.  What  Marqah  is  implying  is  that  God  would  be 
exercising  arbitrary  judgment  if  He  did  not  subject 
the  Samaritans  to  particularly  close  scrutiny.  God's 
impartiality  of  judgment  is  not  a  matter  of  judging 
different  deeds  alike  without  regard  for  differences 
in  the  agent.  It  is  a  matter  of  taking  into  account 
relevant  differences  between  the  agents  when  passing 
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judgment.  The  Samaritans,  who  were  chosento  receive 
the  Law  of  Moses,  are  more  guilty  for  failing  to  obey 
that  Law  than  are  those  who  are  not  thus  chosen. 
What  Marqah  is  doing  here  is  employing  the 
important  philosophical  point  that  there  are  several 
ways  in  which  any  action  may  be  described,  and  though 
two  actions  may  fall  under  the  same  description  when 
considered  from  one  point  of  view,  they  may,  equally 
correctly,  when  considered  from  a  different  point  of 
view  be  given  different,  even  opposite  descriptions. 
For  example,  a  Samaritan  and  a  Roman  could  both  be 
described  correctly  as  eating  a  hare.  And  it  might 
seem  arbitrary  to  punish  the  Samaritan,  but  not  the 
Roman,  for  doing  this.  But  if  we  add  the  fact  that 
the  hare  is  an  unclean  animal,  prohibited,  by  the  Law 
of  Moses,  to  the  Samaritans,  we  can  now  say  that  the 
'same'  actions  performed  by  the  Samaritan  and  the 
Roman  are  radically,  in  being  both  metaphysically  and 
morally,  different.  For  the  action  as  performed  by  the 
Samaritan  can  be  described  as  a  rebellion  against  God, 
whereas  it  would  be  absurd  to  describe  in  the  same 
terms  that  'same'  action  as  performed  by  the  Roman. 
When  the  matter  is  stated  in  this  way  it  can  be 
seen  that  God  would  be  acting  capriciously,  and 
therefore  unjustly,  if  He  were  to  recompense  the 
Samaritan  and  the  Roman  in  the  same  way  for  performing 
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in  their  inner  aspect,  utterly  different. 
Bearing  in  mind  Margah's  claim,  which  appears  as  a 
kind  of  leitmotiv  in  the  Memar,  that  the  God  of  the 
Samaritans  lacks  arbitrariness  or"capriciousness\in  His 
dealings  with  men,  being  the  author  of  a  set  of 
immutable  laws  of  justice  from  which,  for 
metaphysical  reasons,  no  man  can  successfully  seek 
exemption,  it  is  important  to  recognise  that  Hargah 
is  not  in  fact  contradicting  himself  when  he  presents 
what  on  the  face  of  it  is  a  totally  different 
picture  of  God.  The  further  picture  I  have  in  mind 
is  that  of  God  as  loving,  merciful,  pitying  and 
compassionate. 
We  are  faced  here  with  a  problem  identical  to  one 
that  we  found  in  Philo's  teaching  on  God  as  a  person. 
If  God  is  indeed  a  just  God  who  recompenses  men 
inexorably  in  accordance  with  immutable  laws  of 
justice,  then  how  can  He  also  be  merciful  or  pitying 
or  compassionate?  A  judge,  in  exercising  mercy,  makes 
an  exception  of  the  recipient  of  His  mercy.  But  if 
all  judges  were  merciful  all  the  time  there  could,  it 
I'  seems,  be  no  justice  -  or  even  mercy.  For  where  all 
defendants  are  treated  as  exceptions  there  is  no 
regular  treatment  of  defendants  in  relation  to  which 
anything  can,  count  as  exceptional.  Hence,  merciful 
treatment  has  to  be  seen  in  relation  to  a  backcloth  of 217 
just  treatment.  It  follows  that  God  can  be  merciful 
to  some  only  if  He  is  just  to  others.  But  if  He  gives 
some  people  their  just  deserts  but  extends  mercy  to 
others,  thereby  treating  them  more  leniently  than 
justice  demands,  is  He  not  being  arbitrary?  - 
I  suggested,  in  discussing  this  problem  in 
connection  with  Philo's  theodicy,  that  in  the  case  of 
terrestial  judges  who  are  applying  a  positive  law 
the  exercise  of  mercy  can  be  understood  as  contradicting 
positive  law  but  as  demanded  at  the  same  time  by  a 
higher  law  -  the  law  that  embodies  the  claims  of 
natural  justice.  If  the  exercise  of  mercy  is  seen  in 
this  light  then  it  points  to  imperfections  in  the  law 
that  the  judge  has  to  administer.  These  imperfections 
may  be  an  inevitable  feature  of  all  human  legal 
systems,  Alterations  to  those  systems  might  reduce  the 
imperfections  but  cannot  lead  to  the  establishment 
i 
of 
a  perfect  system.  In  that  case  the  judge's  ý 
entitlerpent  to  exercise  mercy  may  be  seen  as  a,  Iform 
of  social  control,  in  that  the  exercise  of  mercy  where 
the  positive  law  clashes  seriously  with  the  demands  of 
natural  justice  can-be  seen  as  a  way  of  mollifying 
elements  in  society  that  would  otherwise  be  tempted"to 
wreck  the  existing  legal  system  in  order  to  replace  it 
by  a  better  one. 
Another  reason  for  exercising  mercy  is  not  that  the 
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pressures  to  resist  the  application  of  the  law  in  a 
particular  case  may  be  too  strong  to  be  overcome, 
That  is,  the  exercise  of  mercy  may  be  a  product  not  of 
a  bad  law  but  of  the  lack  of  power  to  apply  the  law. 
Now,  the  exercise  of  mercy  can  be  seen  to  be  a 
rational  response  by  human  beings*in  human 
circumstances  -  either  the.  circumstance  of  having  an 
imperfect  positive  law  to  apply,  or  the  circumstance 
of  lacking  the  power  to  enforce  the  law  fully.  But  if 
mercy  is  to  be  understood  as  essentially  at  home  in 
the  kinds  of  conditions  I  have  described,  it  is. 
difficult  to  see  how  it  can  be  fitted  into  Margah's 
theodicy.  In  the  first  place,  Marqah  conceives  God's 
law  as  perfect.  He  tells  us:  "Perfect  art  Thou  in 
apportioning"  [Hymn  I  v.  21]ß  and  God  is  the  One 
"whose  power  and  good  are  incalculable"  [I  69,  II  110]. 
It  follows  from  this  that  the  exercise  of  divine 
mercy  cannot  be  justified  by  reference  to  a  system  of 
law  embodying  a  higher  standard  of  justice. 
Secondly,  even  if  per  impossibile  there  were  a 
higher  law  than  the  one  God  established  as  the  basis 
for  His  allocation  of  recompense,  He  could  not  revert 
from  time  to  time  to  that  "higher  law".  For  otherwise 
the  law  of  God  would  not  be  immutable  -  it  wold  lack 
eternal  validity.  Reversion  to 
Lould 
be  y.  a  higher  law 
classified  by  Marqah  as  arbitrariness  and  hence  not  a 
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Thirdly,  the  idea  that  God  exercises  mercy  because 
He  is  unable  to  enforce  divine  law  is  not  one  that 
Marqah  could  seriously  entertain.  Such  an  idea  could 
have  application  only  if  we  could  suppose  there  to  be 
a  power  in  the  face  of  which  God  must  retreat.  But  in 
Marqah's  view  there  could  be  no  such  power.  As  he 
insists:  "On  high  and  down  below  Thy  power  is  great 
and  sovereign"  [Hymn  II  v.  2]ß  and  "0  power  above  all 
powers  -  and  all  powers  derive  from  Thine  -  our  power 
is  weak  and  insignificant  unless  Thou  art  loving" 
[Hymn  III  v.  8].  And  if  it  be  thought  that  man's 
"  power  is  great  if  God  does  love  him,  and  that  a  man 
loved  by  God  could  eorce  God  reluctantly  to  grant 
mercy,  Margah  can  effectively  answer  this  line  of 
argument.  First,  he  can  remind  us  that  eternally 
God's  power  is  sovereign,  and  however  great  a  man's 
power  may  become  with  the  aid  of  God'  s  love,  it  cannot 
match  God's.  power. 
Secondly,  Tiargah  holds  that  God's  love  of  man,  which 
is  a  love  that  empowers,  is  bestowed  on  those  who  love 
Him  and  therefore  would  not  seek,  to  oppose  Him.  God's 
love  of  man,  which  expresses  itself  in  forgiveness  and 
pardon,  is  not  available  to  the  unrepentant  - 
"God 
forgives  and  pardons  you  when  you  turn  back  tl  Him" 
[I  56,  '  II  89].  But  those  who  oppose  God'  cann  t  force 
Him  to  be  merciful.  Margah  declaims:  "Woe  to  anyone 
who  is  an  enemy  to  Him"  [I  4+8,  II  76],  and  asks 220 
rhetorically:  "Whom  have  you  seen  in  the  world  who  has 
been  an  enemy  to  the  True  One  and  prospered  in  his 
doings?  "  [I  57,11  90]. 
Yet  if  neither  the  imperfection  of  divine  law  nor 
the  inability  of  God  to  enforce  that  law  can  be 
invoked  in  explanation  of  how  God.  can  be  merciful, 
then  how  is  Marqah's  claim  that  God  is  merciful  to  be 
understood? 
Similar  difficulties  apply  to  the  idea  of  God 
acting  out  of  pity  or  compassion.  For  even  if  we 
allow  that  God  can  feel  pity  or  compassion,  there  seems 
to  be  an  insuperable  difficulty  to  the  notion  of  His 
being  motivated  by  such  feelings.  The  reason  for 
this  is  that  if  these  feelings  dictated  a  line  of 
action  opposed  to  the  immutable  laws  of  justice  then 
God  would  ignore  the  feelings  and  act  justly.  If,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  feelings  dictated-a  line  of  action 
in  accordance  with  the  immutable  laws  of  justice  then 
God  would  pursue  that  line  of  action  -  but  out  of 
regard  for  justice,  not  from  a  need  to  satisfy  His 
feelings  of  compassion.  Thus,  it  is  impossible  for 
pity  or  compassion  to  serve  as  a  motive  for  divine 
action.  And  yet  we  would  ordinarily  regard  pity  and 
compassion  as  essentially  the  kinds  of  things'that  can 
serve  as  motives  for  action.  This  considerat'on 
suggests  that  "pity"  and  "compassion",  when  applied 
by  Marqah  to  God,  have  a  special,  perhaps  telhnical 221- 
theological  sense.  This  is  indeed  the  conclusion  we 
shall  reach  later  in  this  chapter. 
It  must  be  noted  that  the  same  kind  of  thing  can  be 
said  about  divine  love  that  has  just  been  said  about 
divine  compassion  and  pity.  God,  Marqah  tells  use  is 
a  loving  God.  He  thinks  in  fact  that  a  cosmological 
argument  for  the  existence  of  divine  love  is 
available.  Thus,  he  tells  us:  "Everything  bears 
witness  to  Thee  that  Thy  love  is  without  end" 
[hIymn  III  v.  11],  and:  "Thy  name  is  'Loving  One'. 
Everything  bears  witness  that  Thou  art  so"  [Hymn  III 
y.  21].  Granted  that  God  is  loving,  the  question  can 
be  raised-as  to  whether  He  can  act  from  the  motive  of 
love.  Once  again,  it  would  seem  that  He  cannot.  Ho 
would  not,  from  love,  do  anything  unjust;  and  if  love 
dictated  a  line  of  action  that  was-also  demanded  by 
justice,  He  would  pursue  that  line  of  action  becaupe 
the  immutable  law  of  justice  required  it  and  not  from 
any  other  motive.  Hence,  love,  which  we  regardlas 
essentially  a  motive  for  action,  entirely  lacks  such  a 
connotation  when  applied  to  God. 
This  said,  we  have  to  cope  with  the  fact  that  Marqah 
does  seem  to  have  regarded  divine  love  as  an  active 
principle  in  the  universe.  For  example,  He  offers  up 
the  following  prayer:  "Thy  love  protect  Thy  loving 
children"  [Hymn  I  v.  2O].  God's  protectiveness  towards 
those  who  love  Him  is  a  feature  of  God's  dealings  with 222 
men  which  Marqah  refers  to  not  only  when  he  is  speaking 
of  the  loving  God,.  but  also  when  he  speaks  of  God  as 
compassionate  and  pitying.  God's  compassion  and  pity, 
no  less  than  His  love,  are  expressed  in  His  taking  care 
of  men.  Divine  compassion  and  pity,  as  well  as-  - 
divine  love,  are  active  principles.  This  brings  out 
very  clearly  the  conceptual.  difficulty  facing  us, 
Since  love,  compassion  and  pity  as  ordinarily  understood 
are  active  principles,  and  since  these  three  principles 
as  ordinarily  understood  cannot  be  divine  active 
principles,  and  since,  finally,  Margah  regards  them 
as  active  principles  motivating  God,  it  follows  that 
Marqah  predicates  the  terms  'love',  'compassion'  and 
'pity',  not  as  ordinarily  understood,  of  God.  The 
question  that  must'be  tackled  therefore  is  what  the 
conceptual  difference  is  that  enables  Marqah, 
presumably  without  inconsistency,  to  ascribe  to  God 
the  affections  of  love,  compassion  and  pity. 
In  discussing  the  problem  of  what  Philo  means  by 
his  references  to  divine  mercy,  I  suggested  that  since 
the  dictates  of  divine  mercy  cannot  be  opposed  to  the 
dictates  of  divine  justice,  one  way  to  understand 
Philo's  references  to  divine  mercy  is  to  interpret 
them  as  affirming  that  divine  mercy  is  mercy  n 
relatio  n  to  human  positive  justice.  That  is  to  say, 
if  God  does  what  a  human  court  would  decree  only  by 
an  act  of  mercy  then  God's  action  ca  n  itself  be 223 
described  as  an  act  of  mercy.  But  then,  of  course,  it 
is  an  act  of  mercy  only  in  relation  to  human  law,  not 
in  relation  to  divine  law,  I  think  that  this  account 
of  divine  mercy  accords  to  some  extent  with  Marqah's 
statements  on  this  subject,  but  it  is  possible,  on- 
the  basis  of  Margah's  explicit  teaching,  to  turn 
this  schematic  account  into  a  more  substantial 
analysis. 
As  a  first  step  in  this  direction  it  will  be 
helpful  to  establish  the  principle  on  the  basis  of 
which  God,  in  Margah's  view,  decides  to  whom  among 
men  He  will  show  mercy,  love,  compassion  and  pity. 
Marqah  has  a  good  deal  to  say  on  this  matter.  He 
writes,  for  example:  "It  is  a  special  thing  that  we 
receive  blessings  from  our  Lord,  who  is  merciful  and 
pitiful,  doing  good  to  those  who  love  Him" 
[I  47,  II  75];  "For  God,  mighty  and  awesome,  is  a 
shield  and  helper  to  those  who  believe  in  Him"  j, 
[I  48,  II  77];  "Know  that  He  is  merciful  and 
pitiful,  He  does  not  accept  guilty  men  until  they 
Lord  repent"  [I  67,  II  107];  "But  if  you  come  to  your/ 
with  sincerity,  you-will  find  Him.  He  will  accept 
you,  for  He  is  merciful  and  pitiful  to  those  who 
come  and  go"  [I  78l  II  126];  "Keep  His  statutes,  that 
He  may  keep  you,  for'He  chose  you  for  that  purpose, 
Do  not  delay  coming,  else  you  will  be  rejected  and 
not  find  Him  who  would  take  you  by  the  hand,  and 224 
when  you  repent  repentance  will  not  avail  you.  Your 
God  is  merciful  and  pitiful  near  to  all  who  seek  Him" 
[z  104,11  174], 
I  have  quoted  a  number  of  passages  here  (though 
many  more  similar  ones  are  in  the  Neurar  and  also  in. 
the  Defter  hymns)  because  the  point  that  Nargah  is 
making  is  crucial  for  his  account  of  God  as  a  judge, 
and  I  wanted  to  demonstrate  that  the  point  is  firmly 
established  in  Nargah's  explicitly  stated  position. 
The  point  in  question  is  that  God's  love,  mercy, 
compassion  and  pity  are  not  merely  gratuitously- 
bestowed  on  men.  They  have  to  be  earned,  and  are 
earned  by  living  a  godly  life.  God  does  good  to 
those  who  love  Mini,  not  to  those  who  do  not.  He  is 
a  shield  and  helper  to*those  who  believe  in  Him,  not 
to  those  who  do  not.  He  accepts  the  guilty  who  repent, 
not  those  who  do  not.  He  is  merciful  and  pitiful  to 
those  who  come  to  Him,  not  to  those  who  do  not. 
Diargah  does  not  merely  make  his  point,  he  repeats  it 
with  an  insistence  that  shows  he  was  especially 
anxious  not  to  be  misunderstood.  And  the  reason 
for  this  is  that  the  doctrine  is  perhaps  the  pivotal 
point  of  his  theory  of  divine  justice.  What,  1with 
little  exaggeration,  his  doctrine  says  is  that  God's 
love  for  man  is  in  return  for  man's  love  for  God, 
Given  the  value  to  men  of  divine  love  it  maylseem 
that  Margahts  God  is  unjust,  for  God  will,  s  emingly, 
' 
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withhold  His  love  even  from  those  men  who  are  unable 
to  love  Him.  And  if  a  man  cannot  love  God,  it  may  be 
urged,  he  should  not  be  made  to  suffer  for  failing  to 
do  what  is  not  in  his  power.  Marqah  is  evidently 
aware  of  just  this  line  of  criticism,  for  he  presents 
a  doctrine  that  exactly  counters  it.  His  words  are: 
"You  are  not  expected  to  do  something  that  is  not  in 
your  power  to  do,  but  God  wants  you  now  to  love  your 
Lord  with  (all)  your  power  and  not  to  love  evil.  If 
it  were  not  in  you  to  do  so,  God  will  not  demand  it 
of  you"  [I  77,  II  125],  So  Margah's  answer  to  those 
who  say  that  God's  love  would  only  with  injustice  be 
withheld  from  those  who  are  unable  to  love  Him,  is 
simply  that  there  can  be  no  such  men.  God  does  not 
require  men  to  do  the  impossible,  and  He  does  require 
men  to  love  Him  -  and  not  merely  to  love  Him,  but  to 
do  so  "with  all  your  power". 
The  doctrine  of  divine  love  that  emerges  from  this 
discussion  accords  well  with  Margah's  doctrine  of 
divine  justice.  At  the  heart  of  that  latter  doctrine 
It 
lies  the  principle:  He  recompenses  every  doer, 
according  to  his  deed"  [Hymn  IV  v.  5].  What  Marqah  is 
saying  is  that  divine  love  is 
deeds,  and  the  withholding  of 
recompense  for  godless  deeds. 
expresses  His  love  for  men  b 
them,  He  is  not  going  against 
recompense  for  godly 
divine  love  is 
Thus,  when  Godl 
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justice.  He  is,  on  the  contrary,  giving  embodiment  to 
them  in  His  actions. 
We  can  now  see  the  conceptual  change  that  Margah 
has  introduced  that  enables  him,  within  the  context  of 
his  theory  of  divine  justice,  to  speak  of  divine  love 
and  mercy,  divine  pity  and  compassion.  These 
quasi-pathemata  of  God  are  divine  responses  to  those 
human  actions  which,  in  accordance  with  the  immutable 
laws  of  divine  justice,  inevitably  draw  in  their  train 
divinely  appointed  rewards.  It  is  a  noteworthy  fact  in 
this  context  that  Marqah  nowhere  suggests  that  divine 
love  will  be  bestowed  on  the  ungodly,  just  as  he 
nowhere  suggests  that  it  will  be  withheld  from  the 
godly.  The  picture  emerging  from  his  account  is  that 
divine  love  and  its  opposite,  and  divine  mercy  and  its 
opposite,  are  all  part  of  the  inexorable  unfolding  of 
the  divine  plan  arranged  on  the  basis  of  the  immutable 
laws  of  justice.  Marqah's  theodicy  thus  appears  to  be 
an  extensively  developed,  consistent  system  of 
' 
thought. 
I 
I  would  like  now  to  complete  this  account  of 
Margah's  conception  of  the  nature  of  Godis 
personhood,  as  I  completed  my  account  of  Philo's 
doctrine  on  this  subject,  by  turning  to  the  topic  of 
the  divine  will.  Dlargah,  as  has  already  been  noted, 
does  write  in  such  a  way  as  to  suggest  that  God  has  a 227 
will,  For  example,  he  says  of  God  that  "He  does  what 
He  wills  ('Y1.  TT  ilYa)"  [I  5,  II 
. 
3]9  ""When  He  wills, 
He  does  it  (ia  '-  '-V  z  1T)"  [I  145,  II  239],  and 
"The  Mighty  Awesome  One  is  able  to  achieve  all  that  He 
wills  ('Y2  FT  >'  )"  [Hymn  XII  v.  3].  Using  a  different 
Aramaic  mode  of  expression,  he  speaks'  of  God  as 
bringing  about  "His  will  (711r1n  'i)  and  His  recompense" 
[1  5,  II  41o  Using  a  further  expression  he  writes: 
"The  True  One  there  planned  and  created  by  His  will 
(il'  Lei)"  [I  86,  II  1391,  and:  "He  it  is  who  created 
when  He  willed  (  t7:  L--X  Tom)  and  intended"  [I  91,  II  1493. 
It  must  be  noted  that  there  is  a  close  relation, 
for  ilargah,  between  divine  will  and  divine  power. 
For,  as  we  have  earlier  had  occasion  to  argue,  it  is 
Marqah's  view  that  the  divine  will  has  the  power,  by  a 
pure  act  of  will,  to  bring  into  existence  what  is 
willed.  No  other  causal  factors  need  to  co-operate 
with  the  divine  will  in  order  to  secure  the  end,  willed. 
I 
In  this  independence  of  external  causal  factors'  the 
divine  will  is  unlike,  and  greater  in  power  than, 
%the 
human  will.  But  how  great  is  the  power  of  theldivine 
will?  Is  it  unlimited,  or  is  it  possible  to  specify 
certain  kinds  of  thing  it  is  beyond-the  power-of  the 
divine  will  to  bring  into  existence? 
It  will  be  seen  that  the  divine  power  is 
co-extensive  with  the  power  of  the  divine  will,  since 
whatever  God  has  the  power  to  do,  He  can  do  only  by 228 
willing  it.  If  God  could  not  will  to  do  something,  lie 
could  not  correctly  be  said  to  have  the  power  to  do  it. 
Now,  Margah's  doctrine  of  the  absolute  goodness  of  God 
suggests  one  limitation  on  the  will  of  God,  namely, 
. 
that  He  cannot  will  to  do  anything  evil.  Yet  Marqah 
appears  committed  to  precisely  the  opposite.  He  tells 
us:  "Nothing  is  beyond  His  power,  whether  good  or  evil 
`v'om.  lx,  =3,  t:  z  1T.  N'T,:  )l  1]A)ß  r(ýJý'  V'  1)"  [i  76,11  1231. 
This  passage  bears  a  striking  resemblance  to  one 
quoted  earlier  in  this  chapter  in  our  discussion  of 
Philo.  Philo,  it  will  be  recalled,  took  the  viewl 
that  it  is  in  God's  power  to  do  good  and  to  do  evil. 
It  was  Philo's  view  that  this  showed  that  although 
God  always  does  do  good,  He  always  does  good  freelyp 
that  is,  by  an  act  of  will. 
Nevertheless,  despite  the  close  verbal  similarity 
between  the  above  two  statements  of  Philo  and  Nargah 
we  cannot  without  hesitation  conclude  that  they'are 
making  exactly  the  same  point.  For  Afargah's 
statement  is  ambiguous,  and  on  one  of  its  I 
interpretations  it  is  saying  something  quite 
different  from  the  point  that  Philo  is  concerned  to 
make.  First,  Margah's  statement  could  he  expressing, 
the  doctrine  that  it  is  within  God's  power  to  do  both 
good  and  evil.  If  this  is  what  he  is  saying  then  his 
position  is  the  same  as  Philos. 
Secondly,  however,  the  Aramaic'text  quoted  above  can 
.....  .. 
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also  bear  the  interpretation  that  everything  in  the 
world,  both  good  and  evil,  is  subject  to  the  power  of 
God.  If  this  is  Marqah's  meaning  then  he  can  be 
taken  to  be  making-the  point,  no  doubt  partly 
polemical  in  character,  that  there  are  not  in  the 
world  principles  or  sources  of  evil  it  is  outwith 
Godts  power  to  control.  There  are  not,  so  to  say, 
forces  of  darkness  beyond  the  power  of  God.  In 
particular,  evil  men  would  be  making  a  mistake  to 
suppose  that  God  did  not  have  the  power  to  control 
them. 
This  interpretation  of  the  text  finds  support  in 
the  immediate  context  of  the  statement  at  issue.  The 
passage  is  as  follows:  "Let  us  submit  before  His 
greatness  and  worship  and  turn  away  from  people 
whose  actions  are  such  [viz.  evil]  and  who  have  such 
evil  minds.  Woe  to  them  for  what  they  have  done  within 
themselves..  Let  us  not  ourselves  approve  such  actions, 
nor  learn  from  them  ever,  but  let  us  know  that  our 
Lord  is  merciful  and  pitiful.  He  knows  the  secret  of 
every  heart  and  what  is  hidden  in  it;  nothing  is 
beyond  His  power,  whether  good  or  evil.  If  a  seeker 
seeks  Him  with  a  pure  heart  he  will  find  Himp!  or  if  he 
seeks  Him  with  evil  motive,  He  will  not  liste  to  him 
and  He  will  turn  a  curse  on  him"  [I  769,11  1Z].  Since 
Marqah  affirms  that  evil  is  not  beyond  God's  power, 
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evil  in  men's  hearts  is  not  hidden  from  God,  I  think 
that  Marqah's  affirmation  can  best  be  understood 
according  to  the  second  -  non-Philonic  -  interpretation 
that  I  suggested,  If  Marqah  is  indeed  saying  that 
sources  of  evil  in  the  world,  no  less  than  sources.  of.. 
good,  are  subject  to  divine  power,  then  he  is  not 
saying,  at  least.  in  the  passage  under  discussion,  that 
God  can  will  good  and  also  evil,  and  hence  that-no 
limit  can  be  set  on  the  divine  will,  at  least  with 
regard  to  the  moral  worth  of  what  He  can  do. 
There  remains  a  question,  however,  as  to  whether 
Marqah  would  have  accepted  the.  explicit  Philonic  view 
that  not  only  is  everything  in  the  universe,  and 
therefore  every  good  agent.  and  every  evil  one,  within 
God's  power  to  control,  but  also  every  possible  action, 
whether  good  or  evil,  is  within  God's  power  to  will., 
Certainly  Tiargah  held  that:  "All  Thine  acts  are  good" 
[Hymn  II  v_.  11]ß  and  even  that:.  "Always  God  extends  His 
abundant  goodness"  [I  101,  II  167].  The  question  is 
whether  any  of  His  actions  could  have  been,  or  could 
yet  bei  anything  other  than  good.  The  answer  appears 
to  be  in  the  negative.  God's  dealings  with  men,  in 
particular  His  allocation  of  recompense  to  mer  for 
their  deeds,  are  in  accordance  with  divinely  ?  reated 
immutable  laws  of  justice.  It  would  be  irrational  of., 
God  to  set  up  immutable  laws  of  justice  and  then  act 
contrary  to  them.  He  set  up  laws  which  were/perfect, 231 
and  if  He  then  acted  contrary  to  them  this  would  imply 
either  an  imperfection  in  God  or  an  imperfection  in  the 
laws  -  neither  of  which-alternatives  can,  within 
Margah's  system,  be  allowed.  Thus  the  metaphysical 
system  expounded  by  Nargah  carries  the  implication 
that  even  if  God  has  the  power  to  choose,  this  power 
does  not  extend  to  the  power  to  choose  between  good 
and  evil.  The  possibility  of  choosing  to  do  evil  is, 
for  metaphysical  reasons,  not  a  lively  option  available 
to  God. 
, 
A  further  possibility  has  yet  to  be  considered,  which 
takes  us  to  the  heart  of  one  of  the  perennial  problems 
in  metaphysical  ethics.  And  it  will  be  helpful  for 
our  understanding  of  Marqah  to  see  where  he  stands  in 
relation  to  the  problem.  The  problem  concerns  the 
relationship  between  the  divine  will  and  the 
establishment  of  a  system  of  justice.  Even  if  it  be 
admitted  that  once  an  immutable  system  of  justice  is 
set  up  God  cannot  will  either  to  change  the  system  or 
A 
to  perform  an  action  contrary  to  it,  the  possibility 
which  remains  to  be  considered  is  that  the  particular 
system  of  justice  willed  into  existence  by  God  was 
freely  -chosen,  and  that  He  could  therefore,  had  lie  so 
wished,  have  created  an  entirely  different  system. 
According  to  this  line  of  thought,  although  it  is  now, 
so  to  say,  too  late  for  God  to  will  evil,  it  was  not 
too  late  for  Him  to  do  so  prior  to  the  creatxJon  of  the 232 
immutable  system  of  justice.  In  particular,  what  has 
to  be  examined  is  the  possibility  that  the  immutable 
system  of  justice  created  by  God  might  have  been 
structured  by  a  principle  of  evil,  For  example, 
divine  recompense  might  have  been  so  arranged  that 
from  the  sowing  of  virtue  came  a  harvest  of  thorns, 
and  from  the  sowing  of  evils  came  a  good  harvest. 
There  are,  I  think,  several.  points  that  can  be  made 
about  this  line  of  thought. 
First,  Marqah  held  that  God  is  unchangeable,  and 
also  that  He  is  good.  He  is  therefore  immutably  good. 
Indeed,  Margah  states  expressly  that  prior  to  the 
creation,  as  well  as  subsequently,  God  is  good:  "By 
Thy  goodness  the  world  came  into  being"  [Hymn  III  v.  2]. 
God,  being  immutably  good,  would  not  have  willed  an 
evil  system  of  justice.  But  the  question  is  whether 
God,  who  would  not-have  willed  such  a  system,  also 
could  not  have  willed  it.  I  think  Marqah  would  have 
replied  that  the  reason  why  God  did  not  will  evil, 
namely,  because  He  is  good,  is  also  the  reason  why  He 
could  not  have  done  so.  It  would  have  been  contrary 
to  God's  nature  to  create  an  evil  system  of  justice. 
Now,  the  conception  of  an  evil  system  of  justice, 
though  it  may  seem  a  paradoxical  conception,  s  in 
fact  not  self-contradictory.  We  would  describe  as 
evil  a  system  of  positive  justice  that  fell 
sufficiently  short  of,  or  radically  contradicted  the 
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principles  of,  natural  justice.  But  it  must  be  noted 
that  the  standard  of  justice  by  which  we  measure  the 
moral  worth  of  a  system  of  justice  is  natural  justice 
itself.  Natural  justice  is  being  taken,  therefore,  as 
an  absolute  moral  standard.  It  is  itself  perfectly 
good.  In  so  far  as  natural  justice  is  articulated 
by  the  immutable  laws  of  God,.  the  latter  laws  must 
themselves  be  regarded  as  perfect.  Thus,  though  we 
can  conceive  of  an  evil  system  of  justice,  and  in  fact 
know  that  such  systems  exist,  it  is  by  no  means  clear 
that  we  can  conceive  of  an  evil  system  of  divine 
justice.  For  to  judge  the  system  of  divine  justice 
we  should  need  a  further  absolute  standard  of 
absolute  justice.  And  we  lack  a  further  system  to 
act  as  such  a  standard. 
This  consideration  leads  to  the  second  point  that  I 
would  like  to  make.  Granted  that  Marqah  held  that  if 
God  were  to  create  a  system  of  justice  He  could  not 
but  create  a  good  system,  it  is  possible  that  Marqah 
held  that  that  system  was  good  precisely  because  God 
created  it.  That  is  to  say,  it  was  not  because  God 
saw  that  a  particular  system  would  be  good  that  He 
created  it,  but  rather,  in  creating  it  He  also,  and 
thereby,  created  its  goodness.  Hence,  whatever  system 
God  had  created  would  have  been  good.  God  Himself  is 
so  good  that  He  infuses  with  goodness  all  that  He 
touches.  This  may  be  what  Marqah  meant  whenIlhe  wrote: 234 
"All  Thine  acts  are  good,  0  our  Lord,  and  Thou  art 
better  than  they"  [Hymn  II  v.  7]. 
This  line  accords  with  the  general  tenor  of  Nargah's 
position.  On  the  one  hand,  it  allows  Nargah  to  say 
that  the  system  of  justice  instituted  by  God  is 
necessarily  good.  On  the  other  hand,  it  also  allows 
Marqah  to  say  that  God  willed  it  freely.  The  reason 
it  allows  Marqah  to  make  the  second  point  is  that  God 
could  have  willed  any  system  whatsoever,  for  though 
God  wanted  a  good  system  to  be  established  any  system 
He  could  have  established  would  thereupon  have  been 
infused  with  goodness.  If  Marqah  had  taken  the  line 
that  God  did  not  create  the  goodness  of  His  system  of 
justice,  but  had  to  institute  a  system  of  justice  that 
was,  independently  of  Him,  the  best  possible,  then  He 
would  have  had  no  choice  in  deciding  what  system  to 
pick  -  He  would  have  had  to  pick  the  best  possible. 
As  it  iss  the  immutable  laws  of  justice  form  the  best 
possible  system  of  justice.  But,  if  I  am  correct  in 
my  reading  of  the  Memar,  Marqah  wants  to  hold  that 
God  did  not  will  that  system  because  of  its  suprýme 
moral  value.  Nargah's  position  is,  I  think,  that 
God's  willing  of  the  system  was  itself  the  cause  of 
the  value  of  the  system. 
Support  for  the  interpretation  of  Margai  that  I  am 
here  developing  comes  from  an  unexpected  source, 
namely,  Margahts  epistemology  as  I  interpreted  it 235 
earlier  in  the  chapter.  There  I  argued  that 
according  to  Marqah  one  characteristic  of  God's  acts 
of  knowing,  a  characteristic  that  ensures  that  Margah's 
attribution  of  knowledge  to  God  is  not  an 
anthropomorphic  attribution,  is  the  power  of  those 
acts  to  create  the  truth  of  their  objects.  By  knowing 
something  God  renders  it  true.  It  is  as  though  God, 
the  "True  One"  according  to  one  phrase  Marqah 
persistently  uses  in  referring  to  Him,  is  so  true  that 
everything  He  touches  participates  at  least  to  some 
degree  in  His  truth.  Since  God  is  the  Truth  there  is 
no  truth  except  by  Him.  And  God's  way  of  creating 
truths  is  by  acts  of  knowing. 
What  I  have  been  arguing  in  my  discussion  of 
Nargah's  conception  of  God  as  Judge  and  as  the  source 
of  the  immutable  laws  of  justice  is  that  goodness  is 
dependent  upon  God  exactly  as  truth  is.  For  the 
upshot  of  my  argument  was  that,  according  to  Marqah, 
God  created  the  goodness  of  the  immutable  laws  of 
justice  by  His  very  act  of  promulgation  of  those  laws, 
just  as  God  created  truths  by  His  very  act  of 
knowing  those  truths.  God1s  acts  of  promulgation  are 
not  limited  by  the  need  to  promulgate  good  laws, 
because  He  makes  the  laws  good  by  promulgatin  them. 
And  Gods  ability  to  know  facts  is  not  li"mited,  by  the 
need  to  know  only  the  truth,  because  He  creates  the 
truth,  the  facticity  of  things,  by  knowing  ti  em. 236 
Thus  at  a  crucial  point  Nargah's  theology  of  morals 
and  his  theology  of  knowledge  are  precisely  parallel. 
The  parallel  is  anchored  in  the  fact  that  Margah  iss 
above  all,  concerned  to  stress  the  absolute 
self-subsistence  of  God.  He  needs  nothing  beyond 
Himself.  He  needs  to  look  beyond  Himself  for  neither 
truth  nor  goodness.  He  iss  in  Margah's  view,  both 
Truth  and  Goodness.  He  does  not  need  to  go  in  search  of 
truth  and  goodness  so  that  He  can  know  facts  and 
promulgate  laws;  He  takes  with  Him  both  His  truth 
and  His  goodness  to  the  facts  that  He  knows,  thereby 
rendering  them  true,  and  to  the  laws  He  promulgates, 
thereby  rendering  them  good. 
In  this  chapter  I  have  been  concerned  to  examine 
Nargahts  conception  of  God  as  a  person.  But  there 
is,  of  course,  a  great  deal  more  to  be  said  on  this 
topic.  Marqah  left  numerous  clues  about  his 
opinions  on  matters  in  this  field  that  I  have  not 
had  space  to  discuss.  For  example,  there  are 
questions  to  be  raised  concerning  the  doctrines  in 
the  Memar  on  the  precise  relation  between  divine 
mercy  and  divine  love,  and  on  the  difference  between 
Godts  pity  and  His  compassion.  Margah  employs  a  rich 
vocabulary  of  terms  referring  to  what  used  to  be 
termed  "passions  of  the  soul".  He  applies  mny  such 
terms  liberally  to  God.  While  it  is  reasonably  clear 237 
what  the  relation  is  between  those  terms  when  employed 
in  reference  to  meng  only  close  scrutiny  will  give  us 
a  clear  indication  of  what  Margah  took  to  be  the 
relationship  between  those  terms  when  applied  to  God. 
Such  close  examination  of  the  Aramaic  text,  to  see  for 
example  the  contexts  where  Marqah  contrasts  'love'  and 
'compassion'  or  prefers  to  use  one  term  rather  than 
the  other,  will  play  an  important  part  in  building  up 
a  detailed  picture  of  those  elements  in  the  divine 
existence  that  mark  God  out  as  an  object  of  worship, 
and  not  merely  a  being  of  speculative  philosophical 
interest. 
What  I  have  contented  myself  with  doing  in  the 
present  chapter  is  presenting  a  very  rough  sketch  of 
the  situation,  stating,  though  only  in  broad  outline, 
those  features  of  Marqah's  exposition  that  entitle 
us  to  say  that  for  Marqah  God  is  not  merely  a 
philosophical  sine  qua  none  but  for  whose  existence 
many  phenomena  and  perhaps  the  existence  of  anything 
whatsoever  must  remain  inexplicable,  but  is  on  the 
contrary  a  'person'  worthy  of  worship  and  to  be 
approached  only  in  a  spirit  of  utter  humility; 
appropriate  to  one  standing  in  the  presence  of 
something  of  supernal  value. 
The  features  of  Margah's  exposition  on  which  I 
have  concentrated  are  his  claims,  first,  that  God  is 
a  living  God,  secondly,  that  He.  is  a  knower,;  thirdly, 238 
that  He  is  a  judge,  fourthly,  that  He  is  merciful  and 
loving,  and  finally,  that  He  has  a  will.  Now,  no 
doubt  we  should  not  normally  hesitate  to  attribute 
personhood  to  a  being  who  lives,  and  can  know,  judge, 
love  and  will.  There  is,  indeed,  a  divergence  of 
views  among  philosophers  as  to  what  is  to  count  as  a 
person.  Elsewhere'  I  have  considered  the  theory  that 
rationality  is  the  necessary  and  sufficient  condition 
for  personhood.  But  even  if  we  require  more  than  that 
as  a  condition  for  the  ascription  of  personhood,  a 
being  who  has  all  the  attributes  that  Marqah  ascribes 
to  God  seems  to  have  ample  qualifications  to  justify 
the  ascription. 
But  before  ascribing  personhood  to  God,  on  the 
grounds  that  He  is  alive,  knowing,  just,  loving  and 
possessed  of  a  will,  an  important  proviso  has  to  be 
borne  in  mind,  namely,  that  the  ascription  of  literal 
personhood-to  God  on  the  grounds  just  given  can  be  an 
ascription  of  literal,  personhood  only  if  the  grounds 
are  the  ascription  of  attributes  the  terms  for  which 
are  literally  understood.  This  point  has  an 
important  bearing  on  Marqah's  teaching,  for,  as  we 
have  seen,  each  attribute  Marqah  has  ascribed  to  God 
appears  to  have  peculiar  qualities  that  radicplly 
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distinguish  that  attribute  from  the  attribute  of  the 
same  name  that  is  ascribed  to  men.  For  example,  God's 
life  turned  out  on  analysis  to  be  essentially  different 
from  human  life,  God's  knowledge  from  human  knowledge, 
and  God's  will  from  human  will. 
In  that  case  we  may  seem-compelled  to  say  that 
God's  life  is  life  only  in  an  analogical  sense.  This 
of  course  is  exactly  the  position  that  we  would 
expect  Margah  to  adopt.  For  his  entire  system  is 
geared  to  defending  the  doctrine  of  God's  utter 
otherness.  Consequently,  if  we  do  lay  down  as 
axiomatic  the  proposition  that  only  a  person  can  be  a 
proper  object  of  worship,  Marqah's  response  can  only  be 
that  in  that  case  God's  personhood,  of  whatsoever  it 
may  consist,  cannot  consist  of  those  features  that 
constitute  human  personhood. 
Nevertheless,  it  is  a  vital  point  about  Marqah's 
exposition  of  his  doctrine  of  divine  Ipersonhood,  that 
though  he  wants  to  leave  us  in  no  doubt  that  Godts 
personal  qualities  differ  radically  from  human 
personal  qualities,  he  seems  equally  anxious  to  make 
clear  the  fact  that  God's  personal  qualities  are  not  so 
unlike  human  ones  that  the  terminology  we  employ  in 
speaking  about  human  personal  qualities  is  entirely 
inappropriate  in  application  to  God.  Thus  for  example, 
though  Marqah  leaves  us  in  no  doubt  that  divine 
knowledge  differs  radically  from  human  knowlledge,  he 240 
also  wants  to  say  that  the  difference  is  not  so 
radical  that  forms  of  the  verb  'to  know'  (y  1')q  where 
a  term  denoting  God  is  the  subject  expression,  must  be 
ruled  out  of  court  on  religious  or  theological  grounds, 
To  take  another  example,  and  one  so  pervasive  as  to 
be  rendered  almost  invisible  by  its  sheer  ubiquity, 
Marqah's  use  of  the  second  person  pronoun  and  of  the 
second  person  forms  of  the  verb  in  speaking  to  God 
indicates  that,  however  unlike  a  human  person  Margah 
took  God  to  be,  he  nevertheless  thought  that  God  could 
be  addressed.  He  thought,  in  other  words,  that  God  was 
accessible  to  human  communication.  Marqah's  insistence 
on  the  otherness  of  God  is  never  allowed  to  develop 
into  a  claim  that  God  is  inaccessible.  "...  they  who 
make  request  of  any  but  Thee  will  find  naught" 
[Hymn  II  v.  6].  Requests  to  other  gods,  Marqah  implies 
here,  will  find  nothing  because  there  are  no  other 
gods  to  receive  the  requests.  Requests  to  God,  he 
equally  implies,  will  find  God.  Therefore  He  is 
accessible  to  men.  This  point  is  made  explicitly  in 
the  Pfemar,  as  when  Marqah  writes:  "But  if  you  come  to 
your  Lord  with  sincerity,  you  will  find  Him.  He  will 
accept  you...  "  [I  78P  II  126].  It  is  clear  from  this 
that  Marqah  would  have  repudiated  entirely  th'  claim 
that  the  otherness  of  God  entails  His 
inaccessibility. 
We  have  now  come  full  circle  in  this  chapter,  for 241 
we  began  with  a  discussion  of  the  centrality  of  the 
doctrine  of  the  accessibility  of  God  to  man  within 
a  theology  that  allows  for  the  possibility  of  divine 
worship.  I  hope  that  what  has  been  said  in  the 
intervening  pages  provides  some  idea  of  the  BeingS" 
whom  Margah  took  to  be  uniquely  worthy  of  worship. 
I  would  like  to  end  with  a  comment  on  the  nature 
of  the  accessibility  of  god.  Though  God  is 
regarded  as  accessible,  His  accessibility  is  not  due 
to  channels  of  communication  that  render  human 
beings  accessible  to  each  other.  Now,  there  is  a 
sense  in  which  men  are  unceasingly  accessible  to  God, 
since,  in  Margahts  view,  God  knows  all  men,  knows 
even  their  innermost  thoughts  and  most  deeply 
concealed  secrets.  But  merely  to  know  something,  and 
for  the  thing  therefore  to  be  accessible  for 
inspection,  is  not  to  communicate  with  it,  Marqah 
thinks,  however,  that  man's  accessibility  to  God  has 
received  fuller  expression  in  God's  employment  of 
certain  men  as  His  prophets. 
But  what  are  we  to  say  about  the  reverse  direction, 
about  God'  accessibility  to  mane  and  the  possibility 
of  man's  communication  with  Him?  As  we  have 
frequently  noted,  God  is  not  in  all  respects  hidden 
from  us,  It  is  Marqah's  view  that  the  world  bears 
testimony  to  the  existence  of  God,  to'His  love z42 
and  His  goodness.  Thus,  even  if  God  is  not  accessible 
to  us  as  an  object  of  knowledge,  as  we  are  accessible 
to  God,  our  knowledge  of  the  divine  is  not,  or  at 
least  need  not  be,  inconsiderable.  But  what  of  our 
communication  with  Him?  In  so  far  as  our 
communication  with  God  is  by  prayer,  a  philosophical 
difficulty  appears  to  arise  for  Margah.  The  difficulty 
is  that,  granted  Margahts  doctrine  of  the  scope  of 
divine  knowledge,  prayer  is  redundant. 
As  was  demonstrated  earlier,  Margah  lays  stress-on 
the  spiritual  qualities  of  the  man  who  praysg.  on  his 
love  of  God,  his  sincerity  and  his  genuine  repentance. 
Where  the  point  of  prayer  is  to  seek  forgiveness  then 
prayer  seems  not  to  be  necessary,  because  God,  who 
can  see  into  the  innermost  recesses  of  men's  minds, 
knows  without  having  to  listen  to  the  prayer  whether 
the  man  is  sincere  in  his  repentance  and  his  love  of 
God.  One  might  almost  say  that  those  who  do  feel 
that  they  have  to  pray  in  order  to  secure  forgiveness 
are  in  error  about.  the  nature  of  God,  for  they  think 
that  unless  they  tell  God  that  they  sincerely  repent 
God  will  remain  in  ignorance  of  this  fact.  This 
point  can  be  generalised  to  cover  all  kinds  o/ 
prayer,  since  whatever  it  is  that  we  wish  to 
communicate  to  God  by  means  of  prayer,  God  ca  come 
to  know  without  our  having  to  formulate  the  essage, 
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Margah  could  answer  this  line  of  argument  in 
several  ways,  that  would  enable  him  to  rescue  his 
doctrine  of  the  scope  of  divine  knowledge  while  at  the 
same  time  defending  his  evident  belief  in  the 
efficacy  of  prayer.  Perhaps  the  most  obvious  answer 
available  to  him  is  that  even  though  we  should  not 
conceive  of  our  prayers  as  telling  God  something  that 
He  would  not  otherwise  have  known,  the  act  of  praying 
can  itself  induce  in  us  a  state  of  spirituality  that 
has  religious  value.  I  think  that  Marqah  can,  and 
does,  accept  that  the  full,  purely  spiritual  value  of 
prayer  lies  in  the  spirit  in  which  it  is  addressed  to 
God.  And  that  same  spiritual  quality  is  no  less 
efficacious  when  it  is  not  being  expressed  in  prayer 
than  when  it  is.  The  very  way  of  life  we  lead,  and 
particularly  the  spiritual  values  that  motivate  that 
way  of  life,  are.  the  sovereignly  important  things  in 
the  eyes  of  God.  Marqah  seems  indeed  to  want  to  say 
that  a  godly  life  is  a  kind  of  continuing  prayer,  even 
where  recognised  religious  formulae  are  not  employed. 
We  communicate  with  God,  according  to  this  line  of 
thought,  not  so  much  by  praying  to  Him  as  by  living 
a  godly  life,  The  truly  godly  man  does  not  need  to 
engage  in  specific  acts  of  communication  with  God, 
for  he  knows  that  God  is  in  any  case  with  him  in  all 
he  does.  This  form  of  communication  is  uniqe,  being 
due  to  God's  unique  ability  to  know.  We  might  indeed 244 
want  to  say  that  it  is  so  odd  a  form  of 
communication  that  it  does  not  really  count  as 
communication  at  all.  I  suspect  that  Marqah  would 
want  to  say  that  the  godly  mants  communication  with 
God,  secured,  as  it  is,  simply  by  living  a  Godly  life, 
is  the  deepest  form  of  communication  possible  to  man, 
and  is  indeed  possibly  the  only  true  kind  of 
communication  in  which  we,  in  the  human-condition, 
can  engage. 
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CHAPTER  VII 
THE  CREATIVITY  OF  GOD 
In  the  preceding  five  chapters  attention  has  been 
focused  almost  entirely  on  Nargah's  teachings  on  God. 
I  have  considered  Margah's  proofs  for  the  existence 
of  God,  and  his  doctrines  on  the  oneness  of  God,  His 
powers  and  personhood.  Consideration  has  also  been 
given  to  Nargah's  teaching  on  the  complex 
epistemological  question  of  whether,  and  if  so  then 
with  respect  to  what,  God  is  knowable.  Nevertheless, 
although  God  has  at  all  times  in  the  preceding 
investigation  held  the  centre  of  the  stage,  I  have,  not 
refrained  from  making  reference  to  anything  else.  Had 
I  attempted  to  write,  in  connection  with  the  Memar, 
on  nothing  but  God,  the  resultant  picture  would  not 
merely  have  been  less  rich  in  detail,  it  wouldlbärely 
have  existed,  For  Marqah's  teachings  on  God  take  as 
their  starting  point  what  is  other  than  God.  In 
particular,  Marqah  takes  his  stand  on  the  ordinary 
objects  of  perceptual  experience,  the  familiar  facts 
about  what  we  see  and  hear  in  this  world,  and  he  then 
approaches  as  nearly  as  he  is  able  the  underlying 
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metaphysical  realities  that  explain  both  how  it  comes 
about  that  there  is  anything  to  experience,  and  also 
why  what  it  is  that  we  experience  takes  the  form  it 
does.  Thus,  in  consequence  of  Nargah's  willingness 
to  treat  the  empirical  phenomena  as  a  basis  for  the 
development  of  his  religious  philosophy  -a 
willingness  that  prevents  the  classification  of  Hargah 
as  an  empiricist  from  being  wholly  absurd  -I  have  had 
to  refer  to  certain  of  Margah's  teachings  about  the 
world  when  the  overt  subject  of  attention  was  not  the 
world  but  God. 
For  example,  in  the  discussion  of  Marqah's  proofs 
for  the  existence  of  God,  reference  had  to  be  made  to 
the  cosmos,  because  Margah  considered  that  the 
cosmological  argument  for  God's  existence  has 
validity.  Since  God's  existence  is  known,  or  at  least 
knowable,  from  His  effects,  enough  had  to  be  said 
about  those  effects  to  show  what  it  is  about  them  that 
entitles  us  to  conclude  that  there  is  a  God.  Likewise, 
in  discussing  the  question  of  the  knowability  of  God, 
it  was  not  possible,  nor  indeed  desirable  to  attempt 
to  avoid  reference  to  the  human  mind.  The-reason  for 
this  is  that  in  asking  whether  God  is  knowable,  we  are 
asking  whether  He  is  knowable  by  men.  And  in  order 
to  answer  that  question  some  attention  has  to 
lbe  paid 
to  the  kinds  of  limits  that  must  be  set  on  man's 
ability  to  know.  Whether  or  not  men  can  knoi  God 
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depends  not  only  on  the  kind  of  being  God  is  (or  has) 
but.  alsop  and  to  no  less  an  extent,  on  whether  a 
being  of  such  a  kind  as  God  is  a  possible  object  of 
knowledge  for  a  specifically  human  knower. 
I  wish  now  to  begin  to  shift  the  primary  focus  of 
attention  from  God  to  man,  that  is  to  say,  from  the 
Creator  to  a  certain  and,  in  Marqah's  view,  an  exalted 
species  of  creatures.  But  however  closely  attention 
will  be  focused  on  Marqah's  philosophy  of  man,  his 
teachings  on  God  will  never  be  absent  from,  or  even 
peripheral  to,  the  enquiry.  For  Marqah  at  all  times 
thought  of  men  as  beings  standing  in  a  certain 
inescapable  relationship  to  God.  Men  are  made  in  the 
image  of  God  and  a  man  can  escape  from  that  relation 
with  God  only  by  destroying  himself.  If  he  tries  to 
escape  by,  say,  denouncing  the  immutable  laws  of 
divine  justice  then  he  still  stands  in  such  a 
relationship  to  God  that  he  cannot  be  understood 
except  in  terms  of  that  relationship.  For  the  rebel 
against  God  shapes  his  life  in  response  to,  because  he 
is  in  opposition  to,  God's  laws.  It  is  indeed 
possible  to  argue  that  a  manfs  rebellion  against  God 
emphasises  his  relationship  with  Him,  for  were  it  not 
for  his  rebellion  we  might  be  less  inclined  t  see 
him  in  his  capacity  as  a  creature  responding  n  his 
own  way  to  the  demands  that  God  has  made  of  men. 
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immutable  laws  of  divine  justice,  does  nothing  so  active 
as  engage  in  ostentatious  rebellion  against  those 
laws  he  also  has  not  escaped  his  relationship  with 
God,  because,  as  Margah  states  in  Book  VI  of  the 
Memar,  one  cosmological  argument  takes  as  its  starting 
point  the  four  divisions  within  the  human  soul  -  "desire 
and  idea  and  conscience  and  reason-hidden  deep 
within  you"  [I  131.,  II  2141.  Consequently,  however 
successful  may  be  a  man's  attempt  to  live  according 
to  a  life-style  that  disregards  God's  laws,  he  remains, 
in  his  spiritual  nature,  a  living  testimony  to  God  -a 
holy  testament. 
The  impossibility  of  discussing  Marqah's 
conception  of  man  without  regard  to  man's 
relationship  with  God  does  not,  however,  preclude  the 
possibility  of  a  discussion  whose  overt  centre  of 
attention  is  Margah's  doctrine  of  man.  I  shall 
present  an  exposition  of  this  latter  doctrine  in 
the  next  two  chapters.  In  the  present  chapter  I 
wish  to  provide  a  bridge  between  my  exposition  of 
Marqah's  teachings  on  God  and  his  teachings  on  man. 
The  bridge  consists  of  an  account  of  MargahIs 
teachings  on  the  creation,  for  the  creation  links 
God,  the  Creator,  with  man,  a  product  of  His  creative 
activity.  As  with  the  earlier  chapters  it  will  be 
necessary  to  devote  a  few  pages  to  a  consideration 
of  certain  aspects  of  the  doctrines 
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philosophers.  A  main  reason  for  doing  this  in  the 
present  chapter  is  that  what  Margäh  has  to  say  about 
the  creation  has,  at  several  points,  a  distinctly 
polemical  air,  and  I  think  that  a  deeper 
understanding  of  Marqah's  position  will  be  achieved 
if  we  can  identify  those  who  may  most  readily  be 
judged  to  be  Margah's  target.  That  target,  I  shall 
argue,  is  firmly  placed  in  the  mainstream  of 
Hellenic  philosophy.  First,  however,  I  would  like 
to  make  certain  distinctions,  concerning  the  idea 
of  creation,  that  will  facilitate  the  subsequent 
development  of  my  exposition. 
A  crucial  distinction  is  that  between  two  meanings 
of  the  term  "creation".  For  the  term  itself  is 
ambiguous,  with  its  two  meanings  sufficiently 
similar  to  render  it  often  difficult  to  detect  when 
a  writer  has  slipped  from  using  it  in  one  sense  to  us.  ng 
it  in  the  other.  First,  "creation"  signifies  the  act 
of  creating.  Using  the  term  in  this  sense  we  refer 
to  God's  creation  of  the  world.  Secondly,  "creation" 
signifies  the  outcome  of  the  creative  act.  A  creation, 
in  this  sense,  is  what  has  been  created,  a  res  creata, 
as  opposed  to  the  creating  of  that  res.  Thus  the 
two  kinds  of  creation  relate  to  each  other  as  cause 
to  effect.  By  a  creation  (i.  e.  an  act  of  creating)  a 
creation  (i.  e.  a  product  of  that  act)  is  effected. 
Where  we  understand  the  creation  (the  res  creata) 2O 
to  have  come  into  existence'by  the  process  of 
actualisation  of  a  potential,  then  the  creation  is  not 
a  creation  ex  nihilo,  The  reason  for  this  is  that  if 
prior  to  actualisation  the  created  thing  were 
potentially  what  it  became,  then  it  must,  prior  to 
its  being  created,  have  existed  in  some  form.  For 
what  is  potentially  one  thing  must  be  actually 
something  else  -a  potential  oak  tree  is  not  also  an 
actual  oak  tree,  since  if  it  were  actually  an  oak  its 
potential  to  become  an  oak  would  so  to  say  have  been 
used  up,  The  actual  acorn  is  a  potential  oak,  for 
it  is  the  acorn  that  has  matter  which  is 
structured  in  such  a  way  that  it  can  take  the  form  of 
the  oak. 
If  a  res  creata  were,  prior  to  its  existence, 
something  other  than  what  it  became,  then  it  was  not 
created  from  nothing.  It  was,  obviously,  created  from 
what  it  had  been.  In  this  sense  of  "create"  a 
sculptor  may  be  said  to  create,  because  he  emplioys 
pre-existent  material  in  his  work  -  that  is,  the 
matter  of  the  sculpture  exists  prior  to  the  creative 
act,  His  creative  work  does  not  include  making  the 
marble  that  he  shapes.  The  creative  work  consists  in 
his  giving  a  certain  form  to  material  that  is  already 
to  hand. 
Though  the  sculpture  can  be  regarded  as  the 
sculptor's  creation,  it  may  be  argued  that  the 21 
sculptor's  true  creativity  was  activated,  not  when  he 
began  chiselling  the  marble,  but  when  he  imagined  the 
finished  product.  It  was  having  the  idea  that  was 
creative;  the  embodiment  of  that  idea  in  a  marble 
block  was  achieved  by  craftsmanship.  According  to 
this  way  of  looking  at  the  situation,  the  true 
res  creata  of  the  sculptor  is  not  the  sculpture  but 
the  idea  that  the  sculptor  has  of  the  sculpture.  It 
might  seem  that  the  sculptor's  creation  of  the  idea, 
unlike  his  creation  of  the  statue,  is  a  creatio  ex 
nihilo,  on  the  grounds  that  whereas  the  statue  came 
from  the  block  of  marble,  the  idea  came  from  nothing. 
Or,  to  use  Aristotelian  terminology,  the  sculpture 
had  a  pro-existent  material  cause,  but  the  idea  of 
the  sculpture  did  not. 
This  is  not  perhaps  the  place  to  enter  into  a 
detailed  discussion  of  whether  men,,  all  or  even  any 
men,  are  capable  of  creating  from  nothing.  But  I 
think  that  one  point  that  should  be  made  here  is 
that  the  sculptor's  creation  of  the  idea  of  the 
statue  is  not  unquestionably  ex  nihi]_o.  It  may  be 
said  that  though  his  idea  was  not  one  he  had 
previously  encountered  in  that  form,  it  may  still  be 
possible  to  regard  the  idea  as  a  synthesis  in'a  new 
form  of  other  ideas  that  were  familiar  to  hi  . 
In 
that  case  the  other  ideas,  from  which  the  nei 
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pre-existent  matter  that  was  then  given  the  form 
eventually  embodied  in  the  marble  block. 
This  way  of  regarding  the  pre-existent  ideas, 
namely,  as  the  material  cause  of  the  later  idea,  does 
not  clash  with  the  Aristotelian  way  of  regarding\the 
material  cause.  Aristotle  does  not  think  of  the 
material  cause  as  being  "matter"  in  the  ordinary 
"physical"  sense  of  the  term  "matter".  For  example, 
he  regards  the  premisses  of  a  theoretical  syllogism 
as  the  matter,  i.  e.  the  material  cause  of  the 
conclusion 
I, 
and  he  regards  the  premisses  of 
practical  reasoning  as  referring  to  various 
intentions,  desires  and  beliefs  of  the  agent  which 
themselves  constitute  the  material  cause  of  the 
resulting  action  Also,  Aristotle  regards  the  point 
2 
and  the  line  with  which  the  geometer  deals,  and  which 
are  certainly  not  to  be  thought  of  as  physical 
objects,  as  being  the  matter  of  geometry. 
Ordinary  creating,  the  normal,  and  perhaps  the 
invariable  form  of  human  creating,  involves  working 
on  a  material  cause.  It  requires  a  pre-existent  matter. 
Another  form  of  creating,  the  concept  of  which  we 
can  describe  whether  or  not  we  can  show  that  concept 
to  have  any  instantiations,  is  creating  ex  nihilo. 
0000" 
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Creation  ex  nihilo  does  not  rely.  on  the  pre-existence 
of  something  that  serves  as  ä  material  cause  of  the 
res  creata,  where  the  phrase  "material  cause"  is 
understood  in  the  wide  sense  that  I  have  just  been 
discussing. 
Margah  undoubtedly  believed  in  the  creation  of  the 
world.  Whether  he  believed  in  creation  ex  nihilo 
is  a  problem  that  will  shortly  be  occupying  our 
attention.  So  far  I  have  merely  been  concerned  to 
show  that  belief  in  the  creation  of  the  world  is  not 
necessarily  belief  in  an  ex  nihilo  creation.  The 
world  may,  after  all,  have  been  created  from  a 
pre-existent  matter.  And  if  the  creation  of  the 
world  (  assuming,  of  course,  that  the  world  was 
created)  is  like  the  creation  of  most,  or  perhaps  all, 
human  artifacts,  then  the  creation  of  the  world  was 
from  pre-existent  matter.  Indeed  it  is  possible  that 
it  is  only  by  permitting  an  extension  of  the 
ordinary  meaning  of  the  term  "creation"  (creatio) 
that  we  allow  talk  about  creation  ex  nihilo  at,  alle 
I  would  like  now  to  make  a  further  distinction, 
thid  one  concerning  specifically  the  concept  of 
creation  ex  nihilo.  Let  us  suppose-that  the  world 
was  created  from  nothing,  that  iss  that  there  was  no 
pre-existent  matter  which  became  the  world  as  a 
result  of  receiving  a  certain  form.  We  are  not 
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was  created  from  nothing  it  was  also  created  by 
nothing.  In  this  chapter  I  shall  assume,  what  in  any 
case  I  take  to  be  logically  correct,  that  an 
essential  aspect  of  creation  is  the  existence  of  an 
agens,  a  creator,  who  does  the  creating.  Even  if 
a  pre-existent  material  cause  is  not  a  necessary 
condition  for  creation,  a  creator  is  such  a 
condition. 
The  foregoing  remarks  provide  us  with  a  rough 
conceptual  framework  within  which  our  discussion  of 
the  creativity  of  God  will  take  place.  I  wish  now  to 
focus  much  more  closely  on  certain  crucial  elements 
in  that  framework,  and  to  do  so  while  bearing  in 
mind  what  philosophers  actually  said  on  the  question 
at  issue,  The  philosophical  positions  with  which  I 
shall  be  most  concerned  are  those  of  Plato,  Philo 
and  Nargah,  but  I  shall  not  be  concerned  with  them 
to  the  exclusion  of  all  others. 
Of  the  aforementioned  two  kinds  of  creation,  namely, 
creation  from  nothing,  and  creation  from  ai 
pre-existent  material  cause,  the  former  was.  so  little 
attended  to  by  Hellenic  philosophers  that  the  J 
concept  of  creation  ex  nihilo  may  fairly  be  judged 
to  be  unhellenic.  It  is  worthwhile  asking  wh  this 
concept  is  so  foreign  to  Hellenic  philosophy,  for  the 
answer  will  help  us  to  see  what  kind  of  effect  an 255 
acceptance  of,  the  mainstream  Judaeo-Christian 
interpretation  of  the  first  verse  of  Genesis  may  have 
on  the  direction  of  philosophical  speculation. 
In  Book  A  of  the  Metaphysics  Aristotle  presents 
a  brief  history  of  Greek  metaphysical  speculation 
about  reality.  In  this  history  he  attributes  to 
"the  first  philosophers"  the  following  position: 
"That  of  which  all  things  that  are  consist,  the  first 
from  which  they  came  to,  be,  the  last  into  which  they 
are  resolved  (the  substance  remaining,  but  changing 
in  its  modifications),  this  they  say  is  the  element 
and  this  the  principle  of  things,  and  therefore  they 
think  nothing  is  either  generated  or  destroyed,  since 
this  sort  of  entity  is  always  conserved..,  for  there 
must  be  some  entity  -  either  one  or  more  than  one  - 
from  which  all  other  things  come  to  be,  it  being 
conserved"  [983b7-18]. 
In  this  statement  Aristotle  gives  the  kernel  to  the 
answer  to  our  question.  The  earliest  Greek 
philosophers  took  the  world  as  their  datum  and 
sought  to  explain  what  it  came  from,  that  is,  what  the 
matter  is  from  which  it  was  formed,  this  matter  being 
the  underlying  reality.  They  did  not  go  on  to  ask 
wherein  lay  the  origin  of  that  matter,  since  for 
them  that  matter  itself  is  the  ultimate  origin  of  all 
things.  It  is,  as  Aristotle  says,  neither 
generated  nor  destroyed.  -  What  are  subject  t 256 
generation  and  destruction-are  the  various 
modifications  of  the  matter.  Thales,  "the  founder  of 
this  type  of  philosophy"  L983b20]  declared  that  the* 
first  principle  is  water.  Anaximander  and  Diogenes 
regarded  air  as  the  first  principle.  Heraclitus 
attributed  this  status  to  fire.  Empedocles  attributed 
it  to  the  four  elements,  air,  fire,  earth  and  water, 
"for  these,  he  says,  always  remain  and  do  not  come  to 
be,  except  that  they  come  to  be  more  or  fewer,  being 
aggregated  into  one  and  segregated  out  of  one" 
[98t4a8-11].  Anaxagoras  thought  that  the  underlying 
reality  was  composed  of  an  infinite  number  of  kinds 
of  matter.  But,  once  again,  thoughT  the  relations 
between  them  are  subject  to  change,  the  underlying 
"  reality  is  not  subject  to  either  generation  or 
destruction, 
Thus  the  earliest  Greek  philosophers  did  not 
develop  a  theory  of  creation  ex  nihilo  because  their 
chief  question  concerned  the  nature  of  the  material 
cause  itself.  Approaching  metaphysics  by  way  of  an 
acceptance  of  the  natural  world,  and  then  asking/. 
about  the  nature  of  its  material  cause,  i.  e.  the 
matter  out  of  which  it  is  formed,  they  could  not,  of' 
course,  develop  a  doctrine  of  creation  from  nothing, 
for  by  regarding  the  nature  of  the  material  cause  as 
basic  they  were  precluded  from  asking  what  the  basis 
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1What  did  the  material  cause  come  from?  't  but  rather, 
the  reverse,  namely,  'How  does  it  manifest  itself  in 
the  ways  it  does?  '.  Anaxagoras,  for  example, 
explained  the  manifold  appearances  of  the  material 
cause  in  terms  of  aggregation  and  segregation 
[9811a15]. 
Anaximenes,  having  claimed  that  air  was  the  material 
cause,  sought  to  explain  the  appearance  of  material 
things  by  invoking  a  principle  of  condensation  and 
rarefaction. 
When,  as  a  subsequent  development,  the  Hellenic 
philosophers  raised  the  question  of  the  cause.  of 
motion  in  the  world,  thus  seeking  the  'efficient 
cause',  they  again  ignored  the  possibility  of  a 
creation  from  nothing.  For  what  they  did  was 
explain  how  what  there  was  became  orderly  and 
harmonious,  There  is$  for  example,  no  hint  that 
when  Anaxagoras  invokes  VoV$,  reason,  in  order  to 
explain  how  the  world  was  made,  he  is  trying  to 
explain  how  from  nothing  it  came  into  existence.  On 
the  contrary,  his  purpose  is  to  show  how  reason  can 
be  invoked  to  explain  the  order  and  arrangement  of 
the  world,  that  is  to  say,  to  explain  the  order  and 
arrangement  of  what  in  any  case  existed. 
Although  Aristotle  differs  from  the  earlie 
philosophers  I  have  mentioned  in  that  he  lays  stress 
on  the  idea  of  a  teleological  cause  in  nature,  a 
cause  that  draws  things  to  the  full  realisat  on  of 258  ' 
their  potential,  he  is  in  agreement  with  his 
predecessors  on  the  doctrine  of  the  beginninglessness 
of  the  material  cause.  According  to  Aristotle, 
generation  occurs  when  matter  sloughs  off  one  form 
and  acquires  another.  Prior  to  taking  a  certain 
form  a  thing  has  that  form  potentially.  But  it  is  a 
central  doctrine  of  Aristotle's  metaphysics  that 
what  is  potentially  X  can  be  brought  into  the  state 
of  being  actually  X  only  by  something  that  is  already 
actual.  Thus  the  fact  that  there  are  now  changes 
taking  place,  things  sloughing  off  one  form  and 
acquiring  another,  entails,  for  Aristotle,  that 
there  always  have  been  changes  taking  place.  It  is 
clear  that  the  doctrine  of  creation  ex  nihilo  could 
not,  without  inconsistency,  be  introduced  into  the 
Aristotelian  system. 
There  is  one  further  Hellenic  philosopher  who  sei 
cosmological  system  I  would  like  to  consider  here, 
namely,  Plato,.  whose  doctrine  of  the  creation  is  here 
briefly  outlined  because  of  its  polemical 
significance  for  Marqah. 
According  to  the'Timaeus,  the  perceptual  world  is 
a  world  of  becoming.  It  comes  into.  being  and  changes. 
Therefore  it  has  a  cause  since  "everything  that 
becomes  or  changes  must  do  so  owing  to  some  cause;  for 
nothing  can  come  to  be  without  a  cause" 
[28a].  The 
cause  of  the  world  is  the  demiurge,  the 
yas,  the  maker  and  father  of  the  universe, 
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whom  Plato  also  calls  -"God"  God  used  a  model 
or  pattern  in  making  the  world.  His  model,  which 
could  have  been  eternal  and  changeless,  and  could 
alternatively  have  come  to  be,  was  in  fact  of  the 
former  kind,  for  god  wished  the  world  to  be  good,  and 
for  such  an  end  only  an  eternal  and  unchanging  model, 
a  model  inhabiting  a  world  knowable  only  by  reason 
and  intellect,  would  serve  his  purpose.  The  reason  the 
demiurge  wished  the  world  to  be  good  was  that  he  himself 
was  good  and  wholly  lacking  in  envy,  and  therefore 
wished  to  share  his  goodness  as  fully  as  possible.  He 
could  not,  in  miserly  fashion,  hug  his  goodness 
protectively  to  himself. 
But  what  exactly  did  god  do  to  share  his  goodness? 
In  answer  to  this  Plato  says  the  following:  "God, 
therefore,  wishing  that  all  things  should  be  good, 
and  so  far  as  possible  nothing  be  imperfect,  and 
finding  the  visible  universe  in  a  state  not  of  rest 
but  of  inharmonious  and  disorderly  motion,  reduced  it 
to  order  from  disorder,  as  he  judged  that  order  was  in 
every  way  better"  [30a]:  Since  nothing  without 
mind  (Vows)  is  superior  to  anything  with  mind,  and 
since  mind  is  impossible  without  soul  (YUK  )  the 
world  was  given  a  soul.  Heace,  to  use  Plato's  own 
words:.  "this  world  came  to  be  in  very  truth,  through 
God's  providence,  a  living  being  with  soul  and 
mind"  [30b-c]. 
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The  model  that  god  used  in  making  the  world  was  a 
yo  p  oV  9a  res  intelligibilis.  Since  god  employed  one 
perfect  model,  and  since  the  world  duly  modelled  on  it 
was  a  perfect  copy,  it  follows  that  there  can  be  only 
one  world,  for  the  world  god  made  must  share  with  its 
model  the  characteristic  of  being  one. 
In  this  account  the  efficient  cause  of  the  world 
is  the  demiurge,  and  the  formal  cause  is  the  VO  7  TcV 
which  god  employed  as  a  model.  But  what  of  the 
material  cause?  At  this  point  in  his  argument  Plato 
introduces  a  new  concept,  that  of  the  receptacle 
RDSc 
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which  is  space  in  which 
everything  in  the  perceptual  world  becomes.  The 
receptacle,  described  by  Plato  as  something  "which  is 
eternal  and  indestructible,  which  provides  a  position 
for  everything  that  comes  to  be,  and  which  is 
apprehended  without  the  senses  by  a  sort  of  spurious 
reasoning"  [52b],  is,  prior  to  the  existence  of  'the 
world,  in  a  state  of  chaos.  It  "was  characterised  by 
the  qualities  of  water  and  fire,  of  earth  and  air 
and  by  others  that  go  with  them,  and  its  visual 
appearance  was  therefore  varied;  but  as  there  was  no 
homogeneity  or  balance  in  the  forces  that  filled  it,. 
no  part  of  it  was  in  equilibrium,  but  it  swayed 
unevenly  under  the  impact  of  their  motion,  and  in 
turn  communicated  its  motion  to  them"  [52d-e]. 
Before  being  arranged  into  an  ordered  universe,  we  are 261 
told,  "fire,  water,  earth  and  air  bore  some  traces  of 
their  proper  nature,  but  were  in  the  disorganised  state 
to  be  expected  of  anything  which  god  has  not 
touched"  [53b], 
Whether  the  Timaeus  account  of  the  creation  is  of  a 
creation  ex  nihilo  is  difficult  tö  answer.  Aristotle, 
who,  of  course,  believed  in-the  eternity  of  the  world, 
criticised  Plato  for  teaching  that  time  and  the 
world  began  togetherl  But  it  is  possible  that  what 
Aristotle  was  objecting  to  was  the  notion  of  a 
chaos  existing  timelessly  prior  to  the  creation  of 
the  world,  prior,  that  is,  to  the  introduction  of 
order  into  the  chaos.  Certainly,  the  notion  of  a 
chaos  existing  prior  to  time  is  difficult  to  grasp 
unless  the  priority  in  question  is  a  non-temporal 
priority.  Xenocrates,  who  succeeded  Platos 
successor  Speusippus  as  head  of  the  Academy,  is 
reported  to.  have  held  that  Plato  did  indeed  regard 
the  priority  of  chaos  as  a  non-temporal  priority* 
What  Plato  was  doing,  according  to  this  line  of 
interpretation,  was  carrying  out  in  imagination  the 
experiment  of  thinking  out  of  existence  those 
principles  in  the  universe  that  ensure  its  f 
orderliness  and  harmony,  (just 
as  some  political 
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theorists  have  imagined  men  in  a  state  of  nature  by 
imagining  men  in  society  and  then  thinking  out  of 
existence  all  the  legislative  and  law  enforcement 
agencies).  According  to  Xenocrates,  Plato  believed 
that  the  universe  without  order  was  the  receptacle. 
The  Xenocratice  interpretation  seems  at  first 
sight  neither  to  entail  nor  contradict  the  doctrine 
of  creation  ex  nihilo.  But  whether  Plato's  teaching 
is  in  fact  neutral  on  the  question  of  the  ex  nihi.  lo 
creation  of  the  world  is  a  matter  which  need  not  be 
discussed  here,  since  such  a  discussion  would  take  us 
too  far  from  Margah's  own  teaching  on  the  creation. 
It  may,  however,  at  least  be  noted  here  that  if  Plato 
is  indeed  presenting  the  doctrine  of  ex  nihilo  creation 
then  he  stands,  with  Marqah,  well  outside  the 
mainstream  of  Hellenic  teaching  on  this  subject. 
Having  sketched  the  doctrines  of  certain  of 
Marqah's  Hellenic  predecessors  so  far  as  they  have  a 
bearing  on  the  nature  of  the  creation,  I  shall  turn 
now  to  a  consideration  of  the  creation  doctrine  to  be 
found  in  the  Memar.  We  shall  not,  however,  lose 
sight  of  Marqah's  predecessors.  Plato,  in 
particular,  will  figure  significantly,  though  not 
always  as  an  ally.  In  one  place,  for  example, 
where  Marqah's  position  is  the  antithesis  of  Platots, 
Marqah's  mode  of  expression  strongly  suggests)  that  in 
writing  as  he  does  he  wants  to  make  it  clear  that  his 
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intention  is  partly  polemical,  with  the  Platonic 
theory  playing  the  role  of  target. 
Marqah  speaks  of:  "God  from  whom  everything  is" 
[I  90,  II  l45].  What  kind  of  creation  doctrine 
should  we  read  into  this  description?  Is  Marqah 
saying  that  God  created  the  cosmos  ex  nihilo  or  that 
He  created  it  from  matter  which  existed  prior  to  the 
cosmos  and  was  itself  uncreated?  I  would  like  to 
lead  into  my  answer  to  this  question  by  referring  to 
a  distinction  Marqah  makes  which  has  strong  Platonic 
overtones,  namely,  that  between  form  and  matter. 
Marqah  frequently  distinguishes  between  a  thing, 
and  its  form,  and  what  the  form  informs  thereby 
producing  the  thing  itself.  For  example,  he  tells 
us  that  mental  and  material  objects  are  distinguished 
by  their  forms:  "The  Form  (J7'11ý<)  of  the  mind  is 
not  the  Form  (ji  1  ti)  of  the  material  body"  j 
[I  31,  II  471- 
Let  us  ask,  therefore,  whether  Marqah 
maintained  that  God  created  the  world  by  informing  a 
pre-existent  matter.  Marqah's  language  on  this  point 
is  suggestive.  In  speaking  of  God  as  Creator,  he 
habitually  links  two  modes  of  expression.  Thus,  for 
example,  he  terms  God  "the  Creator,  the  Orderer 
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17J1  1ti'yY)"  [I  60,  II  93b  and  writes:  "He 
created  (X`7-:  L)  all  and  fashioned  (Y  ()  all" 
"'  ýI  132,  II  214],  "The  True  One  there  planned  and 
created  (T?  nj  )F11)  by  His  will"  [1  86 
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"When  the  created  thing  is  perfected  by  the  will  of 
its  Creator  out  of  the  four  elements,  Ile  brings  it 
forth  by  His  power"  [I  131,  'II  214].  In  each  case, 
God  as  Creator  is  linked  to  God  as  orderer,  or 
fashioner,  or  planner,  or  perfecter.  The 
activity  associated  with  the  last  four  terms  seems 
especially  associated  with  the  process  of 
structuring,  that  is,  with  the  informing  of  a  thing. 
This  suggests  that  in  divine  creative  activity  a 
distinction  has  to  be  drawn  between  the  matter  of  the 
res  creata,  this  matter  being  what  is  created,  and 
the  form  of  the  ses  creata  by  which  God  orders  or 
perfects  the  matter.  Certainly  when  Margah  writes  that 
God  "created  all  and  fashioned  all  "he  does  appear  to 
be  making  a  distinction  within  the  creative  activity 
of  God;  and  since,  first,  "fashioned"  is  language 
associated  with  "gi  'ing  a  form"  p  and  since,  '  secondly, 
Nargah  does  distinguish  between  the  form  and  the 
matter  of  a  thing,  a  plausible  explanation  of  Margahts 
repetitious  two-fold  expressions  in  referring  to  the 
creative  activity  of  God,  Is  that  the  term  "reate" 
(X  L),  while  applicable  to  the  divine  act  of  making 
the  universe,  is  used  also  by  Marqah  with  the  more 265 
restricted  connotation  of  making  the  matter,  as 
opposed  to  the  form,  of  a  thing. 
. 
The  argument  I  have  just  presented  would  not, 
however,  even  if  valid,  be  sufficient  to  warrant  the 
conclusion  that  God  created  the  world  by  informing  a 
pre-existent  matter  which  came  from  nothing.  I  would 
not  draw  this  conclusion  from  the  evidence  so  far 
presented  for  two  reasons.  First,  even  if,  in 
referring  to  God  as  Creator  and  Orderer,  Margah  is 
implying  the  doctrine  that  there  are  two  aspects  to 
the  divine  creative  process,  one  relating  to  the 
matter,  and  the  other  relating  to  the  form,  of  tho 
res  creata,  it  by  no  means  need  follow  that  one  of 
those  aspects  precedes  the  other.  God  could, 
equally  well,  be  conceived  of  as  making  a  formed 
object  ex  nihil_o,  where  the  two  aspects  of  the  object, 
its  matter  and  its  form,  are  brought  into  existence 
simultaneously.  However,  whether  God  is  conceived  of 
as  creating  ex  nihilo  matter  that  comes  into  existenco 
only  with  the  formed  object  of  which  it  is  the  matter, 
or  as  creating  ex  nihilo  a  pre-existent  matter,  Good  must 
be  taken  to  create  ex  nihilo.  But  on  the  basis  of 
the  argument  I  have  so  far  traced,  I  do  not  wish  at 
present  to  commit  myself  to  this  interpretation  of 
Marqah.  This  point  brings  me  to  the  second  of  my  two 
reasons  for  hesitating  over  my  tentative  suggestion 
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reason  is  simply  that  in  writing  of  God  as  the 
Creator,  Marqah  employs  numerous  expressions,  and  a 
good  deal  of  detailed  exegesis  must  be  done  before  it 
is  possible  to  write  with  assurance  about  the  precise 
conceptual  differences,  or  perhaps  even  only 
differences  of  tone,  connoted  by  the  different  terms. 
Among  the  numerous  expressions  are  the  following: 
"Thou  didst  establish  (J7>  rf  )  the  world" 
[Hymn  II,,  v.  4] 
"'He  is'  created 
6,,  1L71)  a  universe"  [Hymn  IV  v.  3]ß 
"Thou  didst  germinate  (.  fl.  >»  R)  words  which  generated 
creations"  [Hymn  I  v.  2],  "God  brought  into 
existence  (X'ýý7)  the  different  kinds  of  creatures" 
[I  31,  II  471,  "He  produced  them  (ji 
. 
n)  by  His 
power"  [I  46,  II  74],  "He  is  our  Maker,  Fashioner  and 
Creator  ('171  JýJyX7  1T1Z')"  [I  70,  II  112], 
"...  Creation  was  founded  ('1a))  on  an  origin" 
[I  93,  II  152],  "He  brought  into  being  (P7;  1)  light" 
[I  131,  II  213],  "...  all  places  He  made 
fashioned  {71`71Y1  ),  perfected 
Iset 
in,  order  I 
(773'-FJ7),  made  ready  (J1T1lý/)"  [I  132,  II  215).  /. 
Since  Margah  employs  so  many  expressions  in1the 
course  of  referring'to  the  divine  creative  activity, 
and  since  so  little  is  known  of  the-precise 
conceptual  distinctions  Marqah  indicates  in  using 
this  rich  vocabulary,  it  seems  at  the  present  stage 
of  Samaritan  research  rash  to  attempt  to  conclude,  by 
referring  to  only  a  few  instances,  in  the  Mem  r,  of 
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certain  groupings  of  terms 
Ithat 
Marqah  espoused  the 
doctrine  of  creation  ex  nihilo. 
To  support  the  claim  that  Margah  did  espouse  this 
doctrine,  evidence  of  a  more  explicit  kind  must  be 
brought  forward,  There  iss  I  think,  more  explicit 
evidence,  though  once  again  a  certain  tentativeness 
in  handling  the  material  is  in  order.  The  evidence  in 
question  is  the  following  assertion:  "He  is'  created 
a  universe  from  non-being"  - 
,,;,  xý  T  fix,  1ý  ",  "  uff,,  xya 
This  verse  is,  I  think,  as  unequivocal  a 
formulation  of  the  doctrine  of  creation  ex  nihilo  as 
could  be  expected  from  Margah.  Indeed,  this 
formula  is  precisely  the  kind  that  would  be 
expected  from  Marqah  were  he  seeking  to  encapsulate 
the  doctrine  in  a  single  verse.  It  must  be  admitted 
that  the  verse  does  not  provide  conclusive  evidence 
that  Margah  accepted  the  doctrine  of  creation 
ex  nihiio.  For  the  verse  could  be  taken  to  mean  that 
God  created  the  world  from  what  had  not  been  the  world. 
But  if  this  is  what  Marqah  is  saying  then  the  verse 
seems  to  be  a  mere  truism.  For  whatever  God  did  in 
creating  the  world,  the  world  could  not  have  been 
after  the  creation  what  it  had  been  before  the 
creation. 
Thus,  although  the  thesis  that-Margah  espoused  the 
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incontrovertible,  the  weight  of  evidence  in  the  Atemar 
and.  also  the  Defter  hymns  appears  to  provide  support 
for  it. 
It  iss  in  this  connection,  interesting  to  note 
that  with  regard  to  the  doctrine  of  creation 
ex  nihilo,  Marqah's  great  contempdrary  Amram  Darah 
appears  to  hold  the  same  position  as  Marqah.  For, 
with  a  certain  tentativeness,  and  prompted  in  this 
tentativeness  by  the  same  considerations  as  those 
which  provided  grounds  for  hesitation  over 
interpreting  Marqah,  I  would  take  the  doctrine  of 
creation  ex  nihiio  to  be  equally  attributable  to 
Ainram.  In  particular,  Amram,  like  Margah,  appears 
to  state  the  doctrine  explicitly  in  at  least  one 
verse.  He  writesli  "For  Thou  didst  create  without 
toil  Thy  works  which  are  eminent,  which  Thou  didst 
bring  into  being  from  nothing  in  six  days  - 
,  rUv  l/  NLi  111  D''  7,1x7 
Having  stated  my  reasons  for  thinking  it  at  least 
probable  that  Marqah  taught  that  the  material  cause 
of  the  universe  was  created  by  God,  I  would  like  now 
to  shift  the  focus  of  attention  from  his  teaching 
on  the  material  cause,  to  his  teaching  on  the/formal 
cause  of  the  world. 
I 
Plato's  view,  as  expressed  in  the  Timaeus,  lis  that 
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the  formal  cause  of  the  world  is  a  model  that  the 
demiurge  employed  in  creating  the  world.  The  model 
is  a  Vonro  v,  a  res  intelligibilis9  believed  by  Plato 
to  have  an  existence  independent  of  the  ordinary 
world  of  the  perceptual  consciousness.  It  is  evident 
that  Marqah  was  aware  of  the  doctrine  that  God  used  a 
model  in  the  creation  of  the  world.  The  evidence  is 
that  he  took  great  trouble  to  dissociate  himself  from 
the  doctrine.  Indeed,  Marqah's  persistence  on  this 
matter  strongly  suggests  that  the  doctrine  was  a  live 
option  for  at  least  some  of  Marqah's  Samaritan 
contemporaries.  It  is  tempting  to  see  in  Marqah's 
words  a  veiled  reference  to  a  heretical  Samaritan 
sect.  But  I  shall  not  seek  here  to  identify  Marqah's 
likely  target.  However,  that  he  was  seeking  to 
combat  a  doctrine  he  believed  inimical  to  orthodox 
Samaritanism  is  shown  by  such  passages  as:  "He 
created  without  helper;  He  made  without  any 
associate;  He  formed  without  using  any  model 
(iZY  T) 
... 
He  formed  without  using  any  model  ((X  T)  in  anything 
He  made"  [I  97_8,  II  168]. 
Having  noted  the  polemical  tone  adopted  by  Marqah 
in  rejecting  the  doctrine  that  God  employed  a  model 
in  creating  the  world,  we  must  now  try  to  establish 
the  grounds  of  his  rejection.  If,  which  is  possible, 
the  target  of  Marqah's  polemic  is  Plato's  Timaeus  or 
a  subsequent  version  of  the  Timaeus  doctrine;  then  one 270 
objection  Marqah  would  have  to  it  is  that  it  posits 
an  eternal  changeless  entity.  The  existence  of  such 
an  entity  would  be  rejected  by  Marqah  because  he  believed 
that  the  only  eternal  changeless  entity  is  God  Himself. 
Associated  with  this  point  is  the.  consideration  that 
there  is  a  risk  of  the  ascription  of  divinity  to  an 
entity  co-eternal  with  God.  Such  an  ascription  would, 
of  course,  contradict  Margahts  most  fundamental 
doctrine,  namely  the  doctrine  of  the  oneness  of 
God. 
But  in  any  case,  even  if  Marqah's  target  is  not 
specifically  Platonic,  but  rather,  a  watered  down 
doctrine  that  invokes  the  idea  of  a  model,  though  not 
an  eternal  one,  this  also  would  not  satisfy  Narqah. 
For  Margah  would,  I  think,  regard  as  philosophically 
objectionable  the  idea  that  God  needed  a  model  to 
work  with,  If  He  did  need  a  model  this  would  imply 
an  inadequacy  or  deficiency  in  God.  No  doubt  human 
artificers  need  models,  or  at  least  sometimes  do. 
But  to  conclude  that  for  something  so  complicated  as 
the  cosmos  a  model,  as  certainly  required  by  God  would 
be  to  embrace  anthropomorphismo  And  if  it  is  said 
that  God  did  not  need  a  model  but  used  one  alli  the 
same  then  employment  of  a  model  by  God  would.  eem  to 
be  pointless,  ahd  Marqah  cannot  be  supposed  t  have 
thought  that  God  could  engage  in  anything  poi  tless. 
Furthermore,  and  here  I  anticipate  the  posit' 
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of  Margah's  doctrine,  Margah's  own  teaching  on  how 
God  created,  a  teaching  that  enjoyed  the  benefit  of 
substantial  Pentateuchal  warrant,  left  no  room  for 
the  introduction  of  the  idea  of  a  model  to  be  used 
by  God.  I  wish,  now,  to  turn  to  the  "positive  side" 
of  Margah's  teaching  on  the  subject  of  how  God 
created. 
Granted  that  the  creative  act  of  God  required 
neither  a  pre-existent  material  cause  nor  a 
pre-existent  formal  cause,  two  crucial  questions 
remain  to  be  asked.  First,  how  did  God  create  the 
world,  that  iss  what  was  the  efficient  cause;  and 
secondly,  why  did  lie  create  its  that  is,  what  was 
the  final  cause?  These  two  questions  will  be 
considered  in  turn. 
We  know  that  for  Dlargah  it  was,  of  course,  God 
who  acted  as  the  efficient  cause  of  the  world.  But, 
as  Marqah  was  well  aware,  merely  to  say  that  God 
was  the  efficient  cause  is  to  present  an  entirely 
inadequate  explanation  of  the  creation.  For  if  all 
that  God  had  to  do  in  order  that  the  world  would 
come  into  existence  was  to  exist,  then  the  world 
itself  must  have  existed  eternally.  Thus,  if  ;  God  was 
the  Creator  He  had,  in  order  to  create,  to  do  more 
than  simply  exist;  He  had  also  to  act,  God' 
.  creativity  His  was  grounded  in  s  agency.  The  agency 
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which  any  efficient  cause  is  correctly  classifiable 
as  an  agens,  but  rather,  the  agency  ascribable  to 
an  Agens  by  virtue  of  the  possession  by  that  agens  of 
a  will. 
Of  course,  Marqah  did  not  suppose  that  the  efficient 
cause  of  the  creation  was  God's  mere  possession  of  a 
will.  He  hold  that  the  cosmos  came  into  existence 
through  a  specific  act  of  will.  Thus,  the  efficient 
cause  of  the  universe,  while  not  incorrectly  said  to 
be  God,  is,  in  Marqah's  view,  an  act  of  divine  will. 
God  created  the  universe  by  willing  it  into 
existence.  As  Marqah  tells  us:  "The  True  One  there 
planned  (i7tr7) 
and  created  (TTn)  by  His  will" 
[I  86,  II  139],  and  "He  it  is  who  created  (>  `i  r) 
when  He  willed  (ii)  and  intended"  [I  91,  II  149]. 
Commonly,  when  referring  to  a  person's  act  of  will, 
we  make  reference  not  so  much  to  the  will  as  to  the 
speech  act  that  was  an  expression  of  his  will. 
Thus  when  describing  somebody  who  is  seeking  toi 
impose  his  will  on  others,  'we  say  that  he  commands  or 
orders  them,  or  summons  them,  and  so  on.  These  modes 
of  expression  are  applicable  only  where  the  performer 
of  the  speech  act  in  question  has,  or  thinks  he  has, 
power  over  people.  It  is  other  people  he 
commands  or  orders,  and  he  commands  or  orders  them- 
because  he  thinks  that  his  commands  or  ordert  have 
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them  to,  Margah,  also,  speaks  of  God  ordering  or 
commanding,  But  when  he  does  so  in  connection  with 
the  creation,  several  differences  are  to  be  found. 
First,  God  commands  not  only  people,  but  everything, 
including  what  we  regard  as  dead  matter.  Secondly, 
whereas  men  can  command  only  those  who  are  already 
there,  it  is  by  God's  command  that  what  He  commands 
comes  into  existence.  There  is  here  an  inversion  of 
the  normal  order  of  things  that  we  observed  also  in 
discussing  Margah's  epistemology.  He  held,  as  we  saw, 
that  God's  knowing  something  confers  objective 
validity  on  what  it  is  that  He  knows,  whereas  we 
cannot  know  something  unless  it  already  has  that 
validity.  Likewise,  Marqah  holds  that  God  does  not 
need  to  wait  for  the  existence  of  the  recipient  of  a 
command  before  He  can  give  the  command.  On  the 
contrary,  by  His  command  the  recipient  comes  into 
existence. 
A  third  difference  is  one  that  we  have  already 
had  occasion  to  note.  A  human.  act  of  will  is  not  by 
itself  sufficient  to  secure  the  state  of  affairs 
willed,  -Many  contingent  factors,  not  themselves 
subject  to  the  agents  will,  have  to  co-operate  with 
his  will  if  what  he  wills  is  to  occur.  But  there  is 
no  gap  between  God's  will  and  the  existence  of  the 
object  of  that  will,  If  God  wills  that  something 
should  be  so,  it  is  thereby,  and  necessarily  so. 274 
If  we  read  the  Memar  and  the  Defter  Hymns  to  see 
how  Marqah  speaks  of  the  creative  act  of  God,  we 
find  that  he  speaks  less  of  God  willing  the  world 
into  existence,  than  of  His  commanding,  or  ordering  or 
summoning  it.  That  is  to  say,  he  refers  less  to\the 
will  as  such  than  to  the  kind  of  way  in  which  that 
will  gives  expression  to  itself.  The  following  are 
a  very  few  of  the  expressions  Marqah  employs: 
"At  Thy  summons  come  created  things,  at  Thy 
proclamation  worlds"  [Hymn  I  V-71;  "All  things  are 
subservient  to  Thee  and  by  Thy  command  they  come  into 
being"  [Hymn  XI  v.  11];  "He  spoke  and  He  made 
everything  that  was  His'will'*  [Hymn  XII  v.  13]; 
"I  am  who  am,  commander  of  the  world  and  summoner  of 
creatures"  [I  8,  II  8];  "Everything  is  from  Him  and 
to'Him  everything  will  return.  At  His  command  it  is 
done'f  CI  69,  II  109];  "Everything  was  drawn  into'being 
by  His  command  'Come''  [I  889  II  142];  "Orderer  of 
all  by  His  command"  [I  131,  II  213]. 
Thus  Marqah  places  great  emphasis  on  the  word  of 
God,  In  a  real  sense  the  cosmos  is  a  testament  to 
the  power  of  the  divine  word.  Nargah  may  indeed  have 
wished  to  say  that  the  power  of  God  is  to  be 
identified  precisely  with  the  power  of  the  word  of 
God.  'Though  Plargah  declaims:  "0  Rider  of  Heaven,  the 
world  is  under  Thy  power" 
[IIymn  XI  20],  he  c  uld 
equally  have  said:  "The  world  is  under  the  p  wer  of 275 
Thy  word"v  for  by  His  word.  the  world  was  created  and 
set  in  order. 
The  doctrine  of  the  power  of  the  word  of  God  is 
not  peculiar  to  Margah  in  Samaritan  literature  of 
Roman  times.  Amram  Darah's  position  is  identical  to 
hargah's  and  no  less  unequivocally  stated.  He  writes: 
"While  Thy  wisdom  determines  that  Thou  wilt  create, 
Thy  power  brings  everything  by  Thy  word"  [Hymn  I  v.  7]; 
and:  "Without  a  mouth  Thou  didst  call  out  words  and 
a  world  came  into  being.  Swiftly  Thy  creations 
submitted  to  Thy  words" 
[Hymn  II  x.  7]. 
Marqah  sets  no  limits  on  the  power  of  the  word  of 
God.  The  power  of  God's  word  iss  after  all,  as 
great  as  the  power  of  God.  When  Margah  says:  "There 
is  no  end  to  Thy  power" 
[I".  10,  II  ii],  this  could 
have  been  said  with  equal  accuracy  of  the  power  of 
His  word.  Dearing  in  mind  the  limitlessness  of  the 
power  that  Nargah  saw  as  vested  in  the  word  of  God, 
it  becomes  clear  why  Margah  regarded  as  wholly 
unnecessary  to  God,  both  a  pre-existent  material 
/ 
cause  and  also  a  model  from  which  He  had  to  workt 
A  being  who  can,  by-a  word,  bring  into  existence  a 
cosmos  can  have  no  use  for  a  model  from  which  He 
must  work.  To  say  that  God  did  need  a  model  would 
be,  for  Marqah,  both  sacrilege,  because  it  would 
impugn  God's  power,  and  also  unphilosophical, 
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the  divine  word  with  which  Marqah  was  operating. 
Having  made  these  few  points  about  Marqah's 
teaching  on  the  nature  of  the  efficient  cause  of  the 
creation  I  would  like,  now,  to  turn  to  his 
teaching  on  the  final  cause  of  the  creation.  As  a 
first  step  I  will  make  some  points  about  the 
doctrines  of  Plato  and  also  of  Philo  on  this 
subject'. 
Plato's  account  of  the  final  cause  of  the  world 
is  presented  in  the  Timaeus  (29-30).  The  following, 
part  of  which  I  have  already  had  occasion  to  quote, 
is  the  crucial  passage:  "Let  us  therefore  state  tho 
reason  why  the  framer  of  this  universe  of  change 
framed  it  at  all,  He  was  good,  and  what  is  good  has 
no  particle  of  envy  in  it;  being  therefore  without 
envy  he  wished  all  things  to  be  as  like  himself  as 
possible.  This  is  as  valid  a  principle  for  the;  origin 
of  the  world  of  change  as  we  shall  discover  from  the 
t 
wisdom  of  men,  and  we  should  accept  it.  God  / 
therefore,  wishing  that  all  things  should  be  good, 
and  so  far  as'possible  nothing  be  imperfect,  and 
finding  the  visible  universe  in  a  state  not  of  rest. 
but  of  inharmonious  and  disorderly  motion,  reduced 
it  to  order  from  disorder,  as  he  judged  that  order 
was  in  every  way  better". 
This  idea  reappears  in  the  writings  of  Philo,  in 277 
terms  suggesting  the  direct  influence  of  the  Timaeus 
passage  just  quoted.  Philo  writes:  "Now  just  such 
a  power  is  that  by  which  the  universe  was  made,  one 
that  has  as  its  source  nothing  less  than  true  goodness. 
For  should  we  conceive  a  wish  to  'search  for  the 
cause,  for  the  sake  of 
it  seems  to  me  that  he 
what  indeed  one  of  the 
Father  and  Maker  of  al 
He  grudged  not  a  share 
an  existence  which  has 
which  this  whole  was  created, 
would  not  be  wrong  in  saying, 
men  of  old  did  say,  that  the 
1  is  good;  and  because  of  this 
in  His  own  excellent  nature  to 
of  itself  nothing  fair  and 
lovely,  while  it  is  capable  of  becoming  all  things"l. 
And  in  similar  vein  Philo  writes:  "...  contemplate  that 
greatest  of  houses-or  cities,  this  universe.  Ne 
dhall  see  that  its  cause  is  God,  by  whom  it  has  come 
into  being...  and  the  final  cause  of  the  building  is 
the  goodness  of  the  architect"2.  And  finally:  "...  to 
those  who  ask  what  the  origin  of  creation  is  the 
right  answer  would  be,  that  it  is  the  goodness  and 
grace  of  God,  which  He  bestowed  on  the  race  that 
stands  next  after  Him.  For  all  things  in  the  world 
and  the  world  itself  is  a  free  gift  and  act  oft 
kindness  and  grace  on  God's  part"3. 
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There  is  unfortunately  no  one  passage  where  Nargah 
states  in  detail  his  position  on  the  question  of  God's 
motive  for  creating  the  world.  But  his  position  is 
the  same  as  that  of  Plato  and  Philo,  at  least  so  far 
as  he  holds  that  the  motive  was  somehow  connected 
with  goodness.  This  is  the  implication  of  the  verse: 
"By  Thy  goodness  the  world  came  into  being" 
[Hymn  III  y.  2],  This  verse  need  not  occasion 
surprise.  For  Marqah  in  any  case  frequently  expresses 
his  belief  that  no  act  of  God  could  be  anything 
other  than  good  -  "All  Thine  acts  are  good,  0  our 
Lord,  and  Thou  art  better  than  they"  [Hymn  II  v.  ll]. 
But  Marqah  nowhere  presents  a  detailed  analysis,  as 
does  Plato,  of  the  reason  why  a  good  God  would  be 
motivated  to  create. 
Marqah  agrees  with  Plato,  more  explicitly,  in  so 
far  as  Plato  held  that  god's  creative  activity  was 
engaged  in  not  for  the  sake  of  god  but  for  the  sake 
of  the  mundus  creatus.  Margah  tells  us  that: 
"Thou  hast  brought  into  being  Thy  dominion  (T»  ýV-'  ) 
for  Thy  love's  purpose  (-T-),  n1  L75  1  =2ný,  )"  [Hymn  VII  v.  7]  ß 
What,  however,  is  His  "love's  purpose"?  He  writes: 
"At  Thy  summons  come  created  things,  at  Thy 
proclamation  worlds:  Thy  love  remembers  that  it  is 
for  Thy  servants"  [HIymn  I  v.  7].  Creation,  then,  is 
"for  Thy  servants". 
There.  can,  be  no  doubt  that  Margah  saw  the  created 279 
world  as  a  kind  of  value-hierarchy  -  "Blessed  be  the 
God'who  brought  into  existence  the  different  kinds 
of  creatures  for  the  sake  of  man"  [I  31,  II  471; 
"Israel  is  special  among  all  peoples.  God  chose  them 
and  made  them  select"  [I  46,  II  74];  "If  it  had  not 
been  for  Moses  the  world  would  not  have  been 
created"  [I  46,  II  731.  Thus,  God  created  the  world 
for  the  sake  of  man,  man  for  the  sake  of  Israel,  and 
Israel  for  the  sake  of  Moses.  Hence,  Marqah 
identifies  Moses  as  the  final  cause  of  the  creation, 
he  for  whose  sake  God  created  the  world.  Moses  is 
thus  the  focal  point  of  goodness  in  the  world.  But 
it  is  possible  for  others  to  enjoy  the  reflected 
goodness  of  Moses  and  to  the  extent  that  we  do  give 
expression  to  this  reflected  goodness  we  fulfill  our 
purposed  Margah  tells  us  what  is  required  of  us  - 
"Ascribe  majesty  to  our  God.  For  this  purpose  we 
have  come"-[Hymn  IV  v_.  6].  This  position  is  indeed  a 
far  cry  from  Plato's, 
So  far  in  this  chapter  the  primary  focus  of 
attention  has  been  on  the  causes  of  creation.  In 
this  connection  it  has  been  found  necessary  to  invoke 
the  Aristotelian  doctrine  of  the  four  varieti  s  of 
cause,  For  Margah's  account  of  the  creation  of  the 
world  involves  a  good  deal  more  than  the  ordinary 
concept  of  causation  (whatever  exactly  that  ay  be), 280 
and  perhaps  does  not  involve  that  concept  at  all.  In 
particular  we  found  it  necessary  to  invoke  the 
concepts  of  efficient  and  final  cause.  One  point  that 
emerged  was  that  though  with  respect  to  the  efficient 
cause  God  (or  perhaps  the  will  of  God)  is  the  cause  of 
the  world,  with  respect  to  the  final-cause  Moses  is 
the  cause,  since  he  it  was  for  whose  sake  God  willed 
the  world  into  existence. 
This  concentration  on  the  nature  of  the  cause 
(or  causes)  of  the  created  world,  however, 
must  not  be  allowed  to  distract  us  from  a  particular 
consideration  about  which  Marqah  was  very  insistent, 
namely,  that  one  way  to  find  out  about  the  nature  of 
a  cause  is  to  examine  its  effects.  As  we  noted  in 
Chapter  III  Marqah  espoused-a  thorough-going  version 
of  the  cosmological  argument.  The  world,  considered 
as  a  witness  to  the  divine  existence  and  the  divine 
nature,  was  to  be  regarded  as  a  holy  testament. 
As  a  postscript  to  the  discussion  of  Marqah's  J 
I, 
doctrine  of  the  cause  of  the  mundus  creatus  I  would 
i 
/i  like  to  end  this  chapter  by  noting  the  chief  features 
of  that  world  as  described  by  Nargah. 
Marqah  makes  frequent  use  of  the.  four-fold 
classification  of  the  elements,  fire,  air  (or  wind), 
earth'and  water.  These  were,  of  course,  seen  as 
systematically  interrelated,  in  so  far  as  they  are 
regarded  as  mutually  exclusive  and  jointly  exhaustive, 281 
given  that  the  classification  is.  based  on  the  pair  of 
dichotomies:  light/heavy  and  wet/dry.  Once  it  is 
granted  that  anything  must  be  both  light-or-heavy 
and  wet-or-dry,  it  follows  that  anything  must, 
basically,  belong  to  one  or  other  of  the  following 
four  classes:  light  and  dry  (=fire),  light  and 
wet  (=air),  heavy  and  dry  (=earth),  heavy  and  wet 
(=water). 
This  way  of  classifying  the  elements  provides 
grounds  for  classifying  two  pairs  of  opposites, 
namely,  fire  and  water  (for  the  first  is  light  and 
dry  while  the  second  is  neither)  and  air  and  earth 
(for  the  first  is  light  and  wet  while  the  second  is 
neither),  It  is  noteworthy  that  Nargah  often  opposes 
fire  and  water.  Thus,  for  example,  in  describing  the 
crossing  of  the  Red  Sea  Margah  tells  us  that:  "Greatness 
was  seen  in  that  place;  water  and  fire  were  combined 
This  was  a  tremendous  wonder,  far 
exceeding  anything,  that  water  and  fire  should 
appear 
there"  [I  1+0,  II  64].  His  point,  clearly,  is  that'!  fire 
and  water  cannot  combine  [literally:  "be  as  ono"]'  for 
either  the  fire  would  evaporate  the  water  or  the 
water  would  extinguish  the  fire.  He.  returns  later  to 
this  theme:  "Great  is  the  powerful  One  who  burned 
their  bodies  in  the  midst  of  the  sea  -  the  water 
did  not  extinguish  the  fire!  God_reversedthe  natural 
laws  of  the  world  (&77y,  1 
_"lj-1x 
ýjx, 
-1-r,  ) 
I  -, 282 
in  all  places  for  the  sake  of  Israel"  EI  44,  II  69]. 
:.,:  Though,  as  seems  the  case,  Marqah  accepted  the 
standard  quadripartite  division  of  the  elements,  and 
the  attendant  principles  of  classification,  his  way 
of  speaking  of  those  elements  is  unhellenic.  For  one 
of  Marqah's  characteristic  moves  is  in  the  direction 
of  the  personification  of  the  elements.  He  asserts, 
for  example,  that  at  the  Red  Sea  the  four  elements 
"recognised  them  [the  Israelites]  with  understanding, 
differentiating  between  friends  and  foes" 
[I  32,  II  49]  and  that  "The  water  at  that  time  was  set 
up  as  a  righteous  judge.  It  judged  between 
righteous  and  evil,  and  cast  the  evil  before  the 
righteous  and  killed  him  with  many  strokes" 
[I  34,  II  511.  In  a  similar  vein  Marqah  speaks  of  the 
Nile  and  its  offshoots  "prepared  to  set  forth  to  exact 
revenge"'  [I  17  9  II  24]. 
Despite  his  willingness  to  personify  the  elements, 
Margah  has  things  to  say  about-them  that  accord  well 
with  Hellenic  thought,  In  particular,  Margah's 
assertions  about  certain  of  the  elements  are 
reminiscent  of  Milesian  and  later  pre-Socratic 
speculations  concerning  the  material  cause  of  the 
universe,  the  stuff  out  of  which  things  were  formed, 
Aristotle,  our  primary  source  of  information  about 
the  philosophy  of  Thales  of  Miletus,  reports 
him 
as 
holding  that  the  principle  of  all  things  is  w  ter: 283 
"...  (for 
which  reason  he  declared  that  the  earth  rests 
on  water),  getting  the  notion  perhaps  from  seeing  that 
the  nutriment  of  all  things  is  moist,  and  that  heat 
itself  is  generated  from  the  moist  and  kept  alive  by 
it"l.  Thales'  teaching  on  the  indispensibility  of 
A,  water  for  everything  is  matched  by  Marqah.  In- 
discussing  the  Form  of  Adam  Marqah  affirms  that  it  is 
composed  of  four  elements:  "The  first  element  is 
water,  for  it  is  an  element  needed  by  everything" 
[I  87,  II  140]. 
Nevertheless,  Marqah  does  not  espouse  the  view 
that  there  is  nothing  but  water.  Almost  as  if  with 
Thales'  doctrine  in  mind,  Marqah  writes:  "The  world 
does  not  rest  on  water,  but  it  is  set  only  on  fire  and 
water,  If  it  were  on  water  only,  its  substance  would 
destroy  all  the  trees  in  it  and  also  the 
vegetation.  There  are  many  analogies  for  this.  Even 
!i  if  trees  had  in  them  any  power  to  prolong  their 
existence  -  fire  is  not  mixed  with  water  anyway  '-  its 
moisture  would  harm  all  the  trees  and  vegetation  7nd 
grass,  everything!  "  [I  132,  II  214+],  Thus  at  least 
part  of  Margah's  criticism  of  such  a  position  as 
Thales  espoused  is  that  if  everything  were  water  some 
things  that  are  not  drowned  would  have  been  drowned. 
The  other  part  of  liargah's  criticism  is  that  fire  is 
....  o 
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in  any  case  an  independent  element,  one  not 
generated  (even  in  the  manner  surmised  by  Aristotle) 
from  water.  Fire  is,  indeed,  accorded  by  Marqah  a 
central  position  in  the  matter  of  the  world:  "Fire  is 
part  and  parcel  of  all  created  things,  since  at  the 
Creation  it  was  an  element  for  everything" 
[I  87,  II  14+1],  Yet  it  is  difficult  to  avoid  the 
suspicion  that  in  Marqahts  cosmology  fire  plays  a 
bigger  role  than  that  of  a  material  cause  of  the 
world.  For  he  speaks,  in  one  place,  of  fire  as  "the 
origin  by  which  everything  is  controlled  and  made  to 
exist" 
[I  46,  II  74];  and  this  way  of  speaking 
suggests  that  fire  is  also  to  be  thought  of  as  an 
efficient  cause  of  the  world.  Among  Hellenic 
philosophers  it  was  Heraclitus  who  placed  greatest 
emphasis  on  the  role  of  fire  in  the.  cosmos,  writing  as 
he  did  of  an  ever-living  fire  which  is  both  the 
matter  of  the  universe  and  also,  in  some  sense, 
identical  with  the  ruling  god.  I  do  not  want  here  to 
enter  the  difficult  field  of  Heraclitus  exegesis.  But 
it  may  be  noted  that  there  is  good  reason  to  suppose 
that  the  ever-living  fire  is  not,  at  least  in  the 
Heraclitean  system  of  thought,  tobe  identified  with 
the  perceptible  element  fire.  The  perceptible  fire 
is,  on  the  contrary,  merely  one  of  the  many 
transformations  through  which  the  ever-living/fire 
goes.  There  iss  howeverp.  little  hint  in  the  NLmar 
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that  Marqah  operates  with  two  similarly  distinct 
conceptions  of  fire.  In  the  passage  where  he  could 
have  been-expected  to  develop  two  concepts  of  fire, 
namely,  in  the  mystical  section  concerning  the  seven 
gates  within  the  gate  of  light  [Bk  VI,  sect.  7],  Margah 
speaks  simply  of:  "The  second  gate,  the  gate  of  fire 
which  was  made  an  element  in  all  created  things". 
Thus  the  fire  that  is  considered  an  offshoot  of  the 
primordial  light  is  not  a  "primordial  fire",  but, 
rather,  the  element  fire  from  which  (along  with  the 
other  elements)  the  world  was  formed. 
_ 
In  Marqah's  account  of  the  basic  features  of  the 
created  world,  the  number  "four"  is  prominently 
placed.  For,  first,  there  are  the  four  elements 
(each 
of  which,  we  are  told,  underwent  a  four-fold 
division  at  the  creation1).  Secondly,  there  are 
four  seasons,  and,  thirdly,  four  kinds  of  living 
species,  There  are  also,  we  are  told2,  four  parts 
of  the  human  soul  -  this  last  will  be  dealt  with  in 
the  next  chapter. 
It  was  noted  in  an  earlier  chapter  that  Marqah 
accepted  the  cosmological  argument  for  the  oneness  of 
God.  This  argument  was  based  on  the  fact  of  the 
unity  or  systematicity  of  the  world.  The  first  two 
"o"o"  -ýý 
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foursomes  just  mentioned  contribute  in  an  evident  way 
to  the  systematicity  of  the  world.  For  the  order  of 
the  seasons  exhibits  a  pattern  of  change,  and  the 
elements  are  systematically  related  (since  each  is 
light-or-heavy  and  wet-or-dry).  The  four  living 
species  cannot  be  classified  quite  so  simply.  Fish, 
animals  and  birds  (three  of  the  four  living  species) 
inhabit  the  three  elements  of  water,  land  and  air, 
which  could,  at  least  at  first  sight,  seem  an 
exhaustive  list  of  possibilities.  But  man  does  not 
inhabit  fire,  he  is  a  land-based  animal.  And  hence 
the  four  kinds  of  living  'species  are  not  entirely 
distinguished  from  each  other  by  the  type  of 
environment  natural  to  them.  It  is  possible  indeed 
that  Marqah  did  not  consider  the  four  species 
of  animal  related  to  each  other  as  are  the  four 
seasons  or  the  four  elements.  In  any  case,  the 
unitariness  of  the  universe  does  not  receive  expression 
in  a  common  principle  of  classification  for  the  four 
elements  and  the  four  seasons.  Certainly  the  four 
seasons,  like  the  fo-,.  r  elements,  are  mutually 
independent  of  each  other  -  Marqah  says  this. 
[I  131,  II  213],  Their  independence  consists 
in 
no 
more  than  their  not  being  identical  with  each  ther, 
not  in  their  being  entirely  distinct.  Each  element 
shares  both  its  qualities  (light-or-heavy 
and 
wet-or-dry)  with  other  elements  -  air  and  fir 
Ie 
are 
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both  light,  earth  and  water-both  heavy,  air  and 
water  both  wet,  and  fire  and  earth  both  dry.  Also  the 
four  seasons  share  the  feature  of  standing  in  a  certain 
relation  to  the  process  of  fruition.  But  the  four 
seasons,  according  to  Aiargah's  exposition,  are,  in 
their  orderly  arrangement,  cumulative.  And  this  is  not 
a  feature  of  the  elements.  The  seasons,  we  are  told 
[I  131,  II  213],  are  characterised  successively  by  the 
processes  of  birth,  upbringing,  full  fruition,  and  the 
preparation  for  the  next  cycle. 
Nevertheless,  despite  the  difference  of  principles 
of  classification  involved  in  the  arrangement  of  the 
seasons  and  the  elements,  Marqah  finds  himself  able 
to  say  of  the  four  seasons  and  four  elements  (as  also 
of  the  periods  of  day  and  night)  that  "they  are 
evidences  testifying  of  Him  that  He  is  one  in  His 
essence"  [I  131,  II  213]. 
Marqah  did  not,  however,  hold  that  the  unitariness 
of  nature  was  unbreachable,  Pentateuchal  verses 
provided  him  with  ample  warrant  for  insisting  that 
God  has  produced  everts  running  counter  to  natural  law. 
.  Thus,  for  example,  in  the  course  of  his  exegesis  on 
the  Song  of  Moses,  Marqah  affirms:  "Great  is  the 
Powerful  One  who  burned  their  [the  Egyptians']  bodies 
in  the  midst  of  the  sea  -  water  did  not  extin  ish 
the  fire!  God  reversed  the  natural  laws  of  te  world 
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of  water  is  in  a  downward  direc-tiong  but  in  the  Red 
Sea  He  made  it  to  go  upwards  -  For  the  waters  piled  up 
(Ex.  xv  8)1'  [I  44,  II  69].  We  have  already  noted 
Margah's  interest  in  the  contrariety-of  fire  and 
water.  Here  his  point  is  that  precisely  because 
those  two  elements  are  contrary,  the  fact  that  the 
fire  continued  to  burn  in  the  water  is  a  miracle. 
Despite  the  stress  he  lays  on  the  orderliness  of 
nature  as  bearing  witness  to  the  oneness  of  God, 
Marqah  shows  no  sign  of  leaning  so  hard  on  the 
conception  of  natural  orderliness  that  his  belief  in 
A"  the  reality  of  miracles  is  set  at  risk.  In  this 
context,  it  has  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  Tiargah 
habitually  allegorised  the  Pentateuchal  accounts  of 
miracles.  For  example,  when  writing  of  the  miracle 
whereby  the  water  of  the  Red  Sea  ",,  rose  up  and  up 
from  the  bottom  to  the  top,  yet  the  waters  wonted( 
flow  is  to  move  from  the  top  to  the  bottom,  for;  water 
(normally)  descends!  "  [I  31v,  II  51],  he.  says  in 
exposition  that:  "..  The  water  of  that  time  was  set 
i 
up  as  a  righteous  judge.  It  judged  between  righteous 
and  evil,  and  cast  the  evil  before  the  righteous  and 
killed  him  with  many  strokes.  It  delivered  the 
righteous  from  the  evil,  differentiating  between  the 
two  of  them  at  the  command  of  the  great  Lord". 
However,  Marqah's  fondness  for  allegorising  the 
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rejected  the  stories!  literal  message.  His  modes-of 
expression  suggest,  on  the  contrary,  that  he  took 
the  Pentateuchal  accounts  of  miracles  as  bearing,  on 
two  levels,  the  literal  and  the  allegorinal,  a  valid 
interpretation.  The  allegorical  interpretation 
perhaps  plumbs  deeper  metaphysical  or  spiritual 
depths,  but  does  not  supersede  the  literal 
understanding  of  the  text. 
But  if  Margah  allows  that  the  miracles  did, 
literally,  occur,  why  does  this  not  make  him 
hesitate  over  his  claim  that  nature,  through  its 
unity,  bears  witness  to  the  oneness  of  God?  For 
nature  cannot  be  truly  a  unity  if  there  occur  in 
nature  events  contrary  to  natured  One  way  of  dealing 
with  this  difficulty  is  to  show  that  miracles  are  not 
wholly  at  odds  with  nature,  and  that  therefore  the 
unitariness  of  nature  is  not  shattered  by 
miraculous  occurrences.  A  number  of  philosophers, 
Maimonides  being  one,  have  taken  this  line. 
Naimonides  writes:  "Our  sages,  however,  said  very, 
/ 
strange  things  as  regards  miracles;  they  are  found  in 
Bereshit  Rabba  and  in  Midrash  Koheleth,  namely,  that 
the  miracles  are  also  to  some  extent  natural;  for 
they  say,  when  God  created  the  Universe  with  its 
present  physical  properties,  He  made  it  part  of  these 
properties,  that  they  should  produce  certain  miracles 
i 
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consisted  in  the  fact  that  God  told  him  to  declare 
when  a  certain  thing  will  take  place,  but  the  thine 
itself  was  effected  according  to  the  fixed  laws  of 
Nature"'. 
The  evidence,  however,  does  not  warrant  the 
attribution  to  Marqah  of  the  Maimonidean  position 
just  quoted.  For,  in  the  first  place,  Margah 
emphasises  the  contemporaneousness  of  Godts 
interventions  in  the  workings  of  nature,  and  he  thus 
leaves  no  need,  nor  even  room,  for  the  doctrine  that 
the  world  was  created  with  properties  ensuring  that 
the  miracles  would  certainly  take  place  as  and  when 
God  intended  they  should.  Secondly,  there  is  no 
statement  in  the  Memar  that  can,  on  any  ready 
interpretation  of  the  text,  be  taken  to  imply  the 
above  position  referred  to  in  the  Guide  for  the 
Perplexed.  In  the  one  section  of  the  Memar2 
specifically  devoted  to  a  discussion  of  the  Creation, 
Marqah  does  assert:  "There  is  no  place  outside  of  His 
control;  all  places  He  made,  fashioned,  perfected, 
set  in  order,  made  ready.  He  supplied  their  needs" 
[I  132,  II  215],  But  though  this  passage  teeters  on 
the  brink  of  the  implication  that  all  preparations 
for  the  miracles  were  established  in  the  beg'Inning 
of  the  world,  one  possibility  that  cannot  be  ruled 
1.  Guide  for  the  Perplexed  Ilk  II  sect,  29 
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out  is  precisely  that  the  miracles  were,  in  Margah's 
view,  exceptions  to  the  general  rule,  or  order,  of 
nature  that  was  itself  established  in  the  beginning. 
Even  if  Marqah  held  that  miracles  were  not 
arranged  for  at  the  time  of  the  creation,  and  that 
therefore  they  lack  such  naturalness  as  is  implied 
in  being  arranged  for  in  the  beginning,  he  could  all 
the  same  accept  that  despite  the  occurrence  of 
miracles  the  world  bears  witness,  through  its  unity, 
to  the  oneness  of  God.  For  though  Marqah  held  that 
the  unity  of  nature  has  sufficient  of  the  character 
of  unity  to  be  able  to  bear  witness  to  God's  oneness, 
he  did  not  consider  its  unity  to  be  the  same  as  the 
oneness  of  God.  In  Chapter  III  I  argued  that  Margah, 
employing  a  distinction  between  the  unity 
characteristic  of  a  plurality  of  things  held  together 
under  a  unifying  principle,  and  the  oneness  which  is 
exclusive  of  all  plurality,  ascribed  to  God  absolute 
oneness,  not  a  one-in-many  but  a  one  not  containing  a 
manifold  within  itself.  This  latter  type  of  oneness 
is  clearly  not  characteristic  of  nature.  Whatever 
else  nature  may  be  it  is  at  least  a  system,  and  a 
system  necessarily  has  systematically  related  parts. 
It  is  therefore  a  one-in-many.  It  follows  that 
even  if  the  unity  of  nature  is  to  be  considered  as  a 
reflection  of  the  oneness  of  God,  -it  can  at  l 
lest 
, 
=  from  Marqah's  point  of  view,  be  regarded  as 
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very  imperfect  reflection.  Thus,  even  if  miracles 
are  considered  as  interferences  in  the  systematic 
unfolding  of  a  unitarily  organised  nature,  they 
cannot,  according  to  Margahfs  philosophy,  be  regarded 
as  destroying  what  would  otherwise  be  a  perfect 
mirroring,  in  nature,  of  the  divine  oneness. 
If  it  be  supposed,  however,  that  harm  is  done  by 
the  occurrence  of  miracles  to  the  ability  of  nature 
to  reflect,  and  thereby  act  as  witness  to,  the  oneness 
of  God,  a  further  line,  perhaps  more  at  home  in  ä 
theodicy,  is  available  to  Marqah.  God's  concern  for 
man  is  a  recurrent  theme  in  the  Memar.  Margah's  God 
is  not  the  unapproachable  God  of  the  philosophers 
(particularly  the-,  Aristotelian  philosophers).  He  iss 
on  the  contrary,  the  God  of  the  Patriarchs  and  of 
Moses,  active  in  human  history  and  concerned  to  secure 
for  man  the  certainty,  or  at  least  the  possibility,  of 
lives  structured  by  the  principles  of  justice,  As 
nature  in  its  general,  if  not  universal,  systematicity 
bears  witness  to  the  oneness  of  God,  so  miracles  can  be 
seen  as  bearing  witness  to  His  concern  for  men. 
Considered  from  this  point  of  view,  miracles  are 
evidence  for  the  magnitude  of  God's  concern  for  men. 
For  in  performing  miracles,  God  iss  for  man's  sake, 
diminishing  the  strength  of  the  chief  witness  to  His 
oneness,  namely,  the  systematicity  of  nature.  Of 
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Margah'wished  to  accommodate  miracles  in  his 
philosophy  by  saying  that  really  they  do  not  disrupt 
nature  entirely  since  the  certainty  of  their 
occurrence  was  prepared  for  in  the  beginning,  then 
he  would  not  be  able  to  employ  to  good  effect  the 
theodical  point  I  have  just  presented.  For  the 
latter  point  relies  precisely  on  the  fact  that 
miracles  are  disruptive  of  the  natural  order. 
Thus,  the  order  of  nature,  on  the  one  hand,  and 
miracles,  on  the  other,  point  respectively  to  two 
essential  features  of  Marqah's  God,  namely,  His 
oneness  and  His  concern  for  men:  "Praised  be  the 
King,  eternal  in  his  essence,  who  sustains  all  His 
beloved  and  at  all  times  is  watchful  over  them" 
[I  45,  II  72]o 
i 
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CHAPTER  VIII 
A  SAMARITAN  DE  ANIMA 
In  this  chapter  attention  will  be  focused  on 
Atargah's  teaching  on  the  nature  of  mane  and  in 
particular  on  his  teaching  on  what  may,  loosely,  be 
termed  the  human  soul.  There  are  several  reasons 
why  this  subject  is  appropriately  considered  at 
this  stage  in  our  examination  of  Marqah's  philosophy. 
But  it  Silovlcl  be  stressed  that  'the  decision  to  place 
the  account  of  Margahts  doctrine  of  man  in  this 
position  in  the  sequence  of  chapters  can  in  no  way; 
be  attributed  to  the.  influence  of  Marqah's  own  order 
of  exposition,  Though  it  is  difficult  to  identify 
the  principles  of*arrangement  underlying  the  sequence 
of  ideas  presented  in  the  Memar,  it  seems  certain 
that  Margah's  order  of  presentation  does  not  reflect 
the  demands  of  logic.  In  this  work,  indeed,  part  of 
my  aim  is  to  offer  a  possible  conceptual  framework 
within  which  Marqah's  numerous  philosophical 
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logical  to  consider  at  this  juncture  his  statements 
on  the  nature  of  man  is  that  the  last  chapter  was 
devoted  to  a  consideration  of  the  Creation,  for 
attention  was  directed  first  to  God  as  Creator,  and  then 
to  the  world  as  mundus  creatus.  And  in  this  world 
man  was  seen  to  be  a  special  kind  of  res  create.  He 
is  9  after  all,  in  rlargah's  view,  the  final  cause  of 
the  existence  of  the  world.  Thus  a  question  that  it. 
is  here  logically  appropriate  to  raise  is:  what  kind 
of  being  is  it,  that  is  the  final  cause  of  Creation? 
For  in  order  to  appreciate  the  fittingness  of  man 
for  this  role  in  which  he  has,  according  to  Marqah, 
been  cast  by  God,  it  is  essential  to  know  at  least, 
what  man  iss  ors  perhaps  better,  what  Diargah 
understands  him  to  be. 
A  second  reason  for  dealing  with  Nargah's 
doctrine  of  man  arises  from  the  fact  that  in  the 
preceding  discussion  space  has  been  given  up  to  the 
question  of  what  we  can  claim  entitlement  to  know 
about  the  Creator-God.  And  any  answer  to  this 
, 
question  that  fails.  to  deal  with  the  question  of  the 
nature  of  man  must  remain,  from  Marqah's  point!  of 
view,  in  several  respects  incomplete.  For  fist, 
and  or  particular  importance,  Marqah,  as,  we  h  ve 
noted,  presents  as  valid  the  cosmological  argument  - 
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existence,  and  also  in  justification  of  our 
entitlement  to  make  certain  claims  about  God,  such 
as  that  He  is  one  and  that  He  is  powerful.  But 
evidence  for  these  claims  is  provided  not  only  by 
the  cosmos  considered  as  a  whole,  but  also  by 
specific  elements  within  it  -  elements  which  thus 
have  cosmic  significance  though  themselves  less  than 
cosmic,  and  which  may  therefore,  at  least  from  this 
point  of  view,  fairly  be  regarded  as  microcosmic. 
Margah  believes  that  one  such  element  is  man,  and 
particularly  what  for  the  present  I  am  loosely 
terming  man's  "soul".  Any  discussion  of  Nargah's 
doctrine  of  God  that  is  unaccompanied  by  an  account 
of  his  doctrine  of  man  must  therefore  be  considered 
incomplete.  Rather  than  ignore  Margah's  teachings 
on  man's  nature,  it  would  be  preferable  to  examine 
the  doctrines  of  God's  existence  and  nature  in 
order  to  identify  those  aspects  of  the  doctrines 
that  can  best  be  understood  only  in  the  light  of 
Marqah's  teaching  on  the  nature  of  man,  and  then 
-to  examine  the  latter  teaching  while  bearing  in  mind 
the  former,,  otherwise  incompletely  expounded,  doctrine. 
But  there  is  a  further  reason,  of  primarily 
epistemological  significance,  why  an  account  of 
Marqah's  religious  philosophy  remains  incomplete  if 
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man.  Numerous  passages  in'the  Memar  are  concerned 
with  the  question,  clearly  central  to  Margah's 
thought,  of  whether  God  is  knowable.  It  is 
evident  that  this  question  logically  demands 
discussion  of  the  nature  of  man  no  less  than  of  the 
nature  of  God.  For  the  claim  that  God  iss  or  is 
not,  knowable  is  a  claim  that  He  is  knowable  (or 
not)  by  men.  In  a  sense,  the  fact  that  God  is 
unknowable  (if  He  is)  is  as  much  a  fact  (if  it  is  a 
fact)  about.  men  as  about  God.  For  if  God  is 
unknowable  the  reason  for  this  is  traceable  back 
both  to  facts  about  God  that  place  Him  beyond  the 
bounds  of  possible  human  cognition,  and  also  to  facts 
about  the  human  soul  that  set  such  limits  on  man's 
ability  to  know  as  to  render  God  unknowable  by  us. 
A  final  reason  must,  though  very  briefly,  be  given 
here  as  to  why  it  is  appropriate,  at  this  stage  in( 
my  exposition  of  Marqah's  philosophy,  to  study  his 
doctrine  of  man,  namely,  that  I  shall,  in  the  next 
chapter,  be  examining  Margah's  moral  philosophy,  and, 
as  will  duly  be  shown,  '  it  would  be  absurd  to  attempt 
a  full  presentation  of  Nargah's  ethical  theory 
without  having  previously  prepared  the  ground  by 
considering  his  account  of  the  nature  of  those 
beings  to  whom  ethical  categories  apply. 
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be  stated  that  the  order  of-exposition  within  this 
chapter  no  more  follows  the  order  of  exposition  of 
the  Memar-than  does  the  ordering  of  my  chapter 
headings.  Margah's  assertions  about  the  nature  of 
man  are  scattered  widely  through  the  Memar,  and 
though  it  is  generally  clear  why  they  make  their 
appearance  where  they  do,  their  position  is  more 
often  due  to  non-logical  than  logical  considerations. 
Much  of  the  Memar  is  homiletical  in  character,  and 
even  though  a  homily  may  have  a  characteristic 
'drive'  and  directedness,  the  consideration  that 
determines  the  direction  in  which  it  moves  may  be 
a  rhetorical  one  that  leans  on  poetical  rather  than 
logical  inspiration.  Consequently,  though  in  the 
title  of  this  chapter  I  have  used  (and  I  hope  not 
mis-used)  the  Latin  title  of  Aristotle's  systematic 
treatise  on  the  soul,  I  do  not  thereby  wish  to  give 
the  impression  that  Margah's  account  of  the  soul  is 
presented  systematically  in  the  Memar.  While,  I 
think,  Marqah  does  have  a  system  of  what  would  now 
be  called  'mental  p'iilosophy',  his  ratio  docendi  of 
that  system  is  itself  by  no  means  systematic.;  Of 
coursep'such  a  lack  of  systematicity  in  the 
presentation  of  the  material  renders  peculiar1ly  liable 
to  inaccuracy  any  attempt  to  place  the  material  within 
a  logically  ordered  framework,  For  where  thI 299 
philosophical  ideas  are  not,  in  their  original  setting, 
displayed  in  their  various  mutual  formal 
relationships,  one  of  the  chief  aids  to  interpretation 
is  absent.  Thus,  for  example,  one  important  guide 
to  the  interpretation  of  a  philosophical  proposition 
is  the  set  of  statements  said  to  imply  or  be  implied 
by  that  proposition.  Nevertheless,  it  is,  I  think, 
possible  to  construct  an  orderly  picture  of  Nargah's 
'De  Anima',  both  by  a  consideration  of  the  likely 
meaning  of  the  iPsissima  verba  considered  in 
themselves,  and  also  by  a  consideration  of  Hellenic 
and  Hellenistic  doctrines  with  which  Margah's  verbs 
are  clearly  cognate.  A  fruitful  way  of  approaching 
Margah's  De  Anima  is  through  an  examination  of 
various  of  his  assertions  about  'life'.  I  shall, 
therefore  make  this  my  starting-point. 
Marqah,  like  the  rest  of  us,  could  see  the 
obvious.  But  he  had  a  gift  for  looking  at  the 
obvious  and  seeing  wonderful  things  in  it.  One 
obvious  thing  he  saw  was  life.  He  observed  the 
world  teeming  with  life.  Life,  we  might  say,  though 
hyperbolically,  was  everywhere.  We  must,  however, 
pause  at  this  point.  For  it  is  by  no  means  clear 
that  Marqah  would  have  considered  as  hyperbolic  the 
proposition  that  life  is  everywhere.  He  may  indeed, 300 
have  considered  it  a  plain  truth.  Evidence  that  he 
may  have  done  so  is  provided  both-by  the  general 
tenor  of  the  Memar  and  also  by  particular  statements 
in  that  work,  I  would  like  here  to  examine  this 
evidence  in  some  detail. 
Marqah  very  frequently  gives  expression  to  his 
belief  that  God  is  alive.  His  modes  of  expression 
concerning  the  life  of  God  are  richly  varied,  but 
the  underlying  belief  is  unmistakable.  Thus,  for 
example,  he  affirms:  "...  eternal  life  is  His  and 
all  life  He  drew  from  His  own" 
[I  90,  II  146], 
"Life  is  'borrowed'  from  Him  for  a  season" 
[I  132,  II  214],  and:  "Praise  to  the  King  who 
possesses  eternal  life,  from  whom  all  life  is 
borrowed"  [I  141,  II  232].  Elsewhere  God  is 
described  as:  "...  the  living  one  who  does  not  die" 
[I  8,  II  8].  Similarly,  in  his  hymns  in  the  Defter 
Marqah  presents  the  picture  of  God  as  the  living  God. 
God  is  described  as  the  "Giver  of  life  (rr'n 
[Hymn  I  v.  10].  And  in  a  resounding  phrase  in  the 
twelfth  Hymn  (v.  10)  Marqah  affirms:  "He  is  the  Lord 
of  life  (7"PT  '11"16)"* 
Margah's  affirmation  of  God  as  alive  has 
immediate  consequences  for  a  basic  dichotomy  which  he 
employs.  In  Chapter  V  it  was  argued  that  Marqah 
operates  with  a  distinction  between  God  as 301 
transcendent  and  God  as  immanent.  There  appears  to 
be  no  evidence  in  the  Memar  and  the  Defter  to  support 
the  view  that  Margah's  attribution  of  life  to  God  is 
an  attribution  to  God  only  as  transcendent.  It  seems, 
on  the  contrary,  to  be  an  attribution  to  God 
simpliciter,  If  it  is,  then  even-God  c1ia  immanent 
must  be  understood  to  be  alive.  But  from  the 
doctrine  that  God,  as  immanent  in,  and  therefore  as 
permeating  the  world,  is  alive  it  is  but  a  short 
logical  step  to  the  doctrine  that  the  world  is  alive 
and  God  is  its  life. 
There  are  several  passages  that  in  different 
degrees  support  the  attribution  to  Marqah  of  this  Ot 
latter  doctrine.  He  writes:  "I.  even  I.  am  He,  to 
whom  the  life  of  the  world  belongs" 
[I  111,  II  187].  One  possible  interpretation  of 
this  verse  is  simply  that  all  living  things  in  the 
world  belong  to  God.  But  the  verse  can  also  bear 
the  weight  of  the  interpretation  that  the  world  is 
alive  and  its  life  is  God.  There  is,  however,  in  the 
Memar  a  much  more  explicit  statement  that  should  be 
noted.  In  Book  IV  LI  112,  II  188]  Margah  asserts 
of  the  "eternal,  everlasting  One  who  exists  forever": 
Ul-  17  Jr  71  -V  MV  nth:  ki",  ￿- 
"When  He  speaks  all  the  world  listens  at  the  time. 
It  does  not  have  life  but'He"  . 
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to  ,  and  K11  refers  to  God,  the  latter  half 
of  the  passage  means:  "The  world  has  no  life  to  it 
but  He".  The  A'i  renders  implausible  any  attempt 
to  interpret  this  verse  as  meaning  that  all  living 
things  in  this  world  belong  to  God.  The  Aramaic 
passage  appears,  indeed,  to  be  a  precise  formulation 
of  the  doctrine  we  sought  to  deduce  from  Margah's 
claims  that  God  is  alive  and  is  immanent  in  the 
world. 
There  is  further  evidence  to  support  the 
attribution  to  Margah  of  this  doctrine.  I  shall, 
later  in  this  chapter,  be  discussing  Marqah's  view  of 
man  as  a  microcosm.  The  details  of  this  view  need  not 
here  detain  us,  but  it  may  be  noted  that  from  the 
two  assertions  that  man  is  alive  and  man  is  a  cosmos 
in  miniature,  it  seems  reasonable  to  draw  the 
conclusion  that  the  cosmos  itself  is  alive. 
However,  the  doctrine  which  I  have,  I  think,  fairly 
attributed  to  Margah,  namely,  that  the  world  is 
alive,  cannot  correctly  be,  judged  to  be  entirely 
unproblematic.  One  difficulty  in  particular  is  worth 
considering  at  this  stage,  namely,  that  if  the 
world  is  alive  a  problem  arises  as  to  how,  if  at  all, 
it  is  possible  to  draw  a  distinction  between  those 
things  in  the  world  that  are  alive  and  those  that  are 
not.  For  if  the  world  is  alive  it  would  seemlthat 303 
everything  must  be  alive,  in  which  case,  of  course, 
dead  matter  cannot  exist.  Yet  it'seems  obvious  that 
dead  matter  does  exist.  And,  as  was  said  above, 
Marqah,  like  the  rest  of  us,  could  see  the  obvious. 
There  is  no  passage  in  the  Memar  where  this 
problem  is  explicitly  tackled.  But  Margah  says 
enough  to  make  it  clear  that  one  or  other  of  at 
least  two  'responses  is  available  to  him.  Both 
responses'  involve,  though  perhaps  in  different  ways, 
the  view  that  'dead  matter'  is  not  really  dead. 
Margah  frequently  speaks  about  nature,  including 
what  we  would  consider  to  be  dead  matter,  as  if  it 
were  alive.  This  fact  takes  on  a  new  significance 
in  the  light  of  the  consideration  that  Marqah  appears 
to  believe  that  the  world  itself  is  alive.  For  if 
he  thinks  the  world  as  a  whole  is  alive  it  would  be 
natural  for  him  to  write  as  though  he  thought  that( 
the  parts  of  nature,  such  as  the  various  occurrences 
of  the  element  water,  are  likewise  alive.  I 
Though  Margah  writes  in  animistic  terms  about  all 
the  elements,  the  majority  of  the  passages  where  he 
attributes  life  to  the  elements  concern  water,  and 
in  particular  the  water  of  the  Nile  'and  of  the  Red 
Sea.  Some  examples,  a  few  familiar  from  the 
preceding  chapter,  should  clarify  the  point.  Marqah 
tells  us  that  after  the  waters  of'the  Nile  were 3p!  } 
turned  to  blood,  the  rivers  Gihon,  Tigris  and 
Euphrates  "were  prepared  to  set  forth  to  exact 
revenge"  (I  17,  II  24].  Speaking  of  the  successful 
crossing  of  the  Red  Sea  by  the  Israelites  and  the 
unsuccessful  attempt  by  Pharaoh,  the  Memar  asserts: 
"The  water  at  that  time  was  set  up  as  a  righteous 
judge.  It  judged  between  righteous  and  evil" 
[I  3k,  II  51].  The  Red  Sea  is  not  merely  a 
righteous  judge  but  also  an  articulate  one:  "Let  us 
hearken  to  the  sea  and  listen  as  it  conversed  with 
the  great  prophet  Moses  about  Pharaoh  who  heaped  up 
abomination  after  abomination.  'I  will  not  be  defiled 
by  him  and  his  people.  My  righteousness  will  not  be 
an  eternal  graveyard  for  them"'  [I  35v  II  54]. 
One  must,  however,  hold  lightly  such  passages  as 
the  foregoing.  The  midrashic  style  of  the  passages 
is  unmistakable.  Thus  on  much  the  most  reasonable 
interpretation  of  Marqah's  descriptions  of  the  sea 
as  acting  as  judge  and  speaking,  they  are  to  be 
understood  allegorically  or  as  homiletical  passages. 
Nargah  did,  of  course,  believe  in  miracles,  and  had 
there  been  clear  Pentateuchal  warrant  for  the 
passages  in  question  he  would  no  doubt  have  ac 
1 
cepted 
them  in  their  literal  interpretation  as  miracjes.  But 
there'is  no  clear  Pentateuchal  warrant  for  such  an 
interpretation.  And  in  the  absence  both  of 
that 
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of  any  indication  from  Narqah  that  he  wanted  to  be 
taken  literally,  we  must  accept  the  passages  as 
essentially  allegorical  in  character.  At  the  same 
time,  it  has  to  be  recognised  that  Marqah  did  accept 
N 
as  literally  true  the  bases  of  these  passages  -  even 
though  what  he  was  talking  about  was,  literally, 
miraculous.  Thus,  in  describing  the  sea  as  a 
righteous  judge  he  must  be  understood  to  be  making 
the  point  that  the  Red  Sea  was  being  used  by  God  as 
an  instrument  employed  an 
b. 
, 
demands  of  righteousness, 
the  sea  can  indeed  be  reg, 
the  life  of  God  being,  so 
natural  phenomena  for  the 
end  in  accordance  with  the 
From  this  point  of  view, 
arded  as  dead  matter,  with 
to  say,  read  into  the. 
sake  of  a  homiletical  point. 
Nargah  is,  therefore,  not  saying  that  the  Red  Sea 
was  alive.  He  is  saying  that  it  is  as  if  it  were. 
It  is  worth  noting  at  this  point  that  even  if 
Marqah  had  wanted  to  hold  that  the  Red  Sea  was  alive 
at  the  time  of  the  Exodus,  he  would  not  thereby  have 
been  committed  to  the  doctrine  that  the  Seas  alive, 
For  he  could  have  held  that  the  effect  of  God's 
intervention  in  history  at  that  time  and  place  was  to 
suffuse  with  life  what  had  previously  been  dead. 
After  the  divine  intervention  that  life  could  have 
drained  away,  having  served  its  divine  purpose, 
leaving  the  Sea  in  its  original  dead  state. 306 
This  consideration,  however,  brings  into  sharp 
focus  the  original  argument  for  the  claim  that  the 
world  is  alive,  namely,  that  the  living  God  is 
immanent  in  it.  Marqah  must  in  some  sense  reject 
this  argument  if  his  point  in  speaking  animistically 
about  the  elements  were  to  express  the  view  that  dead 
matter  can  on  occasion,  by  an  act  of  divine 
intervention,  be  vivified.  For  the  aforementioned 
argument  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  the  world  is  in 
its  entirety  alive,  not  merely  on  occasion,  but  all 
"  the  time.  Clearly,  if  the  Red  Sea  is  alive  only  when 
it  is  performing  a  miraculous  act  its  life  is  not 
due  to  the  permanent  immanence  in  it  of  the  living 
God. 
,A  plausible  approach  to  the  foregoing  position  is 
to  say  that  the  cosmos,  including  so-called  dead 
matter,  is  indeed  at  all  times  and  in  all  its  part 
is 
. 
alive  by  virtue  of  the  immanence  in  it  of  the  living 
God,  and  that  by  divine  intervention  in  the  'routine' 
unfolding  of  nature  certain  pieces  of  seemingly  dead 
it 
matter  reveal  in  a  particularly  conspicuous  way  the 
hand  of  the  living  God.  According  to  this  line  of 
thought  the  Red  Sea  during  the  parting  of  the  waves 
was  not  more  'alive'  than  the  rest  of  the  cosmos  -  it 
merely  gave  especially  conspicuous  signs  of  being 
alive. 
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some  indication  of  what  is  meant  in  this  context  by 
1alive'.  In  dealing  with  this  matter  I  come  to  the 
second  of  the  two  responses  that  I  earlier  said  were 
available  to  Marqah  as  ways  of  coping  with"the 
apparent  inconsistency  between  the  two  doctrines  'that 
the  world  is  alive  and  that  dead  matter  exists. 
The  basis  for  this  response  was  prepared  in 
Chapter  VI.  In  defence  of  Marqah  I  there  claimed, 
if  I  may  now  for  the  sake  of  convenience  quote  the 
earlier  passage:  "..  it  seems  that  Marqah  would 
argue  that  to  insist  on  a  similarity  between  God 
and  man,  on  the  grounds  that  God  has  life  and  men 
have  life,  would  be  to  succumb  to  the  misleading 
impression  given  by  the  employment  of  the  single 
term  "life"  in  respect  to  God  and  man".  Marqah's 
view,  I  argued,  was  that  the  term  "life"  is  not 
applied  univocally  to  God  and  man,  but  rather  that 
God  is  'alive'  only  in  an  analogical  sense  of  the 
term. 
The  position  I  wish  now  to  suggest  is  that  the 
same  kind  of  line  is  available  to  Margah  in 
accounting  for  the  fact  that  the  world  is,  in  some 
sense,  alive  even  though  there  is  in  it  dead  matter. 
For  let  it  be  granted  both  that  there  are  two  senses 
of  "alive"  and  also  that  the  claim  that  the  world  is 
alive  amounts  to  the  claim  that  the  living  God  is 308 
immanent  in  the  world.  It  follows  that  since  God  is 
"alive"  only  in  an  analogical  sense  of  the  term,  so 
also  must  the  world  be  "alive"  only  analogically 
speaking.  But  if  the  sense  of  "alive"  according  to 
which  the  world  is  alive  is  only  an  analogical  sense, 
it  cannot  be  the  sense  of  "alive",  according  to  which 
"alive"  is  opposed  to  the  term  "dead  as  literally 
understood.  But  dead  matter  is  dead  in  that  it  is  not 
literally  alive.  Hence  it  cannot  validly  be  argued 
that  since  "dead"  and  "alive"  are  contradictory 
teems,  "The  world  is  alive"  and  "Dead  matter  exists" 
must  be  mutually  inconsistent  statements.  In  the 
sense  of  "alive"  in  which  the  world  is  alive,  no 
doubt  dead  matter  also  is  alive.  But  the  sense,  of 
"alive"  according  to  which  dead  matter  is  alive  does 
not  clash  logically  with  the  sense  of  "dead" 
according  to  which  dead  matter  is  dead. 
If,  as  I  have  suggested,  the  position  outlined 
above  is,  indeed,  the  way  Marqah  would  have  dealt 
with  the  difficulty  of  the  existence  of  dead  matter 
in  a  live  world,  the  following  caveat  should  perhaps 
be  borne  in  mind,  namely,  that  the  doctrine  that  God 
and  the  world  are  alive  only  in  an  analogical  (sense 
of  "alive"  need  not  be  taken  to  imply  either  that  God 
and  the  world  are  not  really  alive  or  that  thIy 
possess  only  an  inferior  kind  of  life.  The  weight 
of  Aquinas'  authority  supports  this  caveat. 
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position,  stated  very  briefly,  is  as  follows:  we  use 
certain  terms,  such  as  live,  good.  and  wise,  to 
describe  both  God  and  men.  Such  terms  can  signify 
God  for  us  only  as  we  understand  Him.  But  we  can 
understand  Him  only  to  the  extent  that  created  things 
"represent"  Him  -  "intellectus  autem  poster,  cum 
cognoscat  Deum  ex  creaturis,  sic  cognoscit  ipsum, 
secundum  quod  creaturae  ipsum  repraesentant"l.  Thus, 
the  satisfactoriness  (or  otherwise)  of  our  language 
in  its  application  to  the  divine  is  determined  by 
the  satisfactoriness  (or  otherwise)  of  creaturely 
representation  of  the  divine.  And  Aquinas  asserts: 
"Sic  igitur  praedicta  nomina 
[id 
est  bonus,  sapiens, 
etc.  ]  divinam,  substantiam  significant,  imperfecte 
tarnen,  sicut  et  creaturae  imperfecte  cam 
repraesentant12.  Thus,  for  example,  when  it  is 
said  that  God  is  good,  what  is  meant  is  that  what  is 
called  "good"  in  creatures  pre-exists  in  God,  and,  as 
Aquinas  adds:  "hoc  quidem  secundum  moduin  altiorem".. 
Hence,  -for  Aquinas,  though  God  is  only  analogically 
good,  goodness  exists,  or  rather  "pre-exists"  in/Him 
not  in  an  inferior  manner  but  on  the  contrary 
J 
"secundum  modum  altiorem".  Likewise  when,  later  in 
the  same  article,  Aquinas  deals  with  the  example  of 
"life"  ascribed  to  God  and  to  creatures,  he  asserts 
""""" 
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that  life  "pre-exists"  in  God  eminentiori  modo1a  it  is 
clear  from  this  that  the  ascription  of  life,  in  an 
analogical  sense  of  the  term,  to  God  need  not  be 
taken  to  carry  the  implication  that  God  either  is 
not  really  alive,  or  is,  though  alive,  alive  only  in 
some  inferior  manner. 
Before  leaving  the  topic  of  the  apparent  clash 
between  the  metaphysical  fact  (if  it  be  a  fact)  that  the 
world  is  alive  and  the  empirical  fact  that  there  is 
dead  matter,  I  would  like  to  consider  one  further 
point.  Let  it  be  granted  that  Margah  held  both 
that  the  cosmos  is  alive  and  also  that  dead  matter 
exists.  I  have  argued  that  the  cosmos  was 
understood  by  Margah  to  be  "alive"  only  analogically 
and  that  therefore  there  is  no  possible  logical 
clash  between  the  cosmos  being  alive  and  some  matter 
being  dead.  But  it  could  be  held  that  even  if  the 
cosmos  were  literally  alive  there  still  need  be  no 
logical  clash  between  its  being  alive  and  some  matter 
being  dead.  For,  it  may  be  argued,  living  beings 
(literally  living)  may  contain  dead  matter  and  hence 
not  all  parts  of  a  living  being  must  themselves  be 
alive.  For  example,  a  live  man  may  have  a  leg  made 
entirely  out  of  steel.  He  is  alive  (literally)  but 
his  artificial  leg  is  not.  Consequently,  it  might 
be  concluded,  the  cosmos  may  be  alive  (literally) 
0090O 
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even  though  it  contains  dead  matter, 
Against  this  line  of  argument  it  must  be  stated 
that  a  living  creature  containing  dead  matter  is  an 
unsatisfactory  model  to  employ  in  trying  to 
understand  the  relation  envisaged  by  Margah  between 
the  living  immanent  God  and  the  cosmos.  The  reason 
for  this  is  that  Marqah  would  not  accept  the  concept 
of  God  as  a  Being  immanent  in  only  part  of  the  world 
as  though  He  were  excluded  from  part  of  His  own 
creation.  In  this  respect  Margah's  position  is  in 
harmony  with  Phil  o  s.  In"an  important  passage  Philo 
asserts:  "He  is  everywhere,  because  He  has  made,  His 
powers  extend  through  earth  and  water,  air  and 
heaven,  and  left  no  part  of  the  universe  without  His 
presence,  and  uniting  all  with  all  has  bound  them  fast 
with  invisible  bonds,  that  they  should  never  be 
loosed"'*  The  concept  of  a  'bond'  as  applied  to  the 
immanence  of  God  appears  in  Marqah's  writings. 
, 
He 
held  that  the  divine  name  YHWH  is  a  power,  and 
' 
indeed  ascribes  to  that  name  the  same  role  Philo 
/ 
ascribes  to  God's  powers.  Marqah  writes:  "I  will 
reveal  to  you  my  great  name  YIIJH...  It  is  a  glorious 
name  which  fills  the  whole  of  creation.  By  it  the 
world  is  bonded  together  ('Ty(ý  ,  ý)...  "  [I  139  II  17]0 
Furthermore,  in  several  passages  in  Margah's  Defter 
0000" 
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hymns  there  are  allusions  to  the  powers  of  God 
permeating  the  cosmos,  The  simplest  affirmation  of 
this  kind  is:  "Thy  divine  power  is  all-permeating,  on 
high  and  below"  [Hymn  I  v.  8],  With  regard  to  truth 
and  goodness,  both  being  powers  of  God,  Marqah  affirms: 
"Thy  truth  fills  the  world  and  Thy  goodness  even  more 
so"  [Hymn  I  v.  9].  Since  God  is,  for  Marqah, 
immanent  in  the  world  by  virtue  of  His  powers,  and 
since  His  powers  are  all-permeating,  it  follows  that 
the  life  of  God,  as  one  of  His  powers,  must  permeate 
the  entire  cosmos,  not  merely  part  of  it.  It  is  for 
this  reason  that  the  suggestion  that  a  living  being 
can  contain  dead  matter  does  not  really  have  any 
bearing  on  the  question  of  whether,  for  Marqah,  a 
living  world  can  contain  dead  matter. 
The  argument  that  a  living  immanent  God  entails  a 
living  world  seems  at  first  sight  to  lead  to  the 
unpalatable  conclusion  that  men,  in  so  far  as  they 
are  alive,  share  this  characteristic  with  everything 
whatsoever  in  the  cosmos.  It  has,  however,  now  been 
shown  that  the  sense  in  which  all  things  in  the 
cosmos  are  'alive'  is  not  the  sense  intended  when  it 
is  said  of  men  that  they  are  alive.  Otherwise  even 
corpses  would  be  literally  alive.  And  that  of  course 
is  absurd.  Thus  we  can,  at  last,  draw  the  conclusion  - 
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not  safely  to  be  taken  for  granted  at  the  theological 
level  -  that  men,  whether  or  not  they  are  unique  in 
the  cosmos  in  being  alive,  at  least  do  not  share  the 
characteristic  of  being  alive  with  all  other  things. 
Margah  does  not,  of  course,  suppose  men  to  be  the 
.  only  living  things  in  the  cosmos.  Near  the  start  of 
-ý 
Book  II  of  the  Memar  he  makes  a  brief  blessing: 
"Blessed  be  the  God  who  brought  into  existence  the 
different  kinds  of  creatures  for  the  sake  of  man" 
[I  319  II  47].  This  blessing  receives  slight 
elaboration  some  lines  later,  in  one  of  the  few 
philosophically  significant  statements  about  animals 
in  the  Memar:  "He  divided  the  various  kinds  of  living 
creatures  into  four  sorts,  the  first 
three  for  the  sake  of  the  fourth,  He  made  the  body 
of  the  last  with  its  wisdom  implanted,  so  that  the 
body  should  be  capable  of  being  illumined  by  the 
mind,  Thus  not  one(of  the  other  three)  can  withstand 
a  man".  It  is  plain  that  in  dividing  non-human 
creatures  into  three  classes  Marqah  is  following 
ihe 
Pentateuchal  division  of  animals  into  those  i/ 
belonging  by  nature  to  sea,  air  and  land  (Gen.  I  20-25). 
This  division,  referred  to  also  in  Plato's  writings 
1; 
is  an  obvious  one  to  make,  and  need  receive  no  comment 
here*  But  I  would  like  to  comment  on  the  second  point 
**090 
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in  the  passage  just  quoted,  *namely,  that  animals  were 
brought  into  existence  "for  the  sake  of  man 
(trT  a 
17 
/.  j  a)  ". 
Marqah,  though  usually  concerned  to  support  his 
doctrines  by  pointing  out  his,  Pentateuchal  warrant 
for  affirming  them,  does  not  tell  us  why  he  holds  that 
fish,  birds  and  land  animals  were  made  for  the  sake  of 
man.  But  one  reasonable  surmise  is  that  he 
considered  his  position  sanctioned  by  Gen.  1262 
"Then  God  said  'Let  us  make  man  in  our  image  and 
likeness  to  rule  the  fish  in  the  sea,,  the  birds  of 
heaven,  the  cattle,  all  wild  animals  on  earth,  and 
all  reptiles  that  crawl  upon  the  earth".  Since  God 
ordained  that  man  rule  the  animals  it  follows,  of 
course,  that  man  has  a  higher  status  than  animals 
in  the  universe.  That  Marqah  regards  man  as  having  a 
higher  status  emerges  clearly  in  an  important  passage 
where  he  portrays  Moses  addressing  Pharaoh-on  the 
subject  of  the  differences  between  Israelites  and- 
Egyptians:  "You  say  the  eating  of  flesh  is  not 
permissible,  We  wait  to  slaughter  and  sacrifice 
cattle.  You  worship  animal  forms,  but  we  sacrifice 
I 
animals  flesh  to  our  God"  [I  19,  II  27].  This 
verse  encapsulates  the  view  that  man's  status  lies 
between  that  of  animals,  whom  he  sacrifices,  and 
that  of  God,  to  whom  they  are  sacrificed.  D  ut  even 
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if  man's  status  is  higher  than  that  of  animals  it  does 
not,  from  this  alone,  follow  that  animals  exist  for 
the  sake  of  men,  that  is,  that  man  is  the  final 
cause  of  the  existence  of  animals,  Yet  to  say.  that 
animals  exist  -O-r;  se  ;1  ýýa:  m  is  to  say  precisely 
that  man  is  their  final  cause. 
One  possible  clue  to  Marqah's  grounds  for  seeing 
the  relation  between  man  and  animals  as  that  of 
final  cause  to  effect  is  provided  by  Philo  in  his 
commentary  on  the  verse  that  introduces  the  story  of 
Noah:  "He  said,  'This  race  of  men  whom  I  have  created, 
I  will  wipe  them  off  the  face  of  the  earth  -  man 
and  beast,  reptiles  and  birds""  (Gen.  VI  7).  Philo 
comments:  "...  it  makes  clearly  known  that  not 
necessarily  and  primarily  were  beasts  made  but  for  the 
sake  of  men  and  for  their  service.  And  when  these 
were  destroyed,  the  former  were  rightly  destroyed 
together  with  them,  since  there  no  longer  existed 
those  for  whose  sake  they  had  been  made"'.  Thus  there 
was  available  to  Marqah  from  the  ideas  of  Hellenistic 
Judaism,  with  which,  as  I  have  been  arguing,  he  was 
familiar,  an  interpretation  of  Scripture  providing 
warrant  for  the  claim  that  man  is  the  final  cause  of 
the  existence  of  animals. 
00000 
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The  doctrine  that  animals  exist  for  the  sake  of  man 
has,  indeed,  Aristotelian  as  well-as  Pentateuchal 
warrant.  Aristotle  writes:  "...  plants  are  created 
for  the  sake  of  animals,  and  animals  for  the  sake  of 
nmen;  the  tame  for  our  use  and  provision;  the  wild,  at 
least  the  greater  part,  for  our  provision  also,  or 
for  some  other  advantageous  purpose,  as  furnishing  us 
with  clothes,  and  the  like.  As  nature  therefore 
makes  nothing  either  imperfect  or  in  vain,  it 
necessarily  follows  that  she  has  made  all  these  things 
for  men"'. 
Before  leaving  Margah's  doctrine  of  animals 
(so 
far  as  he  can  be  said  to  have  anything  that  can 
fairly  be  described  as  a  'doctrine'  of  animals)  a 
further  point  about  the  Memar  passage 
[I  31,  II  47] 
quoted  above  deserves  attention.  Nargah  tells  us 
first  that  the  three  varieties  of 
for  the-sake  of  man,  He  does  not 
give  a  Pentateuchal  justification 
where  we  would  have  expected  such 
Marqah  makes  a  point  that  can  rea' 
animals  were  made 
then,  as  we  noted, 
for  the  claim  But 
a  justification/ 
lily  be  taken  as  a 
philosophical  justification  for  the  claim  that  man  is 
the  final  cause  of  animal-kind.  God,  we  are  told, 
made  the  body  of  man  "with  its  wisdom  implanted,  so 
that  the  body  should  be  capable  of  being  illumined 
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by  the  mind  (Z:.  t7).  Thus  not  one  (of  the  other  three) 
can  withstand  a  man".  Two  points  are  suggested  by 
this  statement,.  First,  in  so  far  as  Nargah  is  here 
giving  his  justification  of  the  claim  that  men  are 
the  final  cause  of  animal-kind,  he  is  saying  that 
the  characteristic  of  man  that  secures  for  him  this 
special  relation  with  the  animals  resides  in  the 
fact  that  his  body  was  made  with  wisdom  (-17xiDn  ) 
implanted  so  that  it  could  be  illumined  by  the  1ß.  Z7. 
The  implication  of  this  is  that  men,  but  not 
animals,  possess  -,  7yjD/7  and  LZB!  . 
Secondly,  Marqah  evidently  thought  that  what 
renders  man  the  final  cause  of  animal-kind  also  renders 
him  stronger  than  animals  -  because  of  his  11I.  Dr7 
and  '24'  animals  cannot  withstand  (7E31  p?  >e7)  him. 
Relative  to  animals  the  strength  of  man  resides  in 
his  specifically  spiritual  faculties.  These  faculties 
thus  secure  man's  survival,  at  least  so  far  as  that 
might  otherwise  be  endangered,,  by  the  animal  kingdom. 
They  also  secure  for  him,  as  we  shall  see,  a  good 
deal  more  than  this  What  this  "good  deal  more"  is 
can  in  part  be  stated  now,  ( 
1 
Man  iss  according  to  Marqah,  not  merely  that  for 
whose  sake  animals  were  created.  He  is  also 
that 
for  whose  sake  everything  was  created, 
'Marqa  has 
several  ways  of  expressing  this  doctrine.  T 
le 
following  three  illustrate  the  diversity  of  these 318 
ways. 
We  are  told  in  the  second  Book  of  the  Memar:  "If  it 
had  not  been  for  Moses  the  world  would  not  have  been 
created"  [I  46,  II  73].  Mankind,  as  instantiated  in 
Moses,  provides  the  necessary  grounds  for  the 
creation  of  all  else.  There  is,  indeed,  as  was 
suggested  in  the  last  chapter,  a  hint  in  the  Memar 
that  Marqah  supposed  there  to  be  a  hierarchy  of  final 
causes  stretching  from  animals  to  Moses.  The 
hierarchy  consists  of  man,  for  whose  sake  animals 
were  created,  Israel,  for  whose  sake  man  was  created, 
11 
and  Moses,  for  whose  sake  Israel  was  created.  The 
first  rung  in  this  hierarchy  has  already  been 
considered  here.  The  second  and  third  rungs  are 
hinted  at  in  the  Memar  where  Marqah  enumerates  "seven 
best  things"  chosen  by  God  and  set  apart  as  divine. 
One  of  these  is  Moses,  "a  special  one  who  magnifies 
every  special  thing",  and  another  is  Israel,  "special 
among  all  peoples"  [I  46,  'II  74]. 
A  second  way  in  which  Margah  expresses  man's 
special  position  in  the  universe  is  the  following: 
"This  is  a  world  made  perfect  in  every  good  thing;  all 
that  is  in  it  is  of  honour  and  appointed  (5'b.  »()  for 
YOU"  [I  133,  II  217].  Once  again  Marqah  is 
concerned  to  make  the  point  that  man  has  an  exalted 
position  in  creation.  Creation  is  indeed  for  him. 
But  Margäh,  in  a  characteristic  movep.  havingistressed 319 
man's  high  status,  promptly  strikes  a  warning  note. 
The  world  is  for  man,  but  individual  men  must  show 
themselves  worthy  of  it:  "Do  not  allow  yourself  to  be 
cut  off  from  this,  for  you  would  be  confounded  among 
all  the  creatures  of  the  world"  [I  133,  II  217]"" 
Thirdly,  Margah  declaims:  "At  Thy-summons  come 
created  things,  at  Thy  proclamation  worlds:  Thy  love 
"  remembers  that  it  is  for  Thy  servants" 
[Hymn  I  v.  71. 
Margah's  position  emerges  from  this  hymnal  verse  with 
particular  clarity.  By  virtue  of  his  role  as  final 
cause  of  all  else  in  creation,  man's  relation  to  the 
cosmos  can  be  described  by  saying  that  he  completes 
the  cosmos,  or  perfects'it.  That  is  to  say,  our 
cosmos,  as  willed  into  existence  by  God,  is  rendered 
complete  by  man's  presence.  Of  course,  if  animals 
.  suddenly  ceased  to  exist,  or  plants  did,  the  universe 
would  then  be  incomplete,  or  imperfect.  But  the  ý 
annihilation  of  man  would  create  a  special 
imperfection  in  the  universe,  since  man's 
annihilation  would  at  the  same  time  remove  the 
I 
'I  justification  for  the  existence  of  all  else.  It"must, 
however,  be  borne  in  mind  that  these  points  are 
pertinent  only  in  relation  to  the  universe  in  which 
we  live,  that  iss  as  God  actually  created  it.  Other 
doctrines  of  Marqah,  discussed  earlier,  concerning  the 
power  of  God,  and  the  fact  that  God  is  not  limited 
by  considerations  of  goodness  but  on  the  contrary 
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causes  goodness  by  His  very'act  of  will,  commit  Margah 
to  the  view  that  God  could  have  created  a  different 
kind  of  cosmos,  and  that  any  other  that  He  might  have 
created  would  also  have  been  good  -  no  less  good  than 
ours.  And  in  another  cosmos  man  might  not  have 
existed  at  all,  or  might  have  existed  only  as  a 
subordinate  member  of  a  hierarchy  of  created  things. 
-  All  I  have  been  concerned  to  argue  here  is  that  Marqah, 
taking  this  world  as  his  datum,  argued  that  man 
perfects  it. 
There  iss  of  course,  for  Marqah  a  sense  in  which 
it  is  not  man  but  God  who  perfects  the  world.  For  it 
is  by  an  act  of  divine  will  that  the  perfect  world, 
perfected  by  man's  presence  in  its  came  into  existence. 
Man  is  the  element  in  the  world  by  whose  presence  the 
world  is  perfected,  and  God  is  He  by  whose  will  man 
constitutes  the  perfecting  element  in  the  world.  God, 
so  to  say,  perfects  the  perfector.  However,  while 
this  way  of  characterising  God  has  point  as  an 
interpretation  of  Marqah's  teaching  in  the  Memar,  it 
could  mislead.  In  particular  it  might  be  seen, 
wrongly,  as  implying  the  doctrine 
god  of  the  rest  of  creation,  just 
of  man.  Margah  would  find  such  a 
It  would  imply  that  man  is  divine 
run  counter  to  the  first  principl 
that  man  is  the 
as  God  is  the  God 
doctrine  re  ellant. 
and  would  therefore 
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religious  philosophy,  namely,  that  God  is  one.  No 
matter  wherein  lies  the  perfection  of  man,  that 
perfection  necessarily  falls  short  of  God's.  For 
God's  perfection  received  expression  in  a  perfect 
world.  Man  cannot  create  a  perfect  world.  Alan  cannot, 
indeed,  according  to  the  teaching  of  the  Memar  create 
anything  that  is  perfect.  There  seems,  at  least,  no 
other  way  of  interpreting  Margahts  assertion:  "Every 
"  craftsman  in  the  world  has  a  defect  in  his  skill, 
but  the  works  of  our  Lord  are  blemishless" 
[I  97,  II  161]. 
Nevertheless,  Margah's  account  of  man's  place  in 
the  cosmos  does  carry  the  implication  that  man  is  in 
some  respect  closer  to  God  than  are  all  other 
res  creatae.  The  closeness  can  perhaps  be  measured  in 
terms  of  sovereignty.  It  would  not  be  unfair,  on  the 
basis  of  the  evidence,  to  attribute  to  Marqah  the  view 
that  man  is  sovereign  in,  and  God  is  sovereign  of' 
the  world.  But  we  should  not,  on  that  account,  be 
tempted  to  claim  that  Marqah  is  seeking  to  minimise  the 
gap  between  God  and  man.  That  he  is  not  doing  so  is 
made  evident  in  that  hymn  in  the  Defter  which  can 
most  appropriately  be  entitled  "The  Hymn  of  Divine 
Sovereignty",  namely,  the  sixth  Hymn  by  Marqah. 
There  he  refers  to  God  as  "Judger  of  kings  whom  none 
other  can  prevent"  [v.  4]ß  and  asks:  "And  what  king 322 
can  stand  before  Thee?  Thou  dost  abide  and  endure, 
but  we  are  mortal  dust"  [v.  6]. 
To  place  in  its  proper  context  this  aspect  of 
Marqah's  teaching  on  man,  it  is  necessary  to  recall 
his  doctrine  of  the  otherness  of  God.  In  Chapter  III 
the  doctrine  of  divine  otherness  was  shown  to  be  a 
logical  derivitive  of  the  concept  of  divine  oneness 
employed  by  Marqah.  I  would  like  here  to  rehearse 
certain  aspects  of  the  doctrine  of  divine  otherness 
so'far  as  that  doctrine  has  a  bearing  on  Margah's 
teaching  on  the  nature  of  man.  A  suitable  source  for 
the  rehearsal  is  the  opening  of  the  Memar.  In  that 
most  conspicuous  position  in  the  entire  work  Marqah 
presents  a  hymn  on  the  otherness  of  God.  It  will  be 
helpful,  for  the  purposes  of  exegesis,  to  quote  here 
some  lines  from  that  hymn: 
"No  secret  is  hidden  from  Him,  for  everything  is 
under  His  dominion.  I 
He  knows  what  has  been,  what  is  now,  and  what  is  yet 
to  be. 
/ 
Self-subsistent  is  He  who  has  no  need  of  anything. 
He  knows  all  secrets  without  having  recourse  to 
knowledge, 
He  is  unseen  and  He  does  what  He  wills. 
There  is  no  sovereign  or  ruler  who  can  withstand  Him. 
The  Lord  is  God  and  there  is  none  besides  Him. 
He  is  great,  but  not  in  size,  and  all  grandeur 
belongs  to  Him". 323 
We  are  told  here  how  far  short  of  God  men  fall,  even 
kings  among  men.  In  the  opening  verse  just  quoted 
Marqah  appears  to  be  grounding  his  doctrine  that  no 
secret  is  hidden  from  God  on  the  fact  that  everything 
is  under  His  dominion  (77)(g  9'/) 
.  But  is  not 
everything  under  the  dominion  of  man  also,  and 
therefore  must  we  not  conclude  that  no  secret  is 
hidden  from  man  either?  In  that  case  man  is,  in  a 
basic  respect,  like  God.  Now  Marqah  might  have 
claimed,  with  the  support  of  Gen.  I  26,28,  that  man 
has  dominion  over  the  fish,  birds  and  land  animals. 
And  from  this  it  might  seem  to  follow  that  Nargah  is 
obliged  to  hold  that  no  secrets  are  hidden  from  man. 
But  such  a  conclusion  would  be  absurd.  The  logical 
fault  leading  to  this  absurdity  lies  in  the 
assumption,  to  which  Marqah  himself  nowhere  gives 
expression,  that  if  man  has  dominion  over  the  other 
three  species  he  must  therefore  have  dominion  over 
everything.  Man  does  not,  after  all,  have  dominion 
over  man.  And  even  if  one  man  had  dominion  over  all 
other  men  it  would  !  till  not  follow  that  from  that 
man  no  secret  would  be  hidden.  Human  dominion  does 
not  bestow  such  insights.  Marqah  evidently  believes 
that  God's  dominion  over  man  is  different  in 
lind 
from  any  sort  of  dominion  that  man  may  exercise. 
Furthermore,  when  Marqah  refers  to  the-  lack  of  any ßz4 
secret  W'i  )  hidden  from  God,  this  reference  could 
encompass  the  secrets  of  nature,  which  may  be  hidden 
from  man  but  cannot  be  hidden  from  God.  Certainly, 
Marqah's  explanation,  "for  everything  is  under  His 
dominion",  would  satisfactorily  account  for  there 
being  no  secret  of  nature  hidden  from  God.  For  God 
as'the  creator  of  the  natural  order  must  know  what 
it  contains.  Here  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that 
Margah  accepted  the  cosmological  argument  for  God's 
existence.  He  saw  the  order  and  harmony  of  the 
cosmos  as  bearing  witness  to  a  divine  creator.  The 
world  bears  the  stamp  of  design.  And  the  designer 
cannot  be  supposed  to  lack  insight  into  what  He 
Himself  designed.  Here,  again,  God's  otherness  is  a 
key  concept.  Not  only  do  men  not  have  total 
dominion  over  other  men.  Men  also  lack  dominion  over 
nature.  Man's  lack  of  total  dominion  derives  from 
His  status  of  'creature',  just  as  God's  total 
dominion'derives  from  His  'creator-hood'.  Hence,  the 
verse:  "No  secret  is  hidden  from  Him,  for  everything 
is  under  His  dominion"  points  univocally  to  the 
doctrine  that  God  is  other  in'relätion  to  man: 
The  immediately  subsequent  verse  carries  forward 
this  thought.  God's  absolute  dominion,  deri  ing  from 
his  creator-hood,  gives  Him  a  view  of  the  world 
sub  specie  aeternitatis,  a  view  therefore  unrestricted 325 
by  time.  Our  past  and  future  are  present  to  God.  But 
creaturely  beings  see  sub  specie  temporis.  Our  past 
is,  after  all,  past  and  not  now  available  for  our 
inspection,  any  more  than  is  our  future. 
Nevertheless,  despite  his  insistepcethat  man  is 
other  than  God,  there  are  pressures,  deriving  from 
his  doctrine  of  divine  dominion,  that  prevent  Marqah 
allowing  no  room  for  some  relationship  between  God  and 
man.  In  particular,  Marqah  was  aware  that  in  a  world 
held  in  order,  and  indeed  held  in  existence,  by  the 
divine  will,  members  of  God's  dominions,  and  the 
dominions  themselves,  are  totally  dependent  upon  God 
for  their  existence. 
Man's  weakness  is  most  fully  expressed  in  his 
total  dependence  on  God.  Yet  man  is  not  destroyed 
by  his  own  weakness,  and  this  fact  calls  for  an 
explanation.  For  despite  the  weakness  of  man,  his 
position  in  the  cosmos  indicates,  on  the  contrary, 
great  power.  Man  is,  after  all,  as  Margah  has 
affirmed,  the  culminating  point  in  creation.  Man  is, 
in  his  own  way,  so  great  that  his  existence  justifies  the 
existence  of  all  else.  The  reason  why  man,  who  is 
so  weak,  appears  to  be  so  strong,  is  that  his  total 
dependence  on  God  is  fully  matched  by  God's  total 
dependability. 
Margah's  view,  "then,  is  that  not  only  do 
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on  God,  we  are  also  fully  entitled  to  rely  on  Godts 
being,  with  respect  to  our  survival,  dependable.  The 
basis  of  our  entitlement,  as  Marqah  saw  it,  was  an 
explicit  commitment  entered  into  by  God  in  the  course 
of  His  promise  to  the  Patriarchs.  In  reference  'to 
this  promise,  Margah  puts  the  following  words  into 
God's  mouth:  "By  my  goodness  I  established  a  covenant 
with  their  fathers,  which  I  shall  not  forget  as  long 
as  the  world  exists"  [I  6,  II  5].  The  theme  of  the 
dependability  of  God's  word  -  all  His  words,  but 
especially  His  covenant  with  the  Patriarchs  -  is 
recurrent  in  the  Memar  and,  even  more  conspicuously, 
in  Marqah's  Defter  hymns,  In  the  first  Hymn  (v.  6) 
Marqah  prays:  "Remember  those  of  the  past  and  forget 
not  those  who  are  yet  to  come:  Thy  servants  and  those 
who  love  Thee  to  whom  Thou  hast  given  Thy  personal 
" 
oath",  The  mood  reappears  twice  in  the  third  Hymn: 
"Thy  right  hand  supports  all  that  is  on  high  and 
down  below:  Thou  didst  swear  to  our  forefathers  not  to 
forsake  their  children  (1.10) 
... 
Thou  hast  proclaimed 
that  Thou  art  loving  and  this  is  a  balm  to  the 
generations. 
proclamation' 
remember  His 
an  assertion 
to  be  relied 
0  proclaimer  of  love,  fo: 
'  (v.  19).  But  these  pleas 
covenant  are  subsequently 
that  God's  word  iss  after 
upon.  This  is  the  burden 
rget  not  Thy 
to  God  to 
transformed  into 
all,  absolutely 
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affirmation:  "0  living  One,  whose  covenants  endure 
forever:  Thy  covenant  with  our  forefathers  is  a 
covenant  that  cannot  be  annulled  <L7-T-)" 
[Hymn  V  v.  19].  And  in  the  tenth  Hymn  (y.  15)  Marqah 
indicates  the  power  of  God  ensuring  the  durability  of 
the  divine  covenants:  "0  Beneficent  One,  whose 
compassion  (1-V4r1  7T)  forgets  not  Thy  covenants". 
-O/7'l  is  always  a  difficult  word  to  translate,  but 
whatever  its  precise  signification  Marqah 
unquestionably  regarded  the  "Dnl  of  God  as  a 
sufficiently  firm  base  for  the  covenant  with  the 
Patriarchs.  In  Hymn  II  v.  15  Marqah  affirms:  "Abundant 
is  Thy  goodness,  plentiful  Thy  or  j  ",  and  some  verses 
later:  "  Dny  of  all,  Thy  t  t141  is  life"  [Z.  20]. 
Diargah  reverts  to  this  theme  in  the  opening  verse  of 
the  sixth  Hymn:  "Thou  art  the  Compassionate  One 
whose  7JI7  is  without  end".  Indeed,  Margah  appears 
to  have  considered  that  the  boundlessness  of  God's 
T17ý  is  evidenced  by  cosmological  considerations,  and 
it  is  these,  rather  than  scriptural  evidence,  that  he 
mentions  in  the  Defter  Hymns:  "Everything  bears 
witness  to  Thee,  that  Thy  DWI  is  without  end" 
[Hymn  III  v.  ii]. 
It  is  evident  that  Margah's  position  regarding  the 
dependability  of  God's  promises  derives  from  his 
doctrine,  donsidered  in  an  earlier  chapter, 
In 
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power  of  God's  will.  For  God  could  not  fail  to  keep 
His  promise  unless  His  will  to  act  in  accordance  with 
the  promise  were  thwarted.  But  there  is  no  possible 
obstacle  to  the  divine  will.  Hence,  as  Marqah  affirms: 
"When  He  wills  He  does  it"  [I  14+5,  II  239].  \, 
I  have,  up  to  this  point  in  the  present  chapter, 
been  concerned  to  state,  though  only  in  broad 
outline,  Margah's  doctrine  of  the  relation  between  man 
and  the  larger  world.  In  this  exposition  emphasis 
has  been  placed  on  Margah's  view  that  man  is  the 
culminating  point  in  the  cosmos,  in  the  sense  that  he 
is  To  ou  E  VE.  r«  s  the  final  cause  of  creation.  I  wish 
now  to  begin  to  turn  towards  a  consideration  of 
Marqah's  assertions  about  the  nature  of  man  in  order 
to  piece  together  an  account  of  what  Marqah  took  to 
be  the  distinguishing  characteristics  of  the  beings 
whom  he  regarded  as  occupying  so  exalted  a  position  in 
the  cosmos. 
From  one  point  of  view  all  things  in  the  cosmos 
may,  with  respect  to  their  value,  be  regarded  as 
equal.  For,  as  Marqah  held,  everything  bears  witness 
to  the  existence'of  God,  everything,  that  is,  can  be 
regarded  as  a  holy  testament,  and,  it  may  be  argued, 
-  no  more  exalted  role  could  be  assigned  to  anything 
existing  under  the  form  of  creatureliness.  But  though, 
as  witness  to  divine  existence,  man  is  not  dstinctive, 329 
there  are  in  man  aspects  enabling  him  to  bear  witness 
in  a  distinctive  way.  His  witness  simpliciter  is  not 
distinctive,  but  its  adverbial  modification  is.  Things 
in  physical  nature,  day  and  night,  the  four  seasons 
and  the  four  elements  [I  131,  II  213]  bear  witness  to 
God.  Man,  as  a  physical  being,  bears  such  witness. 
But  Marqah  was  no  less  insistent  that  man  as  a 
spiritual  being  bears  witness  to  God.  After  discussing 
the  cosmological  significance  of  the  four  seasons 
Margah  affirms:  "...  realise  that  in  yourself  (TIT) 
there  are  important  evidences" 
[I  131,  II  214].  The 
"important  evidences  (1'/1:  ý`'  717r7b  )"  to  which  Marqah 
here  refers  are  not  in  man's  body  but  in  his  soul. 
They  are  "desire  and  idea  and  conscience  and  reason 
hidden  deep  within  you"  [I  131,  II  214].  These  four, 
which  Marqah  presents  as  paralleling  the  four  seasons 
in  their  ability  to  bear  witness  to  God,  are  to  be 
found  in  man  but  not  elsewhere  in  the  natural  order. 
Thus  man  testifies  spiritually  as  well  as  physically 
to  God,  and  to  this  extent  his  witness  iss  by  virtue 
of  its  adverbial  modification,  distinctive. 
Certainly,  when  speaking  of  the  testimony  of  the  four 
seasons  Marqah  speaks  of  them  almost  as  thoug  they 
also  have  spiritual  qualities.  Thus  he  write  :  "The 
first  of  the  seasons  is  like  a  good  mother  giving 
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because  they  are  weak" 
[I  131,  II  213].  But  there  is 
no  need  to  suppose  that  Marqah  is'not  here  employing 
a  simile.  There  is  no  evidence  from  his  writings  as 
a  whole  that  he  is  concerned  to  maintain  that  the 
seasons  havev.  so  to  say,  a  spiritual  aspect 
mirroring  the  spiritual  aspect  of  man. 
It  is  not  clear  to  what  extent  Marqah  took  the 
four  seasons  to  be  mirrored  in  the  four  inner 
elements  of  man  that  he  enumerates.  In  particular,  it 
is  unclear  from  the  text  whether  Marqah  took  the 
inner  elements  to  possess  the  same  sort  of 
systematic,  cumulative  ordering  possessed  by  the 
seasons.  But  with  regard,  if  not  to  the  seasons 
themselves,  then  at  any  rate  to  the  cosmos  as  a  whole, 
Margahts  pronouncements  are  as  clear  as  we  could 
wish.  He  evidently  did  suppose  there  to  be  a 
mirroring  relationship  between  the  cosmos  as  a  whole 
and  man's  soul,  This  is  the  burden  of  his  ' 
remarkable  assertion:  "What  is  in  the  heavens  is  in 
the  heart,  just  as  what  is  in  the  earth  is  in  the/ 
imagination.  What  is  in  the  four  quarters  is  in  the 
reason,  just  as  what  is  in`any  place  is  in  every 
inner  thought"  [I  132,  II  215].  Unless  Margah  is 
stating  that  what  is  in  the  heavens  and  the  earth  is 
identical  with  the  contents  of  the  inner  man,  he  must 
be  taken  to  be  asserting  a  correspondence  between 331 
them.  Man,  that  is  to  say,  in  a  peculiarly 
revelatory  way  mirrors  the  cosmos.  Since  Marqah 
immediately  proceeds  to  tell  us  that:  "From  His 
creations  He  is  known;  from  what  He  has  made  is  He 
comprehended"q  the  significance,  for  Marqah's 
theology,  of  his  statement  "What  is  in  the  heavens  is 
in  the  heart...  "  is  apparent.  Dian  is  not  merely 
evidence  alongside  other  evidence  for  Gods  existence, 
for  no  more  evidence  for  God's  existence  can  be  found 
from  a  consideration  of  the  entire  cosmos  than  is 
to  be  found  by  a  consideration  of  any  individual  man. 
As  a  basis  for  the  cosmological  argument,  an  individual 
man  can  act  as  a  surrogate  for  the  entire  universe. 
Regarded"as  evidence  for  God's  existence,  it  is  as  if 
any  single  man  is  the  cosmos.  In  part,  man's  exalted 
position  in  the  universe  depends  precisely  on  the  fact 
that  each  man  is  himself  a  cosmos.  Though  Marqah 
frequently  refers  to  the  cosmic  significance  of  parts 
of  physical  nature,  he  nowhere  gives  expression  to 
the  view  that  parts  of  physical  nature  are  microcosmic 
in  the  very  full  sense  in  which,  in  the  passage 
under  discussion,  he  states  that  man  is  a' 
microcosmos. 
We  must  not  here  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  in 
speaking  of  man  as  microcosmic  it  is  really  man  as  a 
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being  taken  to  have  this  quality.  For  in  the 
passage  under  discussion  the  parts  of  man  to  which 
Marqah  refers  are  the  heart  (-,  '7j.  /  ),  the  imagination 
the  reason  (s7112y'n)  and  inner  thought 
This  consideration  suggests  that" 
Marqah  would  be  willing  to  accept  the  contention  that 
man's  nature  is  essentially  dual  -  man,  Marqah  must 
surely  say,  is  a  dichotomy  of  mind  and  body. 
Evidence  of  this  dualistic  estimation  of  man  is 
widespread  through  Marqah's  writings.  For  example, 
he  writes:  "I  am  who  I  amp  creator  of  the  body  (;  1!  7'7,1  ) 
and  originator  of  the,  soul  (:  1X/i.  ])"  [I  8,  II  8], 
"Happy  the  souls  (  nýý/ýJ  )  that  pay  homage:  blessed 
the  bodies  (jhje'7,7)  that  bear  the  awe  of  Thee" 
[HYmn  I  v.  9],  "...  all  bodies  and  souls  (1T(VDJ7  1-8'U2  ) 
Thy  power  saves"  [Hymn  V  v.  11],  and:  "They  cried  out 
before  Him...  the  Fashioner  of  bodies  (11l7X,  '`pa)  and 
sustainer  of  souls  (infwc'l]  )"  [Hymn  XII  3C.  18]. 
J.  E.  H.  Thomson  has  asserted  that:  "the  Samaritans 
regard  Man  as  having  a  spiritual  as  well  as  a  material 
nature,  as  being  composed  of  Soul  and  Body"',,  If 
Thomson  is  correct  it  would  seem  to  follow  that  Margah, 
at  least  with  respect  to  his  dualistic  conception  of 
man,  is  characteristically  Samaritan  in  his  thought. 
But  Thomson's  conclusions  have  come  under  attack. 
"1 
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Professor  J.  Macdonald  has  argued  that  according  to 
the  Samaritans  man  is  not,  Pace  Thomson,  a  dichotomy, 
but  on  the  contrary:  "A  careful  study  of  material 
from  many  centuries,  from  the  fourth  to  the 
nineteenth,  reveals  beyond  all  doubt  that  the 
Samaritans  not  only  held  to  a  trichotomy  of  man,  but 
went  even  further  than  that  in  their  assessment  of 
what  makes  man  what  he  is"'.  In  justification  of 
this  thesis  Macdonald  refers  to  the  fact  that  the- 
Samaritans  speak  not  only  of  body  and  soul  but  also 
of  mind  and  spirit.  And  this  suggests  that  a 
tripartite  or  even  quadripartite  account  of  man  is 
nearer  the  mark  than  a  barpitite  account,  certainly 
than  a  bipartite  account  according  to  which  body  and 
soul  are  the  two  mutually  opposed  parts  of  man;  for, 
as  Macdonald  points  out,  Marqah  sometimes  treats  body 
and  soul  as  complementary  rather  than  as  opposed.  In 
this  connection  he  quotes  the  verse:  "Happy  the  souls 
that  pay  homage:  blessed  the  bodies  that  bear  the  awe 
of  Thee"  [Hymn  I  v.  9]. 
It  is  clear  that  the  question  of  the  number  of 
psychic  faculties  possessed  by  man  is  a  substantive 
and  important  question,  that  has  to  be  answered  in  a 
full  discussion  of  Samaritan  psychology.  But  whether 
the  disagreement  between  Thomson  and  Macdonald  is  in 
the  last  analysis  about  this  substantive  issüe,  or 
00006 
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whether  it  is  merely  a  terminological  dispute,  is 
unclear.  For  it  is  possible  that  in  the  sense  in 
which  man  might  be  said  to  be  tripartite,  viz*  by 
virtue  of  having  body,  soul  and  spirit,  Thomson 
would  accept  that  the  Samaritans  believed  man  tobe 
tripartite,  For  when  Thomson  speaks  in  dualistic 
terms  of  the  Samaritan  doctrine  of  man,  he  may 
simply  be  invoking  a  distinction  between  body  and 
non-body,  and  classifying  all  the  psychological 
faculties  under  the  heading  'non-bodyt.  Indeed, 
Thomson's  mode  of  expression  suggests  that  he  is 
doing  just  this,  since  he  speaks  of  man  having  a 
spiritual  and  a  physical  nature-,  a  soul  and  a  body, 
as  though  for  his  purpose  "spirit"  and  "soul"  are 
interchangeable  terms  in  that  both  are  being  made 
to  serve  as  referring  to  that  principle  in  man  which 
is  the  alternative  to  the  bodily  principle.  If, 
however,  Thomson  holds  that  according  to  Samaritan 
thought  there  is  no  difference  between  soul  and' 
spirit,  and  in  general  between  the  seemingly 
disparate  psychological  faculties,  then  the 
disagreement  between  Thomson  and  Macdonald  is  a 
substantive  one,  and  the  evidence,  at  least  so  far 
as  this  is  provided  by  Marqah's  writings,  does  not 
support  Thomson's  position.  I  wish  to  turn  now  to  a 
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That  Thomson  himself  may  not  have  been  fully  alive 
to  the  strength  or  even  the  existence  of  the  evidence 
is  suggested  by  the  statement  he  makes  at  the  start 
of  his  discussion  of  the  Samaritan  doctrine  of  man: 
"The  genius  of  the  Hebrew  was  but  little  analytical; 
it  was  introspective,  but  more  in  a  religious  than  in 
a  psychological  sense.  As  a  consequence,  the 
Samaritan  theologians  do  not  treat  their  readers  to 
disquisitions  on-the  constitution  and  faculties  of 
Man"'*  If-by  "disquisition"  Thomson  means  "systematic 
exposition",  then  he  is  no  doubt  correct-in  denying 
that  Samaritan  theologians  wrote  disquisitions  on  the 
constitution  and  faculties  of  man  -  though  whether 
the  true  explanation  of  this  fact  about  the 
Samaritans  is  the  one  given  by  Thomson  is  another 
matter.  It  is  not  indeed  wholly  clear  what  the 
precise  point  is  that  Thomson  is  making  about  the 
"genius  of  the  Hebrew".  For  example,  the  contrast 
being  drawn  between  introspection  in  a  'religious' 
and  in  a  'psychological'  sense  stands,  in  this 
post-William  Jamesian  age,  in  need  of  clarification. 
But  in  any  case  the  absence  of  disquisitions  seems 
besides  the  point  Thomson  appears  concerned  to  make, 
namely,  that  the  Samaritans,  for  reasons  deriving 
from  their'Hebrew  genius',  did  not  attend  much  in  an 
analytical  way  to  the  subject  of-the  constitition 336 
and  faculties  of  man.  Attention  to  the  most 
important  of  the  Samaritan  theologians,  however, 
namely,  Mi  rgah,  reveals  that  he  had  a  good  deal  to  say 
on  the  constitution  and  faculties  of  man.  And  while 
Marqah's  assertions  are  not  systematically  ordered  in 
the  style  of  a  disquisition,  he  does  deal  in  an 
analytic  way  with  the  subject. 
Early  in  the  Memar  Marqah  finds  his  own  way  of 
asserting  that  man  is  a  psychologically  complex 
being.  A  clearer  idea  of  the  meanings  of  the  terms 
he  employs  gradually  emerges  in  the  Memar,  but  the 
battery  of  psychological  terms  that  he  deploys  early 
in  Book  I  is  impressive,  Thus,  for  example,  Marqah 
represents  God  as  saying  to  Moses:  "Who  has  created 
the  body  (;  7J-7'1)  and  its  structure  (i  1`1T  b) 
,  and 
enclosed  the  spirit 
(1-1rj7'*7) 
within  it?  Who  has 
founded  the  intellect  (1  T))  with  spirit  (  7171'i)? 
Who  has  made  the  soul  (1ý,  /ý7)  along  with  the 
heart  (172'7)?  Who  has  brought  into  being  thought 
(  il`11')  with  reason  )? 
...  Is  it  not  I.  the 
Lord?  "  [I  lO,  II  12], 
Marqah's  vocabulary  of  psychological  terms  ranges, 
indeed,  wider  than  is  revealed  by  the  passage;  'just 
quoted.  The  chief  terms  employed  by  him  are: 
ýl]7Tý.  (=  117'1  =  understanding,  intelligence)!; 
1 
knowledge,  mind)  ;  T11  D  j"j  (wisdom, 
(learning) 
; 
1Z,  /-;  (thought, 
reason,  calculation);  ýx'l  (desire, 337 
inclination,  thought); 
. 
L7  (heart);  y'ri,  (mind, 
intelligence,  knowledge);  V-D7  (soul);  i17'J  / 
(idea,  imagination);  171', 
(spirit);  P7-,, 
-! 
Nr7JI 
(desire,  lust). 
The  suggested  translations  must  be  held  lightly. 
Some  of  the  terms  are  hardly  translatable.  a"  (or 
'_t  257  which  Marqah  seems  to  use  interchangeably  with 
zlý  )  is  a  conspicuous  example.  The  1ý  is  presented 
as  very  closely  related  to  the  emotions.  Thus,  for 
example,  we  read:  "He  could  not  stop  his  l  from  its 
terrible  fear...  He  said..  let  all  this  dread  be 
removed  from  your  2  7"  [I  109,  II  11];  "His  =y  was 
fullof  disquiet"  [I  159  II  20];  "The  only  distress  that 
entered  his  Z' 
jwap  for  them"  [I  57,  II  901;  "11%1'317 
were  gladdened"  [I  12,  II  15],  but  they  can  also 
quake  T-D7'"j)  [1.111,  II  187]  .* 
The  ý  therefore  is 
regarded  by  Marqah  as  able  to  undergo  emotions.  It  iss 
indeed,  as  if  a  person  lives  through  an  emotion  only 
in  so  far  as  his  =r  lives  through  it. 
This,  however,  does  not  exhaust  the  range  of  the 
functions  of  the  I  For  it  is  no  less  closely 
related  to  man's  ability  to  know.  There  are  in  the 
Memar  numerous  statements  such  as  the  following: 
"I  know  (13),  C 
_V-T7)  within  my  own  1.  ßj 
all  that  ou  say 
to  me"  [I  10,  II  12];  "From  the  beginning  [Adam]  was 
borne  by  spirit  and  from  it  wisdom  dwelt  in  hls  Zlj" 338 
[I  4+1,  II  641;  "We  fill  our  .:.  7  with  the  light  of 
knowledge"  [I  75,  II  121];  "[The 
, 
Lord],  illumined  my  ALT 
with  knowledge"  [I  96,  II  158]  ;  "..  his  Z7  was  filled 
with  knowledge  of  what  he  learnt"  [I  110-1,  II  185]; 
Joshua 
...  learnt  all  he  heard  with  3)7  full  of  wisdom" 
[I  119,  II  196];  and  lastly,  and  most  remarkably: 
"...  '  knowledge  is  a  light  that  shines  in  the  ;  any 
L7 
that  has  no  knowledge  in  it  as  its  companion  is  as  a 
blind  man  groping  in  the  dark,  for  knowledge  is  a 
ladder  set  up  from  the 
_:  Iý  to  the  divine  place" 
[I  136,  II  222]. 
Besides  treating  the  1  ias  closely  related  to  the 
emotions  and  to  knowledge,  Margah  also  links  it  with 
faith.  Thus,  for  exampl  e:  " 
..  their 
, 
1i  was  filled 
with  faith  [I  409  II  62],  "It  behoves  us 
ever  to  bow  down  before  Him  to  the  ground,  with  L.  117 
full  of  faith  (ju> 
e<'  -ý4)"  [I  45p  II  72 
1.  Also,  in 
this  group  we  may  quote  the  sentences:  "I  make  ' 
reverent  belief  in  [Moses] 
and  in  God  to  dwell  in 
their  2y"  [I  144,  II  237],  and  "0  people,  awaken  to 
this  knowledge  and  learn  it  with  believing  -27" 
1,  That  the  -q'  and  the  :  jz  ý  are  spoken  of  in  identical 
terms,  viz.  as  1];  3'?  (  'ý7iý  is  part  of  the  evidence 
for  the  view,  which  I  wish  tentatively  to  maintain, 
that  Marqah  did  not  distinguish  between  :  J'  and  2L17,, 339 
[i  145,  zz  239]. 
As  Marqah  conceives  the  matter,  a  fourth  role  played 
by  the  M.  y  is  in  its  relation  to  good  and  evil.  This 
role  defines  its  link  with  what  may  be  termed,  in  a 
broad  sense,  morality.  An  important.  statement  of 
this  aspect  of  3j  appears  in  Book  II  of  the  Memar, 
in  the  course  of  a  'conversation'  between  mind 
and  1t7:  "MIND  said  to  do  what  is  proper  for 
you;  turn  yourself  away  from  evildoing  and  keep  the 
statutes  and  you  will  not  suffer  as  a  result  of  the 
doing  of  evil  things  and  become  weak" 
[I  689  II  108-9], 
Other  references  to  this  facet  of  =ý  occur 
frequently.  Among  them  are:  "Abandon  your  wickedness 
and  drive  it  from  your  zj  j". 
[I  34+,  II  52]  ,  and  "His 
evil  a  j(;  t  o'  -j7  :  L17)  devised  evil"  [I  72,  II  115]* 
There  are,  indeed,  hints  in  the  Memar  that  Marqah 
saw  the 
.  Li  as  possessing  yet  further  aspects,  as  for 
example  when  he  attributes  to  God  the  following  words 
spoken  to  Moses:  "Receive  authority 
(l]l1  /Y/)  from/me 
and  set  it  in  your  --6" 
[1,119  II  131.  But  the  ffur 
aspects  of  the  14  so  far  referred  to,  namely,  those 
linking  it  to  the  emotions,  knowledge,  faith  and 
morality,  are  much  the  most  frequently  invoked  in  the 
Memar.. 
The  four  aspects,  though  disparate,  are  not,  in 
Margah's  eyes,  unrelated.  He  believed  that  faith  and 
i 
;. 34o 
morality  are  closely  linked,  thinking,  as  he  did,  that 
good  men,  men  of  good,  are  also  men  of  God.  Thus,  he 
refers  to:  "God,  who  implanted  secrets  in  the  -1117  of 
good  men*,,  for  the  '3.1ýof  good  men  are  bound  up 
with  their  Lord"  [I  47,  II  75].  Secret  knowledge, 
therefore,  is  in  the  'ZL7.  /  of  good  men,  and  these  men 
are  those  with  faith  in  God  -  their  2'j  is  "bound  up 
with  their  Lord". 
Furthermore,  Marqah  relates  the  emotions  of  the  x. 
17 
to  faith  in  God.  He  does  this  in  several  ways.  One 
is  in  connection  with  the  emotion  of  reverence  (  it7r1"T)  o 
He  attributes  to  Moses  the  instruction:  "Be  sincere 
towards  God  in  thanksgiving  and  say  with  17  full  of 
reverence,  'There  is  only  one  God"'  [I  99,  II  165], 
Thus  a  declaration  of  faith  -  which  comes  from  the  - 
must  be  accompanied  by  an  emotion  in  the  And  if 
the  declaration  is  sincere,  the  -: 
Lý  is  not  merely 
reverential,  but  also  happy:  "Happy  the  -ý  that  abides 
in  Him"  [I  106,  II  177]. 
Divine  authority  was  delegated  to  Moses,  who,  in 
exercising  it,  gave  effective  expression  to  his 
goodness  and  to  his  faith,  reverentially  held,  in  God. 
It  need  therefore  come  as  no  surprise  that  Marqah,  in 
portraying  God  as  delegating  His  authority  to  Moses, 
sees  God  as  requesting  Moses  to  "set  it 
in 
your  =Lý. 
In  view  of  the  link  Marqah  has  claimed  betweel 
-3.7  and 341 
goodness,  faith  and  reverence  p  that  he  should  see  the  UL7 
as  the  seat  of  Moses'  divinely  delegated  authority 
seems  inevitable. 
Following  these  introductory  remarks  concerning 
Margah's  employment  of  the  term  117,  I  would  like  now 
to  raise  the  larger  question  of  the  position  of  the 
in  his  faculty  psychology.  He  is  fairly  explicit 
about  the  relation  of  a97  to  the  faculty  of  -V'TA  ,  for 
which  the  term  "mind"  will  here  be  made  to  serve  as  an 
English  equivalent.  I  shall,  therefore,  turn  to  a 
consideration  of  his  account  of  y-TYi,  partly  in  order 
to  illumine  his  doctrine  of  :  1j-,  and  partly,  in  any 
case,  to  develop  further  our  picture  of  Margah's 
psychology. 
In  numerous  passages  Marqah  draws  together  the 
terms 
-27  and  *-  in  such  a  way  as  to  suggest  that 
he  regarded  the  corresponding  faculties  as,  on  the 
whole,  complementary  rather  than  contrary.  The 
following  may  be  cited  as  instances:  "Hear  an  answer 
that  will  strengthen  your  /T  and  magnify  your 
[I  63,  II  98];  "[Sin'  makes  the  Zý  unclean  and  defiles 
the 
, 
)/T1"  [I  720  II  116];  "They  answered  him..  with 
pure  :  Z4  and  perfect  . 1T)n  "  [I  78,  II  1271,  and 
". 
o  my  3  Li  and  ,  1Tyý  fearful  of  what  I  have  s  en" 
[I  120,  II  197].  This  note  of  complementarine  s  is 
explained,  as  we  shall  see,  by  the-fact  that,  n 342 
Marqahts  view,  and  1T)'ß  have  l  to  a  certain 
extent,  overlapping  functions. 
That  this  was  Margah's  view  emerges  in  part  from 
the  sentence;  "Let  the 
_V- 
TA  understand  that  statement 
and  hear  it  in  great  faith  and 
reverence"  [I  70,  II  112].  This  link  between  )ITYi  and 
faith,  which  establishes  an  overlap  in  function 
between  y  T)a  and  :Lj,  is  underlined  by  Marqah's 
references  to  an  association  between  a  certain  state 
of  .  1TXX  and  faithlessness,  understood  as  rebellion 
against  God.  Marqah  does  indeed  speak  as  though  he 
thought  that  when  a  man  rebels  against  God  it  is  the 
mants  -NI? 
Ya  that  is  the  true  author  of  the  rebellion: 
". 
o  woe  to  the  J  74  that  has  turned  away  from  the 
True  One  and  manifested  provocation  with  all  its 
might"  [I  47,  II  76].  Subsequently,  the  culprit  in 
the  rebellion  is  more  simply  identified:  "..  his  976 
turns  to  an  alien  God"  [I  94,  II  154]. 
-V-r6  further  shares  with 
ya 
close  association 
with  knowledge.  Thus  we  find  Margah  writing:  "It 
magnifies  the  yTY,  which  is  furnished  with  knowledge 
from  Him  and  filled  with  His  spirit  -  all  of  it 
wisdom,  If  you  seek  knowledge  of  the  secrets  of 
these  things,  set  your  -1T%  where  the  True  One  is" 
[I  63,11  99];  or,  this  time  in  a  despairing  tone: 
"Woe  to  us  l  We  do  not  have  the  al't')  to  know1  what  the 
Lord  seeks  of  us"  [I  67,  II  107]. 343  11 
It  must  be  noted,  however,  that  Margah  conceived 
the  yT  tI6  as  having  for  its  object  not  only  religious 
but  also  what  we  would  consider  to  be  specifically 
secular,  knowledge  -  though  of  course  we  could  hardly 
expect  Marqah  to  follow  us  far  in  this  distinction. 
The  secular  aspect  of  sr-ri,  is  invoked  near  the  start 
of  Book  VI  of  the  Memar  where  Nargah  suddenly  embarks  on 
an  exposition  of  terrestial  physics.  He  affirms:  "By 
mighty  power  He  ordered  your  y  Tn  to  investigate 
wisdom;  The  wisdom  in  question  is  immediately 
supplied:  "The  world  does  not  rest  on  water,  but  it  is 
set  only  on  fire  and  water.  If  it  were  on  water  only, 
its  substance  would  destroy  all  the  trees  in  it  and  also 
the  vegetation"  [I  132,  II  2141.  This  passage  is 
important  for  the  study  of  Marqah's  psychology 
(as  it 
is  also  for  the  study  of  his  physics),  for  it  marks 
what  appears  to  be  a  significant  distinction  between  =L'7 
and  y-TL)L.  Wherever  in  the  Memar  Marqah  speaks  of  '::  i7  as 
a  faculty  of  knowledge,  the  kind  of  knowledge 
explicitly  referred  to  is  invariably  of  what  may  b© 
termed  a  religious  or  a  moral  nature,  never  scientific. 
Knowledge  of  the  natural  order  of  things  is  referred 
not  to  the 
-=. 
Lj  but  to  the  y'Ti,. 
In  his  references  to  the  relation  between  Z/-  r4  and 
morality,  however,  Marqah  shows  that  he  took  there  to 
be  a  close  connection  between  ZL  L7  and  have 
already  referred  to  the  passage  where  Marqah  affirms: 344 
"[Sin]  makes  the  (7 
unclean  and-  defiles  the  y'TX1". 
But  Marqah  s.  aw  the  defiled  N/T..  'as  more  than  merely 
the  outcome  or  causal  effect  of  sin.  For  the  ]/TZ  was 
conceived  as  being  capable  of  being  responsible  for  sin. 
This  at  least  seems  the  implication  of  the  sentence: 
"A  man  who  hastens  to  do  evil,  if  he  was  in  his 
right  will  receive  the  Curse"  [I  72t  II  116]. 
Marqah  is  here  distinguishing  implicitly  between  the 
internal  and  the  external  aspects  of  action.  An  action 
. 
is  internally  evil  if  it  not  merely  contradicts  the 
will  of  God  but,  further,  is  known  by  the  agent  to 
do  so.  The  state  of  the  agent's  )1T;  n,  at  the  time  of  the 
action  is  responsible  for  the  action's  being,  in  its 
internal  aspect,  and  hence  truly,  sinful,  This  topic 
will  be  dealt  with  at  some'length  in  the  following 
chapter;  but  here  it  should  at  least  be  noted  that  the 
idea  of  an  action,  by  virtue  of  the  agent's  /  TYP,, 
1 
being  sinful  in  its  internal  aspect,  suggests  that 
Margah  held  that  the  yT.  6  can  be  viewed  as  the 
location  of  sin.  And  indeed,  no  doubt  with  theitenth 
1 
commandment  in  mind,  Marqah  does  make  it  clear  that  he 
sees  this  as  one  aspect  of  the  y-i'z,.  Thus  Marqah 
writes:  "Their  souls  are  blemished  because  they  did 
not  wholeheartedly  follow  the  Lord.  Their  jj'yTi.  I 
will  be  smitten  for'  they  committed  adultery  in  them" 
ýI  109,  II  183].  According  to  this  passage  the  x/T' 345 
is.  punished  because  the  ill.  sinned.  The  idea  of  the 
1T)  as  a  fitting  object  of  punishment  recurs  in  the 
Memar,  as  when  we  read:  "The  vengeance  of  the  world 
will  destroy  T  t')1-i'W"  [I  107,  II  1781, 
This  suggests 
a  further  distinction  between  the  yTX>  and  the  3.  ßj" 
For  nowhere  in  the  Memar  is  the  cl., 
ý7 
spoken  of  as  a 
fitting  object  of  punishment. 
So  far  two  distinctions  between  ß1I  and  ]1TZ  have 
emerged.  Though  these  distinctions  are  of  such  a 
nature  as  to-enable  us  to  drive  a  logical  wedge 
between  the  concepts  of  ..  y 
and  y  TY,  N  ,  the  distinctions 
are  nevertheless  not  large.  It  appears  to  follow 
that  the  list  of  differences  between  the  two  faculties 
has  not  been  exhausted.  For  in  the  one  place  whore 
Marqah  seeks  to  differentiate  the  faculties  on  a  scale 
of  significance,  he  suggests  a  difference  in.  importance 
between  the  two  faculties  that  goes  far  beyond  what) 
we  would  have  expected,  given  only  the  considerations 
that  have  so  far  been  mentioned.  The  passage  in' 
question  must  first  be  quoted  in  full.  It  occurs  in 
i 
the  course  of  an  allegorical  duologue,  which  we  have 
already  encountered,  between 
-=117 
and  At  one 
point  =L7  says  to  y--y,,,  :  "0  y  7),  ,  we  receive  succour 
from  you  and  you  are  the  fountain  from  which  we  drink 
and  from  which  we  prepare  a  lamp  with  pure  oil,  so  that 
your  light  dispels  all  deep  darkness,  for  you  are 346 
before  body,  soul  and  spirit.  Concerning  you  it  is 
said  with  our  minds,  and  our  strength,  'You  are  the 
first  of  created  things.  Who  can  compare  with  you?  '.  ' 
Thanks  be  to  the  Powerful  One  who  gave  you  such  status 
and  has  made  you  worthy  of  all  glory!  Do  not  chasten 
me  until  you  chasten  yourself.  Without  you  and  within 
you  I  exist,  and  I  and  the  Five  [senses] 
are  dependent 
on-you.  Whenever  you  appear,  we  depart"  [I  68,  II  109]. 
This  important  passage  suggests  that  there  exists  an 
order  of  precedence  among  the  various  parts  of  man, 
and  in  particular  that  y  TYa  precedes  body,  soul, 
spirit  and 
17,  ýl  Tyj  must  in  some  respect  have 
precedence  for  it  is  "the  first  of  created  things". 
But  the  priority  thereby  claimed  for  it  need  not  be 
thought  of  as  merely,  or  at  all,  a  temporal  priority. 
It  seems,  rather,  to  be  a  priority  in  importance. 
It  is  from  yT>  that  the  others  receive  succour,, 
I. 
it  is  y"  )X  that  is  the  "fountain  from  which  we 
drink". 
One  aspect,  of  _ITvA  thus  far  not  touched  upon  !  is 
invoked  in  Book  V  of  the  Memar.  In  the  course  of 
that  Book,  which  deals  with  the  death  of  Moses,  ' 
an 
address  by  Moses  to  the  Israelites  is  reported.  In  it 
Moses  affirms:  "0  congregation,  happy  are  you  if  you 
hearken  to  all  this  address  that  I  make  before  you! 
Three  times  my  Lord  said  to  me,  'Go  up  to  it',  and'I 347 
went  up  with  the  YTS-of  prophethood  (-j7Jl'T"=]  ý/'r.  a) 
on  the  (firs.  t)  two  occasions.  I  delivered  the  first 
and  second  tablets  and  on  this  (third)  occasion  I 
receive  the  portion  that  He  presented  me  through  Adam" 
[I  120,  II  198],  Neither  the  phrase  fll71  ',  2  I  217  nor 
an  equivalent  expression  occurs  in  the  Memar,  and  in 
the  absence  of  such  an  expression  the  phrase 
flfl1'].  7  y-7'ß  takes  on  an  added  significance.  For  it 
,  indicates  a  possible  line  of  demarcation  between  Z 
and  J'Tn  ."  What  the  phrase  suggests  is  that  the 
N  Te',  A  of  man,  rather  than  his  -1ý0  has  the  potential 
of  functioning  as  the  organ  of  prophetic  insight. 
That  this  potential  is  actualised  rarely,  or  perhaps 
was  actualised  only  in  Moses,  would  not  alter  the 
fact,  if-it  be  a  fact,  that  the  organ  of  prophethood 
is  the 
However,  this  suggested  basis  for  a  distinction  I 
between  :Zj  and  y'r)i  is  offered  with  hesitation. 
Two  considerations  prompt  the  hesitation.  The 
first 
is  that  at  best  the  suggestion  rests  on  an  arpumentum 
a  silentio,  the  silence  being  due  to  the  absence  from 
the  Memar  of  a  phrase  similar  in  significance  to 
=L7 
"  It  is,  of  course,  possible  that  its 
absence  is  not  due  to  any  metaphysical  or  theological 
difficulty  Margah  might  have  seen  in  its  meaning.  The 
phrase  may  have  made  good  sense  to-him,  even  though  he 
happened  not  to  use  it. 348 
Secondly,  and  perhaps  more  substantially,  Nargah  is 
not  entirely  unequivocal  in  his  account  of  the  number 
of  the  prophets.  He  isq  however,  strongly  influenced 
by  the  verse:  "There  has  never  yet  risen  in  Israel  a 
prophet  like  Moses"  [Deut.  XXXIV  10].  Margah  adds: 
"..  like  him,  and  never  will  arise" 
[I  145,  II  240]. 
Thus  Marqah  conceived  of  Moses'  prophethood  as  unique 
in  the  whole  of  mankind,  and  not  simply  unique  up  to 
his  generation.  He  did,  however,  speak  of  others  as 
prophets.  For  example,  he  writes:  "[Moses']  prophethood 
is  like  the  surrounding  sea,  for  from  it  seventy 
prophets  prophesied  without  any  diminishing  of  it" 
[I  51,  II  82].  But  where  Margah  speaks  of  men  other 
than  Moses  as  "prophets"  he  appears  to  have  in  mind  those 
who  act  as-spokesmen  for  r1oses.  The  uniqueness  of 
Moses  lay  in  the  fact  that  his  insight  into  the  will 
of  God  was  direct,  Such  insight  was,  for  Marqah,  of 
a  kind  from  which  all  other  men  are  necessarily  barred. 
Now,  if  Moses'  prophetic  insight  is  attained  by  t 
exercise  of  his  ,  /Tyl,  and  if  such  exercise  is 
impossible  for  the  rest  of  mankind,  and  if  the 
impossibility  of  performing  a  given  kind  of  exercise 
s' 
entails  the  lack  of  potential  for  performing  its  it 
follows  that,  with  the  exception  of  Moses,  the 
. 
IT) 
of  all  men  is  not  even  potentially  the  organ  of 
prophetic  insight.  And  to  say  otherwise  is  to,  miss 
1i 349 
the  point  of  the  uniqueness  of  the  prophethood  of 
Moses.  But  if  the  y'i'n  of  all  men,  save  Moses, 
cannot  serve  to  give  prophetic  insight,  it  cannot  be 
correct  to  distinguish  between  =LI7  and  W74  by 
saying  that  V7X,  can  give  such  insight. 
Against  this  line  of  argument  it  could  be 
maintained  that  JTYA  is  required  for  an  act  of 
prophecy  even  where  the  prophecy  is  of  the 
non-Mosaic  kind,  where,  that  is,  it  involves  acting 
as  an  indirect  rather  than  as  a  direct  spokesman  of 
God,  But  unfortunately  it  seems  impossible  either  to 
defend  or  to  attack  this  position  by  reference  to 
Margah's'own  words. 
This  discussion  concerning  the  distinction  between 
37  and  -l'?  it  must,  therefore,  be  left  on  an 
imperfect  cadence  rather  than  a  full  close.  I  hope 
at  least  to  have  indicated  some  of  the  obstacles  to  a 
satisfactory  resolution. 
In  Marqah's  large  battery  of  terms  relating  to  what 
we  would  now  describe  as  faculty  psychology,  four 
terms  are  rendered  conspicuous  in  the  Memar  by  the 
frequency  of  their  employment.  The  four  are 
yTX  W-':  >]  and  f71y  .  Having  dealt  with  the  first 
two  of  these,  I  shall  turn  now  to  a  consideration  of 
DI  and  t1j 
,  and  shall  ask  what  Marqah  understands 
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We  could  say,  and  perhaps  at  the  start  ought  to  say, 
that  by  VDI  he  means  "soul"  and  by  n1`)  "spirit". 
However,  this  move,  which  clearly  involves  little,  if 
anything,  beyond  the  replacement  of  a  set  of  Hebrew 
counters  by  a  supposedly  equivalent  set  of  English 
ones,  leaves  untouched  the  substantial  question  of 
the  identification  of  the  rules  governing  the 
employment  of  the  counters.  What,  in  other  wordsq.  do 
ýt/')  and  n1')  mean,  ors  rather,  what  did  they  mean  to 
Marqah? 
There  appears  to  be  no  logical  advantage  to  be 
gained  from  considering  either  of  the  problematic 
terms  before  the  other,  for  although  Marqah  does  link 
the  terms,  in  ways  to  be  dealt  with  later,  and 
although  a  prior  understanding  of  either  term  will 
shed  some  light  on  the  other,  neither  is  better  than 
the  other  at  illuminating  the  other.  Therefore  : 
without  defending  the  order  of  exposition,  beyond 
making  the  trivial  point  that  an  exposition  must  begin 
somewhere,  I  shall  start  by  considering  Margah's  use  of 
the  term  Y/Dj, 
Earlier  in  this  chapter  we  raised  the  question  of 
whether  Marqah  saw  man  as  a  dichotomy.  In  connection 
with  this  question  attention  was  paid  to  J.  E.  ii.  Thomson's 
point  that  the  Samaritans  took  men  to  be  comp  sed  of 
body  and  soul;  from  which,  of  course,  it  is  short 351 
step  to  saying  that  man  has  a  dual  nature.  Though  I 
expressed  reservations  concerning  Thomson's  position, 
it  is  apposite  here  to  point  out  that  Marqah 
frequently  couples  the  concepts  of  body  and  soul,  and 
that  where  he  draws  an  explicit  comparison  between 
body  and  a  psychological  faculty,  the  faculty  is 
always  the  soul.  For  example,  he  writes:  "I  am  who 
I  am,  creator  of  the  body  and.  originator  of  the  soul" 
[I  8,  II  8],  "...  according  to  the  state  of  the  soul  is 
the  body  disposed"  [I  319  II  471ß  "Happy  the  souls  that 
pay  homage:  blessed  the  bodies  that  bear  the  awe  of 
Thee"  [Hymn  I  v.  9]  and  "...  the  Fashioner  of  bodies  and 
Sustainer  of  souls"  [Hymn  XII  v.  18].  These  passages 
indicate  that  Nargah  did  indeed  hold  that  man  is 
composed  of  two  aspects,  one  encompassing  man  as  a 
physical  being,  as  a  body,  and  the  other  encompassing 
man  as  a  spiritual  being,  as  a  soul.  If  this  is 
correct  then  it  is  plausible  to  argue  that  Margah 
employs  the  term  .v  Dj  to  refer,  not  to  one 
psychological  faculty  among  others,  but  rather  to  the 
general  psychological  aspect  of  man,  which  can  then 
be  considered  as  itself  classifiable  under  a  number  of 
different  headings,  these  headings  being  the  various 
psychological  faculties.  This  sense  of  ,  ':  D3  is 
what  I  shall  term  its  'generic'  sense. 
But  there  is  ample  evidence  that  Marqah  tolk  WD) 352 
to  have  not  only  a  generic  but  also  a  'specific'  sense. 
That  is,  he  'understood  wl>).  to  refer  both  to  the 
genus  of  which  the  various  psychological  faculties  are 
species,  in  which  sense  WL)  is  seen  as  a  natural 
alternative  to  "body",  and  also  to  a  specific 
psychological  faculty.  Thus  the  statement  "The 
human  s'!  )j  includes  a  /.  D]",  though  perhaps 
paradoxical,  is  not,  on  Marqah's  understanding  of  '«D3, 
self-contradictory. 
The  evidence  for  the  claim  that  Marqah  accepted  the 
existence  of  a  specific,  rather  than  a  generic  sense 
of  'Dj  is  provided  by  the  particular  way  in  which 
he  deploys  the  term  in  the  course  of  referring  to 
other  psychological  faculties.  A  few  examples  should 
suffice  to  make  the  point:  "Who  has  made  the  soul  along 
with  the  heart  (a,  ) 
... 
Is  it  not  I  the  Lord?  " 
[I  10,  II  12],  "Bodies  were  in  torment,  souls  iniagony, 
hearts  in  anguish"  [I  17,  II  25],  "You  [sic,  yT  ]  are 
before  body,  soul  and  spirit" 
[I  68,  II  109],  / 
"...  [Moses] 
proclaimed  aloud  with  heart  and  soul  filled 
with  fear"  [I  96,11158]. 
It  is  not  always  clear  from  the  context  whether  the 
term  WDR  is  being  employed  in  its  generic  or  its 
specific  sense.  One  principle,  which  would  lead  to  a 
simplification  of  the  situation  if  it  could  be 
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generically  wherever  it,  conjoined  with  no  other  term 
referring  to  a  psychological  faculty,  is  placed  in 
opposition  to  "body".  This  principle 
prove.  If,  however,  it  were  valid  it 
that  WDR  is  being  used  generically 
important  passage:  '  "He  gave  a  perfect 
servants  to  provide  life  and  length  o 
observing  of  it  is  the  soul  disposed, 
is  difficult  to 
would  follow 
in  the  following 
Law  to  His 
f  days  p  for  by  the 
and  according  to 
the  state  of  the  soul  is  the  body  disposed.  As  the 
stature  of  a  man  lies  with  the  soul,  so  the  stature 
of  the  soul  lies  in  the  Law"  [I  31,  II  47].  The 
importance  of  this  passage  lies  in  its  expressing 
Marqah's  view  that  whether  or  not  there  is  point  to 
speaking  of  the  soul  and  body  as  alternative  and 
opposing  principles  in'the  human  being,  there  is 
certainly  point  to  speaking  of  the  dependence  of  one 
of  these  principles  upon  the  other.  For  here  the  body 
is  being  said  to  depend  for  its  well-being  upon  the 
soul.  Thus  Marqah  holds  that  the  soul,  possibly  the 
generic  soul,  is  a  link  between  the  Law  of  God  and  the 
human  body.  The  model  with  which  Marqah  appears  to  be 
working  is  of  a  soul  that  obeys  the  Law  of  God,  and  of 
a  body  that  gives  expression  to  the  norms  (the  Laws) 
structuring  the  soul.  That  the  soul  causes  the  body 
to  be  disposed  according  to  the  Law,  rather  thrn  the 
body  causing  the  soul  to  be  thus  disposed,  gives  the 
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soul  a  position  of  higher  importance  than  the  body 
In  determining  the  worth  of  a  man;  though  a  man  is 
composite  of  body  and  soul,  "the  stature  of  a  man  lies 
with  the  soul". 
The  relation  between  WD)  and  the  Law  is  touched.  on 
occasionally  in  the  Memar  though  it  is  unfortunately 
not  always  possible  to  establish  whether,  in  the 
relevant  contexts,  y/  D]  is  to  be  understood 
generically  or  specifically.  Thus,  for  example,  Marqah 
affirms:  "It  is  our  duty  .  to  hasten  to  acquire  wisdom 
and  fill  our  souls  with  what  the  True  One  taught  us" 
[I  55ý  II  88]. 
But,  as  was  mentioned  earlier,  it  is  sometimes  clear 
that  the  specific  soul  is  in  question.  And  this 
enables  us  to  say  something  about  what  Margah  took  to 
0 
characterise  the  specific  soul.  He  thought  that  it 
can  have  feelings:  "souls  [were]  in  agony,  hearts  in 
anguish"  [I  17,  II  25].  Elsewhere,  and  with  obvious 
scriptural  warrant,  to  the  specific  soul  is  attributed 
the  power  of  love:  "Their  souls  are  pure  for  they 
loved  their  Lord  with  soul  and  heart  and  strength" 
[1,1099  II  183].  It  seems,  indeed,  that  in  the  verse 
just  quoted,  each  type  of  soul  is  referred  to  in  turn; 
the  soul  that  is  pure  is  generic,  and-the  soul  that 
loves  is  specific. 
A  further  passage  has  yet  to  be  mentioned  here  Marqah 355 
refers  to  what  is  clearly  the  soul,  specifically 
understood.  In  a  speech  to  Pharaoh,  Moses  and  Aaron 
contrasted  the  beliefs  of  the  Israelites  with  those  of 
the  Egyptians.  In  the  course  of  it  they  say:  "You  say 
that  spirits  are  shared  among  the  dead  and  the  living, 
but  we  speak  of  soul  and  spirit,  referring  the  soul  to 
the  body  and  the  spirit  to  the  living.  The  governing 
of  living  human  beings  is  by  both  soul  and  spirit;  the 
governing  of  the  dead  is  sufficiently  done  by"soul" 
[I  18,  II  26-7].  Given  the  context,  it  is  evident 
that  there  are  here  important  issues  at  stake.  But  it 
is  hard  to  state  what  those  issues  are.  Marqah  provides 
us  with  too  few  clues.  Professor  J.  Macdonald,  in 
his  discussion  of  this  Memar  passage,  suggests  that: 
"This  may  reflect  the  older  Old  Testament  view  of  a 
vague  formless  existence  after  death"'.  He  adds: 
"By  'spirit'  [Marqah] 
apparently  means  the  'breath 
of 
life'  of  the  Pentateuch  (e.  g.  Gen.  VI  17)"-  But'  it  is 
hard  to  see  how  one  can  go  much  beyond  these 
conjectures.  It  can,  howevers  be  noted  that  the 
passage  under  consideration  is  consistent  with  at 
least  most  other  Memar  passages  with  which  it  comes  in 
logical  contact.  For  instance,  in  reference  to  the 
tenth  plague,  Marqah  asserts:  "..  the  Destroyer 
swallowed  up  the  spirits  of  their  first  born" 
[I  27,  II  43].  That  iss  those  who-died  did  so  with  the 
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loss  of  their  spirits  -  their  bodies  would  have 
continued  to  be  governed  by  their  souls.  But  such 
internal  consistency  does  not  shed  a  great  deal  of 
light  on  the  obscure  passage  at  issue. 
Neither  is  help  forthcoming  from  an  examination  of 
Margah's  use  of  the  term  "spirit".  Spirit  is  spoken 
of  with  reference  to  several  kinds  of  attribute. 
Feelings  and  emotions  figure  prominently.  We  find 
such  phrases  as:  "My  spirit  despairs"  [I  16,  II  21], 
"My  spirit  is  not  at  ease"  [I  16,  II  22],  "..  my  spirit 
would  not  rest  from  turmoil"  [I  16,  II  23],  "Their 
bodies  died  while  their  spirits  suffered" 
[I  19,  II  27]. 
"Spirit"  also  has  a  cognitive  aspect,  as  is 
evidenced  by  such  sentences  as:  "0  may  your  spirit 
know  that  the  fences  of  your  garden  which 
you  planted  are  broken  down"  [I  119,  II  197],  and 
"When  the  heart  of  Jacob  was  full  of  the  spirit  of 
I 
wisdom,  all  good  was  brought  about  for  him,  for  the 
" 
wisdom  that  was  in  it  was  true  wisdom" 
[I  136,  II  222]. 
If  the  spirit  is  essentially  related  to  feelings, 
/ 
emotions  and  cognitions,  and  if  the  dead  could 
experience  or  engage  in  none  of  these,  then,  of  course, 
it  would  make  no  sense  to  speak  of  the  dead  as; 
governed  by  spirit.  Marqah's  position  on  this  matter 
would  be  consistent.  But  we  are  left  with  the, 
question  of  what  the  soul  does  that  validates  Nargah's 357 
assertion  that  the  dead  are  sufficiently  governed  by 
soul.  In  the  absence  of-what  I  can  recognise  as  clues 
in  the  Nemar  I  am  unable  to  answer  that  question. 
One  puzzling  aspect  of  Marqah's  teaching  concerns 
his  references  to  the  soul  as 
start  of  Book  VI  he  refers  to 
certain  terrestial  phenomena 
divine,  and  then  affirms  that 
"important  evidences".  Since 
evidences  are"four  divisions" 
the  four  seasons  and  the  four 
witness  to  God.  At  the 
the  heavenly  bodies  and 
as  witnesses  to  the 
in  ourselves  there  are 
he  tells  us  that  these 
in  us,  corresponding  to 
elements,  we  would 
expect  him  to  enumerate  the  four  elements  of  the  soul 
to  which  he  had  hitherto  most  frequently  referred  and 
had,  seemingly,  attached  most  importance,  namely, 
:1 
ýi 
v  yTYý  ,  WDI  and  r11`1  . 
But  in  fact  he  lists 
none  of  these.  He  says,  instead,  that:  "These  four 
"  are  desire  (`1Y"  )  and  idea  (1119)  and  conscience 
(t`)) 
and  reason  hidden  deep  within  you  (-[: 
￿ 
1bß  ;  1aWrl  )" 
[I  131,  II  214].  It  is  not  at  all  clear  why  Marqah 
lists  these  four.  He  merely  says  that  God  has  created 
them  "so  that  you  may  exist  and  be  developed  with 
power".  He  adds:  "Each  one  of  them  has  a  powerful 
controlling  force  in  your  body  which  brings  about  your 
intellect".  Professor  Macdonald's  comment  on  this 
mysterious  passage  is  "the  four  parts  contrib  to  to 358 
thought"'.  I  do  not  wish  to  disagree  with  this 
Interpretation,  but  would  merely  like  to  suggest  a 
direction  in  which  it  may,  without  I  hope  distorting 
Marqah's  thought,  be  developed. 
What  point  is  being  made  by  the  claim  that  each  has 
a  powerful  controlling  force  (ý  J'(7  b7)`)')  in  the 
body,  and  what  is  meant  by  saying  that  they  "bring 
about  your  intellect  (  .  1117))1  "  r3>  )"?  Though  there 
are  too  few  clues  in  the  text  to  justify  the  confident 
exposition  of  an  interpretation,  I  would  like  to  draw 
attention  to  an  Aristotelian  doctrine  with  which  the 
above  statements  by  Marqah  are,  on  the  face  of  it,  in 
accord.  Certain  parallels,  based  on  verbal 
reseniblancesq  are  at  least  suggestive  of  a  possible 
interpretation  of  Marqah's  position. 
The  line  I  wish  to  suggest  as  a  possibly  correct 
account  of  Margah'is  that  when  Macdonald  interprets 
Marqah  as  saying  that  the  four  parts  contribute  to 
thought,  what  should  be  added'is  that  the  kind  of 
thought  to  which  they  contribute  is  practical  thought, 
and  that,  in  consequence,  what  Marqah  has  in  mind  in 
distinguishing  the  four  aspects  of  the  soul  and  in 
speaking  of  them  as  powerful  controlling  forces  in 
the  body  are  the  various  aspects  of  practical  reasoning, 
000"9 
1.  Memar  Marnah  vol.  II  p.  214  n.  6 359 
reasoning,  that  is  to  say,  which  is  embodied  in  action, 
and  which  so  relates  to  the  body,  by  way  of 
controlling  or  structuring  its  movements,  that  it  and 
those  movements  together  form  what  can  truly  be  called 
"rational  action". 
In  his  analysis  of  the  notion  of  practical  reasoning1 
Aristotle  argues  that  one  of  its  elements  is  desire 
(ors  sometimes,  wish  (poü  Ago-L5)) 
.  Practical 
reasoning,  or  deliberation,  can  occur  only  when  the 
agent  desires  a  given  end.  But  we  do  not  deliberate 
about  what  the  object  of  desire  should  be.  Rather,  we 
deliberate  about  the  means  that  have  to  be  adopted  if 
that  object  is  to  be  secured  (1112b12).  The  deliberation 
is  based  on  the  agent's  conception  of  what  is 
possible,  and  of  which  of  several  possibilities 
(if 
there  are  several)  is  most  easily  realised 
(1112bl7). 
There  is  a  further  element,  one  involving  a  value 
judgment,  Aristotle  writes:  "That  wish  is  for  the 
end  has  already  been  stated;  some  think  that  it  is  for 
the  good,  others  for  the  apparent  good"  (1113a15  f). 
He  has  qualms,  which  he  goes  on  immediately  to  express, 
about  each  of  these  alternatives,  and  tentatively 
suggests  a  compromise  position.  But  he  never  lets:  go 
"  of  the  idea  that  what  we  desire,  which  is  what  prompts 
"..  o. 
ý- 
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the  reasoning  process,  must  be  seen  within  an  evaluative 
context.  'What  we  desire  is  either  the  good  simnliciter- 
or  the  apparent  good.  Subsequently,  when  concerned 
with  the  question  of  what  is  involved  in  a  good  choice, 
choice  being  defined  as  desiderative  reason  or 
ratiocinative  desire  (1139b7),  he  affirms  that  the 
reasoning  must  be  true  and  the  desire  right.  His 
entire  discussion  on  the  nature  of  virtue  makes  it 
clear  that  the  pp 
VL. 
"14  05  ,  the  practically  wise  man, 
will  act  on  desires  which  are  right  in  the  sense  that 
they  are  in  accordance  with  the  principle  of  the  mean; 
the  desires  will  be  neither  excessive  nor  deficient  p. 
but  moderate, 
Thus,  on  Aristotle's  analysis,  practical  wisdom 
contains  four  basic  elements,  namely,  a  desire,  a 
conception  of  what  is  possible  and  available  to  the 
agent,  and  evaluation  and  a  process  of  reasoning. 
There  is  a  striking  resemblance  between  this  list  of  four 
items  and  Marqah's  list  of  four  divisions  in  us, 
-  namely,  "desire  and  idea  and  conscience  and  reason 
hidden  deep  within  you".  Furthermore,  Marqah's 
reference  to  the  four  elements  in  us  as  having  a 
"powerful  controlling  force  in  the  body"  makes  good 
sense  on  the  assumption  that  what  he  has  in  mind  is 
the  set  of  elements  constituting  the  cause  of 
! 
an  action 
l. 
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What  is  suggested  by  this  line  of  thought  is  that 
when  Nargah  speaks  about  these  elements  as  bringing 
about  "your  intellect  (F1l1712)  "I  the  difficult  term 
:  'intellect"  could  be  taken  to  refer  at  least 
\. 
approximately  to  what  Aristotle  terms  "practical- 
wisdom  (Tp  Ana-ýSý". 
The  degree  of  speculativeness 
of  this  suggestion  is  not  reduced  by  the  fact  that  on 
the  very  few  other  occasions  when  Marqah  employs  the 
term  P  D11  the  context  gives  no  guidance  on  whether 
the  term  refers  to  practical  wisdom  or,  instead,  to 
another  of,  the  intellectual  virtues.  For  an 
understanding  of  17111  we  are  thus  restricted  largely 
to  what  can  be  gleaned  from  the  Nemar  passage 
presently  under  examination.  I  am  not,  of  course, 
wishing  to  suggest  that  Nargah  was  familiar  with  the 
Nicomachean  Ethics,  but  merely  that  what  he  has  to  say 
about  the  four  divisions  in  us  closely  resembles, 
Aristotle's  account,  or  at  any  rate  the  schema  of  his 
account,  of  practical  reasoning,  and  that  this  fact 
provides  Prima  facie  evidence  for  the  view  that 
" 
Aristotle's  Tpö  ýd'LS  and  Margah's  17111  are,  if 
not  the  sainet 
/then 
at  least  conceptual  neighbours. 
Before  leaving  Margah's  discussion  of  the  faculties 
of  the  soul,  one  point  should  be  mentioned.  Marqah 
makes  a  statement  about  y  TYP  which  he  may  oll  have 362 
wished  to  make  about  other  mental  faculties  also,  and 
the  statement  calls  for  comment.  He  writes:  "Cain  is 
not  our  forefather,  that  we  should  be  forbidden.  Nor 
are  we  the  descendants  of  Enoch  that  we  should  be 
delivered,  nor  of  Cush  that  we  should  be  enslaved, 
nor  of  Nimrod  that  we  should  be  brought  low,  nor  of 
the  Tower  Builders  that  we  should  be  scattered,  ..  nor 
of  Korah  that  the  earth  should  swallow  us  up.  jlith 
what  _/'TyA  could  we  be  involved  in  evil  things?  " 
[I  95,  II  156].  The  clear  implication  of  this 
passage  is  that  Samaritans,  by  virtue  of  their 
heredity,  could  not  be  involved  in  evil  things.  The 
point  of  especial  interest  in  this  passage  is  that 
Margah  is  maintaining  that  spiritual  qualities  can 
be  transmitted  genetically.  He  is  not  saying  merely 
that  y7n  is  inherited,  but  that  the  y-r,!:  i  as 
possessing  certain  moral  qualities  is  inherited.  We 
have  already  in  this  chapter  observed  that  Margah 
claims  a  close  connection  between  y  Tý  and  ' 
morality.  It  now  seems  that  the  agent  is  not  only 
not  responsible  for  having  ayT  Ya  (any  more  than  he 
is  for  having  a  leg  or  a  skull),  he  is  also  not 
responsible,  or  at  least  not  fully  responsible,  for 
its  moral  qualities. 
He  speaks,  for  example,  of  men  committing  adultery 363  1 
in  their  y-r;  n  1.  It  would  seem  to  follow,  therefore, 
that  it  is  more  difficult  for  a  Samaritan  '916  to  be 
thus,  blemished  than  it  would  be  for  the  y  TAN  of  a 
descendant  of  the  Tower  Builders.  Marqah  may  thus  be 
suggesting  that  specific  ideas,  say,  of  what  is  to"' 
be  judged  good  or  judged  evil,  are  inherited.  He  does 
not,  in  connection  with  the  passage  under  examination, 
offer  a  scriptural  proof  text  for  this  conception.  But 
one  may  conjecture  that  the  second  commandment  was  not 
far  from  his  mind. 
Certain  psychological  and  metaphysical  questions 
relating  to  the  concept  of  free  will  are  prompted  by 
the  foregoing  discussion.  For  it  is  evident  that  the 
conception  of  the  inheritance  of  spiritual  qualities, 
particularly  moral  ones,  must  sit  uneasily  in  the 
context  of  a  libertarian  doctrine  of  human  action.  The 
question  at  issue,  then,  is  simply  stated:  Was  Marqah 
a  determinist? 
The  answer  cannot  be  so  easily  forthcoming,  for 
several  reasons.  The  first  is  that  Marqah  was  not  so 
obliging  to  subsequent  philosophers  as  to  raise  the 
question  himself  and  then  answer  it  for  us.  If  an 
answer  is  to  be  got  at  all  it  can  be  secured  not  by 
reading  it  off  the  text  but  only  by  extrapolation 
from  it. 
A  second  difficulty  arises  from-the  real  obJscurity 
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of  the  question.  The  terms  "free  will"  and 
"determinism"  do  not  mean  the  same  thing  to  different 
philosophers.  It  is  not  certain  that  they  mean,  or 
meant,  anything  at  all  to  some.  It  is  not  easy  to  say, 
for  example,  what  the  classical  Greek  equivalents  are. 
Can  Aristotle's  discussionl  of  -fo 
CKOUO"Lm￿ 
and 
-rc 
äKOvcT 
Lo￿  fairly  be  interpreted  as  a  discussion 
of  the  nature  of  a  freely  willed  action,  or  is  it 
perhaps  a  discussion  of  a  juridical  concept  relating 
to  the  settling  of  questions  of  criminal  responsibility 
in  a  couict  of  law? 
2 
And  in  any  cases  if  certain 
Greek  terms  or  phrases  are  taken  to  be  equivalent  to 
"free  will"  and  "determinism"  then  it  must  be  stated 
that  those  terms  are  equivalent  to  the  English 
expressions  as  used  by  given  thinkers  in  given  works. 
;  n-to  Czreek 
Translationnpresents  its  own  problems.  But  it  is 
even  less  clear  how  "free  will"  and  "determinism"  are 
to  be  translated  into  Samaritan  Aramaic.  And  i 
asking  whether  Marqah  is  a  determinist  we  may  in  fact 
be  asking  of  his  philosophy  a  question  which  cou1ld  not 
be  stated  in  such  terms  that  Marqah  could  understand  it. 
Formidable  methodological  considerations,  therefore, 
demand  that  in  attempting  to  answer  this  question  we 
move  with  caution, 
1.  N.  E.  III  1 
2.  See  e.  r.  D.  J.  Allan  "The  Practical  Syllogism""in' 
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This  is  not  the  place  for  a  long  discussion  on  the 
nature  of  free  will.  But  I  will  say  something  now  on 
this  topic,  since  my  answer  to  the  question  of  whether 
Marqah  was  a  determinist  will  not  convey  the  meaning  I 
wish  it  to  unless  the  sense  in  which  I  am  using  the 
term  "free  will"  is  also  conveyed. 
I  want,  for  present  purposes,  to  take  the  line  that 
talk  about  free  will  can  be  translated  into  talk  about 
self-expression.  A  free  action,  one  produced  by  an 
act  of  free  will,  gives  expression  to  the  agent's 
nature  as  a  person.  But  what  is  the  agentts  nature  as 
a  person?  This  question  amounts  to  asking  what  the 
essence  of  man  is,  The  traditional  philosophical  way 
of  dealing  with  this  question  is  to  ask  what  man's 
"distinctive  endowment"  is.  What  is  it  that 
distinguishes  him  from  other  kinds  of  living  creature? 
lie  have  elsewhere  considered  the  passage  in  which 
Marqah  lets  us  see  his  answer  to  this  question. 
/ 
For 
i 
convenience,  I  shall  repeat  the  passage  here:  "[Goff] 
divided  the  various  kinds  of  living  creatures  into  four 
sorts,  the  first  three  for  the  sake  of  the  fourth.  He 
made  the  body  of  the  last  with  its  wisdom  implanted, 
so  that  the  body  should  be  capable  of  being  illumined 
by  the'  u  Thus  not  one  (of  the  other  three)  can 
withstand  a  man"  [I  31,  II  47].  Hence,  in  Nargah's 
view,  the  distinctive  endowment  of  man  is  his  soul, 366 
and  in  particular  the  12.7  .  Thus  a  freely  willed 
I 
action  must  constitute  an  embodiment  of  the  M.  ß￿7 
and  its  wisdom.  But  this  is  too  abstract.  What, 
more  specifically,  does  the  freely  willed  action 
embody?  Margah's  immediately  following  sentence  so 
completely  answers  this  question  it  is  almost  as 
though  he  wrote  the  sentence  with  our  question  in 
mind.  His  words  are:  "He  gave  a  perfect  law  to  his 
servants  to  provide  life  and  length  of  days,  for  by  the 
observing  of  it  is  the  soul  disposed,  according  to".  the 
state  of  the  soul  is  the  body  disposed.  As  the 
stature  of  a  man  lies  with  the  soul,  so  the  stature 
of  the  soul  lies  with  the  law"  [I  31,114+7].  Part  of 
the  point  Marqah  seems  concerned  here  to  make  is  that 
a  man's  distinctive  endowment,  that  which 
distinguishes  him  from  the  other  kinds  of  living 
creature,  is  his  soul,  and  that  the  worth  of  a  man  is 
measured  by  the  extent  to  which  hei  in  his  way  of 
life,  constitutes  an  incarnation  of  that  by  which  his 
soul  itself  is  measured,  namely,  the 
is  clear  that  Marqah  considered  that 
accordance  with  the  divine  will,  has 
stature  is  measured  by  the  extent  to 
expressive  of  divine  Law,  man's  true 
to  secure  in  his  way  of  life,  and  th 
Law  of  God.  It 
because  man,  in 
a  soul  whose 
which  it  is 
purpose  must  be 
erefore  in  his 
actionsg  embodiment  of  the  Law  of  God. 367 
But  if  this  is  the  true  end  of  man  it  must  also  be 
his-essence.  Man  is  essentially  a  creature  so  created 
by  God  that  he  is.  committed  by  his  nature  to  expressing 
God's  will.  To  the  extent  to  which  he  fails  to 
N 
actualise  this  aspect  of  his  nature  he  is  not  really 
being  himself,  and  to  that  extent,  according  to  the 
above  account  of  free  will,  he  is  not  free.  The 
position,  therefore,  that  seems  to  emerge  in  the  Nemar 
is  that  the  way  truly  to  be  free  is  to  live  a  godly 
life.  Freedom  cannot  be  gained  unless  the  human  agent 
seeks  to  harmonise  his  own  will  with  God's  will.  Hence, 
give}  the  concept  of  "free  will"  outlined  earlier,  we 
must  say  that,  for  Margah,.  the  answer  to  the  question 
"Is  free  action  possible?  "  must  also  be  the  answer  to 
the  question  "Is  godly  action  possible?  ",  Since  in 
living  a  godly  life  we  are  giving  expression  to  our 
true  nature,  it  follows  that  we  are  most  ourselves  when 
we  are  closest  to  God.  I  take  this  to  be  a  central 
principle  in  Margah's  religious  anthropology,  and  to 
be  the  burden  of  the  verse:  "As  the  stature  of  a  man 
lies  with  the  soul,  so  the  stature  of  the  soul  lies  with 
the  law". 
Thus,  on  a  quite  specific  account  of  "free  will"l  it 
"  appears  that  Nargah  must  say  that  free  will  is  possible. 
Universal  determinism  is  thus  an  invalid  doctrine  in  so 
far  as  it  is  inconsistent  with  the  claim  that 
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actions  are  performed.  It  follows  from  this  that  our 
original  problem,  namely,  how  free  will  is  possible 
if  spiritual  qualities  are  inherited,  is  in  a  sense 
undercut.  For  I  am  interpreting  Marqah  as  saying  that, 
by  whatever  means  a  man  comes  to  have  the  spiritual 
qualities  he  does  have,  whether  he'is  free  or  not 
depends  on  how  he  uses  the  qualities  he  has.  If  with 
-the  spiritual  qualities  he  has  he  leads  a  godly  life 
he  lives  freely,  if  not  then  not.  That  his  spiritual 
inheritance  makes  it  in  one  respect  easier  or  more 
difficult  to  lead  such  a  life  is  irrelevant.  The 
question  is  only  whether  he  actually  leads  one. 
We  ought  not  to  lose  sight  here  of  Marqah's 
conception  of  the  power  of  God  as  a  limitless  power 
stretching  through  the  universe.  This  conception 
might  be  seen,  within  the  context  of  the  Memar,  'as 
forming'a  very  unstable  alliance  with  the  conception' 
of  man  as  free.  For  how,  it  might  be  asked,  ca,  man  be 
free  if  God's  power  is  infinite?  Does  not  the  freedom 
of  man  give  him  jurisdiction,  or  at  least  the 
possibility  of  jurisdiction,  in  areas  in  which  God's 
power  is,  necessarily,  effective?  And  in  that  case 
does  not  the  freedom  of  man  constitute  an  encroachment 
upon  the  power  of  God?  But  any  being  capable  of 
setting  any  limits  whatsoever  on  the  power  of  God 
must  himself  have  a  power  in  some  respect  not  less 
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than  God's  power.  And  suddenly  Nargah's  fundamental 
conception  of  the  utter  otherness  of  God  seems  in 
jeopardy.  Man  himself  would  be  practically  a  god. 
"  This  problem  is  not  one  which  Marqah  explicitly, 
raises.  Nor  do  there  seem,  in  the  Memar,  to  be 
passages  which  can  be  taken  as  an  answer.  I  merely 
want  to  show  here,  first,  that  the  problem,  which  is 
a  perennial  problem  in  the  philosophy  of  religion, 
raises  a  question  mark  over  the  Memar,  and,  secondly, 
that  had  Marqah  tackled  it  he  would  not  necessarily 
have  been  at  a  loss  as  to  how  to  dull  the  point  of  the 
attack.  Two  points  can  be  made  in  defence  of  Marqah's 
position. 
The  first  is  that  if  we  are  to  speak  of  God's 
infinite  power  as  leaving  no  room  for  human  freedom 
it  is  necessary  to  expound  the  conception  of  freedom 
thus  invoked,  It  is  possible  that  the  existencelof 
God's  infinite  power  creates  a  problem  for  one  kind 
of  freedom,  but-not  necessarily  for  another,  Taki  g, 
as  before,  the  conception  of  freedom  as  a  certain/ 
conception  of  self-expression,  and  holding,  along 
with,  I  believe,  Marqah,  that  man  is  freest  when  his 
will  most  coincides  with  the  divine  will,  it  is  not  at 
all  clear  that  the  infinite  power  of  God  need  be 
seen  as  constituting  an  obstacle  to  the  possibility 
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There  is  a  second  point  which  should  be  considered, 
whether  or  not  it  will  in  the  long  run  prove  tenable. 
If  God's  power  stretches  through  everything  in  such  a 
way  that  everything  is  determined  both  to  exist  and  to 
be  as  it  is  through  the  power  of  God,.  and  if,  further, 
God  lacks  the  power  to  prevent  His  power  so  operating, 
then  this  fact  alone  would  suggest  that  God's  power  is, 
after  all  . 
finite.  It  would  suggest  that  there  is  at 
least  one  thing  God  cannot  do;  He  cannot,  so  to  say, 
leave  anything  alone.  If,  therefore,  God  is  infinite 
in  His  power  then  He  must  have  the  power  not  merely  to 
determine  things  but  also,  if  He  chooses,  to  let 
things  determine  themselves.  His  infinite  power  would 
then  be  expressed  in  His  creating  areas  within  which 
other  beings  could  operate  under  the  conditions  of 
self-determination. 
This  last  consideration  opens  up  a  further  aspect' 
of  freedom.  I  have  so  far  outlined  a  concept  ofl 
freedom  according  to  which  freedom  can  be  understood 
as  godliness,  a  free  life  is  a  godly  life,  a  free/action 
is  one  done  because  it  embodies  divine  Law  and 
therefore  the  will  of  God,  But  for  Marqah,  while  this 
is,  I  think,  part  of  the  story  of  freedom,  it  cannot  be 
the  whole  story.  Samaritan  writers,  as  Professor  J. 
Macdonald  reminds  usl,  based  their  doctrine  of  free  will 
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on  Scripture,  and  in  particular  on  Deut.  XI  26-8, 
XXX  15-20.  The  former  passage  runs: 
"Understand  that 
this  day  I  offer  you  the  choice  of  a  blessing  and  a 
curse,  The  blessing  will  come  if  you  listen  to  the 
commandments  of  the  Lord  your  God  which  I  give  you 
this  day,  and  the  curse  if  you  do  not  listen  to  the 
commandments  of  the  Lord  your  God  but  turn  aside  from 
the  way  that  I  command  you  this  day  and  follow  other 
gods  whom  you  do  not  know".  In  one  senses  then,  free 
action  must  be  godly.  In  another  sense,  however,  an 
action  may  be  free  though  sinful,  a  possibility  which 
is  left  open  by  our  conception  of  God's  infinite 
power  as  only  being  infinite  if  it  can  create  areas  in 
which  men  can  determine  their  own  actions.  This  point 
returns  the  discussion  to  its  point  of  origin.  If  men 
inherit  spiritual  qualities  how  can  they  determine 
their  own  actions?  The  answer  that  Marqah,  I  think', 
would  give  is  that  heredity  does  not  determine  ups  to 
act  in  one  way  rather  than  another,  it  merely  creates 
a  tendency  in  a  given  direction.  The  reason  for  % 
suspecting  that  Marqah  would  take  this  line  is  that 
the  Memar  contains  numerous  injunctions  to  Samaritans 
to  return  to  a  godly  way  of  living.  Assuming  that 
Samaritans  have  a  common  heredity  and  that  some  are 
godly,  others  not,  it  follows  that  heredity  cannot  be 
the  sole  determinant  of  action;  it  assists,  we  might 372 
say,  but  does  not  compel. 
Margah,  'as  we  have  seen,  has  a  great  deal  to  say 
about  the  human  soul.  He  has,  indeed,  a  great  deal 
more  to  say  about  it  than  I  have  mentioned.  But  the 
foregoing  exposition  of  what  in  the  title  of  this 
chapter  I  refer  to,  perhaps  tendentiously,  as  his 
De  Anima,  brings  us  to  the  point  where  a  sufficiently 
firm  base  is  prepared  for  the  posing,  and  answering, 
of  certain  questions  relating  to  the  practical  life 
of  man.  Man  has  a  certain  nature,  and  how  he  ought 
to  behave  is  a  function,  at  least  in  part,  of  his 
nature.  Having,  in  this  chapter,  discussed  Marqah's 
account  of  human  nature,  I  shall,  in  the  next, 
attempt  an  exposition  of  Marqah's  account  of  how  men  ought 
to  behave. 
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CHAPTER  IX 
ETHICS 
How  ought  men  to  behave?  And,  since  our 
behaviour  patterxis  can  be  seen  as  forming  what  may 
be  termed  our  tlife  stylesI,  the  question  can  be 
posed  in  the  form:  How  ought  men  to  live?  The  Me  mar 
answers  these  questions,  But  the  answers  are  not 
straightforward.  In  this  chapter  I  want  to  consider 
some  of  the  chief  factors  contributing  to  their 
complexity.  At  the  start,  however,  it  must  be  stated 
that  Marqah's  ethics  owe  less  to  Hellenic  and 
Hellenistic  influences  than  do  other  aspects  of  his 
philosophy  considered  in  the  preceding  chapters.  His 
ethics  are  Pentateuchal  through  and  through.  It  is 
true  that  often  what  he  has  to  say  in  the  couIse  of 
his  ethical  deliberations  reflects  in  various  ways 
the  specific  conditions  in  which  the  Samaritan 
community  lived,  and  in  particular  reflectSt1je 
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But  the  principles  of  behaviour  enjoined  by  Marqah 
are,  nevertheless,  Pentateuchal.  The  contemporary 
social  conditions  merely  provide  the  occasion  for 
obedience  and,  often,  provide  also  an  explanation  of 
why  Marqah's  ethical  writings  are  marked  by  tones 
of  anxiety  and  even  urgency. 
After  what  we  learnt  in  the  preceding  chapter 
concerning  Margah's  psychology  it  can  come  as  no 
surprise  to  find 
is  placed  on  the 
Marqah  certainly 
good  life  (11,  aW 
living  such  a  li: 
knowledge  was  so 
that  in  his  ethics  great  emphasis 
importance  of  knowledge  and  wisdom. 
regarded  knowledge  of  how  to  live  a 
1-n)  as  a  necessary  condition  for 
Pe.  Indeed,  the  need  to  have 
stressed  by  Marqah  that  he  seems  at 
times  to  regard  knowledge  as  itself  the  end,  that  is, 
the  proper  end,  of  life.  Thus  he  writes:  "0  people,. 
understand  and  do  not  be  carried  off  from  acquiring 
knowledge,  for  a  man's  life  does  not  consist  merely 
of  the  length  of  his  days.  A  mants  life  consists  of 
increasing  his  knowledge.  Woe  to  a  man  who  rejoices 
in  days,  with  God  having  no  place  in  them" 
(I  14+3,  II  2351.  That  the  knowledge  Marqah  here 
invokes  is  knowledge  of  the  Pentateuch  is  made  clear 
by  the  fact  that  the  passage  just  quoted  is  prefaced 375 
by  the  words:  "Greatness  belongs  to  God,  in  whose 
words  there  is  nothing  but  wisdom,  Happy  the  man  who 
possesses  it!  ",  The  theme  of  man's  need  to  acquire 
wisdom  and  knowledge  makes  a 
the  Memar.  Elsewhere  Margah 
to  be  a  tree  good  to  behold, 
fruits,  and  to  hasten  to  acqi 
souls  with  what  the  True  One 
behove  us  to  leave  ourselves 
frequent  appearance  in 
writes:  "It  is  our  duty 
crowned-with  goodly 
lire  wisdom  and  fill  our 
taught  us.  It  does  not 
like  a  waste  land 
which  has  nothing  in  it,  or  like  a  tree  without 
fruits,  for  an  end  has  to  be  made  of  itl.  We  were 
created  rather  to  acquire  the  wisdom  of  our 
ancestors,  as  is  fitting"  [I  55,  II  88].  More  briefly; 
"We  were  not  chosen  but  for  learning;  we  were  not 
delivered  but  for  knowledge"  [I  889  II  l42]. 
In  general  in  the  Nemar  both  wisdom  (i  I21DR)  and 
knowledge  (n  ?)  are,  as  was  argued  in  the  last 
chapter,  essentially  related  to  God.  We  are  told, 
for  example,  that:  "Perfect  state  of  . 
fl  iT  means 
knowing  that  the  Lord  is  God  and  that  there  is  none 
besides  Him.  The  beginning  of  1  YSD  n  is  when 
,ä 
man  knows  the  might  of  his  Creator  and  trembles  at 
His  greatness  and  is  in  dread  of  His  power" 
"0"0  40  1 
1,  Cf.  the  remarkable  parallel  in  Math.  vii  19:  "And 
when  a  tree  does  not  yield  good  fruit  it  is  cut 
down  and  burnt"  ! 376 
"[I  14+1,  II  231]  .  Likewise:  "1  tDf  7  is  a  ladder  set 
up  from  the  heart  to  the  divine  place"  [I  136,  II  222]. 
The  ladder  is  provided  by  Moses:  "All  ;t  Y1  n  has  been 
made  known  through  you  [Moses]"  [I  11&8,  II  243].  The 
Pentateuch  gives  us  knowledge  not  only  of  the  nature 
of  things  as  created  by  the  power  of  God,  but  also  of 
men  as  they  ought  to  live.  Both  these  kinds  of 
matter,  the  theoretical  and  the  practical,  are  thus 
embodied  in  '7>  t'1  as  the  term  is  used  by  Marqah. 
Marqah's  iD  Dn  must  therefore  be  seen  as 
encompassing  both  theology  and  ethics. 
It  is  important  for  our  understanding  of  Margah's 
I, 
conception  of  the  ethical  aspect  of  -1;  n  to 
recognise  that  though  his  ethics  are  Pentateuchal-,  at 
least  in  the  sense  that  he  habitually  provides 
Pentateuchal  warrant  for  his  positions,  he 
nevertheless  does  not  restrict  himself  to  simple 
repetition  of  the  Mosaic  injunctions.  Like  Philo,  he 
is  willing  to  read  the  Law  with  an  eye  on  its  inner 
significance.  For  example,  with  respect  to  one 
injunction  he  prefaces  his  interpretation  with  the 
words:  "See  the  inner  meaning 
WI  )  of  this  great 
statement"  [I  719  II  114].  The  statement  in 
question-is:  "Cursed  be  he  who  misleads  a  blind  man 
on  the  road,  and  all  the  people  shall  say  'Amen"" 
(Deut, 
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Marqah  takes  the  term  "blind  man"  to  refer,  not  to 
a  physically  blind  person,  but,  rather,  to  one  suffering 
from  a  kind  of  spiritual  blindness.  We  do  not  need 
to  suppose  that  Marqah  took  the  literal  interpretation 
to  be  incorrect,  It  is  natural  to  suppose  that  on 
the  contrary  he  took  that  interpretation  for  granted 
because  it  was  the  obvious  one,  and  that  he  was 
concerned  instead  to  point  out  that  as  well  as  the 
manifest  significance  of  the  verse,  there  was  an 
equally  valid  inner  meaning  that  also  had  to  be 
learned  and  adopted  as  a  guide  to  conduct. 
On  Marqah's  interpretation  the  verse  comprises 
twelve  commandments.  All  twelve  need  not 
here  be  quoted,  A  few  will  serve  to  indicate  the 
general  points  Marqah  is  concerned  to  make:  "In  the 
case  of  a  man  who  asks  about  the  truth,  his  question 
is  not  to  be  unanswered...  in  the  case  of  a  man  who 
goes  astray  in  the  way  of  evil,  do  not  desert  him  - 
(if  you  did)  you  would  bear  his  burden...  in  the  case 
of  a  man  who  is  caught  in  his  guilt  and  who  does  not 
realise  the  significance  of  it,  turn  him  from  his 
way...  in  the  case  of  a  man  who  teaches  you  something 
he  himself  does  not  know,  acquaint  him  with  the  truth 
"  and  do  not  let  him  go  astray" 
[I  71,  II  114]. 
Man's  duties,  then,  as  the  position  is  represented 
by  Margah,  are  not  simply  to  be  read  off  the  pages  of 378 
the  Pentateuch,  The  inner  meaning  also  of  what  we 
read  there  must  be  considered,  for  it  can  refer  to 
duties  other  than  those  indicated  by  the  manifest 
meaning. 
I  would  like  now  to  ask  how,  within  the  framework 
of  the  Memar,  duties  should  be  classified.  Let  us 
begin  with  the  claim  that  man's  duties  can  be 
considered  in  their  vertical  and  their  horizontal 
aspects.  Vertically,  they  relate  man  to  God,  and 
horizontally  they  relate  man  to  man.  And  since  man 
can  be  related,  with  respect  to  ethical  demands,  both 
to  himself  and  to  others,  it  follows  that  at  one  level 
of  analysis  duties  are  classifiable  under  three 
headings,  namely,  duties  to  God,  duties  to  oneself, 
and  duties  to  other  men.  Whether  at  a  deeper  level  of 
analysis,  and  one  to  which  Marqah  would  be  willing  to 
subscribe,  these  three  classes  can  maintain  their 
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separate  identities,  is  a  question  to  which  I  wish  now 
to  turn.  Marqah's  interpretation,  given  above,  '  of 
Deuto  xxvii  18  will  help  us  find  the  answer. 
Elsewhere  we  have  acknowledged  that  Marqah 
recognised  that  man  has  duties  to  God:  "Ascribe 
majesty  to  our  God!  For  this  purpose  we  have  come" 
[Hymn  IV  v.  6].  And  the  numerous  Pentateuchal 
injunctions  regarding  sacrifices  and  other  ritual 
practices  can  be  seen  as  giving  rise  to  duties  to  God. 379 
We  also  know  that  Marqah  recognised  the  existence  of  f 
duties  a  man  has  to  himself,  for  example,  the  duty  to 
learn  God's  will.  As  Margah  tells  us:  "It  is  good 
for  us  to  purify  our  heart  and  know  the  truth  and  fill 
our  heart  with  instruction  of  knowledge"  (I  134,  II  218]. 
What  now  emerges  from  Margah's  interpretation  of 
Deut.  xxvii  18  is  that  he  also  accepted  the  idea 
that  each  man  has  duties,  not  only  to  God  and  to 
himself,  but  also  to  other  men.  For  at  least  we  have 
a  duty  to  help  the  blind.  The  kind  of  aid  we  are  to 
provide  is  spelled  out  by  Marqah.  We  are  not  merely 
required  to  protect  the  spiritually  blind  from  their 
spiritual  blindness  by  preventing  them  performing 
actions  expressive  of  their  blindness.  On  the 
contrary,  we  are  to  cure  them  of  their  very  blindness. 
The  instrument  for  securing  this  end  is  moral 
instruction,  what  Marqah  [I  56,  II  89]  terms 
Marqah  writes,  therefore,  as  though  there  are 
three  kinds  of  duties,  those  to  God,  to  oneself  and  to 
others.  But  there  are,  at  the  same  time,  pressures 
pushing  him  towards  the  view  that  these  three  kinds 
are  not  all  on  the  same  logical  level.  In  the  first 
place,  Nargah  considered  that  we  have  duties  to,  men, 
and  that  subsumable  under  this  rubric  are  duties  to 
oneself  and  duties  to  others.  For  example,  Marqah 
believed  knowledge  to  be  an  intrinsic  element  in  the 380 
good  life.  Men  must  seek  knowledge.  But  it  iss  for 
Marqah,  in  a  sense  irrelevant  whether-we  seek  it  for 
ourselves  or  for  others.  The  crucial  point  is  that 
since  knowledge  is  good  it  must  be  gained.  If  we 
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lack  it  we  should  seek  it;  if  we  possess  it  we  should 
share  it.  And  the  requirement  to  share  it  is 
explicitly  stated  by  Marqah  to  be  universal  in  its 
scope.  Knowledge,  being  good,  is  good  whoever 
possesses  it,  and  hence  is  good  in  non-Samaritans  as 
it  is  in  the  elect.  Therefore,  Marqah  tells  us:  "It 
is  good  for  us  to  purify  our  heart  and  know  the  truth 
and  fill  our  heart  with  the  instruction  of  knowledge, 
and  then  teach  all  the  nations(il'x 
ý"-  )" 
[I  134,  II  218].  Hence,  in  a  very  real  sense  the 
duty  to  gain  knowledge  is  not  in  its  essence  a  duty 
to  oneself,  though  one  has  a  duty  to  secure  it  for 
oneself,  or  a  duty  to  secure  it  for  others,  though 
one  has  a  duty  to  teach  it  to  others.  The  duty  is 
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a  duty  to  make  knowledge  the  possession  of 
whomsoever  can  be  led  to  own  it.  It  iss  in  other 
words,  a  duty  to  men  in  general,  rather  than  to  oneself 
in  particular,  or  to  others  in  particular,  even  though 
on  the  surface  it  seems  clearly  a  duty  to  oneself. 
Likewise,  duties  that  seem  obviously  classifiable 
as  duties  to  others  can  be  shown  to  belong  to  a 
different  class,  The  injunction  not  to  misl  ad  a 381 
.  blind  man  may  seem  to  be  straightforwardly  a  duty  to 
blind  men,  even,  and  indeed  especially,  if  the 
injunction  is  understood  in  the  way  Margah  understands 
it,  Yet  what  is  being  enjoined  here,  as  Marqah 
interprets  the  Deuteronomic  verse  in  questiong,  is" 
,  that  ignorance,  particularly  moral  ignorance,  should 
be  replaced  by  knowledge.  Ignorance  is  evil,  and  we 
should  therefore  seek  to  dispel  it,  whether  we 
;  recognise  it  in  ourselves  or  in  others.  Thus  the 
duty  to  dispel  moral  ignorance  is  not  essentially  a 
duty  to  others  any  more  than  it  is  essentially  a 
duty  to  oneself.  Essentially,  we  might  say,  it  is  a 
duty  simpliciter.  It  is  an  historical  accident  that 
the  duty  to  dispel  ignorance  is  on  some  occasions 
acted  upon  because  we  have  recognised  ignorance  in 
another  person,  and  on  some  occasions  because  we  have 
recognised  it  in  ourselves. 
Instead  of  distinguishing  between  duties  to 
oneself  and  duties  to  others,  it  might  be  closer  to 
Marqah's  position  to  hold  that  certain  things, 
-  knowledge  being  one,  are  ideals,  and  men  owe  loyalty 
to  these  ideals.  In  part  this  loyalty  should  be 
expressed  in  each  person's  striving  to  secure 
embodiment  of  these  ideals  wherever  possible.  Our 
duties  to  men  could  then  be  conceived,  not  as  duties 
to  ourselves  or  as  duties  to  others,  as  though  duties 382 
of  these  two  kinds  differ  in  essence,  but  simply  as 
duties  to  men  -  both  ourselves  and  others. 
On  this  analysis  two  of  the  three  general  kinds  of 
duties,  to  God,  to  others  and  to  self,  collapse  into 
the  category  of  "duties  to  men".  From  this  point  of 
view  Marqah's  ethics  cannot  properly  be  classified 
either  as  egoistic  or  as  altruistic,  for  priority  is 
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given  neither  to  the  self  nor  to  others.  His  ethics 
are  more  correctly  described  as  universalistic.  And 
in  this  connection  his  injunction,  quoted  above,  to 
give  instruction  to  all  the  nations  takes  on  a 
particular  significance. 
We  are  therefore  left  with  two  kinds  of  duty,  those 
to  God  and  those  to  men,  The  precise  relationship, 
in  Margah's  teaching,  between  these  two  kinds  of 
duty  is  hard  to  establish.  But,  minimally,  there  is 
substantial.  --evidence 
that  he  considered  the  relation 
to  be  very  close.  Thus,  for  example,  Marqah  writes: 
"No  deceiver  in  the  world  has  any  future.  A  corrupter 
of  men  is  a  corrupter  of  the  Lord,  for  he  has  denied 
Him"  [I  72,  II  115],  In  part  at  least,  this  ' 
statement  implies  that  certain  morally  unacceptable 
types  of  action  directed  against  men  must  also 
ipso  facto  be  against  God.  For  God  established 
certain  values  -  universal  values  -  and  whoever  in 
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his  actions  embodies  the  negation  of  these  values, 
and  hence  denies  the  value  of  the  values  themselves, 
must  in  so  doing  be  rejecting  God  as  the  Creator  of 
those  values.  Put  otherwise,  a  failure  in  our  duty  to 
men  entails  a  rejection  of  the  sovereign  authority 
of  God,  and  hence  a  rejection  of  the  moral 
legitimacy  of  our  duties  to  Him.  Any  person  guilty 
of  such  a  rejection  could  not  be  guilty  of  it  unless 
he  had  a  distorted  or  corrupted  conception  of  God. 
Hence  Marqah's  statement:  "A  corrupter  of  men  is  a 
corrupter  of  the  Lord".  Marqah  cannot  mean, 
literally,  that  such  a  man  corrupts  God.  He  must 
mean,  ratheri  that  such  a  man's  picture  or  conception 
of  God  is  corrupt.  -' 
There  is  a  strong  suggestion  within  the  Nemar 
that  in  the  close  relationship  between  duties  to  God 
and  duties  to  man,  the  former  have  primacy.  Marqah 
conceived  wisdom,  as  we  saw  earlier,  to  be  the  Law 
of  Moses;  all  wisdom  is  to  be  read  in  the  Pentateuch. 
Hence  all  practical  wisdom  is  to  found  there.  All 
duties,  therefore,  are  formulated  there,  We  learn 
what  we  ought  to  do  and  we  obey  (if  we  obey)  because 
f_  we  recognise  the  sovereign  authority,  including  the 
sovereign  moral  authority,  o  the  author  of  the  Law. 
Thus  it  can  be  said  that,  according  to  Marqah,  to  do 
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to  obey  God.  And  therefore  our-duty  is  to  God.  In 
part  we  fulfill  that  duty  by  treating  men  as  God 
requires  us  to.  Hence  we  find  Margah  adopting'the 
view  that  a  failure  in  our  duty  to  men  is  a  failure 
in  our  duty  to  God;  for  our  duty  to  men  is  in  its 
essence  a  duty  to  God.  As  he  puts  it:  To  corrupt  men 
is  to  deny  God.  Even  though,  in  the  sense  described, 
there  is  point  to  saying  that  our  duties  to  God  have 
primacy  over  our  duties  to  men,  or  even  that  our 
only  true  duties  are  to  God,  there  remains  nevertheless 
point  to  talking  about  duties  to  men.  Such  duties 
can  be  understood  to  be  those  duties  to  God  that  can 
be  acted  upon  only  by  treating  men  in  the  way  that' 
God  demands  of  us.  To  have  duties  to  men  is  to  owe 
it  to  God  to  modify  our  conduct  towards  men  in 
accordance  with  His  commands. 
Although  Marqah's  ethics  are  universalistic  in  the 
way  described,  it  can  hardly  be  denied  that  his' 
writings  exhibit  a  total  commitment  to  a  doctrine/of 
Samaritan  particularism.  The  Samaritans  were,  'after 
all,  seen  as  the  elect  nation,  and  its  members 
enjoyed  certain  privileges  and  attendant 
responsibilities  because  of  their  election.  Whether 
any  tensions  are  created  in  Marqah's  writings  by  the 
co-existence  of  the  two  doctrines  of  ethical 385 
universalism  and  Samaritan  particularism  is  a  question 
that  must,  at  least  briefly,  be  considered  here. 
The  particularist  thesis  is'expressed  several 
times  in  the  Memar.  Thus  we  read:  "..  our  Lord  has 
chosen  us  and  made  us  His  very  own  out  of  all  the 
nations"  [I  95,  II  156].  Marqah  makes  it  very  plain 
that  the  purpose  of  the  election  is  to  give  to  the 
Samaritans  a  truth  that  will  then,  if  they  fulfill  the 
role  designed  for  them,  be  taught  to  all  the  other 
nations.  The  truth,  of  course,  is  the  Law  of  God. 
Moses  is  to  be  used  as  an  intermediary  between  God 
and  Israel,  and  Israel  is  then  to  be  used  as  an 
intermediary  between  God  and  all  humanity.  Now,  in  a 
sense  once  Israel  has  been  taught  the  Law  of  God  it 
is  in  possession  of  moral  knowledge  superior  to  the 
moral  values  of  other  nations.  It  might  be  supposed, 
therefore,  that  Margah  believed  that  election 
conferred  moral  superiority. 
Nevertheless,  Marqah  did  not  teach  that  the 
Samaritans  were  morally  superior.  On  the  contrary, 
he  almost  affirms  t'ie  contrary  position.  His  grounds 
are  that  the  measure  of  the  moral  failure  of  the 
Samaritans  is  revealed  by  the  fact  that  despite  being 
taught  the  Law  of  God  they  still  fail  to  embody 
God's  will  in  their-actions.  And  those  who  now 
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not  worse  than,  those  who  through  ignorance  of  God's 
will  fail  to  make  His  will  their  own. 
This  interpretation  of  Margah's  position  can  be 
supported  by  numerous  statements  in  the  Memar.  For 
example,  Marqah  portrays  God  speaking  in  the 
following  terms  about  the  Samaritans:  "I  called  them; 
they  did  not  come.  I  warned  them;  they  paid  no 
attention.  I  taught  them;  they  remained  ignorant. 
I  honoured  them;  they  rebelled.  I  instructed  them; 
they  forgot.  I  uplifted  them;  they  fell  down.  I 
treated  them  well;  they  behaved  shamefully.  In  view 
of  this  how  can  I  have  pity  for  them?  ... 
I  recompense 
every  doer  according  to  what  he  has  done" 
[I  11pß  II  185].  Nargah  then  continues:  "These 
statements  do  not  apply  to  other  men,  only  to  us.  Woe 
to  us  if  we  do  not  learn  them,  for  we  will  receive 
recompense  according  to  what  we  have  heard"'.  Normally 
Marqah  affirms  that  we  will  receive'  recompense 
according  to  what  we  have  done.  The  change  of  " 
expression  here  is  due  to  his  concern  to  stress  that 
God,  the  just  Judge,  achieves  equity  of  judgment  by 
taking  into  account  the  different  degrees  to  which 
different  men  have  been  given  the  opportunity  to  live 
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10  "according  to  what  we  have  heard"  may  be  presumed  to 
be  a  reference  to  the  Samaritan  tradition  of 
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better  lives.  And  in  this  connection  there  is  no 
more  important  a  question  than  whether  they  have  been 
instructed  in  the  Law  of  God. 
In  a  similar  vein  Nargah  elsewhere  affirms:  "Not  all 
peoples  will  be  questioned  about  a  deed,  for  they 
have  not  been  called  holy  People,  nor  first  born,  nor 
heritage,  nor  priests,  nor  holvj'nor  specially  elect, 
nor  have  they  heard  the  voice  of  the  living  God" 
[I  108,  II  180],  The  implication  of  this,  of  course, 
is  that  the  Samaritans  will  be  questioned  and  their 
replies  will  be  found  inadequate,  Whatever  else  may 
be  contained  in  Margah's  doctrine  of  Samaritan 
particularism  it  certainly  does  not  contain  a  doctrine 
of  Samaritan  moral  superiority. 
Hence,  any  conflict  that  may  arise  between  Nargah's 
universalism  and  his  particularism  cannot  be  traced 
to  a  doctrine  affirming  the  moral  superiority  of  the 
Samaritans.  But  the  suggestion  that  there  is  a 
conflict  can  be  attacked  on  more  positive  grounds 
than  this.  For  it  is  possible  to  argue  that  though 
Marqah's  universalism  is  an  ethical  doctrine, 
defining  as  it  does  the  view  that  all  men  are  equally 
appropriate  repositories  of  the  Law  of  God  and  that 
all  men  ought  therefore  to  be  taught  the  Law,  the 
particularism  of  Marqah  is  not  basically  an  ethical 388 
doctrine  though  it  has  ethi'cal  implications, 
Essentially  it  affirms  that  there"is'something  special 
about  the  Samaritans.  They  are  not  specially  moral, 
but  specially  chosen.  If  they  carried  out  all  for 
which  they  were  chosen  they  would  be  moral  -  though 
perhaps  not  specially  moral  for  if  they  were  successful 
all  nations  would  obey  the  Law  of  God  and  hence  would 
be  as  good  as  the  Samaritans.  But,  as  Marqah  does  not 
neglect  to  reiterate,  the  Samaritans,  despite 
opportunities,  have  not  lifted  themselves  to  a  higher 
plane  of  morality,  nor  even  have  raised  themselves 
comparatively  high  on  the  plane  of  morality  they  share 
with  other  nations.  This  moral  fact  about  the 
Samaritans  does  not,  however,  serve  to  disprove  the 
doctrine  of  particularism,  since  that  doctrine  does 
not  affirm  that  the  Samaritans  were  elevated  to  an 
exalted  moral  plane.  I 
When  Marqah's  universalism  and  particularism  are 
formulated  in  the  above  fashion  it  can  be  seen 
that 
there  is  no  conflict  between  the  two  doctrines, 
. And 
while  neither  doctrine  logically  implies  the  other, 
Margah's  view  of  history  certainly  led  him  to.  hold 
that  ethical  universalism  and  the  election  of  Israel 
form  a  closely  knit  system  of  ideas  and  historical 
events  -  in  Marqah's  view,  the  message  of  ethical 
universalism,  and  in  particular  the  need  to  have  all 
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nations  accept  its  led  to  the  election.  Universalism 
and  particularism,  though  logically  distinct,  are,  for 
the  Samaritan  consciousness,  inextricably  interwoven. 
As  well  as  the  kind  of  ethical  universalism 
discussed  above,  there  is,  a  further  doctrine,  often 
invoked  by  Nargah,  that  warrants  classification  as  a 
form  of,  or  at  least  as  an  aspect  ofq  ethical 
universalism.  This  further  doctrine,  which  received 
brief  mention  earlier,  concerns  Marqah's  conception 
of  justice.  Perhaps  the  central  notion  in  this 
conception  is  that  of  "equity".  God,  the  just  Judge, 
treats  men  equitably.  He  does  not  have  favourites. 
As  Marqah  puts  the  point:  ',,..  our  Lord  is  righteous; 
He  is  not  a  favourer  of  persons,  whether  great  or 
small"  [I  62,  II  97].  If,  therefore,  some  men 
receive  favourable  treatment  from  God  this  can  only  be 
because  in  truth  they  deserve  it:  "My  great  power 
does  not  show  favour  unless  to  bring  about  the  truth" 
[i  719  II  113],  It  is  perhaps  with  a  view  to  stressing 
the  impartiality  of  God  that  Marqah  persistently 
refers  to  God  as  recompensing  men  for  their  deeds. 
That  iss  God's  recompense  is  earned,  not  by  virtue  of 
who  the  agent  iss  but  of  what  he  has  done,  For  example, 
he  writes:  "In  this  world  I  will  recompense  [the  evil 
doer]  for  whatever  deed,  according  to  what  he  has  done". 390 
[I  71,  II  114],  "He  has  warned  you  and  taught  you  that 
He  will  recompense  every  doer  according  to  his  deed, 
whether  good  or  bad.  Thus  said  the  son  of  Ben  Eden, 
'In  proportion  to  the  action  is  the  reward"" 
[I  899  II  145],  and  "Righteousness  belongs  to  the 
Judge  who  shows  no  partiality  and  who  does  not 
overlook  an  action,  whether  by  praising  its  good  or 
condemning  its  evil"  [I  101,  II  168],  But  Marqah  is 
concerned  to  make  the  point  that  to  know  a  deed,  or  at 
least  to  know  sufficient  about  a  deed  to  be  well 
placed  to  judge  its  degree  of  meritoriousness,  it  is 
not  enough  to  have  seen  only  the  external  aspect  of 
that  deed,  to  have  seen  that  is,  its  physical 
manifestation.  Its  internal  aspect  also  must  be 
taken  into  account.  This  aspect  includes  the  agent's 
motives  and  intentions,  his  beliefs  about  the  situation 
at  hand,  his  knowledge  or  ignorance  about  relevant 
matters,  and  even  the  quality  of  his  ignorance,  whether, 
for  example,  it  is  or  is  not  culpable. 
The  bearing  of  the  last  mentioned,  cognitive  aspects 
of  an  action  upon  tote  question  of  its  meritoriousness, 
is  referred  to  in  several  places  in  the  Memar 
....  0 
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The  statements  of  the  son  of  Ben  Eden  and 
He  He  may  be  formulations  of  a"  conventions 
statement  of  wisdom. 
But 
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Marqah's  position  on  this  matter  does  not  emerge  with 
great  clarity.  That  he  took  questions  of  knowledge 
and  ignorance  to  be  relevant  in  determining  the  moral 
worth  of  actions  has  already  emerged  from  our 
discussion  of  Samaritan  particularism.  When  Marqah 
affirms:  "Not  all  peoples  will  be  questioned  about  a 
deed,  for  they  have  not  been  called  holy  ...  nor  have 
they  heard  the  voice  of  the  living  God"  [I  108,  II  180], 
one  aspect  of  his  point  is  that,  unlike  other  nations, 
the  Samaritans  cannot  plead  ignorance  of  God's  Law  as 
an  excuse  for  their  misdeeds.  The  implication  of  this 
is  that  ignorance  can  function  as  a  mitigating 
circumstance,  But  it  need  not  mitigate.  Margah 
distinguishes  different  kinds  of  ignorance,  regarding 
one  kind  as  an  excusing  condition  and  the  other  not. 
There  is  the  ignorance  possessed  by  a  person  who, 
through  lack  of  instruction  or  for  some  other  reason, 
Bannot  reasonably  be  expected  not  to  be  ignorant.  And 
there  is  the  ignorance  possessed  by  a  person  who  can 
reasonably  be  expected  not  to  be  ignorant.  The 
ignorance  of  the  other  nations  is  of  one  kind.  But 
Marqah  makes  it  clear  that  he  considered  the  j 
ignorance  of  the  Samaritans  to  be  of  another.  '  He  does, 
after.  allq  picture  God  as  saying  of  the  Samar  tans: 
"I  taught  them;  they  remained  ignorant...  I  instructed 
them;  they  forgot...  In  view  of  this  how  can 
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pity  for  them"  [I  110,  II  185]. 
Marqah  is  not,  however,  committed  to  the  view  that 
a  person  living  in  inculpable  ignorance  of  the  Law  of 
God  can,  due  to  the  absolving  nature  of  his  ignorance, 
lead  a  good  life.  On  this  matter  Marqah  is 
explicit;  "There  is-no  good  life  except  that  of  men 
who  know  the  truth  and  walk  in  it"  [I  93,  II  152]. 
The  best  that  can  be  said  on  behalf  of  the  inculpably 
ignorant  is  that  they  do  not  live  an  evil  life. 
Margah's  doctrine,  then,  is  that  ignorance  of  Godls 
Law  does  not  lead  necessarily  to  evil  action,  for  the 
fact  of  the  ignorance  enters  into  the  nature  of  the 
consequent  action  in  such  a  way  as  to  have 
determinative  bearing  on  whether  the  action  is  evil. 
The  very  ignorance  may  itself  prevent  the  action 
being  evil.  Of  course,  in  its  external  aspect  an 
action  performed  in  blameless  ignorance  may  be  evil 
in  the  sense  that  it  overtly  transgresses  God's  Law. 
But  the  exercise  of  justice,  as  we  saw,  reqires  that 
the  action's  inner  aspect  also  be  identified.  And  the 
ignorance  of  the  agont,  as  part  of  that  inner  aspect  p; 
may  make  all  the  difference  in  the  world  to  the 
judgment. 
Granted  that  ignorance  of  God's  Law  does  nIt 
lead  necessarily  to  evil  action,  can  it'also  e  said 
that  knowledge  of  that  Law  necessarily  leads  to  good 
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action?  Marqah  makes  several  statements  that  have  a 
bearing  on  this  question,  but  his  answer  is  not 
entirely  free  from  obscurity,  In  at  least  one  passage 
he  appears  tobe  suggesting  that  all  sinful  actions  are 
performed  in  a  state  of  knowledge  of  their 
sinfulness.  Thus  he  writes:  "There  is  no  sin  except 
where  I  have  taught  you  about  it  beforehand.  It  makes 
the  heart  unclean  and  defiles  the  mind,  and  it  turns 
a  man  from  honour  to  dishonour  and  places  him  in  a 
state.  of  infamy.  He  sees  a  light,  but  cannot  walk  by 
it"  [I  72,  II  116].  It  is  possible  that  Margah  is 
again  implying  that  one  can  sin  despite  being  in  a 
state  of  knowledge  of  the  sinfulness  of  the  action, 
when  he  writes:  "A  man  who  hastens  to  do  evil,  if  he 
was  in  his  right  mind  76  i1'",  1  will 
receive  the  curse"  [I  729  II  116].  In  this  passage 
there  seems  implied  a  distinction  between  evil  action 
done  in  a  state  of  knowledge,  which  is  therefore  evil 
in  its  internal  aspect,  and  evil  action  not  performed 
in  that  state,  which  is  merely  externally  evil,  and 
which,  unlike  the  former  kind,  does  not  merit 
punishment,  or  at  least  as  severe  a  punishment  as  is 
merited  by  an  agent  whose  actions  are  evil  in  their 
internal  aspect.  -But  this  apparent  implication  cannot 
be  presented  with  assurance,  depending  as  it  does 
on  a  certain  interpretation  of  the  difficult  clause 
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A  further  difficult  passage  that  must  be  considered 
here,  because  of  its  bearing  on  the  question  of 
whether  it  is  possible  knowingly  to  do  evil,  is  the 
following:  "We  are  possessed  of  darkness,  yet  we  have 
abundant  illuminating  light  within  our  grasp 
We  are  possessed  of  darkness,  witness  the  many 
sinful  actions  we  do...  We  find  ourselves  in  all  sorts 
of  transgression  and  we  are  unable  with  all  our 
power  (17'n  i)  to  put  an  end  to  them"  [I  133,  II  217]. 
Granted  Marqah's  habitual  use  of  the  terms  "light" 
and  "darkness"  in  referring  to  knowledge  and 
ignorance,  he  appears  here  to  be  asserting  that  we 
(the  Samaritans)  are  ignorant,  yet  knowledge  is 
"within  our  grasp  (11.7N,  7,  )" 
.  T]'  "TK  7.  ,  literally 
"in  our  hands",  must  mean  here  "within  our  reach". 
But  though  within  reach,  the  knowledge  that  will  put 
an  end  to  our  transgression  iss  nevertheless,  JI 
"i 
inaccessible,  for  "we  are  unable  with  all  our  p,  ower 
to  put  an  end  to  them".  Hence,  although  Margah  allows 
that  the  relevant  knowledge  is  in  some  sense  "wi 
hin 
11 
reach",  he  also  allows  that  it  is  not.  For  in  a  good 
sense  of  "within  reach"  what  is  within  reach  must  be 
accessible.  '  What  cannot  be  reached  cannot  be  within 
reach.  Superficially,  then,  Margahts  position,  as 
expressed  in  the  above  passage,  is  inconsistent, 
But  if  we  refuse  to  look  only  at  the  surface  an 395 
important  philosophical  point  can  be  seen  to  he  at 
issue,  Marqah  is  saying  that  on  the  one  hand  the 
sinner  in'some  sense  knows  his  sinfulness,  for  the 
"abundant  illuminating  light"  is  11'"T  ICI  ,  and  we 
show  ourselves  to  have  this  knowledge  in  failing  to 
act  on  it  despite  using  all  our  power.  And  on  the 
other  hand,  the  sinner  is  in  some  sense  ignorant  of 
his  sinfulness,  as  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  he  does 
actually  transgress.  The  basic  situation  now  under 
consideration  is  expressed  elsewhere  by  Marqah  in  the 
following  simple  terms:  "He  [the  sinner]  sees  a  light, 
but  cannot  walk  by  it"  [I  72pII  116].  We  are  here 
at  the  heart  of  a  perennial  philosophical  problem 
first  brought  to  the  centre  of  the  stage  by  Socrates. 
The  problem,  as  expressed  in  Aris-totle's  classic 
exposition,  is  as  follows:  "it  would  be  strange 
(cýýýVový 
-  so  Socrates  thought  -  if  when  knowledge 
was  in  a  man  something  else  could  master  it  and  drag 
it  about  like  a  slave,  For  Socrates  was  entirely 
Opposed  to  the  view  in  question,  holding  that  there  is 
no  such  thing  as  innontinence  (o'ctpoLcrLo  );  no  one, 
he  said,  when  he  judges,  acts  against  what  he  judges 
best  "»  people  act  so  only  by  reason  of  ignorarico" 
(N=  1145b23-7)  o  Aristotle's  own  position  of  this 
matter  ý  Thus  presents  notorious  difficultieso 
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one  hand  he  appears  to  reject  Socrates'  reje  tion  of 396 
the  possibility  of  incontinence;  for  immediately  after 
the  passage  just  quoted  he  writes:  "Now  this  view 
plainly  contradicts  the  observed  facts".  Yet  on  the 
other  hand  in  his  subsequent  analysis  he  appears  to 
accept  the  Socratic  doctrine.  For  he  distinguishes 
different  senses  of  "know"p  namely,  "exercise 
knowledge"  and  "possess  knowledge  though  not 
exercising  it"  (1146b3-4).  And  this  latter  sense  is 
itself  divisible  into  parts.  One  part  applies  to  the 
state  of  a  person  who  in  a  sense  has  knowledge  but 
cannot  exercise  it  because  he  is  asleep,  mad  or 
drunk.  Aristotle  adds:  "But  now  this  is  just  the 
condition  of  men  under  the  influence  of  passions" 
(1147al4-5).  Having,  then,  explained  the  sense  in 
which  the  incontinent  man  has  knowledge  even  though 
acting  against  it,  Aristotle  asserts:  "The  explanation 
of  how  the  ignorance  is  dissolved  and  the  incontinent 
man  regains  his  consciousness  is  the  same  as  in  the 
case  of  a  man  drunk  or  asleep" 
(1147b6-8).  Thus  it 
appears  that  Aristotle  agrees  with  Socrates'  doctrine 
that  a  man  who  acts  against  what  he  knows  to  be  best 
is  really  in  a  state  of  ignorance  at  the  time  of  his 
action.  In  one  sense  he  knows,  for  he  has  known,  and 
in  suitable  circumstances  could  exercise  that 
knowledge;  but  in  another  sense  he  is  ignoraI  t,  for 397 
at  the  time  of  his  action.  because  he  has  been 
overwhelmed  by  passion  or  by  a  similarly  effective 
condition,  he  is  unable  to  exercise  the  knowledge 
that  in  one  sense  he  has  and  in  another  sense  he 
merely  once  had. 
Margahts  discussions  of  the  relations  between 
knowledge,  ignorance  and  moral  assessibility  can 
readily  be  seen  to  fit  into  the  conceptual  framework 
just  discussed.  Let  us  return  briefly  to  the  Memar, 
passage  that  has  been  occupying  our  attention. 
Margah  there  affirms:  "We  are  possessed  of  darkness, 
yet  we  have  abundant  illuminating  light  within  our 
grasp.  We  are  possessed  of  darkness,  witness  the  many 
sinful  actions  we  do".  I  wish  to  interpret  this 
passage  as  referring  to  the  kind  of  person  Aristotle 
classifies  as  an  ýtýpvr  75  .  He  is 
. 
ignorant,  not 
because  he  never  knew,  buutp  rather,  despite  the 
knowledge  he  once  had,  The  "abundant  illuminating 
light"  is  within  his  grasp  in  that  the  knowledge  is 
in  him  -  he  has  been  able  to  exercise  it.  But  that 
he  now  lacks  knowlecge  in  the  full-blooded  sense  is 
evidenced  by  his  failure  to  act  on  it.  Likewise,  the 
sinner  who  "sees  a  light,  but  cannot  walk  by  ýt" 
{i  729  II  116]  can  readily  be  taken  to  be  the 
Aristotelian  ä 
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Samaritan  religious  context. 
To  establish  the  measure  of  agreement  between, 
Aristotle  and  Marqah  on  this  matter  it  is  necessary 
to  ask  what  Margah  took  to  be  the  cause  of  the 
sinner's  failure  to  "walk  by  the  light",  Aristotle 
can  be  interpreted  as  holding  that  the  ,  ryAq-,  % 
becomes  overwhelmed  by  passion  or  by  a  similarly 
effective  state.  Does  Margah's  answer  agree  with 
Aristotle's?  The  short  answer  is  'yes'.  In  an 
important  passage  not  previously  considered  here, 
Marqah  writes:  "What  we  have  done  is  evil...  All  this 
corresponds  to  the  desire  (  %1Jl  rx  ri  7)  that  rules  us 
and  makes  us  to  wear  darkness  in  the  heart  (77-a7)  and 
destroys  knowledge  (i'7J7-VT)  from  us"  [I  136-7,  II  223]. 
This  general  explanation  of  how  evil  occurs  is 
entirely  consonant  with  the  Socratic  position 
accepted  also  by  Aristotle.  Nargah's  position  is  that 
'the  evil  person  must  in  some  sense  be  in  a  state  of 
ignorance.  He  who  really  knows  must  act  on  his, 
knowledge.  At  the  same  time  Margah  identifies  the 
cause  of  the  ignorance,  namely,  desire,  which  destroys 
(11-7"  z)  the  knowledge.  But  since  Marqah,  as  we  saw, 
regards  evil  men  as  those  who  see  the  light  but 
cannot  walk  by  it,  he  appears  to  leave  room  for  saying 
that  in  one  sense  the  evil  doer  does  know  he  acts 
evilly  he  knows  in  the  way  that  a  person  k  ows 399 
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something  when,  through  being  overwhelmed  by  desire, 
he  is  unable  to  exercise  his  knowledge.  He  has 
knowledge,  but  owing  to  the  effectiveness  of  his 
desires  it  is  not  practical  knowledge. 
In  his  account  of  the  evil  doer,  Marqah  seems  to 
allow  for  the  occurrence  of  a  moral  struggle  at  two 
stages  in  the  evil  doing.  First,  he  portrays  the 
evil  doer  as  having  had  knowledge  that  is  no  longer 
effective.  And  his  explanation  of  its  ceasing  to  be 
effective  is  that  desire  destroyed  it  -  destroyed  its 
that  iss  as  a  motivating  factor.  But  secondly,  Margah 
seems  to  allow  for  the  possibility  of  a  struggle 
between  knowledge  and  desire  even  after  desire  has 
installed  itself  as  ruler.  This,  at  least,  is  the 
implication  of  the  statement:  "We  find  ourselves  in  all 
sorts  of  transgression  and  we  are  unable  with  all  our 
power  to  put  an  end  to  them"  [I  133,  II  217],  The 
picture  here  is  of  a  person  who  has  knowledge  which 
he  is  unable  to  exercise,  but  who  is  failing  to  / 
exercise  it  despite  using  all  his  powern  Margah 
therefore,  seems  to-allow  for  the  occurrence  of  a 
moral  struggle  not  only  before  the  evil  is  done,  but. 
even  during  the  period  of  transgression.  His  position 
is  thus  in  line  with  Aristotle's  on  at  least  one 
influential  interpretation  of  the  latter's  doctrine. 4oo 
Sir  David  Ross',  after  criticising  Aristotle  for 
failing,  in.  part  of  his  discussion  of  incontinence,  to 
introduce  the  'concept  of  a  moral  struggle,  adds 
that  elsewhere  he  "shows  himself  alive  to  the 
existence  of  a  moral  struggle,  a  conflict  between 
rational 
wish  and  appetite,  in  which  the  agent  has 
actual  knowledge  of  the  wrongness  of  the  particular 
act  he  does". 
'  There  is  no  doubt  that  in  Margah's  moral 
psychology  desire  (rrr  nh)  is  assigned  the  role  of 
villain.  Habitually  in  the  Nemar  P-r4f71l  is 
qualified  by  the  term  ý1ý'  L-  shameful,  wrong,  evil. 
It  is  not  certain  that  for  Margah  T7  T4  nJ1  possesses 
a  morally  neutral  sense.  It  is  too  close  in  meaning 
to  "lust"  or  "covetousness"  to  be  entirely  free  of 
disapprobatory  moral  implications.  Sometimes  it 
stands  without  explicit  moral  epithets,  but  in  such 
cases  moral  judgment  is  normally  implied,  as,  for 
example,  when  Marqah  speaks  of  "he  who  has  set  up  a 
god  for  himself  in  the  desire  of  his  heart 
(1Z1 
-mi-rxi  mri))"  [I  94+,  II  155]  ,  and  r  ffirms:  '  "We 
have  lied  against  the  True  One  and  have  gone  after  our 
own  desires  (h7-rn  ntr)"  [I  136,11'  222].  However, 
more  commonly  11`rß  ß'7J-7  carries  explicit 
qualification:  "[The  sinners]  walked..  in  a  way  that 
"0000 
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destroyed  those  who  walked*in  it.  They  were  gathered 
with  their  evil  desires  jisir-r  n.  1'7  'o  i  )" 
[I  579  II  90b  ..  from  evil  desires  (i117?  ZýC/,.  z  nr-r-tnn) 
they  have  kept  away"  [I  949  II  154],  "Join  yourself 
to  the  truth;  no  enemy  will  have  power  over  you,  as 
long  as  you  do  not  establish  yourself  in  evil 
desire  n  T)  r,  r7::.  )"1  [I  106,  II  177], 
"True  speech  means  keeping  oneself  aloof  from  all 
wrong  desire  (.  'ii  i-rra  n  Jh  )  and  swearing  never  to 
entertain  such"  [I  140,  II  230],  There  is  thus 
reason  to  believe  that  within  Nargah's  conceptual 
scheme  t  7V/-,  =  is  attached  only  pleonastically  to 
ý1?  n  r7 ry  17  .  Not  surprisingly,  therefore,  Marqah  sees 
desire  as  something  that  has  to  be  controlled  if  the 
good  life  is  to  be  secured,  Desires  that  are  given 
free  rein  are  condemned  with  the  obvious  Pentateuchal 
warrant  of  the  tenth  commandment:  "Let 
lie  in  your  possessions  so  as  to  make 
you  do)  I  will  deprive  you  of  all  that 
Let  your  eye  not  covet  what  belongs  to 
e"o"o 
your  heart  not 
ii 
it  hard,  j 
(If 
you  possess* 
your  neighbour. 
1.  Cf.  Mishnah  Aboth  IV  l: 
The  precise  relation  between  Marqah's  o'7V-3.  #'1  r.  l1J1 
and  the  Talmudes  Y1  fix'  is  an  interesting  topic 
too  peripheral  to  the  present  context  to  be 
examined  here  in  the  detail  it  deserves. 
r 
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That  would  be  a  sin  on  your  part" 
[I  71v  II  113]. 
Margah's'sustained  moral  denigration  of  desire 
does  not  serve  to  distinguish  him  from  other 
Hellenistic  philosophers.  On  the  contrary  it 
establishes  a  close  link,  Of  course,  the  seeds  of 
such  denigration  were  well  established  in  Hellenic 
philosophy.  The  ideal  state  described  by  Plato  in 
the  Republic  is  structured  partly  by  a  recognition  of 
the  need  to  keep  desire  under  the  control  of  reason. 
And  correspondingly  the  well-functioning  citizen  is 
characterised  by  his  ability  to  moderate  his  appetite 
by  rational  principle.  Though  Plato  stresses  the 
impossibility  of  justice  if  desire  is  allowed  to  slip 
from  the  controlling  influence  of  reason,  he  is  not 
as  expressly  hostile  to  desire  as  are  others.  Philo, 
for  example,  writes:  ",,  the  divine  legislator 
prohibits  covetousness,  knowing  that  desire  is  a 
thing  fond  of  revolution  and  of  plotting  agains 
others;  for  all  the  passions  of  the  soul  are 
formidably  exciting  and  agitating  it  contrary  to 
nature,  and  not  permitting  it  to  remain  in  a  healthy 
state,  but  of  all  such  passions  the  worst  is  desire" 
And.  elsewherej  in  discussing  the  tenth  commandment, 
after.  comparing  covetous  desire  to  a  desetise  which 
000"" 
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creeps  over,  and  infects,  the  whole  body,  he 
continues:  "So  great  and  so  excessive  an  evil  is 
covetous  desire;  or  rather,  if  I  am  to  speak  the  plain 
truth  concerning  its  it  is  the  source  of  all  evils. 
For  from  what  other  source  do  all  the  thefts,  and 
acts  of  rapine,  and  repudiation  of  debt,  and  all  false 
accusations,  and  acts  of  insolence,  and,  moreover,  all 
ravishments,  and  adulteries,  and  murders,  and  in 
short,  all  mischiefs,  whether  private  or  public,  or 
sacred  or  profane,  take  their  rise?  "'*  Perhaps  this 
passage  provides  a  clue  to  the  vigour  of  Marqah's 
condemnation  of  desire,  for  what  Philo  is  saying,  at 
least  in  part,  is  that  transgression  of  the  tenth 
commandment  puts  all  the  others  in  jeopardy. 
The  philosophical  principle  that  to  have  an 
obligation  presupposes  the  poss=ibility  of  fulfilling 
that  obligation  receives  a  formulation  in  the  Nemar. 
Marqah  writes:  "You  are  not  expected  to  do  something 
that  is  not  in  your  power  (T7'n  =L)  to  dog  but  God 
wants  you  now  to  love  your  Lord  with  (all)  your 
power  and  not  to  love  evil.  If  it  is  not  in  you  to 
do  soy  God  will  not  demand  it  of  you"  [I  779  II  125]. 
Relying  for  his  warrant  on  the  tenth  commandment, 
Margah  takes  the  view  that  the  control  of  our  desire 
0o0  "" 
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is  required  by  God.  Hence,  for  Marqah,  it  must  be 
possible  for  us  to  control  it.  And  if  it  is  under 
our  control  it  must  be  subject  to  our  will.  A  failure 
to  control  desire  is  a  failure  of  will.  The  logic  of 
Margah's  position  leads,  therefore,  to  the  doctrine 
that  desire  is  voluntary.  It  is  important  to  note 
that  what  is  being  said  to  be  voluntary,  within  the 
conceptual  framework  now  under  consideration,  is  not 
merely  action  dictated  by  desire,  but  desire  itself. 
In  Book  VI  of  the  MemaiýAiargah  urges:  "0  you  who  are 
imprisoned  in  sins,  look  for  forgiveness  and  meet 
that  good  day  with  ten  good  kinds".  One  of  these  ten 
good  kinds  is  true  speech  which  means.  "keeping  oneself 
aloof  from  wrong  desire  and  swearing  never  to 
entertain  such"  [I  140,  II  230].  This  passage  would 
hardly  make  sense  except  on  the  assumption  that 
desires  are  subject  to  the  will.  Certainly  Margah 
would  consider  it  sacrilegious,  a  profanation  of  the 
Name,  to  have  a  person  swear  to  do  something  that 
was  known  to  be  outside  the  power  of  the  will  to 
regulate.  Granted,  then,  that  Tsargah  held  that  the 
emotion  of  desire  is  voluntary,  it  is  significant, 
for  those  concerned  to  establish  Marqah's 
relationship  with  Hellenistic  philosophical  thought, 
that  on  this  matter  he  is  in  full  agreement  with 4o5 
Philonic  doctrine. 
We  have  already  noted  Philo  to-hold  that  all  the 
passions  agitate  the  soul  contrary  to  nature  not 
permitting  it  to  remain  in  a  healthy  state,  but  that 
of  all  the  passions  the  worst  is  desire.  Philo 
thereupon  adds:  "On  which  account  each  of  the  other 
passions,  coming  in  from  without  and  attacking  the 
soul  from  external  points,  appears  to  be  involuntary; 
but  this  desire  alone  derives  its  origin  from 
ourselves,  and  is  wholly  voluntary"'.  Philo's 
precise  ground  for  holding  that  desire  is  the  only 
voluntary  passion  is  unclear,  as  indeed  is  his  ground 
for  holding  that  any  passion  is  voluntary.  The 
conception  of  a  voluntary  passion,  however.,  does  not 
originate  with  Philo.  Aristotle  mentions  the 
conception,  at  least  in  passing,  when  he  affirms  that 
"on  voluntary  passions  and  actions  praise  and  blame 
are  bestowed"  [N.  B.  1109b32],  though  in  his 
'III 
subsequent  discussion  of  voluntariness  in  Book 
1 
of  the  Ethics  Aristotle  restricts  himself  to  speaking 
about  actions,  passion  being  left  out  of  the  explicit 
Picture*  Indeed,  on  his  definition  of  "voluntary"  he 
hardly  leaves  room  for  a  conception-Of  voluntary 
passions,  lie  writes:  "the  voluntary  would  seem  to  be 
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that  of  which  the  moving  principle  is  in  the  agent 
himself,  he  being  aware  of  the  particular 
circumstances  of  the  action" 
(lllla22-4).  He 
immediately  adds:  "Presumably  acts  done  by  reason  of 
anger  or  appetite 
(c--.  RHO  v  Luv 
)  are  not  rightly 
called  involuntary",  but  here  it  is  not  appetite 
itself  but  actions  motivated  by  it  that  are  at  issue, 
and  in  any  case  "not  involuntary"  may  not,  for 
Aristotle,  mean  the  same  thing  as  "voluntary"*  For 
elsewhere  (lllObl8-9)  he  draws  a  conceptual  distinction 
between  the  "not  voluntary" 
(ov  CtOUD'LoV) 
and  the 
"involuntary"  (CA'y_Ov-c,  0V)  j  and  this  suggests  that  he 
would  make  a  parallel  distinction  between  the  "not 
involuntary"  and  the  "voluntary"* 
Thus  it  is  not  certain  that  Aristotle  would  embrace 
a  full-blown  conception  of  voluntary  passion.  It  is 
possible  that  by  "voluntary  passion"  he  meant  no  more 
than  a  passion  that  motivates  a  voluntary  action.  And 
Philo  makes  it  clear  that  in  his  view  desire  as  such, 
whether  it  is  allowed  by  the  agent  to  result  in  action 
or  not,  is  still  voluntary.  Philots  position  further 
differs  from  Aristotle's  in  that  whereas  Philo 
explicitly  picks  out  dbsire  as  the  one  passion  that  is 
voluntary,  Aristotle  does  not,  and  neither  is  it  clear 
that  he  can. 407 
Wolfsonl,  who  raises  the  question  of  the  origin  of 
Philo's  doctrine  of  desire  as  the  sole  voluntary 
passion, 
presents  a  convincing  answer,  in  terms  that 
make  Marqah  sound  very  Philonic.  Wolfson  argues,  in 
effect,  that  Philo's  warrant  is  Pentateuchal.  His 
argument  is  that  Philo  is  relying  both  on  the  verses 
11 
affirming  God's  gift  to  man  of  the  freedom  to  choose 
between  good  and  evil,  and  also  on  parts  of  the 
Aristotelian  psychological  apparatus  expounded  in 
De  Anima  III  10,  Choice,  we  learn  there,  is  grounded 
on  appetency  (7C/(-'4-$  and  desire  is  a  species  of 
appetency,  the  species  which  moves  a  man  in 
opposition  to  reason.  Free  choice  can  therefore  be 
considered  as  having  two  aspects  or  parts,  first,  the 
species  of  appetency  which  moves  man  in  accordance 
with  reason,  this  being  termed  P  0VA  %Crc.  s  '  and 
secondly  the  species  which  moves  a  man  contrary  to 
reason,  namely  11  (  7o( 
(cý 
uv,  r  ß't5  is  freedom 
to  do  good;  E  Rt 
Ov 
p  is  freedom  to  do  evil.  Hence, 
for  Philo  desire  must  be  voluntary.  But  since  his 
only  warrant  for  describing  desires  as  voluntary  is 
the  Pentateuchal  verses  affirming  man's  freedom  to  do 
good  and  evil,  and  since  the  verses  carry  no 
implication  at  all  for  the  voluntariness  of  all  the 
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other  emotions,  Philo  felt  able  to  assert  both  that 
desire  itself  must  be  voluntary  and  also  that  no 
other  passion  shares  this  characteristic  with  desire. 
There  is  hardly  sufficient  ground  for  holding  that 
Margah  would  have  agreed  with  the  whole  of  this. 
account  of  Philo's  teaching  on  desire.  But  it  is 
evident  that  the  general  tenor  of  that  teaching  accords 
well  both  with  Marqah's  specific  assertions,  about 
desire,  and  also  with  Marqah's  customary  method  of 
relying  on  Pentateuchal  warrant  for  his  doctrines. 
ý, 
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One  important  doctrine  which  has  emerged  from  the 
foregoing  discussion  of  Margahts  moral  psychology  is 
that 
within  the  soul  there  are  two  elements,  namely, 
knowledge  or  wisdom,  and  desire,  which  are  the  chief 
determinants  of  the  kind  of  life,  morally  considered, 
that  each  man  liveso  A  life  structured  by  the 
dictates  of  wisdom  is  good,  one  dominated  by  the 
/ 
dictates  of  desire  evil.  If  we  changed  the  language 
slightly  and  spoke  of  reason  and  passion  rather  than 
wisdom  and  desire  this  moral  doctrine  in  the  Memar 
would  be  seen  to  be  merely  a  Samaritan  version  of  a 
philosophical  position  characteristic  of  one  of  the 
mainstreams  of  Hellenic  and  Hellenistic  philosophical 
speculation.  And  as  with  those  writing  their  philosophy 409 
in  Greek,  so  also  Margah  found  himself  having  to 
answer  a  certain  question  of  primary  significance 
that  is  naturally  prompted  by  the  thesis  that 
reason  and  passion,  considered  as  motives  for  human 
action,  have  moral  significance.  The  question, 
baldly  stated,  is:  why  follow  reason?  This  question 
demands  an  answer  because,  for  those  writing  within 
the  Hellenic  and  Hellenistic  tradition,  reason  was 
seen  as  a  restraining  force.  What  in  particular  it 
restrains  (when,  that  is  to  say,  it  is  fulfilling  its 
function  and  exercising  a  restraining  influence)  is 
passion.  But  passions  are  egoistic  motivating 
forces;  each  demands  its  own  fulfillment  and  creates 
asense  of  frustration  if  its  demands  are  not  met. 
Thus,  it  would  seem,  a  life  in  which  passions  are 
held  in  restraint  by  reason  must  be  an  uncomfortable 
and  even  an  intolerable  life.  Why,  then,  live  under 
the  rule  of  reason? 
Two  main  answers  have  been  given,  first,  that  a 
life  of  reason  is  rewarded  by  happiness,  and, 
secondly,  that  a  life  of  reason  is  good  in  itself. 
Briefly  put,  the  first  justifies  rational  action  by 
references  to  its  consequences,  and  the  second 
'justifies  it  by  saying,  roughly,  that  it  is  its  own 
reward,  that  iss  that  there  is  no  need  to  look 410 
beyond  the  action  itself  to  find  its  justification, 
for  reason,  being  in  itself  valuable,  constitutes  a 
source  of  value  in  anything  embodying  it. 
The  question  'Why  act  rationally?  '  might 
correctly  be  answered:  'Because  the  agent  will 
thereby  secure  happiness  for  himself'.  But  it  is 
also  possible  that  although  happiness  is  a  real 
and  even  necessary  consequence  of  a  rational  action 
it  is  not  a  possible  motive  for  acting  rationally. 
For  whether  an  action  is  rational  or  not  depends 
in  part,  at  least,  on  its  motive,  and  certain 
classes  of  motive  may  preclude  the  possibility  of  an 
action's  being  rational.  One  such  motive  may  be  the 
wish  to  be  rewarded  with  happiness,  If  these 
possibilities  are  in  fact  valid  then,  though  one 
may  act  rationally  knowing  that  the  action  will  be 
rewarded  with  happiness,  if  one  so  acts  for  the  sake 
of  that  reward  then  neither  will  the  reward  be 
-  bestowed  nor  will  the  action  even  be  rational.  The 
Greek  texts  dealing  with  the  various  doctrines  just 
outlined  are  familiar.  In  Republic  Bk  I1  Plato 
argues  that  only  the  truly  just  man  can  be  truly 
happy,  But  on  the  question  of  whether  justice  is 
o""o" 
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worth  pursuing  because  of  the  rewards  justice  brings, 
Plato  answers  iri  the  negative.  He  puts  into  Socrates' 
mouth  the  words:  "And  thus.,.  we  have  disproved  the 
charges  brought  against  justice  without  introducing. 
the  rewards  and  glories,  which,  as  you  were  saying, 
are  to  be  found  ascribed  to  her  in  Homer  and  Hesiod; 
but  justice  in  her  own  nature  has  been  shown  to  be 
best  for  the  soul  in  her  own  nature.  Let  a  man  do" 
what  is  just,  whether  he  have  the  ring  of  Gyges  or 
not,  and  even  if  in  addition  to  the  ring  of  Gyges  he 
put  on  the  helmet  of  Hades"  (612a-b).  But,  again, 
having  stressed  that  justice  is  to  be  pursued  for  its 
own  sake,  Plato  immediately  adds:  "And  nowq  Glaucon, 
there  will  be  no  harm  in  further  enumerating  how  many 
and  how  great  are  the  rewards  which  justice  and  the 
other  virtues  procure  to  the  soul  from  gods  and  men, 
both  in  life  and  after  death"  (612b-c)"  Plato 
thought,  therefore,  that  justice  should  be  pursued 
not  for  the  sake  of  reward  but  for  the  sake  of 
justice,  but  that  if  pursued  for  the  sake  of  justice 
rewards  would  follow.  Since,  for  Plato,  just  action 
is  the  same  as  action  performed  when  the  soul  is  under 
the  control  of  the  faculty  of  reason,  it  follows  that 
for  him  rational  action  should  be  pursued  for  its  own 
sake  and  that,  if  it  iss  the  agent  will  be 
rewarded. 412 
Aristotle's  position  on  this  matter  does  not  differ 
greatly  from  Plato's.  Aristotle's  answer  to  the 
question  'Why  be  virtuous?  '  is  as  follows:  "Now  those 
activities  are  desirable  in  themselves  from  which 
nothing  is  sought  beyond  the  activity.  And  of  this 
nature  virtuous  actions  are  thought  to  be;  for  to  do 
noble  and  good  deeds  is  a  thing  desirable  for  its  own 
sake"  (N.  E.  1176b6-9).  On  the  further  question  of 
whether  virtuous  action  will  be  rewarded  by  happiness, 
Aristotle's  answer  seems  to  be  'yes'.  In  Book  I  of 
the  Ethics  he  declares  that  all  men  are  agreed  that 
happiness  is  the  good  for  man,  and  that  the  question 
to  be  asked  is  'What  is  happiness?  '.  His  answer  is 
"activity  of  the  soul  in  accordance  with  virtue" 
(1098al6-8).  Elsewhere  he  says  simply  that  happiness 
lies  in  virtuous  activity  (1177a9-11)o  It  should  be 
noted  here  that  Aristotle's  position  cannot  fairly  be 
represented  by  saying  that  he  holds  that  virtuous 
activity-will  be  rewarded  with  happiness,  for  this 
way  of  speaking  suggests  that  the  reward  is  external 
or  extrinsic  to  the  activity  itself;  whereas  Aristotle's 
position  is,  -rather,  that  virtuous  activity  is  itself 
an  element  in  human  happiness. 
The  doctrines  of  Plato  and  Aristotle,  concerning 
motives  for,  and  recompense  for,  virtuous  ac'ionq 413 
reappear  in  the  Memar,  though  the  modes  of  expression 
are,  naturally,  different.  The  emphases  also  are  differente 
no  doubt  under  the  influence  of  the  radically 
different  social  conditions  of  the  Samaritans,  as  well 
as  in  response  to  the  relevant  Pentateuchal  verses. 
11 
Marqah  has  a  great  deal  to  say  about  recompense  for 
men's  actions,  and  often  writes  as  if  considerations 
of  recompense  ought,  morally,  to  constitute  motives  for 
action*  But  it  would,  I  think,  be  incorrect  to 
suggest  that  Marqah  thought  that  we  ought  to  act 
ý_  r 
well  for  the  sake  of  gaining  a  reward  and  of  avoiding 
punishment,  Margah's  teaching  on  the  nature  of  man's 
purpose,  discussed  in  an  earlier  chapter-l  points 
unequivocally  to  the  doctrine  that  we  were  created 
to  live  a  godly  life,  to  live,  that  iss  a  life 
structured  by  the  Law  of  Moses.  The  reason,  according 
to  Marqah,  why  we  ought  to  live  such  a  life  is  that 
it  was  for  that  that  we  were  created.  The  crucial 
point  for  Nargah,  of  course, 
_is 
that  we  were  created 
by  God,  who  has  sovereign  moral  authority  in  the 
/ 
universe,  and  we  should  therefore,  out  of  revereice 
for  His  authority,  do  as  He  requires.  We  should  live 
a  life  of  wisdom,  a  morally  upright  .  life,  not  in 
anticipation  of  what  will  befall  us  if  we  do  (or  don't) 
but  from  a  recollection  of  what  has  happened,  namely, 
that  God  gave  to  Moses  a  Law  of  universal  validity. 414 
Certainly,  if  we  obey  God's  Law*we  will  be  rewarded, 
But  we  ought  not-to  act  out  of  hope  for  the  reward.  For 
our  motive  should  be  reverence  for  God.  And  we  cannot, 
without  sin,  do  good  out  of  reverence  for  God  and 
forýthe  sake  of  a  reward,  because  then  the  hope  of  a 
reward  would  have  primacy  over  our  reverence  for  God. 
That  reverence,  indeed,  since  it  would  be  merely  a 
means  to  a  further  end,  would  not  be  true  reverence. 
r_ý,. 
Margah's  position  can  be  put  by  saying  that  for  us 
living  in  the  human  condition  there  can  be  nothing  in 
the  world  as  valuable  as  the  Law  that  God  promulgated  for 
men.  We  thus  achieve  value  within  ourselves  to  the 
extent  that  we  submit  our  lives  to  that  Law,  And  the 
greatest  possible  value  a  man  can  achieve  is  gained  by 
his  living  as  fully  as  is  possible  for  him.  under  the 
Law,  To  obey  the  Law  for  the  sake  of  a  reward  is  to  " 
treat  what  is  of  sovereign  value,  namely,  the  Law,  /as 
if  it  were  of  less  value  than.  the  reward.  It  would 
thus  be  irrational,  while  recognising  the  sovereignty 
of  the  Law  to  make  the  reward  for  obedience  the  aim 
i 
of  one's  action.  Unreason  would  thus  dominate  in  one's 
soul,  and  that,  for  Marqah,  is  tantamount  to  saying 
that  one  is  living  under  the  dominion  of  desire. 
,;.  -j  , 
Despite  this,  the  Memar  is  replete  with  warnings 
of  the  consequences  of  disobedience  as  well  as  with 
promises  of  the  consequences  of  obedience.  A  few 
a1 
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examples  should  serve  to  give  a'picture  of  Margah's 
position:  "Whom  have  you  seen  in  the  world  who  has 
been  an  enemy  to  the  True  One  and  prospered  in  his- 
doings?  "  [I  57-89  II  90]q  "If  you  deviate  from  the  way 
of-,,  the  True  One,  then  what  happened  to  the  people  of 
Sodom  will  happen  to  you"  [I  70,  'II  111],  "How  long 
dwellings  devoid  of  inhabitants,  how  long  vineyards 
planted  without  having  an  exchange  value?  How  long 
will  your  cattle  be  slaughtered  and  all  your  beasts 
plundered  by  your  enemies  before  your  very  eyes?  All 
this  is  the  penalty  for  the  doing  of  the  evil  you  have 
done  and  for  your  haste  in  doing  it"  [I  141,  II  232], 
"Happy  the  heart  that  abides  in  Him!  "  [I  106,  II  177]" 
These  statements  flow  from  a  teaching  frequently 
expressed  in  the  Memar,  and  formulated  in  one  place 
as:  "He  has  warned  you  and  taught  you  that  He  will 
recompense  every  doer  according  to  his  deed,  whether 
good  or  bad"  [I  89,  II  145]. 
Margah's  theodicy,  -as  expressed  in  the  above  1 
quotations,  has  immediate  consequences  for  a  central 
problem  in  moral  theology:  if  God  is  a  truly  just  God, 
recompensing  every  doer  according  to  his  deed,  and  if 
therefore  the  righteous  are  happy  ("Happy  the,  heart 
that  abideth  in  Him!  "),  then  how  is  it  possible  for 
the  righteous  to  suffer?  Marqah  has  not  been,  so 
helpful  to  future  commentators  as,  to  pose  this  question 416 
and'then  answer  it  for  us.  But  the  general  tenor  of 
his,  position.  is  unmistakable.  His  position  is  that 
there  are  no  suffering  righteous,  Since  our  reward 
is  commensurate  with  our  righteousness,  it  follows 
that  those  who  do  not  receive  a  reward  are  not 
worthy  of  one, 
:.,;  This  interpretation  of  Nargah's  position  demands 
certain  points  of  clarification.  First,  it  might 
be-said  that  the  suffering  of  the  righteous,  which 
we  all  know  to  exist  because  we  can  see  its  is  not 
true  suffering  and  that,  correspondingly,  the 
happiness  of  the  evil  is  not  true  happiness.  For 
divinely  appointed  rewards  and  punishments  are 
undergone  in  the  next  life,  not  in  the  present  one. 
Hence,  the  fact  that  we  see  righteous  men  'suffer' 
does  not  prove  that  God  is  being  unjust  to  the 
righteous  any  more  than  our  seeing  evil  men  prospering 
proves  that  He  is  unjust  to  the  evils  for  these  do 
not,  mean  that  God  is  failing  to  recompense  each  doer 
according  to  his  deed.  They  merely  show  that  we  are 
in  error  about  what  counts  as  real  happiness  and  real 
suffering. 
Now,  though  this  is  certainly  a  possible  position 
to  adopt  it  cannot  be  adopted  as  an  interpre 
lation 
of 
Marqah,  The  reason  for  this  is  that  Marqah  makes  it 
clear  that  in  speaking  about  rewards  and  pun  shments 
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bestowed  by  God  on  men  in  accordance  with  men's 
deserts,  he  is  referring  to  recompense  that  is 
bestowed  in  this  life  no  less  than  in  the  next.  When 
he  asks:  "Whom  have  you  seen  in  the  world  who  has 
been,  an  enemy  to  the  True  One  and  prospered  in  his 
doings?  "  he  clearly  has  in  mind  recompense  that  is 
visible  to  us;  and  the  point  is  made  more  explicitly 
still  in  the  statement:  "In  this  world  I  will 
recompense  him  for  whatever  deed,  according  to  what 
he  has  done"  [I  719  II  114+].  And  in  one  place  where 
Marqah  gives  a  list  of  divine  punishments  for  wrong 
, 
doing  it  is  evident  that  he  has  the  contemporary 
Samaritan  scene  in  mind:  "How  long  dwellings  devoid  of 
inhabitants,  how  long  vineyards  planted  without 
having  an  exchange  value?  How  long  will  your  cattle 
be-slaughtered...  All  this  is  the  penalty  for  the 
doing  of  evil".  Hence,  what  we  all  understand  by 
suffering  Margah'understands  by  it  when  he  speaks 
about  suffering  occurring,  by  divine  will, 
commensurately  with  evil. 
:..  A  second  point  of  clarification  concerns  Nargah's 
concept,  discussed  towards  the  end 
of  the  efficacy  of  ancestral  merit 
of  ancestral  demerit.  It  might  be 
of..  such  concepts,  that  if  the  evil 
be  due  to  their  benefitting  from  t 
of  Chapter  /Vll, 
and,  correspondingly, 
held,  on  t 
le 
basis 
prosper  this  must 
he  merit  o  their 
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ancestors,  and  the  righteous  who  suffer  do  so  because 
of'ancestral  demerit.  While  this  may  be  a  tenable 
theory  when  held  in  conjunction  with  a  certain  kind 
of  theodicy,  the  evidence  points  strongly  in  the 
direction  of  Marqah  rejecting  such  a  theory.  Whatever 
maybe  Marqah's  precise  doctrine  of  the  efficacy  of 
ancestral  merit  and  demerit,  he  did  not  hold  that  God 
would  punish  a  man  because  of  the  actions  of  his 
ancestors.  Two  considerations  can  be  presented  in 
justifi 
us`  to  a 
is,  that 
deeds, 
and:  the 
cation  of  this  claim.  The  first,  which  returns 
basic  moral  theological  principle  of  Margah's, 
each  person  is  recompensed  according  to  his 
If  a  person  sins  he  is  recompensed  for  its 
recompense-he  receives  is  commensurate  with 
the  sin.  But  if  one  punishment  is  full  recompense 
then  a  further  punishment  for  the'same  deed,  but  a 
punishment  inflicted  this  time  on  a  descendant,  must 
b'e"unjust.  For  the  original  deed  would  then  be 
over-recompensed.  But  secondly,  Marqah  lays  great 
stress  throughout  the  Nemar  on  the  concept  of 
individual  responsibility.  We  are  each  of.  us  regarded 
by-"him  as  responsible  not  only  for  the  degreejof 
our'  righteousness',  'but  also  for  the  degree  of'  our 
prosperity  or  suffering.  Marqah  affirms:  "W  e  to  the 
sinner  for  what  he  has  brought  on  himself" 
[1'109-10,  II  183].  And  Moses  is  represente  as 419 
addressing  Pharaoh  in  the  following  terms:  "You  slay 
yourself  -  you  are  your  own  enemy.  Your  own  words 
have  become  your  destroyer.  Your  own  deeds  punish 
you.  You  yourself  have  amassed  evil  deeds.  Receive 
recompense  for  them  all"  [I  34-5,  II  52], 
It  seems  fair  to  conclude  from  the  foregoing  that 
Margah  would  have  rejected  the  doctrine  that  a  man 
could  be  punished  by  God  for  the  misdeeds  of  his 
r.  , 
ancestors, 
The  last  quotation  given  above  is  important  for 
our  understanding  of  Marqah's  doctrine  of  the 
administration  of  justice*  Up  to  now  we  have 
spoken  as  if  Marqah  held  that  God  is  legislator, 
judge  and  recompensero  And,  indeed,  it  is  in 
general  in  terms  such  as  these  that  Margah  writes  of 
the  administration  of  justiceo  But  the  picture  is 
not  quite  so  simple,  for  on  occasion  he  writes  as 
though  it  is  not  God  who  recompenses  man,  but,  rather, 
man  who  recompenses  himself.  This  at  least  seems,  the 
implication  of  the  verse:  "You  slay  yourself  -!  you  are 
your  own  enemy.  Your  own  words  have  become  your 
destroyer.  Your  own  deeds  punish  you".  And  the 
inevitability  of  self-inflicted  punishment  is  thereupon 
expressed  by  the  addition  of  the  verse:  "In  truth 
from  the  sowing  of  evil  comes  a  harvest  of  thorns". 
Elsewhere  Nargah  writes:  "Your  enemy  is  your  actions, 420 
your  words!  Woe  to  a  man  whose  own  guilt  slays  him, 
whose  word  is  his  sword  punishing  him"  [I  107,  II  178-9]t 
"Woe  to  the  sinner  for  what  he  has  brought  on  himself" 
[I  109-101  II  183]  and  "Do  not  be  an  enemy  to  God; 
you  would  destroy  yourself"  [I  134,  II  218]. 
However,  these  verses  need  not  be  interpreted  in 
such  a  way  as  to  contradict  the  doctrine  that  God 
recompenses  men.  I  think  it  more  accurate  to 
interpret  Marqah  as  making  the  point  that  it  is  no 
less  correct  to  speak  of  men  punishing  themselves 
than  to  speak  of  God  punishing  men.  Marqah's  position 
is  that  since  God  recompenses  each  doer  according  to 
his  deeds,  at  least  two  distinct  agents  are  required 
if  divine  recompense  is  to  be  bestowed.  For  God  is 
required  in  order  to  bestow  the  recompense,  and  man 
is  required  to  perform  actions  which  merit 
recompense,  Man  recompenses  himself  not  merelyjin 
the  sense  that  had  he  not  acted  recompense  would  not 
have  been  bestowed,  but  also  in  the  tougher  sense  that 
he  is  fully  responsible  for  the  actions  which 
Ire 
recompensed  -  he  chooses  freely  between  good  and  evil, 
and  can  thus  be  held  fully  responsible  for  the 
recompense  he  receives. 
Underlying  this  position.  is  a  picture,  drawn  by 
Marqah,  of  a  moral  universe  governed  by  a  set  of 
absolute  principles  of  justice,  and  administered  in 421 
accordance  with  the  principle:  Each  doer  is 
recompensed:  according  to  his  deeds.  This  being  the 
theodical  basis  of  the  universe,  in  the  hands  of  each 
man  lies  his  free  choice  to  obey  the  principles  of 
justice  and,  in  accordance  with  the  principle  of  the 
divine  administration  of  justice,  be  rewarded,  or  to 
disobey,  and  in  accordance  with  the  same  principle, 
receive  inevitably,  as  if  by  a  law  of  nature,  the 
attendant  punishment  -  "In  truth  from  the  sowing  of 
evil  comes  a  harvest  of  thorns",  The  extent  to  which 
man's  destiny  lies  in  his  own  hands  is  expressed  by 
Marqah  in  a  bitter  passage  in  which  he  represents  God 
as  saying:  "I  called  them;  they  did  not  come.  I  warned 
them;  they  paid  no  attention.  I  taught  them;  they 
remained  ignorant.  I  honoured  them;  they  rebelled. 
I  instructed  them;  they  forgot.  I  uplifted  them; 
they  fell  down.  I  treated  them  well;  they  behaved 
shamefully.  In  view  of  this  how  can  I  have  pity  for 
them?  .,,  I  recompense  every  doer  according  to 
what 
he 
has  done"  [I  110,  II  185]. 
It  is  clear  from  the  foregoing  that  the  Memar 
places  great  emphasis  on  the  concept  of  divine 
recompense.  Yet,  as  was  argued  earlier,  Marqah  held 
that  we  should  obey  the.  Law  of  God  out  of  reverence 
for  God,  not  out  of  fear  'of  the  consequences  of 
disobedience.  Why,  then,  does  Märgah  attend  so 422 
persistently  to  the  idea  of  divine  recompense?  At 
least  part  of  the  answer  lies  in  the  fact  that,  though 
he  believed  that  men  ought  to  act  from  the  motive  of 
reverence  for  God,  it  is  nevertheless  preferable  to 
obey  out  of  fear  of  punishment  rather  than  not  obey 
at  all.  Marqah's  distinction,  by  now  familiar  to  us, 
between  action  in  its  external  and  its  internal 
aspects  is  relevant  to  the  matter  at  issue.  He  writes: 
,,, 
If  you  would  discipline  yourself  outwardly  and 
inwardly,  secretly  and  manifestly,  you  will  be  in  the 
world  above,  and  a  holy  and  select  people" 
[I  709  II  112],  It  is  probable  that  he  is  making  the 
same  point  when  he  affirms:  "Guard  yourself  outwardly 
and  inwardly,  and  know  what  action  is  to  your  benefit, 
through  which  you  will  possess  the  Blessing,  or  through 
which  you  may  possess  the  Curse"  [I  66,  II  105]. 
In  so  writing,  Margah  affirms  that  both  the  outward 
and  the  inward  aspects  of  an  action  contribute  to  its 
overall  meritoriousness.  Marqah  appears  indeed  to 
regard  each  aspect  as  of  value.  If  only  the  inner 
aspect  mattered  morally  it  would  have  been  sufficient 
to  have  spoken  of  the  internal  aspect.  Certainly, 
he  thought  that  the  inner  aspect  will  receive  -' 
behavioural  manifestation.  But  if  he  had  supposed 
the  internal  aspect  alone  to  be  of  value  there  would 
have  been  no  need,  in  speaking  of  actions  aslmeriting 423 
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recompense,  to  speak  of  the  outward  action,  as  he 
persistently  does,  as  well  as  of  the  inner  aspect  of 
the  action.  It  seems  reasonable  to  conclude, 
therefore,  that  Margah  did  attach  some  value  to  the 
N 
external  aspect  of  an  action.  And  since  the  test  of 
meritoriousness  of  the  external  action  can  only  bei 
for`Margah,  whether  it  accords  with  the  Law  of  God, 
it  follows  that  Marqah  regarded  actions  conformable  with 
God's  Law  as  possessing  some  merit,  though  if  their 
motive  was  fear  of  punishment  their  merit  would  have 
been  less  than  the  merit  attaching  to  action 
performed  from  reverence  for  the  Law. 
It  may  also  be  speculated  that  Marqah  believed 
that  men  can  graduate  from  one  kind  of  motive  to 
another;  and  that,  in  particular,  in  the  course  of 
obeying  God's  Law  from  fear  of  punishment  men  may 
come,  through  the  very  performance  of  the  actions, 
to  have  an  insight  into  the  value  of  the  Law  itself, 
so  that  in  time  they  come  to  act,  not  for  their  own 
sakes,  but  for  the  sake  of  the  Law.  A  similar 
doctrine  occurs  in  Aristotle's  Ethics,  He  argues  that 
we  acquire  virtues  by  first  exercising  them,  and 
likens  them  in  this  respect  to  the  arts:  "For  the 
things  we  have  to  learn  before  we  can  do  them,  we 
learn  by  doing  them,  e.  1.  men  become  builders  by 
building,  and  lyre-players  by  playing  the  ly  e;  so x+24 
too  we  become  just  by  doing  just  acts,  temperate  by 
doing  temperate  acts,  brave  by  doing  brave  acts" 
(1103a32-b2).  Aristotle's  position  is  that  by 
imitating  just  men  we  come  in  time  to  have  an 
insight  into  the  principles  of  justice.  Once  the 
principles  have  been  internalised  we  are  truly  just. 
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Till  then,  certainly,  we  are  not  really  just.  But 
Aristotle  clearly  thought  that  it  is  better  for  those 
not  yet  just  to  imitate  the  just  rather  than  not  to. 
imitate  them,  for  if  we  do  not  imitate  them  we  will 
not  become  just  whereas  if  we  do  we  might. 
There  is  a  hint  of  this  position  in  the  Memar. 
°Margah  writes:  "Woe  to  a  man  who"does  not  do-good 
actions  first  and  make  himself  like  the  good  men  in 
what  they  did,  rather  than  model  himself  on  the  image 
of  Cain"  [I  93,  II  152].  He  appears  to  be  saying 
that  we  should  model  ourselves  on  good  men,  and 
first  perform  actions.  The  implication  is  that. 
modelling  ourselves  on  good  men,  and  therefore  doing 
the  kinds  of  things  good  men  do,  is  itself 
meritorious;  And  this  bears  out  our  earlier 
contention  that  Marqah  held  that  good  action,  even 
when  considered  only  in  its  external  aspect,  is 
meritorious.  But  the  text  does  not  quite  warrant  a 
further  attribution  to  Margah  of  the  Aristotelian 425 
view  that  the  principles  on  which  good  men  operate 
will  in  time  come  to  take  a  hold  of  our  souls,  The 
hint  of  this  position,  however,  remains. 
But  on  the  larger  question  of  whether  we  ought 
to  be  virtuous  for  the  sake  of  virtue,  or  for  the 
sake  of  a  reward  lying  beyond  virtue  itself,  Margah1s 
position  is  evidently,  as  on  many  other  matters,  as 
Aristotelian  as  even  Aristotle  could  have  wished. 
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CHAPTER  X 
4 
CONCLUSION 
I 
The  foregoing  discussion  of  Marqah's  ethics 
completes  my  exposition  of  his  philosophy.  I  shall 
now  draw  together  the  many  threads  by  first  giving  a 
brief  summary  of  my  exposition,  and  next  presenting 
0. 
certain  theses  for  which  we  shall  by  then  be 
prepared, 
The  exposition  can  be  considered  to  be  in  two  parts, 
the  first  on  God  (Chapters  II-VII)  and  the  second  on 
man  (Chapters  VIII-IX).  Chapter  VII,  on  the 
creativity  of  God,  thus  has  a  pivotal  role,  since 
there  the  shift  is  made  from  a  consideration  of 
Margah's  teaching  on  God  to  his  teaching  on  God's 
creative  power  and  on  the  world  he  created,  whose 
most  exalted  inhabitant  is  man, 
However,  the  earlier  chapters  do  not  disregard 
Marqah's  teachings  on  the  created_world,  for'Margah 
sought  clues  in  the  world  to  the  nature  of  te  Creator. 427 
In  Chapter  II,  on  the  existence  of-God,  it  is  shown 
that  Margah  regarded  as  valid  the  cosmological 
argument  for  the  existence  of  God.  Large  scale 
features  of  the  world,  and  even  features  of  man,  whom 
Marqah  regarded  as  a  microcosmos,  were  taken  to  point 
to  His  existence.  It  was  shown  that  both  the  general 
forms  of  Margah's  arguments,  and  even  the  small 
details  of  formulation,  are  to  be  found  in  the  works 
of  earlier  philosophers,  especially  Plato,  Aristotle, 
the  Stoics  and  Philo.  Margah's  position  iss  indeed,  so 
close  to  Philo's  it  would  not  tax  the  imagination  to 
suppose  that  Marqah  had  studied  Philo's  writings  on 
the  subject. 
But  what  can  be  said  about  God  beyond  the  fact--that 
He  exists?  A.  good  deal  of  what  Nargah  has  to  say 
about  God  follows  from  his  acceptance  of  God  as  one. 
Attention  is  therefore  focused  on  this  aspect  of  God. 
I.  argue  that  Marqah  employs  a  distinction  drawn  by 
Aristotle  between  'one'  understood  as  connoting 
'simplicity',  'absence  of  internal  plurality',  and 
'one'  as  connoting  'quantitative  oneness',  that  is, 
'uniqueness'..  I  argue  that  Aristotle's  god  is  one, 
both  internally  and  quantitatively,  and  show  how 
"  certain  conclusions  can  be  drawn  from  this,  namely, 
that  god  is  spaceless,  timeless  and  incorporeal.  This 428 
conception  reappears  in  the  works  of  Philo,  and 
thereafter  in  the  Memar  of  Marqah.  The  details  of 
Margah's  position  are  shown  to  be  almost  identical 
to  the  details  of  Philos. 
The  concept  of,  the  otherness  of  God  appears  in  the 
course  of  our  examination  of  Margah's  teaching  on 
divine  oneness,  because  that  teaching  implies  that 
God  is  other  than  man.  But  the  extent  of  God's 
otherness,  -as  this  is  seen  by  Marqah,  raises  a 
question,  examined  in  Chapter  IV,  of  whether  or  not. 
God  is  knowable.  I  argue  that  Marqah,  like  Philo, 
held  that  God  is  in  essence  unknowable,  and  that  in 
taking  this  line  they  were  adopting  a  doctrine  to 
which  Aristotle  was  committed  by  his  account  of  god 
in  the  Metaphysics  and'his  account  of  man  in  the 
De  Anima,  Both  Philo  and  Marqah  speak  of  men  as 
knowing  God.  However,  both  draw  a  distinction  between 
knowing  that  God  is  and  knowing  what  he  iss  and  their 
references  to  men  as  knowing  God  can  readily  be 
interpreted  as  meaning  that  men  know  that  God  exists. 
Although  God  is,  according  to  both  Philo  and 
Marqah,  internally  one,  both  attribute  many  things  to 
Him,,  such  as  justice,  mercy  and  knowledge.  I  argues 
that  there  is  no  inconsistency  here,  for  both  thinkers, 
if  I  am  correct,  regard  God's  attributes,  which  they 429 
identify  with  His  powers,  as  'properties'  of  God,  in 
the  technical  Aristotelian  sense  of  the  term;  they  are 
not  part  of  His  essence,  but  belong  to  Him  by  virtue  of 
His  essence.  Hence  the  essential  oneness  of  God  is 
not  called  in  question  by  the  attribution  to  Him  of 
many  powers,  Various  characteristics  of  God's  power, 
and  the  question  of  their  knowability,  are  discussed. 
Frequent  reference  is  made  to  Philots  writings  since 
they  shed  a  great  deal  of  light  on  biargah's  teachings 
on  the  powers  of  God.  On  this  topic  the  teachings  of 
Philo  and  Marqah  are  almost  identical, 
Among  the  attributes  of  God  listed  by  Marqah  are 
His  justice-;.  compassion,  mercy,  love  and  knowledge. 
These  attributions  reveal  that  Margah  regarded  God  as 
a  person.  I  argue  that  on  this  matter  Margah's 
position  is  in  opposition  to  Aristotle's  and  in 
accord  with  Philos.  I  discuss  the  various  ways  in 
which  Marqah's  position  can  be  defended  against  the 
charge  of  anthropomorphism  and  then  examine  various 
of  the  personal  qualities  Marqah  attributes  to  God. 
Special  attention  is  paid  to  the  nature  of  divine 
knowledge  and  the  divine  will;  it  is  argued  that 
Margah  held  that  these  two  divine  attributes  are,  in 
crucial  respects,  wholly  unlike  human  knowledge  and 
will. 
In  Chapter  VII  attention  is  focused  on  a  particular 430 
act  of  divine  will,  that  act  by  which  the  world  was 
created.  Marqah's  position,  namely,  that  the  world 
was  created  ex  nihilo  by  an  act  of  divine  will,  is 
contrasted  with  the  ideas  of  Hellenic  philosophers 
from  Thales  to  Aristotle,  who  either  ignore  the 
possibility  of  creation  ex  nihilo  (Thales  and 
Anaximander)  or  reject  its  possibility  (Aristotle). 
Plato's  Timaeus  doctrine,  involving  the  idea  of  the 
demiurge  employing  ä  model  in  creation,  is  expounded, 
and  it  is  suggested  that  Plato  may  have  been  Margah's 
target  when  Marqah  attacks  the  idea  that  God  used  a 
model,  The  Memar's  position  regarding  certain  large 
aspects  of  the  created  world  is  discussed,  as  is 
Marqah's  acceptance  of  the  reality  of  miracles.  That 
acceptance  is  squared  with  his  idea  that  the 
systematicity  of  the  world  testifies  to  the  oneness  of 
God. 
Chapter  VIII  is  on  Margah's  teaching  on  man,  first, 
as  he  stands  in  relation  to  the  rest  of  the  creation, 
and  secondly,  as  he  is  in  himself.  Marqah,  like 
Philo,  sees  man  as  the  final  cause  of  the  creation,  and, 
again  like  Philo,  sees  man,  by  virtue  of  his 
spiritual  qualities,  as  a  microcosmos.  A  detailed 
examination  is  made  of  a  number  of  Margah's 
psychological.  terms,  and  it  is  argued  that  Marqah's 431 
account  of  the  divisions  of  the  soul  parallels  the 
Aristotelian  account  of  practical  reason.  Finally,  I 
argue  that  Marqah  taught  the  doctrine  of  human  free 
will. 
After  considering  mants  psychology,  I  turn,  in 
Chapter  IXE  to  man  regarded  as  an  ethical  animal.  I 
argue  that  Marqah's  ethics  are  universalistic  in 
nature,  and  discuss  this  universalism  in  its  relation 
to  Samaritan  particularism.  Margah's  conception  of 
justice  is  considered,  and  especially  his  claim  that 
the  cognitive  aspects  of  an  action  have  a  crucial 
bearing  on  the  question  of  its  meritoriousness. 
Arising  from  this  consideration  of  the  cognitive 
aspects  of  action,  attention  is  paid  to  Marqah's 
account  of  weakness  of  will,  and  the  consonance  of 
that  account  with  Aristotle's  is  established.  Next, 
Margah's  theory  of  the  suffering  righteous  is 
examined  -I  argue  that  he  denies  that  the  righteous 
do  suffer.  And  I  end  with  a  discussion  of  Marqah's 
teaching  on  the  relation  between  the  motives  of  fear 
and  love.  In  connection  with  this  teaching  certain 
significant  parallels  with  Aristotle  are  established. 
N 
With  this  brief  recapitulation  of  the  foregoing 
chapters  before  us,  I  would  like  to  formulate  certain 432 
theses. 
First,  the  Memar  contains  a  philosophical  system. 
It  is  true  that  the  system  is  not  systematically 
expounded  by  Marqah.  The  philosophy  is  presented  as 
part  of  an  exegesis  of  the  Pentateuch,  and 
consequently  philosophical  fragments  are  introduced 
from  time  to  time  by  Margah  as  a  means  of  shedding 
light  on  Pentateuchal  verses.  However,  the  fact  that 
the  philosophy  in  the  Memar  is  not  presented  in  a 
systematic  fashion  does  not  imply  that  there  is  not 
an  underlying  philosophical  system  which  can  be 
extrapolated  from  the  text.  The  system  emerges 
sufficiently  frequently  to  provide  us  with. 
substantial  clues  as  to  its  nature.  If  a  philosophy 
is  to  count  as  a  system  only  if  its  author  has 
expounded  it  systematically,  then  of  course  the 
Memar  does  not  contain  a  philosophical  system,  IBut" 
this  account  of  what  is  to  count  as  a  system  isle 
over-rigorous,  and  may  indeed  miss  the  point,  for  it 
appears  to  confuse  the  systematic  exposition  If  p 
philosophy  and  the  systematicity  of  the  philosophy 
itself.  If  I  am  correct,  the  whole  weight  of 
evidence  presented  in  the  foregoing  chapters  points 
to  the  thesis  that  the  philosophy  of  the  Memar  is  a 
system  of  philosophy,  It  should  perhaps  be  added  that 433 
Marqah's  failure  to  present  the  philosophy  in  a 
systematically  ordered  exposition  is  not  a  failure  on 
Margah's  own  terms,  for  if  anything  at  all  about  the 
Memar  is  clear  it  is  that  Margah  did  not  write  it  as 
a  work  of  philosophy.  It  would  be  closer  to  the  mark 
to  describe  it  as  a  homiletical  exegesis  of  the 
Pentateuch,  though  it  is  more  than  that. 
A  second  thesis  I  wish  to  present  is  that  the 
philosophical  system  underlying  the  Memar  is 
Hellenistic  in  character,  The  extent  of  the 
coincidence  of  Margah's  philosophical  ideas  with 
'those  of  other  thinkers,  in  particular,  Aristotle 
and  Philo,  forces  us  to  go  further  than  say  merely 
that  the  Memar  contains  Hellenistic  philosophical 
elements.  For  the  whole  of  Marqah's  philosophical 
system  is  permeated  with  Hellenistic  ideas. 
And  yet  Marqah  was  a  Samaritan,  and  therefore  was 
committed  to  an  acceptance  of  the  validity  of 
Pentateuchal  teaching  -  his  method  of  seeking 
Pentateuchal  warrant  for  his  philosophical  ideas  flows 
from  that  commitment.  This  fact  about  Nargah  must  be 
seen  to  give  rise  to  a  problem,  for  the  presence  in  the 
Memar  of  so.  much  thought  that  is  consonant  with 
Hellenistic  philosophy  may  seem  to  show  that  Margah 
was  to  that  extent  false  to  his  ideal  of  the 
Pentateuch  as.  the  fountainhead  of  truth,  How,  it  may 434 
be  asked,  could  he  be  both  a  Hellenistic  philosopher 
and  a  Samaritan? 
To  regard  the  Pentateuchalism  and  the  Hellenism  of 
the  Memar,  as  held  together  in  a  tense  and  unstable 
alliance  is,  however,  to  remain  unresponsive  to  an 
important  harmonising  principle,  namely,  that  all 
truth  is  Mosaic  truth.  Marqah  retained  his  reception 
apparatus,  both  intellectual  and  sensual,  in  a  state 
of  readiness  to  respond  to  stimuli  from  any  source  of 
truth.  The  source  could  be  Hellenistic  philosophy  as 
well  as  the  natural  world.  We  have  seen 
that  Marqah  held  that  created  things  can  give  us,  via 
our  created  faculties,  a  clue  to  the  nature  of  the 
Creator.  In  that  case  there  should  be  nothing 
surprising  in  the  idea  that  Marqah  could  believe  that 
one  of  God's  creatures  -  even  a  non-Samaritan  creature  - 
by  thinking,  with  his  God-given  mind,  about  the  ýI 
God-given  world  that  is  known  to  him  through  hii 
God-given  senses,  might  give  birth  to  an  idea  that 
could  deepen  Margahts  insight  into  the  word  of;  Gpd  as 
that  is  formulated  in  the  Pentateuch.  For  Margah,  then, 
the  policy  of  rejecting  out  of  hand  all  ideas' 
emanating  from  a  non-Samaritan  source  could  lead  to 
a  rejection  of  Mosaic  teaching.  Justin  Martyr's 
"  dictum:  "All  things  that  men  say  truly,  belong  to  us 435 
Christians"1  could 
a  related  key:  "Al 
to  us  Samaritans", 
philosophy  and  his 
easy  accord  in  the 
have  been  transposed  by  Marqah  to 
L  things  that  men  say  truly,  belong 
Thus  Marqah's  Hellenistic 
Samaritan  Pentateuchalism  live  in 
N 
Memar. 
But  a  question'can  be  raised  as  to  how  the 
Hellenistic  philosophy  reached  Marqah,  Now  it'cannot 
be  supposed  that  he  worked  it  out  without  leaning  in 
any  way  upon  external  sources,  The  rlemar,  as  has  been 
shown,  is  permeated  with  philosophical  ideas  found 
in  the  works  of  Plato,  Aristotle,  the  Stoics  and  Philo, 
and  it  is  a  probability  approaching  certainty  that 
Marqah  knew,  even  if  only  at  second  hand,  the  works 
of  these  thinkers. 
Neither  need  it  be  supposed  that  Marqah  must  have 
spent  time  at  a  school  of  philosophy  outside 
Palestine.  Two  reasons  for  not  accepting  this 
supposition  may  be  adduced. 
First,  it  is  almost  as  unlikely  that  Margah's 
synthesis  of  Samaritanism  and  Hellenistic  philosophy 
lacked  forerunners  as  that  Aquinas'  synthesis  of 
Christianity  and  Aristotelianism  could  have  lacked 
forerunners.  And  if  it  had  forerunners  this  implies 
that  there  were  other  Samaritans  who  had  themselves 
learned  Hellenistic  philosophy.  The  probability, 
therefore,  is  that  the  Samaritan  community  of  which 
....  . 
1.  II  Apolo1y  10 
a 436  - 
Margah  was  a  member  had  a  developed  philosophical 
tradition  by  the  time  Margah  came  to  write  the  Atemar. 
In  that  case  we  do  not  need  to  suppose  that  in  order 
to  study  philosophy  Margah  had  to  leave  his 
community. 
N 
Secondlya  Margah's  hymns,  which,  as  we  have  seen, 
contain  many  concepts  characteristic  of  Hellenistic 
philosophy,  were  accepted  for  inclusion  in  the 
Defter,  the  Samaritan  Book  of  Common  Prayer.  If  we 
suppose  there  not  to  have  been  a  Hellenistic 
philosophical  tradition  in  his  community,  we  would 
have  to  suppose  that  community  to  have  been  so  docile, 
or  so  unattached  to  tradition  as  to  be  willing  to 
swallow  large  quantities  of  an  alien  philosophy 
without  the  benefit  of  preparations,  If  it  be  replied 
that  in  Nargah's  hands  Hellenistic  philosophy  did  not 
0 
seem  alien,  then  it  must  be  asked  whether  it  is 
plausible  to  suppose  that  he  could  have  accomplished 
so  difficultatask  as  an  unobtrusive  harmonisation  of 
Samaritanism  and  Hellenistic  philosophy  without 
drawing  upon  the  experience  of  others. 
In  the  face  of  these  considerations  I  wish  to 
present  as  a  further  thesis  that  Marqah,  in  writing 
the  Memar,  was,  in  all  probability,  drawing  upon 
philosophical  ideas  that  formed  part  of  . the  cultural 
ethos  of  the  Samaritan  community.  "  It  is  a  mItter  for 437 
conjecture  whether  there  was  a  school  of  philosophy 
in  Shechem,  in  the  4th  century  Samaritan  renaissance 
under  Baba  Rabba,  but  I  hope  I  have  established  the 
probability  that  a  good  deal  of  philosophising  was 
in  progress  in  the  Samaritan  community  during  that 
period. 
If  I  am  correct,  then,  a  survey  of  4th  century 
Palestine  that  omits  reference  to  Samaritan 
Hellenistic  philosophy  ignores  a  remarkable  aspect 
of  Palestinian  cultural  life. 
I  like  to  think  that  I  have  also  shown  that. 
Marqah's  philosophy  deserves  to  be  read  for  the  sake 
of  the  philosophical  insights  it  affords.  Had  Margah 
written  in  Greek,  and  not  in  Samaritan  Aramaic,  he 
would  surely  have  found  a  niche  long  ago  in  standard 
histories  of  philosophy. 
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